


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
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# The Harvard theological review

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**THE  
HARVARD  
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW**

**VOLUME VI**



**ISSUED QUARTERLY BY**

**THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, J. H. Ropes, and Rev. Frederic Palmer.

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## *Editorial Committee*

GEORGE F. MOORE

WILLIAM W. FENN

JAMES H. ROPES

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The *Harvard Theological Review* is an undenominational theological quarterly, established by the aid of the bequest of Miss Mildred Everett, daughter of Reverend Charles Carroll Everett, D.D., Bussey Professor of Theology in the Harvard Divinity School, 1869-1900, and Dean of the School, 1878-1900.

The Review aims to include discussions in the various fields of theological study and also in the history of religions, ethics, education, economics, and sociology, in their theological and religious aspects. It is designed to serve the needs not only of clergymen and scholars, but of all who are interested in religious thought and in the place and function of religion in modern life.

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VI

JANUARY, 1913

NUMBER 1

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## *THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF RELIGION*

HENRY S. NASH

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE

To attempt in these days a definition of religion may seem like taking a wanton risk of intellectual confusion. Even a rough classification of religions is difficult. The mass of data is so vast, the varieties of religion so manifold, that no sooner has a scheme of classification established itself than it begins to sag under the weight of material thrown upon it. The old schemes which hinged on a fixed distinction between the religion of the Bible and all religions outside the pale of Biblical revelation, succeeded by dint of excluding a large part of the phenomena. But, as things are with us, no classification is better than a working hypothesis into which, as a constituent element, enters the knowledge of its own mortality.

If classification is difficult, definition would seem to be perilous. Its chances of success turn largely on its narrowness. And by narrowness it pleads guilty to a mishandling of the facts involved, sacrificing thoroughness to clearness. The student of religion, in case he has a grudge to fatten, might almost say, "Oh that mine enemy would publish a definition!"

Yet the mass of data which render definition perilous also make it necessary. The definition may be imperfect; still, it is a help to clearer thinking. And every attempt at definition presupposes a straight question brought to bear, with varying degrees of precision, on the phenomena which at the same moment invite and resist analysis.

In our day the need of definition is imperious. A rapidly

increasing body of facts, gathered from the four corners of the world, is being pressed on our attention. If one has any real speculative interest in religion as a factor in the world's life, and if he desires to be an intelligent reader, then, no matter how vehemently he may disclaim any attempt at a science of religion, he must have a provisional definition to give direction to his reading. Otherwise, he will surely fall a victim to a series of impressions, more or less vivid, but lacking continuity.

Apart from the need personal to us as intelligent readers is the larger need of our generation. The definitions which we have inherited sprang from times of transition and crisis. One set belongs to the period that witnessed the establishment of Christianity in the Mediterranean world. The local, ancestral religions had broken down and defaulted. The times demanded a universal religion. Greek philosophy compelled earnest men to reflect on the nature of religion as a whole, and the result was a set of definitions.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries similar causes have produced similar results, though they are on a much larger scale. Dogma has lost its grip on reason. Authority has let slip its hold on the will. The religious consciousness has broken away from its own past. The rise of the modern state and the exploration of the universe have put forward objects of interest which lay claim to the full attention of earnest people. At the same time all parts of the earth have come into touch with one another, and, since the lines of distinction between the religion of the Bible and all other religions are no longer clear and convincing, the great debate of the world's religions has for the first time in history honestly begun. Now if one is to enter that debate with any hope of a sincere and effective give-and-take, he must have a working definition. Define, then, the student must,—even though, as under a certain law in ancient Athens, he makes the attempt with a rope round his neck.

The title chosen for this paper is of some significance, at least for the writer. Should it read the "essence" or the "nature" of religion? In strict logic, there is no distinction between the terms. But logic and usage have different standards. Books like Harnack's *Essence of Christianity* suggest that the term "essence"

is more objective than "nature," and that it has, moreover, a stronger tendency to raise questions regarding the metaphysical or historical contents of this or that religious view of the universe. The word "nature," on the other hand, is more subjective, and has a stronger tendency towards questions such as: How does the religious element within consciousness differ from the other elements which enter into it? how is the religious element related to the other elements? and what is the taste it leaves in the mouth? So the best working title is "The Nature and Definition of Religion."

In searching for a definition, our method is prescribed to us by the nature of the subject. Not in the experience of the individual but in the experience of the race are we to conduct our investigation. For in no field is Cicero's "*unus homo nullus homo*" quite so plain as in the fields of religion. We must, therefore, seek our end in the history of religion; and the history must be taken in its totality. Fetichism belongs to it no less than the highest form of the Christian consciousness. No other method is safe. More than one of the definitions which have been put forward, while springing from the depths of an individual need or even from the need of a generation of men, have missed the mark by reason of the restricted area of feeling and tendency which they include. A definition inspired by the needs of a particular age or a particular circle, however vital and impassioned it may be, is in danger of forgetting a great deal that needs to be remembered. The excluding power of passion is in proportion to its intensity.

The danger is at its height in the case of the modern student, deeply self-conscious, more or less widely detached from some things which the man who lived deep in antiquity would have set down as vitally important. Just once in history has an individual appeared who acted as though he were the "author of himself," knowing "no other kin"; and that was in the eighteenth century. It is true that the eighteenth-century individual no longer has credit. Indeed, so far as appearances go, he is dead and buried. But a period so extraordinary is deeply symptomatic, leaving behind it influences that strongly mould thought long after its public credit has vanished.

We may safely venture to say that there are three questions, and three alone, that have vitally interested all sorts and conditions of men from the beginning of historic time. These are the food question, the sex question, and the religious question. Other things, such as culture, philosophy, science, and art, have been the specialties of one or another class of men, of this or that period of history, of such and such parts of the earth. But these three questions have touched the race always and everywhere, and touched it to the quick.

Therefore the contemporary individual is in danger of over-weighting certain elements in his own consciousness, while under-weighting elements which at another time and place may be of prime importance. "More water floweth by the mill than wots the miller of." The student must ally himself closely to the ancients. For it is evident that universal history believes in the division of labor on a vast scale. Antiquity did the pioneer's work that has made history possible. The State was founded; civilization was achieved. And the work done by religion in this field is essential to a clear insight into the nature of religion as an historical force. The result is that antiquity, where religion operated under conditions extremely unlike the specializing conditions of our time, is most important in any large consideration of our subject. It is a well-known law in psychological study that close attention to the phenomena of one's own inner consciousness is apt to dissipate the phenomena under investigation. One must catch himself off guard, peep through the keyhole at himself, above all must see himself writ large in society and history, in order to know to the fullest extent the fact or tendency in question. Even so is it in the field of religion. The modern must guard himself against the risk of excluding from consideration things which may not be apprehended by the reflective individual as needful and yet to the nation and the race have primary worth and supreme significance.

Before we study the history of religion at large, it seems advisable to review briefly both the definitions which we have inherited and the ones now current. The review may prepare us for deeper insight into history.

The first group of definitions was published in the Roman

empire, being in connection with the destruction of the old religion and the spread and triumph of the new. Speaking roughly, two causes worked together in the process of destruction. The first was the widening polity of the ancient world. Many nations were dragged inside one pale. Local religions, incompetent to handle the widening and deepening relationships of humanity, fell into discredit. The enlargement of social obligations called for a larger conception of life and of its unseen foundations. The second cause was philosophical criticism upon inherited customs and convictions. But philosophy itself was eventually sucked into a stream of tendency which ended by making necessary a view of things flushed with the passion and primary feeling that philosophy by itself could not supply.

First in order of time is the view of Lucretius, which so deeply influenced later thought, and which is compactly expressed in the often-quoted words of Petronius (Fragm. xxvii, 1 B), "*Primus in orbe timor fecit deos.*" One striking illustration of its influence is found in Virgil's lines (Georg. ii, 490 ff.):

*Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,  
Atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum  
Subjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.*

Lucretius built his conception of religion on Epicurus. In its first meaning it applies mainly to the individual, and it was in that sense that Lucretius designed it. The object of philosophy is deliverance from the fears and terrors which beset and besiege the soul of the uncultivated man, driving him into the open arms of superstition. But, as Hobbes showed long ago and as Professor Palmer has recently suggested (in *The Field of Ethics*), Lucretius' conception has a wider meaning than he was clearly aware of. Beyond all question there is a profound truth in it. A quotation from Hume, discussing the origin of religion, is in point:

We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want, which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes*, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and, while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by our anxious expectation

of events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire dependence.

In antiquity, before philosophy and science had shaped the conception of the universe as an organism of law, religion was the sole sanctuary from the fears that besiege consciousness on every side. Religion, and religion alone, could overcome the terrors of the unknown. At this point the religious history of Babylonia is profoundly significant. Here was shaped that system of augury which enabled the ancient world to find helpful meaning in the happenings of life. Here, too, on a higher plane than augury, was elaborated and published that body of knowledge and fancy which we call primitive astronomy or astrology, whose aim was to give men foresight of the future, thus robbing it of its power to terrorize consciousness. In one sense or another Lucretius' idea is deeply true. Ancient religion is inseparable from the beginnings of civilization, and not merely from its beginnings but from some of its most considerable achievements. From one point of view civilization is a system of insurance on a vast scale. And the function of religion, as an organic part of antiquity, was to insure men against the perils and dread of the unknown. Lucretius himself stood in a contemptuous attitude toward religion. He was playing for his own hand, seeking the individual's peace of mind. He did not undertake to explain the moral foundations of states and the ultimate grounds of political obligation. But his words go deeper and wider than his intention. Not only was it true in the beginnings of the religious consciousness that fear largely controlled and shaped the course of religious feeling. It is still true. The relation between the known and the unknown tracts of being and meaning is the ultimate spring of abiding religion.

Yet the definition, when put forward as final and exclusive, is seen to be impossible. A larger experience, a widening consciousness relation with the nature of things, discloses the fact that in the course of history fear ceases to be the prime motive of religious action and becomes the medium, or a part of the medium, through which the ultimate reality makes itself known to men.

Next in order of time is Cicero's definition (*De natura deorum*,

ii, 28): "Religion (*relegere*) is the art of collecting the deeper meanings out of multitudinous religious customs." The words themselves are on the surface of the subject. But in fairness to Cicero we must put them in the context of his life. He was an eclectic, and his eclecticism suggested an etymology which is practically impossible. But a man's etymologies are not the measure of his truths. Behind Cicero's eclecticism stood philosophical monotheism with its inspiring ideals of self-knowledge and of the unity and coherence of all knowledge in the idea of God. Thus taken, in its suggestion rather than in its mistaken etymological sense, the definition contains an element of value. Like the view of Lucretius, the suggestion goes deeper than the words, and points toward the Aristotelian and Kantian doctrine of the saving unity of thought in its relation to the unity of God. It deserves more consideration than recent students have condescended to give it. But a glance at the history of religion is enough to cashier it, if it attempts to become anything more than a constituent element within a larger total.

Last in order of time, but most significant of all the ancient definitions, is the one given by Lactantius (*Inst.* iv, 28). Criticising Cicero's definition he says: "The name of religion is derived from the bond (*religare*) of piety, because God has *tied* man to himself and *bound* him by piety, for we must serve him as a master, and be obedient to him as a father." Lactantius' etymology is probably correct. But etymological correctness is a small part of the value in the definition, which goes very deep indeed into the nature of religion both in the ancient and the modern worlds. Let the student read Plutarch's lives of Lycurgus and Numa, Fustel de Coulanges' *Ancient City*, and Wissowa's *Religion und Cultus der Römer*. Let him in connection therewith study the use of the Old Testament canon, considering it under the aspect of law. He shall then see how near Lactantius comes to the deepest meaning of religion in antiquity. Now, as has been said, the modern student must take antiquity's teaching deeply to heart. Thanks to our distinction between church and state and the resultant division of labor, we are poorly equipped for insight into the part played by religion in founding and developing the state. It is not until one has reflected on the grounds



of civic obligation, and has carried that question into its contemporary position inside the "social question," that he is in a condition to pass judgment on the definition of Lactantius. And it is a serious criticism on the moderns that they have so lightly passed it by. For example, Hagenbach (*Theologische Encyclopädie*, § 12) carelessly dismisses it with two lines of fine print.

The explanation of this cursory treatment is found in the personal equation of the moderns. Along with the distinction between church and state go tendencies of culture which mark off a certain tract of experience as the only territory over which religious judgments run, while outside lies a widening tract within which religion consciously lays its hand on its mouth. Authoritative in one clearly defined field, in an adjacent field it lacks even the right of speech.

Each of the definitions thus far considered is suggestive. Two of them are extremely valuable. And all three lie close to that period in the history of the race wherein religion has done, so far, its greatest work. We moderns should not take ourselves too seriously. Particularly should we be on our guard against contemporaneity. It may be that ahead of us lies a constructive period in religion for which the critical work of our time is a preliminary. We must have a care lest the distinctions of function which we have achieved at so great a cost, and which are proportionately dear to us, shall lead us to separate things which prove to be more deeply related the more clearly they are distinguished.

We now turn to a set of definitions having a very different color. To prepare ourselves to understand them, we must take careful account of the conditions under which they have taken shape. First, then, let us go back to the eighteenth century, out of which we have been digged. Something quite foreign to antiquity now appears. In the recoil from the dogma of infallibility in all its power, the rejection of religion is put on higher grounds than those on which the ancient skeptics stood. It is in the interest of the state, in the interest of a higher moral law, in order to draw attention away from the world beyond and to fix it on the world of citizenship, that religious authority is so passionately rejected. As a consequence, religion is subjected to

a far more persistent and searching examination than it has ever received before.

Secondly, the individual and his rights become the all-absorbing theme. In antiquity the individual hardly existed. Even in Greece philosophy was largely the affair of a circle or a school, a kind of philosophic family. But in the modern period the individual in full armor leaps into the lists. Religion, if he concerns himself with it at all, is a highly personal affair. Now with the great gains accruing from this position both to vital religion and social morality we are not here concerned. It is the results of the position and mental action of this well-nigh elaborately self-conscious individual, when he sets himself to defining religion, that concern us. And it is easily seen that the situation is almost antipodal to that of antiquity.

Thirdly, science not only takes on a form which throws the achievements of the ancients into the shade, but—what is much more to our purpose—science becomes popular, profoundly affecting the common consciousness. This democratic aspect of science finds almost no analogy in the Mediterranean world, where science was the prerogative of a very small circle, having no popular spread worth speaking of.

Fourthly, in connection with science stands the immensely important idea of evolution, in so far as it bears on ethics and upon systems of idealism. Darwin, in his study of earth-worms, says that mental inability to appreciate the prodigious effects of small causes persistently working over a wide tract of time is the greatest obstacle in the way of scientific advancement. We may apply his thought to the study of idealism in its history and in its methods. Thanks to the idea of evolution, the idealizing man can keep his footing on the earth under a strain that would either have broken down his idealizing kinsman in antiquity (debasement into a worldling) or else, in the fear of moral bankruptcy, have driven him into open and confessed religion. The modern idealist, on the contrary, filled with his great conception of orderly progress and content with small gains slowly but steadily accumulating, is less apt to fall into the conscious need of religion.

Finally, the modern nation has come on the field. In antiquity

church and state were identified. For many centuries after the break-down of ancient culture and law the church was supreme over the state. Now the state is supreme. And however great may be the amount of actual and potential religion within the state, yet there is here in view a wide field of idealizing activities more or less distinct, even if not separated, from the consciously and deliberately religious method for insuring the ideal interests of society.

The upshot of all the distinctively modern conditions is that religion can be held aloof from the nobler and more earnest spirits to a degree impossible in the ancient world. And along with this is given the possibility both of a far more restricted area of feeling for religion to cover and of a more searching analysis of the individual's conscious relation to it.

The first of the modern definitions in the order of time is that of Kant. It stands in connection with his position in the history of philosophy. His function therein was to grasp clearly the scientific conception of the universe on the one hand, and on the other to assert the principle of moral freedom. One can understand him only by beginning with Thales and coming up to him through Greek philosophy and the history of Christianity. When Western philosophy began its career it had no clear conception of consciousness. Mind and nature were fused. Slowly the idea of inanimate nature and a self-conscious human reason were distinguished. But the distinction came very slowly. The Stoics plainly show that, in spite of Plato and Aristotle, Mind had great difficulty in distinguishing itself from Nature. The turn of the road was made by Neoplatonism and Christianity. Here the modern idea of self-consciousness first clearly appears. But at the same time the scientific conception of the universe shaped by Alexandrian thought is practically submerged by the religious and poetical imagination, so that the full consequences of the doctrine of self-consciousness could not manifest themselves. But in Kant the two things come into direct collision. In this respect he is a deeply representative modern. The conception of self-consciousness in its originating and initiating capacity is developed with revolutionary decision and completeness. But it is no part of a mystical view of the universe. On the contrary,

the scientific view of nature is entertained in all its strength. Out of the shock and collision of these two elements comes Kant's idea of religion.

The right of religion to exist and to thrive in a world of thinking men can be made good only within the precincts of the practical reason. That is to say, the man who is a scientist with all his mental being while with all his moral and social being he believes in freedom—that is, man's ability to become what he longs to be—must, in order to keep his footing, get help from a religious view of the unseen universe, its resources and its tendencies. Pure reason cannot save him from the death-grip of cosmic necessity. The philosopher and the charcoal-burner must tread the same path. The practical reason, which we may describe in technical language as man's compelling need to take high views of his capacity and destiny and to insist upon his right to such views, whatever may be the gainsaying evidence of his senses and of nature—the practical reason takes the place of the pure reason. But the practical reason cannot continue to exist and grow strong without religion. And the essence of religion is an act of faith, or creative self-assertion, in which the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality are given to man with authoritative conviction, and through which his destiny as a moral being who is in search of the inseparable goods of virtue and happiness is made certain and secure. Religion is identical with high and efficient morality.

It is for this reason that the Kantian definition has been most widely criticised. Religion cannot be identified with morality. The poet has quite as much to say about the matter in hand as has the moralist. The artist has quite as much authority as the philosopher. The man of religion, borne on a tide of fresh and joyous emotion, refuses to shut himself up inside Kant's definition. But the bulk of criticism on Kant has gone wide of the mark. Kant's definition, like those of Lucretius and Cicero, should be taken in its drift and tendency, not confined to its literal statement and scope. Take it as meaning that religion is the means whereby man triumphantly asserts, in the face of nature, his high calling and large future, and it is profoundly true. Not only does our own experience prove it. It is proved

also by the entire history of religion. The real flaw in Kant's definition lies deeper. His unit of thought and feeling is the eighteenth-century individual. The social relations of thought hang loose upon him. The result is that his connection with the vast bulk of religious feeling that has put itself on record is vague and uncertain.

Schleiermacher is quite as typical in the religious field as is Kant in the field of philosophy. In him two elements blend. In part he is a deeply metaphysical head. In part—and here he differs from Kant—he is a man of intense and vital religious emotion. Religion with Kant is an auxiliary to morality. With Schleiermacher it is an end in itself. The pith of religion is the inrush and uprush of feeling which flushes consciousness with an eager and joyous sense of solidarity with the unseen world. In this view Schleiermacher discloses his connection with the romanticism which on the one hand revolted against the tyranny of eighteenth-century intelligibility and common sense, and on the other protested with equal vehemence against the conventional. Romantic feeling was tortured by the contrast between the world one lives in and the world one longs for. The passion for the infinite, cabined and confined within stale but invincible customs—that is the theme of romantic literature. Schleiermacher shared deeply in the movement. It gave force and edge to his temperamental capacity for emotional self-surrender to the mystery of things. At the same time he takes from Kant the depreciatory estimate of the competence of reason. Defining religion in terms of pure feeling and in clear distinction from Kant's moralizing definition on one side and from the traditional credal view on the other, he shaped that conception which has precipitated all modern tendencies towards definition and with which every student must settle his account.

“Religion is the feeling of absolute dependence upon the First Cause of life.” Two elements in the statement should be noted. First, religion is neither knowledge nor action, but feeling. Knowledge and action inevitably follow, but, abstraction being necessary for clearness, they are seen to be distinct from its essence. Historically, they are always in connection with it. Logically, they may be and must be distinguished, though not sepa-

rated. Secondly, religious feeling differs from other forms of feeling by its absoluteness. It is closely akin to aesthetic emotion and, in truth, to all those forms of primary emotion, such as patriotism, which carry a man outside himself and enable him joyously to identify himself with an order of things stretching far beyond his largest thought and purpose. But all other forms of primary emotion leave a man standing in his world with a stronger or weaker sense of freedom. Religious feeling, on the contrary, throws men at the feet of the Almighty. The consciousness of freedom is no constituent part of it. Its distinguishing quality is the sense of absolute dependence. And when it is analyzed and a theological system results, the one aim of dogmatics is to make manifest to reason God's part in the making of men.

This definition lies at the very heart of religion. That is beyond question. In contrast with Kant, Schleiermacher rightly conceives religion as the deepest source of primary and plenary emotion. It is the soul's vitalizing contact with an ultimate reality too vast for conscious thought to grasp or conscious purpose to put into specific actions. And, in opposition to the credal and intellectualistic view of faith, it rightly shifts the centre of gravity to first-hand experience. Yet the definition has some serious faults. For one thing, the term "feeling" has too many entangling alliances to be largely usable. Schleiermacher takes pains to show that knowing and doing are historically inseparable from feeling. But he does not succeed. The world of feeling is related to the world of meaning and action somewhat as, in the romantic view of things, the sense of the infinite relates itself to the actual constitution of society. The term "feeling" inevitably leads to misunderstanding and misstatement. Schleiermacher, however, insists on the term, and by his insistence lays bare a deeper flaw in his view. When he comes to systematic theology, God in his essence draws apart from God in his attributes. In other words, the essential being of God is loosely, not organically, related to the universe. The core of deity shrinks from history. Schleiermacher's idea of God is substantially one with that of the mystics from Plotinus to Boehme.

A further consequence is that the individual saint is loosely related to the spiritual community within which he has his being. This comes out in the exposition of the difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. In the former, it is affirmed, the individual's relationship to the church is mediated through his relationship to Christ, while in the latter his relationship to Christ is mediated through his relationship to the church. Now there is, of course, a considerable element of truth in the statement. But, taken as a final statement, this does not hold water. Put it alongside of the New Testament, that is, test it by the religious experience of the men who founded the Christian community, and its tendency is plainly seen. It is the reflection of an individual who has never done any creative social work of any kind. Brandes says with point (*Main Currents*, iii, p. 256): "Schleiermacher . . . is of opinion that the only hope for religion lies in surrendering all the outworks and leading it back to the inmost stronghold, the purely personal feeling of the individual." We are still within the eighteenth century. We are not wholly rid of Robinson Crusoe. Now, as a matter of fact, the religious individual cannot deeply know or master himself save in the fellowship of his peers. Relationship is as deep in him as his nature. And the God of the community reveals himself within and through the community, as being of like nature. Relationship is as deep in God as the divine being. Therefore Schleiermacher's definition, indispensable as it is to the clearing of our heads, is faulty. And its faults have a common root, a lack of intimacy between the soul and the historical process within which its fortune is made or lost.

The most widely current definition of our time is the result of the Ritschelian movement. Once more the conditions should be carefully noted. Philosophy in Germany has fallen from her high estate. Trendelenburg said jestingly, but with biting truth, that after Hegelianism had run its course, Germany resembled a man who had gone on a prolonged spree, and, waking up with a splitting headache, resolved to drink no more. This condition of philosophical thought is even more significant than the state of things to which Kant applied Ovid's lines on Hecuba in the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique*:



*Modo maxima rerum,  
Tot generis natisque potens, . . . nunc trahor exul, inops.*

For now a rival interest has taken possession of consciousness. Science has become dominant. Metaphysical thought is quite out of fashion. So Kant's antithesis between natural necessity and moral freedom is more in place than in his own time. Tennyson's lines,

Are God and nature then at strife,  
That nature lends such evil dreams?

have given to the modern situation enduring expression. Strauss, in the Introduction to his *Glaubenslehre*, described another aspect of the situation when he said that the controversy between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism had become a relatively unimportant thing, the supreme issue lying between the Christian view of life and science.

In vital connection with Ritschl's work stand the beginnings of that great movement which resulted in a united and triumphant Germany. Positive and practical things began to take hold of Teutonic consciousness with convincing power. Thanks to the political and the scientific cause together, the academic world of Kant and Hegel passed away. Furthermore, high philosophy passed out of Hegelianism into socialism. Feuerbach is a typical figure. Strauss travelled the same road. Socialism began the career which has ended in our own day in its practically supplanting the established Protestant faith in Germany. The total result is that idealizing thought is more and more driven out of metaphysics. The pride of philosophy is completely humbled. Abandoning Hegel's ground, she returns to the position of Kant's second Preface. If idealism is to be saved, it must be by another method than that of high speculation. Only through the practical, or moral, reason can the cause of idealism be secured.

A very interesting illustration is found in the new base for the doctrine of freedom. Kant had grounded it in thought, by means of the distinction between the empirically and the transcendently real. But Ritschl frankly abandons that ground. The sole sanction, he thinks, of the individual's freedom is the freedom of society, the enduring possibility of betterment. We build the

stronghold of our faith in the individual's freedom in the space lying between society as it is and society as it is to be (*Science and Metaphysics*, part 2, chap. 3). Whatever one may think about the permanent value of this position, there can be no doubt regarding its contemporary significance. The social ideal controls all things, even metaphysics.

Under these conditions Ritschelianism, harking back to Kant in philosophy and to Luther in religion, and staking everything on the possibility of freeing the religious consciousness from the interference and intrusion of metaphysics, forms its definition. From Schleiermacher it takes the conception of religion as that form of feeling which entirely transcends finite conditions; but it avoids his left-handed marriage with mysticism. Religion is a working conviction, supreme amongst the judgments of worth. By means of it man secures his position in the universe, maintains his freedom against the perilous siege of natural necessity, and insures his self-respect. Schleiermacher made much of the Biblical idea of the kingdom of God. Owing, however, to the other elements in his system, he could not do it full justice. In Ritschelianism it becomes the centre of a system. Religion is the form of feeling which secures a man in his conviction that human life as a whole can be moralized.

In a small way, our study of definitions proves the truth of the saying that the history of the world is the world's judgment-seat. For the last definition reached is the most comprehensive. It retains what is valuable in Kant's position without losing the vitalizing sense of personal religion which distinguishes Schleiermacher. Beyond question it comes from the very depths of personal and social need in our time. But its form of statement suffers from excessive contemporaneity. May not the essence of it be put in a way which shall smack less strongly of the philosophically trained modern?

There are other definitions more or less current in our day which are too highly specialized to detain us. For example, Max Müller defines religion as the sense of the Infinite. This will appeal to us in proportion to our poetical and philosophical culture. But it is too largely the birth of our own time to yield itself to a wide historical application. And our review of the inherited and

the modern definitions strengthens the belief that the hope of reaching a sound and comprehensive conception is bound up with a study of the religious consciousness when it is at work on a large scale. So alone can we keep clear of excessive emphasis on the mood of an individual or a generation. We must build our definition into the history of religion.

Marshall, in his *Principles of Economics* (vol. i, p. 1), says that "the two great forming agencies of the world have been the religious and the economic." The truth of his words is seen with great clearness in the founding of states. Civilization, understood in the deepest sense, is the power of co-operative labor—co-operation in terms of space, so that large masses of men are trained to work and to fight as a unit; co-operation in terms of time, the building of a continuous memory, so that an increasing purpose is apprehended and appropriated by successive generations. The problem of early civilization is in part the successful transition to artificial food-production on a large scale and to the means of defence whereby a settled agricultural population maintains itself against attack. And, in equal measure, the problem is to maintain friendly relations with the unseen forces and powers which beset human intelligence and purpose more and more insistently as consciousness deepens and the range of activity is increased. The economic and the religious agencies are, in the long run, inseparable. Working together, they founded and shaped ancient civilization.

We may take Chaldaea as a typical case and Babylon—one of the four cities that have most deeply affected the mind and the manners of men—as a typical path-making community. The cultus, or worship, is the life-blood of the state; under one form it manifests itself as primitive prayer, prayer being inseparable from magic. There are certain fixed forms of words which, when joined to certain symbolical actions, grasp and hold fast the invisible agencies of the world, and thus insure to human purpose a right of way through the unseen portions of the universe. Under another form the cultus manifests itself as sacrifice. The psychological basis of sacrifice is found in the fact that by means of it man brings his strongest power of attention to bear upon the unknown forces that beset him. This stands out plainly in

the prerogative cases of the ancient cultus, such as Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia, Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, Mesha's sacrifice of his eldest son, and Epimenides' sacrifice of two noble young Athenians in order to cleanse and absolve the conscience of Athens. When in dire need and under well-nigh fatal strain, man devoted his most precious possession to the invisible powers. His sacrifice is an act of piercing attention to the unseen world. And through the prodigious exercise of will a response to human need is wrung from the resources of that world.

Under another form the cultus manifests itself as the common feast. Robertson Smith has proved in a masterly way that this is profoundly characteristic of the higher forms of tribal communities. Hearne in his *Aryan Household*, Fustel de Coulanges in *The Ancient City*, and Maine in *Ancient Law* together prove that it perpetuated itself in many ways long after a number of tribal communities had merged into a real state. Through the common meal or festival and the joyous uprush of common feeling to which it gave rise, men were strengthened in their consciousness of collective power. At the same time their sense of solidarity with the unseen powers was proportionately deepened. Thus, to use a formula in favor with those ancient folk, they "quieted the heart." Out of this situation sprang that primitive conception of the covenant between God and man which is one of the fundamental ideas of the race and which asserts its influence clear through the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. And it was an unhappy chance in the history of words that gave us "Testament" instead of "Covenant" as the name for our Bible.

Finally, the cultus discloses its power by conferring insight into the unknown. The system of augury which draws out of omens of many kinds a convincing knowledge of impending things is in full evidence at this point. And in closest connection with it, though far higher in moral range and mental promise, is the astrology by means of which man enabled himself to read confidently the book of the future in the light of the "secret influence" of the stars.

Through all these causes in co-operation, hallowed by immemorial usage, beaten by rigid custom into an incongruous yet sacramental unity, man attained his first working hypothesis

regarding an authoritative disclosure of the ultimate force or will. And thus he solved for a time that most difficult of all problems, the problem of law.

From Babylon, regarded as a typical city, we may derive certain features or characteristics of religion when it is laboring on the most heroic of human tasks, the founding and grounding of society. Advanced civilization, with its highly developed specializations of function, conceals or slurs over some things which here lie in plain sight. To the student of the beginnings of civilization it is quite clear that religion is to be viewed as the supreme form of self-assertion on man's part. The underlying reason for the connection between the economic and the religious forces of history lies in the fact that they constitute the supreme form of the struggle for existence. As civilization advances and character deepens, the struggle is waged on higher levels. But always and everywhere it is one and the same battle. Through religion man asserts himself in the face and even in the teeth of adverse circumstances, asserts himself with self-convincing power, maintains his dignity and pride and so insures his efficiency.

The method through which this self-assertion and this self-insurance are wrought out is, on the social side, deepening common feeling. Religion here manifests itself as the final form of common consciousness. In our own time there are other forms of common feeling, such as fervid patriotism and social sympathy, which seem to put themselves forward as rivals of religious feeling. But a thorough analysis shows that a religious element is hidden within them, and that it is due to temporary conditions and causes that this implicitly religious equality of deep and wide common consciousness does not become explicit.

On the side of the cultus or system of public and private worship, the method is a symbolical and sacramental connection with the unseen world. The primitive sacrament takes on many forms. But in every one of them, just as plainly as in the most refined and spiritualized conception of the Lord's Supper, the object aimed at—and attained, if the sacrament be sacramentally apprehended—is the solidarity between the seen and the unseen parts of an indivisible universe.

It is a single indivisible world with which antiquity deals.

The familiar saying that there is no supernatural in Homer applies to the whole field of antiquity. There is no supernatural because there is no scientific conception of nature. Our terminology relating to the supernatural has grown out of the alliance between the Bible on the one hand and a philosophy and science on the other which in their origin and early stages of development came from a source wholly outside the Bible. Antiquity had an indivisible universe to deal with. There was no supernatural—but there was an over-world fully as real as the visible world. And with this over-world religion put man on terms of intimacy. The wider the view of life, the more largely was this over-world conceived, and the greater became the range and steadiness of motive. On the low level of fetichism human motive is narrow in its range. When states are founded, the range is vastly widened, and at the same time the personal and social will gain proportionately in steadiness. But the end of religion remains the same. It is man's final and fundamental act of self-assertion in terms of the unseen and unknown realities into which he peers with hope and dread. The religious method is social on the one side and on the other sacramental. The result in terms of emotion is the certainty of strengthening, saving connection with forces mightier than man. And sympathetic insight into these forces—practical confidence in their eventual workings—is the ultimate aim.

These characteristics of religion take on diverse forms when the religious consciousness advances to problems far removed from the bread-and-butter questions and the club-law of primitive social order. But the diversity of form does not alter the identity of purpose. The decisive change is effected when soul and body are clearly distinguished in thought, and when, later on, the soul succeeds in claiming for itself a kind of reality superior to the reality of the body. India takes the place of Babylon as the typical or prerogative case. Now the most significant fact in the religious history of India is that political relationship and political responsibility did not succeed in imposing themselves on the deepest religious consciousness as matters of primary religious obligation. The saintly soul, with a logic of consummate precision and beauty, thinks away, or volatilizes, the reality

of that order of things within which the state lives and moves and has its being. An intense and compelling "otherworldliness" becomes the order of the day.

This gives us another note of ancient religion. When civilization has gone so far that for a certain number of men the pressure of practical problems either ceases altogether or perceptibly lightens, and when, standing foot-loose towards many forms of obligation which held all men in the earlier days with an iron grip, these privileged men go deep into their own natures in search of some easement beneath "the heavy and the weary weight" of an "unintelligible world," they inevitably become "otherworldly." Their otherworldliness may take the form of the Buddhist nirvana or the heaven of the mediaeval saint. But the aim is one. All religions that have gone any considerable distance beyond the tribal polity and the tribal theology have pursued it. The real world is taken to be vastly larger than the world that is seen. And in this unseen yet real order of things the interests of the soul are invested.

Still, though the methods whereby the soul seeks its ends may differ widely from the methods of primitive religion, the result is the same—namely, successful self-assertion against the discounts and belittlings of unkindly circumstances and contemptuous death. Moreover, while methods differ, at bottom there is an identity in method. It consists in establishing a sympathetic relationship between the known and the unknown, between the facts of reality open to every-day experience and the reality outlying and inaccessible, so that the mind discovers an asylum where fear cannot touch it, and finds, in the heart of agitation, an abiding peace.

The religious experience of Israel, as recorded in the Old Testament, has a unique value, and for three reasons. First, because we have here a kind of religion that moves towards universalism not, as in India, by invalidating the historical life of the race, but by imposing on history a moral purpose and prescribing for it a moral end. Secondly, because the individual, while acquiring a deeper and deeper knowledge of himself and setting on the individual life an ever-increasing value, keeps himself in close contact with the common consciousness of his nation. Thirdly,



because the Old Testament, while on the surface it is a book of mediation and compromise and fuses the genius of primitive Semitic religion with the genius of Prophetism, has in its deepest being a logic of life which demands the Christian interpretation of history.

The prophet, building on the foundations common to the Semites, shaped a new form of idealism. His supreme good is in the most intimate connection with the destiny of his nation. The unity of God and the unity of Israel, the eternal being of God and the indestructibility of Israel, are for him correlative conceptions. He does not, as did Aristotle, put history aside as a badly conducted drama. The divine unity with him is not a matter to be apprehended only by severe and continuous thinking. History is viewed as a moral drama moving steadily towards a divine conclusion, and through its turns and issues the being and will of God are revealed. Still less does the prophet, like the Hindu idealist, cashier the political and social will in order to save his soul. The nation's existence and will has so tough a fibre, and he partakes of it so deeply, that his otherworldliness never becomes the otherworldliness of the saintly ascetic. On the contrary, it takes the form of the messianic hope, the impassioned and noble, though narrow, belief in the future of his people.

The prophet takes the primitive religion of the Semites and moralizes it, shifting the centre of gravity from levitical custom and sacrifice to the keeping of the heart. But to the aim of that religion he holds himself true. Taking the primitive conception of a covenant between God and man, he purifies it so that Israel is not thought of as part and parcel of nature, drifting with circumstance, but becomes God's free creation. God is exalted high above circumstances, above the entire frame of nature. And the divine resources are pledged to Israel's preservation. For primitive magic and primitive astronomy the prophet substitutes confidence in the moral character of God. The wizard, the soothsayer, the astrologer, shall have no part in his polity. In their stead comes a deep self-consciousness, within which the unknown powers and forces of nature reveal themselves as the personal will of the God who stakes his very being on Israel's perfecting.

God in his holiness, in his exaltation above nature and history, is the ground and pledge of the high calling of the nation and the individual. In direct proportion to the consciousness of the divine holiness stands the seriousness with which the fact of evil is apprehended. Over against the polity of the true Israel—that is, God's plan for humanity—stands the world, a vast bulk of moral indifference, moral indolence, and downright opposition to the will of God and the well-being of the nation. Between things as they are and things as they ought to be is a gulf so deep and wide that to all appearances it cannot be bridged. But faith in God and in man's capacity to apprehend and obey God bridges the gulf. There is nothing truly real save God's plan for history. By faith man makes that plan his very own. God's will becomes the prophet's own will. He makes the final and supreme act of self-assertion.

Here begins the historical career of our master-word, faith. It has its roots in the soil of lower religions. It inherits the task undertaken by the primitive cultus or ritual. But where ritual fails, faith succeeds. The ritual asserts the solidarity between the seen and unseen worlds in language that the eye can take in, and thereby robs the unknown of its terrors. Faith does the same thing, but after the cultus has reached the limit of its power, after the inner life has asserted and won its rights, after universal history has, so far as all appearances go, vetoed the possibility of national success. Then, refusing to turn aside from the highway of history in order to go off into a monastic retreat, the prophet, his consciousness flushed with the invasive energy of God, his eyes seeing in the crisis of history the promise and potency of divine presence and power, triumphantly asserts and affirms himself. "Faith," Renouvier happily says, "is but the self" (*Psychologie rationnelle*, iii, p. 80). But it is self in the widest and deepest sense, the self that includes the nation and reaches down to the base and bottom of the moral law. Through a supreme act of will and of self-assertion man rises to a hope "that can create from its own wreck the thing it contemplates."

The great value of the New Testament as a book of witness to the nature of religion is due to two causes. One is the fact that it is the literary by-product of the supreme religious revolution.

The self-conscious literary element is found in it, for example, in the Epistle to the Hebrews. But, taken as a whole, it is extraordinarily free from the literary motive. The other cause is its inseparable connection with the Old Testament. It is not a book of mysticism; like the Old Testament itself it is beaten out on the anvil of history. Furthermore, it is a literature produced by a practical and social, not by an academic and speculative, movement. For example, the letters of Paul are drawn from him by crises in the development of the Pauline churches, the literary and speculative impulses are not main causes in his literary activity. Hence the New Testament stands very close to the building of community. To a peculiar degree it is instinct with common feeling and consciousness.

The New Testament, on the external side, carries the logic of prophetism over into explicit universalism. On the internal side it completes the transition from sacrifice to prayer as a method of self-expression. Psychologically considered, prayer is the deepest and intensest form of purpose. It is the will of man hewing his way into the unknown. Hence the connection between prayer and revelation. The divine will meets the high-wrought human will and, opening itself to need, lays bare the secret of self-renewing life. The prayer of the poor, that is, of the consciousness which on the one hand is deeply aware of dire need and on the other hand is dominated by the highest purpose—the prayer of the poor pierces the clouds. The very heart, the fundamental meaning, of the universe imparts itself to the heart of man.

In the thought of revelation we come upon the final note of religion as it discloses itself, when it is doing, in co-operation with economic forces, the world's primary work of grounding and developing the social consciousness. Revelation is the sense of an invasive and pervading energy coming from the deepest source of being. By reason of this energy, which flushes the veins with joyous feeling and imparts to consciousness a radiant certainty of intimacy with the unseen Power, the torment of the unknown is forever allayed, and the problem is solved. What reason and culture cannot do, namely, maintain the unity of life under the strain of increasing difficulty, is triumphantly achieved. Human being and fundamental being are made one.

A necessary consequence is that primary religious experience is accompanied by the consciousness of mystery. What is called common sense deals only with the things that are simple and clear. Vital religion breaks in upon the clear with the consciousness of the infinite. A man's feet are set in a large room. His experiences become spacious, his soul an inlet of divine reality. His reason either ripens or swoons into revelation. Common sense finds itself either allied to the mystical or besieged by it.

It is in connection with revelation as the final characteristic of religion that the idea of God as a personal being comes into full play. The personality of God is the only successful way of vitalizing the entire revealableness of the unseen powers. As individuality strikes its roots deeper while its purpose ranges farther out, as responsibility widens and burdens greaten, two paths are open to the foot. The man who has become greatly individual, in order to attain the satisfaction of his spiritual needs, may go off with the Hindu mystic, and, leaving the social and political order of things to take care of themselves, he may seek his own perfection. Or else, standing fast in his place and duties as a citizen of the visible world, he surrenders himself to a belief in the divine personality. A philosophical, or abstract, conception of ultimate being cannot serve his needs; for pure speculation invariably brings up in the thought of absolute reality as transcending the relations of human consciousness. The one and sole efficient help is found in the fact, or the fancy, of complete revelation. God is a person. His entire being comes into intimate relations with the being of man. The unseen world is found to be, or fancied to be, in perfect sympathy with outreaching and upreaching individuality. The personality of God pledges the resources of the unseen universe to man's attainment of virtue and happiness. The essential nature of religion lies in its authentication of reality. The ultimate, the final, meanings and values are brought within man's reach. "*Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.*" There is the gist of it in a nutshell.

Through the Old Testament the New Testament is kept in vital connection with the religions of antiquity and so fulfils their logic. This may be illustrated by its master-words, the correlative terms "faith" and "kingdom of God." The Book of Deuter-

onomy and the First Epistle of John, read together, will make the point clear. Faith is man's final act of self-assertion. It takes for granted a deep and clear self-consciousness. Only the mature individual can enter deeply into its meaning. But the individual by himself is not the unit of thought and feeling. Faith knows the individual only where he truly knows and finds himself, in the fellowship of his peers. Faith and the kingdom of God are inseparable parts of a single concept. Faith is the final assent, assent to a belief in the perfectibility of man as bottomed on and built upon the being and will of God or the inmost essence and reality of things. It is the strongest form of will; for by means of it a man grips a far distant end of personal and social action. He knows himself and masters himself only in the depth of fellowship. And in that self-same deep of fellowship God reveals Himself, and so overcomes the terrors of the unknown. Not on the mountain-top of the speculator nor in the cell of the monastic saint is given the beatific vision that restores integrity to consciousness, but in the heart of the community. One with his fellows, man feels his oneness with the ultimate will and force. Fear is cast out. The working will, afire with love and aglow with hope, faces the world with unfaltering and unconquerable confidence.

We have run through the history of religions in the period when religion did its most difficult work, when it helped to create states and make civilization possible and at last founded the Christian church—the most comprehensive form of social consciousness, the society that contains the largest store of idealizing energy and the most efficient body of high and penetrating motives. If we compare this work of religion in antiquity with religion in Germany, from which land all the modern definitions of religion have come, we cannot but see a striking difference. In the contemporary situation the field of experience is spaced off and divided. Science has one function and metaphysics another. The state and the church, each deeply self-conscious, are distinct and practically separated. The unit of thought and feeling is the individual, who studies religion from the side of his own need, and who, having gained a clear conception of religion that answers to his needs, then proceeds to include his neighbor within his defini-

tion. He is pretty sure to be strongly influenced by the personal equation of his generation or even of his circle. But we are beginning to suspect that in the deep of the unknown future towards which the economic and social movement, with or without our will, is carrying us, there is hidden a larger and more vitalizing conception of religion. Meantime, in order to guard ourselves against ourselves, we have undertaken to draw a definition from the history of religion taken as a whole.

We have seen that religion is the supreme form of self-assertion on man's part. He begins his career in a state of mind where God and nature are one. As he grows into clear self-consciousness, "God" becomes distinct from "nature." In the wide field of pantheistic monotheism, indeed, the distinction does not advance beyond the Stoic doctrine of the *anima mundi*. But in the narrow field of prophetic monotheism, by reason of the fact that the moral task of humanity is more seriously taken, God is exalted high above nature, and nature becomes the plastic material under his hand, being shaped toward a moral end and consummation of history. We have seen, however, that under all its ancient forms the method of religion is unvarying, namely, a sacramental manifestation of solidarity between the seen and the unseen parts of an indivisible universe. From the lowest forms to the highest there runs a continuous consciousness. We have seen, also, that the aim is everywhere the same, to overcome man's dread and terror of the unknown. Heartease amidst the torturing insecurities and uncertainties of life is the end desired. Religion brings the anxious heart of man to this end by bestowing on him the peace of the universe. The religious imagination makes life wide and spacious. Fear vanishes. The lion and the lamb lie down together. A little child shepherds the wild beasts of the earth. And, finally, we have learned that religion, when doing its hardest and most heroic work, takes on the form of a profound common feeling and consciousness.

Thus equipped, we take on ourselves the risk of a definition—perhaps it would be more safe to say, a description. Religion is that form of common consciousness through which the friendly relationship between the seen and the unseen, between human consciousness and purpose on the one side and the higher powers

and deepest tendencies on the other, is authoritatively disclosed and assented to. The unvarying quality of this consciousness is a sense of finality. Illusion and error are a necessary part of religious feeling. But the illusion and the error are held within a larger process, illusion breaking only to uncover a surer reality, and error, when it is detected, becoming a door opened into wider truth; so that the sense of finality, checked and chastened, goes from strength to strength. The known and the unknown are felt to be parts of a single and unbroken context of meaning and value.

The enduring as well as the immediate result is an assured sense of security in the possession of one's higher wealth. This sense of security is the fundamental value of life. From it, in the last analysis, all other values draw their sap and juice. It is in this way that religion has made itself the foster-parent of civilization, and that law, in the twofold sense of obligation and security in the possession of rights, has found in it a powerful ally. And here is the pith and marrow of religion. From time to time imperious needs and situations give it one or another color, and so conceptions and definitions more or less specialized come to light. But every one of them, when hard pressed, takes refuge in the larger, if vaguer, conception of a friendly relation with the unseen forces and tendencies, greater than man, which are bearing nature and history onward.

It is a matter of course that many shades and varieties of feeling and motive should blend with the religious consciousness when once its primary character is understood. Things which by nature are secondary are caught up by the religious feeling, and so completely incorporated with it that they seem to be an organic part of religion itself. Indeed, they may actually become necessary to religion as a working force. And so various shades of religious feeling come into being. But the pith of the thing is the sense of security created by the consciousness of union with the unseen powers. The relation between this primary element and the secondary elements which intertwine with it is happily illustrated by the relation between the primary and secondary elements in the total impression made on us by the highest order of beauty. Thus into one's consciousness of the incomparable

beauty of the Yellowstone Cañon there inevitably comes the thought of the vast period of geological time that has gone to its making, and the effect of its sublime loveliness is thereby enhanced. Or again, into the deep pleasure given by the beauty of a great wheat-field in the North-west may come the thought of the large uses into which the grain shall pass. But the primary thing is the beauty itself. So it is with the religious consciousness. It changes color with changing situations. Its essential character, however, is a joyous, radiant confidence in the nature and constitution of the unseen universe.

Naturally, religion purifies itself as the mental objects of man multiply in number and increase in range. It is a long march from the early tribal period, when the food-question was always pressing and the most real things were the things immediately at hand, to our scientific age with its immense range of disinterested knowledge and its splendid ability to realize distant ends. Science, therefore, is bound to affect, in increasing measure, the color and complexion of the religious motive. But the essential nature of religion is unchanging. In truth, the practical and the theoretical aspects of science, taken together, bring out in the clearest light the old truths. For, on the practical side, science has made possible, through inventions, the vast nation of modern times and has imparted to it an irresistible tendency towards democracy. Now democracy involves a tremendous increase in the seriousness of the moral task of humanity. A great mass of people who in ancient days would have had no standing within the mind of the idealist in our time possess both collective and individual significance. Consequently, the labor of moralizing the community is very much greater for the modern idealist than it was for Plato. Plato, with perfect rectitude, could wipe the masses off the slate. Their one function was to be governed. But in a modern democracy the supreme function of the same class of people is to govern themselves. The task of lifting them to the level of self-government immensely increases the strain upon the collective moral purpose which is the source of true law within the community. But that moral purpose must find its stronghold in a growing body of advanced individuals, and these individuals, gladly dooming themselves to entire responsibility



for the common welfare, will be irresistibly driven into conscious relations with the deepest forces and tendencies of the universe. And the law of life becomes, in their experience, a constantly repeated act of faith in the universe or God on the one side and in their nation and race on the other. And since this act of faith is made necessary by the terrific contrast between things as they are and things as they ought to be, science itself on its practical side brings into clear light the motive of religion.

Again, on the theoretical side also the same thing appears. The scientific conception of the universe leaves no nook or corner for the ancient notion about the terrors of nature to take refuge in. Law dominates the whole sweep of things. Yet law itself seems to give rise to an even deadlier terror. Does it not shut out freedom? does it not pour contempt on man's pride? Only in appearance. For the progress of science is irrevocably wedded to the fortunes of the free state. The universe must be thought or felt to guarantee the increasing well-being of man. And this thought and feeling are essentially religious. They quite transcend verifiable experience. They necessitate, and they rest upon, a supreme act of faith—faith in the inner constitution of the universe and faith in man's kinship to it. Our majestic conception of the universe drives us into the conviction that the deepest meanings and powers are on the side of the highest human purpose. By means of that conviction we make our peace with the stones of the field and with an apparently merciless and unpitying nature. A sense of security in our struggle for the rights of mankind pervades and possesses us. Now this is the pith and marrow of religious feeling. So the definition, or description, of religion taken from antiquity suits our needs and conditions fairly well. Religion, as a matter of feeling and thought, is for us the consciousness of intimate and friendly relations with the unseen powers and tendencies of the universe. As a matter of will, it is an assured confidence regarding the moral quality and the moral end of history. The life of the nation and the life of the race are worthy of hearty participation on the part of the choicest spirits, because through religion the heart of things, called God, enters into an enduring connection or covenant with the heart of man.

*GEORGE FOX AS A MYSTIC*

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This paper is but a fragmentary contribution to that study of the "Varieties of Religious Experience" which William James has so significantly brought to the attention of students of human nature. I propose to sketch some personal peculiarities of the founder of Quakerism, George Fox, and in the end to show what place was filled in his life by what may be called his experiences as a mystic. Every one knows that the typical Quakers have made prominent amongst their spiritual exercises what they call "silent worship" as conducted in their meetings, and that they have held that this "silent worship" often brings the worshipper under the direct influence of the movings of the Divine Spirit. I have here no concern with any question as to the truth or as to the ultimate merits of this or of any other tenet of George Fox or of his followers. I intend simply to show the place that the experiences of silent worship occupied in the mental life of Fox himself, and why he found this form of what is technically called mysticism a valuable feature of his religious consciousness. This study will bring us into somewhat closer contact with the mental complications of a remarkable personality—a personality in which the normal and the abnormal were in a very interesting way united. We shall see how certain tendencies that, in another context, would have proved highly dangerous to the sanity of their possessor were so combined in Fox that the ultimate result was prevailingly good, both for himself and for his environment. Religious history contains many instances where men whose mental life showed numerous abnormal traits still were so constituted that they retained their essential self-control and accomplished a great work. The study of Fox presents one more such instance, and may also possess genuine psychological interest.

Since my discussion deals with Fox as a mystic, I shall first have to explain what one technically means by mysticism in relig-

ion. Then I shall have to show that Fox had many traits which were not those of the typical mystic. And, finally, I shall try to point out what part Fox's mystical tendencies played in determining certain aspects of his mind and of his career.

## I

By a mystic in religion or in any department of life, many mean, somewhat vaguely, one who pretends to the possession of extraordinary power to know spiritual mysteries, or to control or predict fortune by supernatural means. Thus various superstitions are often spoken of as forms or instances of mysticism. So the trusting person who seeks intercourse with his dead friends at an ordinary Spiritualistic séance is sometimes called a mystic. Sometimes the word is applied to believers in telepathy, or to people who consult fortune-tellers, or who employ any sort of divination, or even to credulous purchasers of astrological almanacs. The term, thus employed, is too loosely and widely applied to suggest any useful meaning. For, from this point of view, every form of primitive religion would include many elements of mysticism. And only those would not be mystics who abandoned making any practical use of their supposed relations with a supernatural world, and who abandoned any belief in their power to know about such a world. Everybody who is sufficiently civilized to conceive of a contrast between nature and the supernatural admits that there is something extraordinary in the establishment of close relations with the supernatural world. Seers, prophets, wonder-workers, magicians, medicine-men, devotees of all sorts, in so far as they are intelligent enough to conceive of the ordinary life of plain men as a dealing with nature, regard either themselves as extraordinary persons or their glimpses of what others do not see as extraordinary incidents in their experience. And thus, from this point of view, mysticism would come to include nearly all forms of superstition and also of the higher historical religions. But for the common elements of all these sorts of faith and practice we have names enough, without using the term "mysticism." The term itself, originally employed with reference to the Greek Mysteries, threatened indeed at one

time to become a name for all knowledge or practice that involved any sort of technical initiation or even apprenticeship. But in religious history it has been especially associated with certain great names, and has been used to denote certain famous doctrines whose common features suggest a decidedly narrower use of the word than the vague one just illustrated. And to this narrower usage I think it best to try to confine our term.

The greater religious teachers who have been most known as mystics are, in European history, first, the characteristic representatives of the Neoplatonic school; then, certain noted mediaeval and modern religious reformers and instructors who were of a more or less completely orthodox reputation in their communions (whether these communions were Catholic or Protestant); and, finally, a good many confessedly unorthodox sectarians and independent believers. Common to all these more notable and typical mystics, whatever their creed may otherwise be, is a persuasion that, through certain exercises, or by means of special supernatural influences, or, generally, through a combination of both, the properly disposed soul can attain a state in which it becomes immediately aware of the Absolute Truth, immediately acquainted with God, or with whatever else the ultimate reality or the highest truth is declared to be by the individual mystic. In this state of mystical illumination the typical mystic reports that he becomes one with the Absolute, and that he knows this ultimate truth, not by reasoning, nor yet as one knows ordinary objects by the senses, but through a direct interior revelation, through becoming simply one with the object known. The mystic knowledge is consequently sharply distinguished, by the reports of all the typical mystics, from every other form of insight. It not only acquaints them, so they say, with another grade of Being than that which either reason or sense ever displays to men, but it also acquaints them with this absolute object in a wholly unique fashion, namely, by an immediate presence of the object which is nowhere else possible in case of any knowing process. Thus the mystic knowledge is often characterized as something beyond all definite consciousness. It must be portrayed to the vulgar in negative terms, together with but one positive predicate, viz., that it is *better*, or is *higher*,

than all other knowledge, or is *beyond, above, more precious*, than whatever else is called knowledge. Thus the object known by the typical mystic is, like the mystical state itself, something quite ineffable and indescribable. One must say of this object that it has *none* of the predicates that ordinary beings possess. And so far one's account of it is indeed wholly negative. The mystics, who love paradoxes, enjoy baffling common sense by emphasizing this their "negative theology." Their ultimate is what common sense would call nothing at all. The typical mystics not only admit this fact, but they glory in it. For this nameless unity, this formless glory, which common sense finds to be nothing, they find to be the source of all things, the ground and reality of whatever exists, the most real and ultimate of truths. And this positive attribute they assign to their Absolute for a reason which they try to articulate thus: This object of the mystic insight is *above*, is *beyond*, is *higher* than, is *better* than, is ineffably *superior* to, every finite being, because it possesses in a transcendent degree that which all imperfect beings are, so to speak, trying to possess, namely, finality and perfection. Hence in its perfection the object of the mystic knowledge possesses all the attributes of the God of the faithful.

Historically, this doctrine of the typical mystics is not limited to the confines of Christianity, nor to the wider territory within which not only Christianity proper but also its offshooting sects and heresies, as well as the Neoplatonic doctrines have flourished. Mysticism, under other names, developed some of its most typical forms in India, its probable birthplace. The prevailing doctrine of those ancient scriptures called the Upanishads is a form of mysticism. The philosophical school known as the Vedanta gave mysticism its completest technical expression, not as a mere phase of religious experience, but as the culminating doctrine of a system of metaphysics. Some typical forms of mysticism have also prospered in certain ages and sects of the Mohammedan world.

On the whole, despite the number and variety of these typical mystics, many of them agree in certain mental traits sufficiently to make them constitute a sort of psychological type. What interests us in the notable mystics is, first, the fact that they unite,

in surprising ways, high and even critical intelligence with great and sometimes abnormally strong emotional tendencies. Secondly, with their emotional life they often combine, in rather paradoxical fashion, strongly sensuous traits, such as are shown in their frequent fondness for extremely sensuous metaphorical language, with a marked asceticism of life and doctrine. And, thirdly, they often join their fondness for strange and impractical emotional experiences, for passive rapture, for abnormal inner concentration, with great skill, calm objectivity, and strenuousness in carrying on their life-work. Extravagant mystics have sometimes been good leaders of religious orders, effective managers of complex organizations or of worldly affairs.

If such is the essence, the historical place, and some of the psychological interest of the typical mysticism, we are naturally puzzled to see why so paradoxical a teaching should have led captive so many noble minds. For the typical mystics, while they include many simple-minded or even superstitious folk, also comprise amongst their number many decidedly ingenious, acute, and philosophical thinkers. In fact, the mystical philosophers, for instance the Vedantists, Plotinus, Eckhart, and even Spinoza, are often found to be amongst the most technical and critical inquirers, at least in all subjects not too directly connected with their mystical experience. Moreover, since the mystics are often lofty characters and powerful leaders, one cannot attribute their absorption in their vision of the Absolute to mere narrowness or poverty of inner life.

And so the mystic seems to be, on the one hand, paradoxical, credulous, adoring an empty vision which he calls an immediate knowledge of ultimate truth; while on the other hand he shows himself to be, by the wealth of his nature, the earnestness of his piety, and—in case of the principal philosophical mystics—by the ingenuity of his thinking processes, a person of whom the impartial critic would have expected better things. Why then, such a critic asks, does the mystic suppose the experiences of his trance, the mere nothingness of which his ecstasy makes him dimly aware, to be a revelation of ultimate truth?

This is no place to estimate the philosophical value of mysticism. But I venture to point out what I take to be the main

reason why the typical mystic conceives himself to be able, in his trance, to become directly acquainted with the Absolute.

The typical mystic, then, is, first, a person who has become convinced, through his religious faith or through his processes of thinking, that God, or the Absolute Truth, by whatever name that truth is called, possesses a perfection, a goodness, and a completeness and unity, which do not exist in any object of our ordinary experience or discursive thought. So far we have a perfectly normal form of religious conviction. Our typical mystic is, secondly, a person who longs and hopes to get some sort of close communion with God, so that he himself, and not another, shall view the Truth as it is in itself. This hope and this desire may indeed seem bold to the unsympathetic critic; but they are at least human enough to be, by themselves, quite intelligible incidents of piety. Now, thirdly, in the course of his religious exercises or of his philosophical reflections, the typical mystic observes that when, with his thoughts fixed upon the divine things in which he already believes, he abandons himself to the contemplation of them, and so forgets the things of outer sense and the fragmentary truths of ordinary discursive thought, he assumes more and more a certain inner state of delightful contemplation, while conflict and complexity give place to peace. All this happens because, since divine things are conceived as good, one delights in them; and, since God is conceived as One, the man who thus steadfastly contemplates him loses sight of all variety; while, since God is perfect and all-powerful, to meditate upon him is to dwell upon that against which nothing can contend and which is therefore in perfect peace. Now as one centralizes one's consciousness about these associations connected with unity, simplicity, perfection, peace, and joy, the result is twofold. First, it is, as to the concrete objects of contemplation, principally negative, because the typical mystic carefully avoids thinking of distracting varieties. Hence he dwells upon whatever is *not* one of God's mere creatures. Thus far he is, indeed, dwelling upon what common sense, which only takes account of creatures, calls nothing. Secondly, however, the nearer the mystic comes to dwelling upon no concrete object at all, the surer he feels that he is contemplating that which, by

its attributes of goodness, unity, and peace, is rendered far higher than all the concrete objects which he is forsaking. For to the mystic the unity thus approached is God. Thus the mystic is progressing toward a wilderness where nothing is to be found by mortal sense, and yet he is sure that in this wilderness is to be found the home of his soul, the very God whom he set out to seek.

Now the limit of this mental process, in the mystic's experience, is a state of consciousness in which nothing at all is present. Towards this limit he constantly strives. But since every step toward this goal leads toward that which is, by hypothesis, higher than the more complex objects of any previous stage, and so is a step nearer to God, the mystic, through a pleasing fallacy, familiar to all students of the doctrine of limits, easily supposes that whenever that limit is reached, and whenever the Nothing is consequently faced, God, the all-perfect, must thereby become known. Hence the object of the mystic's trance is to him divine, while for all who are not in such a trance it is indeed nothing. The mystic is confirmed in his belief by the fact that, as he approaches the ultimate state, his joy is more untroubled, just because all thoughts of variety, of problems, of complexities, are vanishing. Hence, in knowing the Absolute that is also nothing, the mystic holds that he must obtain the satisfaction of desire, the perfect peace. He must, therefore, have become one with the Absolute Good.

So much for some indication of the nature of the typical mysticism, and for a hint as to why it has seemed persuasive even to very critical thinkers, and still more to uncritically devout souls who have been in search of the presence of God.

## II

I now turn directly to Fox, and shall try to show in what sense there was a mystical trait in him. We shall find that mysticism, although but an auxiliary element, was still an indispensable part of his character. Had George Fox been known to his fellow-men chiefly as a mystic, he would have been less influential, and might have been soon forgotten. Even his mysticism became



as influential as it was over other men's lives because it was but a part of his strength. What made him historically important was his practical work as a leader of men, as an organizer of religious communities, as a social reformer, and as a consistent expounder and exemplar of one of the principal ideals that resulted from the English Reformation. This was the ideal of a spiritual unity of all men, to be established apart from outward formality, and to be sustained solely by voluntary conformity.

Still, this ideal was closely connected, in the personal experience of Fox, with a form of religious consciousness akin to that known in history by the name of mysticism. Yet Fox, as we shall see, was not a typical mystic. And, in fact, just the difference between his experience and that of the typical mystics proves to be the feature of his religious life which was most in his favor as an effective teacher. For since he was no poet and no speculative thinker, since he was neither possessed of a richly sensuous imagination nor fond of long continued unpractical contemplation, his experiences in the mystical realm, important as they proved to be for his life, would have meant little to him or to others, had they not always been swiftly translated into terms of humane activity. Other mystics have written words that people treasure for their own sake as pure literature, or as speculative illumination, or as emotional inspiration; but what Fox wrote was meant to guide his followers in their tasks and in the problems of their generation, and was bare of all adornment save that which its fervent practical spirit inevitably produced. Even his *Journal*, detailed as its record of personal experience is, is written rather as the soldier records his campaigns than as the typical mystic tells of that wondrous journey which he believes leads Godwards. "That all may know," so Fox begins his *Journal*, "the dealings of the Lord with me, and the various exercises, trials, and troubles through which he led me, in order to prepare and fit me for the work unto which he had appointed me, . . . I think fit, before I proceed to set forth my public travels in the service of truth, briefly to mention how it was with me in my youth."

One sees, even in these opening words of the *Journal*, the

epitome of his life as he himself surveyed it. The Lord had wrought it; but what the Lord had meant was "to prepare and fit" him "for the work"; and the dealings of the Lord with him in his youth were a preliminary to his true career, namely, to the "public travels in the service of truth." One must always remember these "public travels" and the constant, intimate, and varied social relations which they involved, whenever one is dwelling upon the inner life of Fox. In his youth, Fox knew a good deal about what spiritual solitude meant; but he never revelled in such solitude for its own sake as the typical mystics do. On the contrary, until he found the way out of it he was ill at ease. He was perfectly capable of meeting God "in the bush," and was always very sure that God dwells not in temples made with hands; but he had no wish to avoid "the mart and the crowded street," provided only that he could utter his testimony in the presence of his fellows; and he obviously preferred to look for God in the Meeting, side by side with his brethren. The religion of Fox was thus a very insistent social religion, in which solitude was an incident, not a goal. His strong spirit needed no isolation to secure inner peace. Contemplation was compatible with work; and the Light was still with him in the company of his Friends.

Now these things, as I have said, are not wholly characteristic of the typical mystics. The latter too have often been reformers, or men and women of considerable social activity. But in general they tend to a certain primary separation of the outer and the inner man, of the works of charity and the illuminations of the Spirit, to a sundering of the contemplation of God and the service of the world. They try, indeed, to bridge over this division of their life, to reunite their mysticism with their duty as members of religious orders, or as teachers and reformers. Some of them succeed in such a reconciliation of the opposing forces. But usually the peace that passeth all understanding makes their daily business seem a little shadowy to them, while their hearts are with God, the Ineffable, and with his moveless rest that lies beyond all finitude. Fox, however, despite his many contradictory traits, knows nothing of just this sort of division of spirit. His God is not only the ocean of light, but also the counsellor of

deeds. And even the Light, Fox praises not merely for its purity, but for what it enables him to discern.

George Fox was born in 1624, in Leicestershire, the son of a weaver, and died in January, 1691, at the age of sixty-six. His mature life was one of great activity in the service of his cause, the cause of early Quakerism. At eight distinct times he suffered considerable periods of imprisonment for the sake of his religious faith and practice. He wrote extensively, labored hard in organizing the various communities of Friends both in England and abroad, and for many years was almost constantly engaged, so far as his health permitted, in attending meetings, in travelling, and in writing his epistles to his brethren. The trials and strains of this life, and especially the hardships endured in the wretched jails of his time, wore heavily upon his constitution. He aged early; and in the latter part of his life was much beset by illnesses. We thus have considerable means of judging how far he was originally a man of sound brain, since the events of his life severely tested his sanity; and we can face with some prospect of success the question which should precede the study of his mysticism, namely, the question how far Fox shows signs of the nervous and mental instability which are so often found in people of extraordinary religious experience. The result of an examination of the main facts may first be so stated as to indicate at once wherein lay the unquestionable strength of our reformer. Fox's most characteristic religious activities, as a mature man, were consistent, humane, and free from most of the extravagances to which the troubles of the age, the enthusiasm of his followers, and even some of his own beliefs, constantly tempted him. The social state of England was then most dangerous, since persecution, controversy, changing forms of faith and government, and fanatical sectarianism prevailed. Yet on the whole Fox learned to live and to work in this social atmosphere with increasing mental steadiness, with essentially calm self-control, and with effectiveness. He learned to avoid, as time went on, some of his earlier mistakes. He grew more objective, more influential, stronger in soul. He joined authority of bearing with the steady determination to frown down the more violently intolerant tendencies of his day. He was indeed a stern controversialist; but he kept

his hostilities under the strict control of his Quaker principles. His own attitude toward the problems of his sect was always objective. He joined great self-assurance with real freedom from any disposition to self-aggrandizement. His emotional life, in spite of painful vicissitudes, remained relatively calm. In his maturer years his mental distresses seem to have been largely caused by sympathy with the misfortunes of his brethren. Despite his natural vehemence of speech, he was relatively uncomplaining as to his personal griefs. Despite physical weakness, he labored diligently to the end.

So far we have the picture of the saner aspect of his nature which predominated in his social activities. But in contrast with this picture we must record some decided mental anomalies. They are of sorts well known in religious history; but, as they were combined in Fox, they are often decidedly hard to estimate.

We have to judge of these anomalous aspects of Fox's character very largely upon the basis of his own reports. It is well, therefore, to try to get first an impression of some of his most general traits, both as shown in his career and in his writings. These general traits will not in themselves constitute his more anomalous tendencies. But we may better judge the value of his more special accounts of his experience, and may also understand why his reports must leave us in doubt as to certain very interesting questions, when we have first seen, apart from his more doubtful peculiarities, what manner of man, on the whole, he was.

First, then, a word as to Fox's mode of life. As a child, still more as a youth, he was very serious-minded, always deeply interested in religious problems, and always, according to his years, undoubtedly sober and discreet in conduct. There was in his youth no period of wild living or of impiety. There was—and this is very notable—no crisis of conversion. Fox's period of youthful doubt and distress was almost wholly filled with problems regarding his mission from the Lord and regarding the relief of the very evil state in which he saw other people living. He was early concerned with the problem of salvation; but his distress or despair was more connected with the salvation of his countrymen than with that of his own soul. His religious,

and in fact his entire, education depended upon the reading of his English Bible. Like his countryman and contemporary, John Bunyan, he was a typical product of this time of intense enthusiasm for religious reform, when earnest men, ignorant like himself of all technical erudition, and let loose, so to speak, without any control but their Bible and their own consciences, struggled with the problems of Christianity as if no historical church had ever existed to define a traditional faith and practice, and believed themselves as near as were the Apostles to the sources of divine guidance. Fox, like many others of his time, had no interest in life that was not directly colored by his religious fervor. From early manhood on he was constantly engaged in discussing passages of Scripture, in criticising religious beliefs and practices, in counselling his fellows, in taking part in religious exercises, in planning religious activities. His life, as we have seen, early became that of the wandering preacher. His travels were actually very extensive.

In view of this wandering and unworldly nature of his career, we should now note that Fox was nevertheless always careful of his small, yet, for one of his frugal habits, apparently sufficient store of money. He often mentions how he paid, or offered to pay, for what he needed on his journeys. Nobody, so far as I know, ever accused him of unfairness in the use of money. Yet he never seems to have been in actual need, although he earned nothing by his work as a preacher, except in so far as he made use of the free hospitality offered by Friends to a travelling preacher. He always vehemently condemned the practice of the State clergy in preaching for hire. His practice in this matter surely agreed with his preaching. We do not know the source of his small income, though at first his parents seem to have supplied him with some money. What we know is that he was as economical and careful as he was unworldly. When, quite late in life, he married a widow of means and position, he insisted in advance upon a settlement which placed her property beyond his control, and which fully protected the rights of her children. He was always scrupulously honest.

But, in connection with this choice of the life of the wandering preacher, we next come upon a trait of Fox's character which is

central, and which his biographers do not always emphasize as I do, in my efforts to understand the man. Fox belongs to what some students of character like to call the "motor" type of personality. He is, so far as his purely external fashion of behavior is concerned, a notably active, restless, or perhaps I should say an unresting, type of man. This aspect of his character is all the more interesting in view of its contrast with the vein of mysticism of which we are soon to speak. It is also interesting because of its further contrast with his marked seasons of strange physical weakness and other signs of invalidism. Of course Fox himself is not wholly aware of the nature of this trait of motor restlessness in his character. Yet page after page of his lengthy diary illustrates it. Fox supposes his wanderings to be wholly for the service of the Lord. It is plain to the reader that he learned to serve the Lord in this way largely because his temperament forbade him to stay long in any one place. An unsympathetic reader might be tempted to view his first recorded travels as symptoms of a youthful tendency to vagabondage. During his period of religious unrest, before he discovered his mission, his lonely journeys were, indeed, in outward seeming, so aimless as to suggest the presence of some deeper defect in his nature. Yet even these wanderings were determined not so much by painful emotion as by the mere necessity of movement and of action. Fox at first—so he tells his story—seeks among the people whom he later disapprovingly calls "the priests and professors" for light on religious problems. He goes from place to place upon this quest. Nobody gives him satisfactory guidance. So he wanders unrestingly further. Sometimes he seems merely to be looking, as if in a forest of doubts, for some undefined supernatural aid. But sometimes he strives toward a more definite goal. For as a youth he is curious to go and see whether any one can be found who has any new light upon religious truth. Thus, as he narrates, once during this early period he learns of a fasting woman whose supposed supernatural powers have attracted attention. He decides that he must seek her out. He sees her; but in a very characteristic fashion he reacts to her presence by forthwith "discerning," as he says, that hers is not the right sort of religious life. So

he tells her what he "has from the Lord" for her, and goes his way.

But this quick response to situations, this eager willingness to go any distance to gain an end, this readiness for brisk motor activity, does not leave Fox with his youth. It remains to mould his whole career. It helps him to administrative deeds of much importance for the later and more organized stages of the life of the Quaker society. Meanwhile it often appears in ways that surprise his intimates. Once in later years, when he was ill, and his friends believed him dying, he rises suddenly from his bed, as we shall soon see from his own account, and demands a coach to go and visit a friend, twelve miles away, who is really dying. He is never content to settle permanently in a single community. In the course of his life he visits all parts of England. He wanders to Scotland, to Ireland, and even to America. His example makes of all the early Quaker teachers a remarkably wandering community. Of course, circumstances and the needs of the time determine much of this wandering. But Fox's temperament is deeper than all circumstances. Were he an angel in heaven, he would prefer a missionary expedition into the deeps to an eternity of rest in the beatific vision. And so it is no wonder that those experiences of direct supernatural revelations which he called his "openings" are especially impulses to action, motor "automatisms," which Fox cultivated with an insistence that would unquestionably have proved very perilous to a weaker brain than his.

One other general trait of Fox's mind may still be mentioned before going on to more special matters. This is the very great extent and detail of his memory for events, and of his interest in such social and personal matters as had directly to do with his life-work. Much of his so-called Journal is plainly written some time after the events which he narrates. Yet the great multitude of incidents, the care in stating the precise order in which journeys, meetings, sermons, interviews, and the like, occurred, and the conscientious effort for accuracy of report, show Fox's mind to be one for which a sober and minute, and obviously laborious, record of his daily work had great interest. The general tone of the diary is, as we shall soon see, mainly objective.

That is, Fox, despite his sense of the importance of his religious mission, has a very wholesome freedom from any exaggerated sort of self-consciousness.

From these general features of Fox's character, we turn to more special facts that characterize him. We have already said that this unresting and patient worker, humane, benevolent, and effective as he was, suffered frequently from illnesses. Some of these have a psychological interest. Taken by themselves, as Fox reports them, they would give us a very different view of the man from any that we have yet obtained in this account. I cannot tell what caused these illnesses, or how they would have appeared to an expert observer. Fox records them in his Journal. But of their nature he knew only what his consciousness and his memory told him—necessarily an unscientific knowledge. We note, however, that his memory of some of these illnesses was decidedly fuller and clearer than of others.

At the age of twenty, as Fox tells us in his Journal, and during a very critical period of his religious development: "A great work of the Lord fell upon me, to the admiration of many, who thought I had been dead; and many came to see me about fourteen days. For I was very much altered in countenance and person, as if my body had been new moulded or changed. While I was in that condition, I had a sense and discerning given me by the Lord, through which I saw plainly that when many people talked of God and Christ, etc., the serpent spoke in them; but this was hard to be borne." Another and less mysteriously described attack, which Fox also refers to a mental cause, is recorded in 1659, when Fox was thirty-five years of age. The political troubles of the time and the sympathetic distresses caused by the persecutions of Quakers are here assigned as the occasions of Fox's trouble. "After awhile," he says in his Journal, "I went to Reading, where I remained under great sufferings and exercises, and in great travail of spirit for about ten weeks. For I saw there was great confusion and distraction amongst the people, and that the powers were plucking each other to pieces. . . . While I was under that sore travail at Reading, by reason of grief and sorrow of mind, and the great exercise that was upon my spirit, my countenance being altered, and my body



became poor and thin." Hereupon, as Fox tells us, certain "unclean spirits" (that is, certain evil-minded people living in that town) came to him and told him that the plagues of God were upon him. Fox vigorously repudiated this interpretation of his state, and, after he had "travailed with the witness of God," he came, through further spiritual exercises, "to have ease." "And then," he continues, "having recovered, my body and face swelled when I came abroad into the air. Then the bad spirit said, 'I was grown fat,' and they envied at that also. So I saw that no condition nor state would please that spirit of theirs; but the Lord preserved me by his power and spirit through and over all; and in the Lord's power I came to London again."

In 1670, when Fox was forty-six years old, there occurred another illness wherein the mental aspect is prominent. By this time his constitution had suffered heavily in consequence of imprisonments, and several serious illnesses whose physical causes were obvious enough in the unwholesome surroundings of prisons, had preceded the present attack. He records his experience as follows:—

The next day we passed towards Rochester. And on the way, as I was walking down a hill, a great weight and oppression fell upon my spirit. I got my horse again; but the weight remained so heavy on me that I was hardly able to ride. At length we came to Rochester; but I was much spent, being so extremely loaden and burdened with the world's spirits [that is, with trouble about the persecution of Friends] that my life was oppressed under them. I got with difficulty to Gravesend, and lay at an inn there, but could hardly either eat or sleep. The next day . . . John Stubbs and I went over the ferry into Essex. We came to Horn Church, where was a meeting on the first day. After the meeting I rode with great uneasiness to Stratford, to a Friend's whose name was Williams. . . . Here I lay exceeding weak, and at last lost both my hearing and my sight. Several Friends came to me from London. I told them, "I should be as a sign to such as would not see, and such as would not hear the truth." In this condition I continued a pretty while. Several came about me; and though I could not see their persons, I felt and discerned their spirits, who of them was honest-hearted, and who was not. Divers Friends, who practised physic, would have given me medicines; but I was not to meddle with any; for I was

sensible I had a travail to go through; and therefore spoke to Friends, to let none but solid weighty Friends be about me. Under great sufferings, groanings, travails, sorrows, and oppressions I lay for several weeks; whereby I was brought so low and weak in body that few thought I could live.

Fox's death was, he tells us, actually reported at this time in London. But he himself viewed his case all the while as not dangerous to life; for he was aware that the Lord's power was supporting him. After a time he recovered "a little glimmering sight," and hereupon rose from his bed and insisted upon being carried to see a dying Friend, one Gerard Amor, whom he greatly consoled. Thereafter Fox remained at Enfield, in a very weak state, all the winter. As his quoted words indicate, he interpreted this whole illness as a divinely sent spiritual experience. All through the following winter he was "warring in spirit with the evil spirits of the world that warred against truth and Friends. For there were great persecutions at this time." In some way he thus connected his illness with the need that he should inwardly struggle in order to bear his share of the burdens of his persecuted brethren, and so help them. His pain was lightened by inward visions of the state of the New Jerusalem, within which, as he insists, "all who are within the light of Christ" already dwell; "the gates whereof stand open all the day (for there is no night there) that all may come in." "After some time," says Fox, "it pleased the Lord to allay this violent persecution" (namely, that which the Friends were suffering); "and I felt in spirit an overcoming of the spirits of those man-eaters that had stirred it up, and carried it on to that height of cruelty, though I was outwardly very weak. And I plainly felt, and those Friends that were with me, and that came to visit me, took notice, that, as the persecution ceased, I came from under the travails and sufferings which had laid with such weight upon me; so that towards spring I began to recover, and to walk up and down, beyond the expectation of many."

Such cases as these seem to show that Fox was occasionally subject to somewhat lengthy attacks, in which spiritual troubles, usually of a highly humane and sympathetic character, were associated with nervous disturbances, which, at least once, in-

cluded the temporary loss of hearing and of sight. The attacks were attended with great prostration, with altered nutrition, and with the belief that his countenance was profoundly changed in a way that attracted much attention. He understood that at least twice those near him at such times had thought him either dead or very near death. While his consciousness at those times was usually depressed, he had some memory, and sometimes a very clear memory, of how he had felt. During such times he had at least intervals of a strong sense of heightened discernment, which seemed to him of a more or less clairvoyant or telepathic character. These attacks came on, as it appears, slowly, with gradually increasing weakness. They passed away without any periods of excitement. In spite of nervous depression, Fox experienced no change in his usual views of life or of his mission. The attacks were painful, but brought no despair.

Next, Fox was subject, throughout his career, to strong intuitions, to experiences which he always viewed as immediate revelations from the Lord, in brief, to what he called "openings." In estimating these experiences, we must of course remember that, as a man whose whole education was obtained from the English Bible, Fox was, by essentially normal processes of reasoning, convinced, as were thousands of devout souls in his day, that the properly prepared worshipper should be able to receive the Lord's direct guidance. Fox, as is well known, held that this guidance ought to be just as direct, and on occasion just as detailed and authoritative, as that given to the ancient prophets and apostles. This tenet was an essential article of that "everlasting gospel" which he daily preached, and this same tenet became one of the most characteristic of the beliefs of the Quakers. As a fact, therefore, Fox did not regard himself as peculiarly privileged among men by reason of his "openings"; but he rather held that the power to receive such direct revelations is a universal test of piety. He used this test in his controversies: If Christ dwells in you, he helps you, even in your daily business. And if you can get no sign of such direct help, then you are no true Christian. This is Fox's doctrine; and he reaches it by what are, on his presuppositions, perfectly normal, even though mistaken, processes of argument. His personal revelations must of course

be judged accordingly. As to their contents, Fox's "openings" take the form, first, of comforting, or inspiring, or prophetic inner visions. These are described, in general, in no very vivid or plastic way, so far as the merely sensuous imagery is concerned. I suspect that they were often rather felt or verbally supplemented than visualized with any great detail. Hallucinations of vision appear in his case mostly in the form of mere color and light visions. But, secondly, the more important and constantly recurrent of Fox's "openings" are not these inner visions, but assume rather a more directly motor form as impulses to action. Fox "has it from the Lord" that he shall do thus or thus. Or it is "given to him" to speak this or that. The general importance of this motor aspect of Fox's character, the prevalence of decisions, of confident activities, is thus extensively illustrated.

Still a third type of the "openings" we find in what Fox calls a "discerning" of truths. What he thus "discerns" is in general something of practical importance. He is, for instance, a "discerner of spirits," and knows at a glance the inmost characters of the people whom he meets; and to his actual skill in this respect some of his most celebrated brethren later bore witness in their obituary testimonies. Some of his inner visions express other of his discernments. He has, as we saw, prophetic visions, occasionally attended with simple visual hallucinations of light or of color. But these visions usually relate to important political, social, or religious crises, and warn or otherwise guide him. In general, these "discerning" processes show him the contrasts of things, enable him to tell good from evil, to expose false teachers, refute disputants, and the like.

Some of the "openings," in the fourth place, take the form of voices. "I heard a voice say," he occasionally tells us. But, on the whole, one may doubt whether these voices often had the character of true auditory hallucinations. They appear, in general, more like those interior voices whose mental material consists rather of motor speech imagery than of words vividly heard.

If one considers the various sorts of "openings" together, one finds that, even in their most pronounced forms, they usually keep nearer to the boundary of the normal than one might at

first be disposed to think. For, whatever their contents, their meaning is usually humane, benevolent, objective, and commonly in perfectly reasonable relation to Fox's life-work. They are indeed automatisms that, in a weaker brain, would have tended toward the systematizing of delusions. But in the context of Fox's life they acquired, and on the whole kept, a decidedly sane bearing upon his general plans; and that he made so much of them, and believed in them so steadfastly, is due quite as much to his theology and to his education as to their own character.<sup>1</sup>

It remains, in this sketch of Fox's mental type, to notice one very important contrast between his experiences and those of many other religiously-minded persons. It is common, in the history of religious struggles, to meet with the experiences of those who are of the general type of the ordinary anxious, nervous invalid. Such may be people of genius, as was, for instance, Fox's contemporary, Bunyan. They may gain enough self-control to triumph finally over their ills. But their story, while it lasts, is always very different from that of Fox. The ordinary nervous sufferer, the victim of a sensitive heredity, or of an overstrain, or of both, first of all suffers from various masses of abnormal sensations and feelings, and then defines his practical prob-

<sup>1</sup> There is indeed one exceptional automatism which occurred during Fox's youth, and which has suggested to many critics a graver interpretation. This is his famous act of walking barefoot through the city of Lichfield, by the command of the Lord, crying, "Woe! Woe! to the bloody city of Lichfield." This has often been regarded as a peculiarly insane expression of excitement, because there was no discoverable objective ground for the act. I regard the incident as intelligible enough in the context of Fox's early life, although it was indeed pathological. But its pathological significance appears less when we remember the time, and Fox's training in automatisms, and finally his relatively normal grounds for feeling confidence in any of his "openings." Fox had just been released from his year's imprisonment at Derby. His temperament was restless, and his long confinement must have been extremely irritating. After such a release from prison the ordinary youthful convict plunges into some vicious excess. But Fox gave vent to his long imprisoned motor tendencies by this otherwise useless outburst. It was indeed plainly no normal incident. But it was less abnormal than might at first appear. The sight of the church steeples in Lichfield first stirred up hostile feelings in Fox's mind. He then felt a restless sense that something must be done—something vigorous, intense, significant. Then came a state of confusion, then an automatism to which Fox himself could assign no coherent intent, and then the final outburst. Relieved by yielding to his strange impulse, Fox forthwith became calm; and, by chance, no such incident ever occurred again.

lems in terms of his sufferings. He is therefore chiefly anxious about himself. He habitually consults friends or physicians in the hope of personal relief. He is, as Bunyan once said, "loathe to perish." His life becomes the drama of the captive seeking escape from his prison-house. But his dungeon is his own soul. His captor is his own fear. Accordingly, he becomes elaborately introspective, is expert in his own sorrows, analyzes their supposed sources, and studies his own psychology, vainly, perhaps, but devotedly. He sometimes consults his adviser with his own written notes in his hands, lest he should let some of the precious details of his case escape his own memory. He finds it hard that his adviser grows weary of his tale. His fears are most characteristic of his state, even though his fears are shadowy. Most of all, he fears himself.

Now if such a chronic sufferer, who may indeed be a genius, wins peace through his tribulations, and then, like Bunyan, undertakes to tell you about the outcome, he shows an elaborate skill in introspection which his sufferings have entailed. Bunyan's *Grace Abounding* is as transparent a confession as could be made. No essential detail that an uncultivated patient's consciousness could have perceived escapes notice. Bunyan knows nothing of psychology, and profoundly misinterprets the causes of his troubles; but his confession is a monument of untrained introspective skill; and to understand him you only need to listen to him sympathetically.

Quite otherwise is it with Fox. He never writes as the ordinary nervous invalid would. He suffers, but always about objective matters—about his practical problems and his external misfortunes. He makes no elaborate problem out of his mere suffering. He is, even in the struggles of his youth, comparatively little concerned about himself. He has few fears, and no deeper sense of guilt. During illness, death is the least of his concerns. His enemy is always outside of him, in the evil of the world, in the common foe of mankind. He has none of the ordinary nervous invalid's hesitancies. He always knows what to do. He consults no one, after he has once learned how useless the "priests" are. He has no conviction of sin, no crisis of conversion, no change of heart. Bodily weakness never abates his wholesome

self-consciousness. Accordingly, however, he is poor at introspection. He scrutinizes little the nature, the conditions, the sources, of his "openings." He knows that they are from the Lord, and that is enough. All the harder is it for us to read between the lines of the Autobiography, and learn the true psychological character of his experiences. There is no intentional concealment, but he speaks in parables. He is clear about his business and about the outer world, and he means to be frank about himself. But, since his inner spiritual exercises are from the Lord, he does not need to trace the intricacies of their origin or of their vicissitudes, as the ordinary nervous invalid would try to do. He reports the truth that the Lord has "opened" to him. That is enough. Now you see at once what the practical problem of such a nature must be. The right source of self-control must be found, the right refuge from the danger of mental chaos.

### III

In following the experiences of Fox as indications of his mental constitution, we have thus at length reached the boundary where begins the truly mystical realm of his experience. Yet all that has preceded has been needful for the understanding of this realm. The "openings" are, psychologically speaking, mere automatisms, and are not of themselves sufficient to ally Fox to the great historical mystics of whom I earlier spoke. I therefore portrayed at such length the essential elements of the religious experience of those typical mystics, that we might differentiate their type from the type of the mere believers in supernatural intimations such as we have considered in Fox's case. Yet it is true that without considering Fox's "openings" we could not understand his mysticism, in so far as he was something of a mystic. It is true that most of the typical mystics had their own kind and degrees of what Fox called "openings." But closely as the two sorts of religious phenomena were connected in Fox's case and in many others, the "openings" and the central mystical consciousness are decidedly different sorts of mental facts. I have therefore dwelt upon both classes of facts sepa-

ately as a preparation for showing how they were joined in Fox.

In addition to the special "openings," the automatisms now characterized, Fox possessed a consciousness of the presence of the divine which was a central feature in what he calls the "Light"; namely, in that Light which he believed to be the most precious possession of all believers. The characterization of this Light is now needed to complete our portrayal of Fox's religious tendencies. And we find this Light to be an element in strong contrast to the features thus far emphasized, yet one that for the first time gives unity to what might otherwise have been chaotic. Like all great natures, Fox was able to harmonize apparently conflicting traits. This unresting soul, whose body so constantly, and as it were automatically, wandered, and whose voluntary and rational labors were always strenuous, had, besides its strenuousness, quite another virtue amongst its most prominent ideals. This is a virtue that the Friends from the first learned to emphasize. Its nature is suggested by phrases that constantly recur in Fox's many epistles to Friends and to those whom he hoped to convert. Let us cite an instance or two of this phraseology:—

To his parents Fox wrote, in 1652: "To that of God in you both I speak, and do beseech you both, for the Lord's sake, to return within, and wait to hear the voice of the Lord there; and waiting there, and keeping close to the Lord, a discerning will grow, that ye may distinguish the voice of the stranger when ye hear it." In the same year, in epistles to Friends, one finds such expressions as these:

To you all, dear friends, who have tasted of the immediate working power of the Lord, and do find an alteration in your minds, and do see from whence virtue doth come, and strength that doth renew the inward man, and doth refresh you; which draws you in love to forsake the world, and that which hath form and beauty in it to the eye of the world . . . to you all I say, Wait upon God in that which is pure. Though you see little, and know little, and have little, and see your emptiness, and see your nakedness, and barrenness, and unfruitfulness . . . it is the Light that discovers all this, and the love of God to you, and it is that which is immediate; but



the dark understanding cannot comprehend it. So wait upon God in that which is pure. . . . And meeting and waiting in his power, which ye have received, in it all to improve your measure that God hath given you; for ye never improve your measure, so long as you rely upon any visible thing without you. . . . When your mind runs into anything outwardly, without the power, it covers and veils the pure in you.

Such words as these at once introduce us to a thought that is thus far new in our account. Yet all who are acquainted with Fox know how central it is amongst his thoughts. It is the thought that inspires and justifies silent worship. It stands, it would seem, in a very interesting contrast to that active and unresting side of Fox's nature which we have so far emphasized. When this wanderer sits in the meeting, he can become, for the time, apart from the need of serving his brethren, a Quietist. His chief word to express this attitude is the word *wait*, used as the Psalmist uses it when he says, "I waited patiently for God." This pious *waiting* is the other virtue of which I just spoke. And what Fox wins by waiting is a certain restful consciousness of the divine presence which he defines by the term the Light—a term henceforth embodied in the Quaker vocabulary. The term was not at all new, and it certainly was scriptural. But in this emphasized usage it was intended to be mystical. Another term for such experiences is the "immediate working power of the Lord," or, briefly, "the power." To win the consciousness of this power to the full, one must be passive. But when once "the power" has wrought its work in the soul, its influence can remain during one's activities; and then one's special revelations from the Lord appear as its manifestations.

This restless soul thus added to all its other virtues the willingness to wait. And it is the waiting, with its experiences, which allies Fox to the contemplative mystics. I said that Fox was able in this way to unite somewhat contradictory tendencies. As a fact, the union was in so far a compromise as the contemplation, in Fox's case, soon tended again towards action. The "Light" is constantly spoken of in his epistles as a source of "discernment." Yet, on the other hand, not only was the Light a direct consciousness of God's presence, but it had two further

features which ally it to the classical mysticism. The one of these features relates to the reason why Fox finds the consciousness of the Light so convincing, and so immediately a revelation of God. The other relates to the character which the Light revealed as the essentially divine character.

I previously explained why the typical mystics view their ultimate vision as the revelation of the Absolute. Now Fox shows little sign of having ever striven for the attainment of the ultimate vision of the typical mystics. But it is true that he often speaks of the vision of God as something unutterable in ordinary speech, although he does not speak of it as beyond consciousness, and although he thinks of it as a state of mind that every pious soul ought daily to have. But the reason why he is sure that his vision of God is a true one has often to be articulated when he rebukes the extravagances of the more wayward or disputatious members of his sect. This reason is that, in the moment when the Light shines, peace, unity, harmony, attainment, perfection, are present to the soul. Herein the consciousness of the Light differs from the previously mentioned automatisms. They are many. It is one. They, therefore, despite their subjective certainty, might be diabolical impulses instead of divine movings, if they did not visibly proceed from that unity and tend to lead others back to it. Hence the Light is indeed a discernor of good and evil tendencies, and as such Fox constantly extols it. Nobody can say, "I am aware that God's spirit moves me to do" this or this—for instance, to go to the wars—"and now my moving of the Spirit is as good, George Fox, as are your various intuitions and your many impulses that you have from the Lord." No, the special impulses are, after all, of a lower order of revelation than is the Light. They must be judged by its simplicity, by its harmony, by its peace. The One Spirit cannot counsel conflicting tendencies, cannot approve worldly desires, cannot countenance destructive or wayward automatisms. And the test that the Light is true is this very experience that it is beyond all conflict, and is absolutely simple in its revelations. Hence all those impulses, and those only, which lead life back towards the central unity, impulses such as those to brotherhood, and peace on earth, and good will to men, and simplicity of speech, can be

justified by the Light. Thus Fox, on occasion, sets right the victims of wayward openings.

Now this reason of Fox for feeling assured of the Light as a revelation of the truly divine is essentially the same as the typical mystic's reason. There is a state of mind which is filled with harmony, unity, absolute goodness, perfect peace. The object present in this state of mind must be the God in whom all desires are fulfilled and from whom all power comes. This is the essential mystical thought.

And now, further, as to the character which the Light reveals as the truly divine: "Great things," says Fox, in speaking of the crises of his youthful experience, "did the Lord lead me into, and wonderful depths were opened unto me, beyond what can by words be declared." He then learned, as he explains, "the hidden unity in the Eternal Being." Again in his account of his early experiences he says: "I saw also that there was an ocean of darkness and death; but an infinite ocean of light and love which flowed over the ocean of darkness. . . . I saw into that which was without end, things which cannot be uttered, and the greatness and infiniteness of the love of God which cannot be expressed by words." He himself compared at the time his state with that of Paul, when Paul was caught up into the third heaven. Unity, infinity, perfection, are the predicates constantly ascribed by Fox, in his later writings, to that which the vision of God reveals. Now that these are Divine Attributes everybody has heard. Fox, however, had a strong sense that the Light enables the soul to see these attributes by a direct intuition at the moment of contemplation. This, however, is so far the typical mystic doctrine. And it is notable in this connection that Fox is comparatively indifferent to any further technical definition of God's nature except in these terms, an indifference common to all mystics. That this immediate intuition was associated in his mind with the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, is true; but the theological problems to which this doctrine leads are wholly in the background of his consciousness just in so far as he considers the central intuition of the divine presence itself. But precisely such indifference to the further articulation of the concept of the Divine Being is characteristic of the mystics.

Whether they speak of God or of Christ, of the Spirit or of the Absolute, all is to them One, and this One is unity and peace.

Here, then, is the mystical aspect of Fox's experience and of his theology. In his portrayal of the experience of the Light, the sensuous imagery so characteristic of typical mystics is very little in evidence. Yet it is not wholly lacking. The term "the Light" is itself a sensuous metaphor, although indeed a conventional one. But Fox occasionally goes further in the use of a sort of speech which mystics employ mainly because an immediate experience must indeed be formulated, if at all, in terms of sensations and of simple feelings. In 1664, at the age of forty years, Fox writes, in one of his epistles, to Friends in distress, regarding the comforts that Christ can give them: "And so think not the winter and cold weather, nor the night long; for the lilies do grow, and the gardens do give a good smell; and there is a difference between the carnal mind and a spiritual. . . . And the sun shines, and the light is clear and not dim, that you may see your way, and life, though there is a storm and tempest in the sea. And so mind the summer, and the singing of birds; and not the winter and night in which evil beasts do yell." In his youth, when the Light first came to him, it was accompanied by an especially numerous collection of interior visions, and on the other hand appeared to give to his ordinary perceptions an extraordinarily clear and vivid character. The following often quoted passage is here in question. It occurs in the record of the year 1648, when Fox was twenty-four years old:

Now was I come up in spirit, through the flaming sword, into the paradise of God. All things were new, and all the creation gave another smell unto me than before, beyond what words can utter. I knew nothing but pureness, innocency, and righteousness, being renewed into the image of God by Christ Jesus; so that I was come up to the state of Adam, which he was in before he fell. The creation was open to me; and it was showed me how all things had their names given them, according to their nature and virtue. I was at a stand in my mind, whether I should practise physick for the good of mankind, seeing the nature and virtues of the creatures were so opened to me by the Lord.

Fox soon gave up this idea, and turned back to religious plans; but this "opening" and the rejection of the plan show how the

mystic vision quickly translated itself in Fox's mind into practical form.

It was, however, just this tendency of the mystic vision to guide Fox's impulses into unity that gives the mystical aspect of his nature its actual importance in his life-work. As we saw at the outset, he never remained long absorbed in the vision. But, as we also saw in studying his "openings" in their general character, he was disposed by nature and by training to experience a variety of impulses, of openings, of automatisms, which in itself was dangerously chaotic. His humane and social tendencies were, indeed, a strongly counterbalancing influence, preventing false subjectivity. But, on the other hand, his freedom from nervous fears and from inhibitory scruples, with his vigorous self-confidence, disposed him to courses of action which, like the Lichfield incident, might have ruined his influence if he had lacked strong inner restraint. To gain such restraint was, as we have seen, the central problem of such a nature. Now it was the Light, the experience, never very trance-like, seldom very vivid or sensuously rich in coloring, but always calm, comforting, refreshing, quiet—the experience of God's immediate presence—it was this which gave his vehement active tendencies their needed rest, which brought them into consistency, which demanded that they should all be used in its service, and which saved them from chaos, from excess, and from wilfulness. Thus at length we see how Fox's mysticism, although but an auxiliary tendency in his nature, was an indispensable auxiliary.

Until, in his youth, between twenty-two and twenty-four years of age, Fox first came to know the Light as a sustained experience, his unrest was manifest, but not his mission; his piety, but not his higher self-control; his interest in religion, but not his possession of power. His automatisms were numerous and benevolent, but thus far they lacked unity. While, as I said, he never had any deep sense of guilt, some of his automatic processes occasionally seemed to him temptations of the evil one. He therefore lived for years in a state of puzzle, of inward division. The Light, when it came, meant a vision of unity—a vision that was in so far of the mystic type. The vision, at first unsteady, became habitual, controlled, and a regular

spiritual exercise. It was never the true mystic trance. It remained, however, always a sense of immediate communion with the Infinite. It thus became the Unmoved Mover, if I may use Aristotle's phrase, in his life. Henceforth his unresting nature remained; but the centre of his world had become fixed; and from that centre up to the highest heaven of his experience, the aim to imitate that which he viewed as beyond all his experience but as in immediate touch with his highest intuitions pervaded all his life. The automatisms persisted; but they became organized in the service of the one principle. The special revelations were daily with him; but they were forced to be the revelations of the same great and immovable unity which he called God.

Such, I take it, was the place of mysticism in the life of George Fox. In consequence, his untutored theology, despite its unconsciousness of philosophy, was nearer to becoming an Idealism, in the modern sense, than to being a Mysticism in the classical sense. His vision of God, despite all his quaint interpretations of Scripture and all his capricious private intimations of supernatural guidance, remained nearer to being a revelation of truth than it would have been, had he sunk deeper into the mystic trance. And, above all, the Light taught this unresting soul how to labor amid all the storms and the lurid hatreds of his day, not in vain, but humanely, valiantly, and beneficently.

*THE PRESENT POSITION OF NEW TESTAMENT  
THEOLOGY*

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It is not a little significant that several books have appeared within the last year or two which deal with the subject of New Testament Theology in its whole extent. For a considerable time there has been a shrinking from this large enterprise, and the work of Holtzmann was allowed to maintain its place without serious competition. The attention of younger scholars has been more directed to the literary and historical criticism of the New Testament than to its theology; and while the theology has been by no means neglected, it has been discussed in many separate monographs rather than in works of a comprehensive nature. Now, however, we have the three books of Weinel, Feine, and Schlatter, appearing almost simultaneously, while the monumental work of Holtzmann is being reissued in a fully revised edition.

This sudden outburst of activity in a field that seemed almost abandoned may be taken in several ways as a good omen. It points, for one thing, to a revival of interest in the thought of the New Testament, which has often been half-forgotten in the controversy over subsidiary problems. Again, it is an indication that the many-sided researches of modern scholarship have yielded some assured results, so that constructive work may at last be attempted. For a number of years past, scholars have been fully occupied with the collecting of fresh data and the weighing of rival theories; the process was a necessary one, and had to be carried out with sufficient thoroughness before any conclusions could be more than tentative. It would appear that these preliminary labors are approaching completion, and that the work of building is now to be commenced. Once more, the appearance of these books, in which the primitive theology is treated as a whole, bears witness to a growing conviction that New

Testament thought is far more closely linked together than the critics of the last generation were willing to admit. The tendency has been to emphasize the cleavage between Jesus and Paul, and between Paul and the later church, with the result that each of the several phases of early doctrine has been studied in a compartment by itself. It is now coming to be recognized that no sharp lines of separation can be drawn, and that the teaching of the New Testament must be taken as a whole before we can rightly apprehend the bearing of its different parts.

We propose in this article to consider two of the works recently published, in order to arrive at some estimate of the present position of New Testament Theology and the outlook for the future. A review of four such comprehensive books is hardly practicable, and two of them, for different reasons, may be left out of account. The revised edition of Holtzmann is not yet completed, and any judgment on it would be premature; while the work of Schlatter, able and suggestive as it is, is not sufficiently representative for our purposes. The author prides himself on treating his subject from a point of view and according to methods which are peculiar to himself, and tries as far as possible to forget everything that has previously been written about it. His book is well worthy of study as the work of a vigorous though eccentric thinker, but it stands for nothing except his own individual views. Weinell and Feine, on the other hand, are representative in a high degree. Their aim is not so much to advocate private theories as to gather up the whole result of modern investigation, while in the performance of this task one of them adopts a somewhat radical and the other a somewhat conservative attitude.

By way of approach to the two books it will be well to indicate some of the new material of which the writers have been able to avail themselves, and which has made their work necessary. Holtzmann's great book has qualities of thoroughness, erudition, philosophical insight, that stamp it with a permanent value; and the revision which it is now undergoing at the hands of Jülicher will secure it in the place which it has long occupied. But since the last edition of Holtzmann in 1897 the whole position of New Testament theology has become different. The labors of many scholars in widely diverse fields of Biblical research have not only



accumulated fresh data for answering the various problems, but have compelled, in almost every instance, a new statement of the problem itself.

1. Documents external to the New Testament but illustrative of its thought and beliefs have been more carefully examined. (a) The apocalyptic literature has received closer attention. Its sources, purpose and character are far better understood than they were twenty years ago; and its influence on early Christian ideas has been investigated in detail. The results of this study alone, though on some cardinal points they are still far from certain, have been little short of revolutionary. (b) Rabbinical literature has become more accessible, and in the light of it we are better able to appreciate certain aspects of New Testament thought. One of the most hopeful signs of recent years has been the increasing willingness of Jewish and Christian scholars to co-operate. The Jewish Encyclopedia, the commentary on the Synoptic Gospels by Montefiore and Abrahams, the contributions of Schechter and others, have done much to correct and supplement our traditional ideas of the New Testament. (c) The interest in Philo has undergone a marked revival within the last few years. His works have been critically edited for the first time by Cohn and Wendland. Discussions like those of Bréhier and Windisch have enabled us to apprehend his thought more fairly. The whole question of Alexandrian speculation has been placed on a new footing by the discovery of Egyptian as well as Greek affinities in the system of Philo. (d) The influence of Greek, and especially Stoic, philosophy on the New Testament has long been recognized; but it is only of late years that the points of contact between Paul's Epistles and the Diatribe literature have been noted and investigated by Wendland, Bultmann, and others. It has thus become possible to estimate in a more accurate manner the relation of Paul's thinking to the current philosophy. (e) The researches of Deissmann and others have taught us how the New Testament writers were affected by the popular Hellenistic ideas. It may be that Deissmann has tried to prove too much from purely linguistic evidence, but there can be no question that the new data have cleared up many points of detail which were previously obscure. (f) An entirely

fresh light has been thrown on early Christian thought by the study of the Oriental mystery-religions, especially by Reitzenstein, Cumont, and Dieterich. This line of inquiry has only been opened up in recent years, and the conclusions which have been reached are of a more or less tentative character. Many scholars are perhaps disposed to make too much of the new discoveries, and to miss what is essential in Christian thought by reading everything in terms of the Oriental cults. But it can hardly be questioned that we have now learned to distinguish a new and important element which must be taken into account in all future expositions of the primitive theology.

2. The literary criticism of the New Testament has been notably advanced by the labors of the last ten or fifteen years; and a more accurate knowledge of the structure and origin of the various writings has helped to elucidate their teaching. In two cases, more especially, literary criticism has reacted on our study of the theology. (a) It would be too bold to persuade ourselves that the Synoptic problem is approaching anything like a final solution; but the different strata in the evangelic tradition have now been so far determined that the analysis of the teaching of Jesus may be based on certain definite principles. We can distinguish, with a confidence hitherto impossible, between the earliest records and the later interpretations. (b) The book of Acts has recovered something of its former significance. By our attitude to this book our view of the whole course of early Christianity must be largely determined; and, while such a position as that of Harnack in his later studies can hardly be maintained, it seems clear that Acts must now be taken seriously as an historical document. The analytical criticism of the introductory chapters (Harnack, Clemen, Jungst, and others) has been especially valuable, since it has established a strong probability that in his account of the most ancient period the author made use of sources which can still, in some measure, be recognized.

3. Separate aspects of New Testament thought have been very fully investigated in recent years; and not a few of the monographs have marked a real addition to our knowledge. It will be enough simply to mention the works of Heitmüller on the baptismal formula; of Gunkel and Volz on the Spirit; of A. See-

berg on the primitive confession; of Lietzmann and Fiebig on the Son of Man. In this connection, too, we may note the commentaries, many of them of quite exceptional value, which have appeared since the beginning of the century, such as J. Weiss on 1 Corinthians, Loisy on the Synoptic Gospels, Bousset on Revelation, Bacon on Mark and Galatians. Questions of exegesis have been so treated in many of these recent commentaries as to illuminate the larger theological problems.

On all sides, then, a great mass of fresh and valuable material has been collected for the writer on New Testament Theology. His task has in some ways been rendered more complex, but in others has been lightened and simplified. He can make use of well-made roads where his predecessors had to hew their own way through the jungle, and can advance to positive results without wasting his labor on mere controversy. It must indeed be admitted that the last few years have had their full share of wild theories, as well as of solid and fruitful work. Echoes are still heard of Van Manen's attack on the authenticity of Paul's Epistles. The old debate as to whether Jesus was an historical person has been revived in new forms. Attempts have been made to construe the early Christian movement by means of categories borrowed from modern Socialism. But these mere fire-works of criticism have already enjoyed the brief moment in which they have had time to spend themselves. They have served a useful purpose by bringing out into clearer relief the assured facts which have to be studied and interpreted.

It would be difficult to say which of the two books before us is the better done; and happily it is not necessary. Both of them are works of remarkable ability, thorough in their treatment, honest and fair-minded in their conclusions. Weinell's, it will be generally acknowledged, is the more brilliant and original book: Feine's is perhaps the more useful for the purposes of the student. By a fortunate accident the two books, which might have easily stood in mere rivalry, serve to complement each other and will be found equally necessary. While both writers are at pains to hold the balances even and to bring every question into the fullest modern light, Weinell reflects the opinions of the more ad-

vanced criticism, while Feine is more cautious, and prefers in case of doubt to fall back on orthodox positions. This will become apparent as we proceed to outline some of the more salient features of the two discussions.

Weinel<sup>1</sup> lays stress at the outset on the close relation between the thought and the life of the primitive church, and shows that the old conception of an abstract development of doctrine is misleading. Throughout his book—and this perhaps is its chief excellence—he tries to make us feel that Christian thinking in the first century was only the other side of Christian history and experience. His first care is to define the specific character of Christianity as distinguished from the religions amidst which it arose, and which, in some cases, superficially resembled it. It was a religion of redemption, unlike the moral-ceremonial religion of Judaism. At the same time it was not an aesthetic redemptive religion, like the Oriental cults; that is, it did not aim at deliverance merely from the sense of suffering and earthly limitation. It was an ethical-redemptive religion, seeking its goal in the deliverance from moral unworthiness. From this point of view Weinell discusses the teaching of Jesus. He fully admits the apocalyptic framework of the teaching, but shows that its true affinities were with Old Testament prophecy. Jesus was concerned, not so much with the Kingdom itself as with the conditions on which men might enter it; and these conditions were of a moral nature. Mysticism had no place in the thought of Jesus, and his seeming asceticism was in reality a demand for sacrifice. On the basis of the apocalyptic idea of the Kingdom he perfected the ethical religion, insisting on obedience to the will of God, and separating that will from everything that is not morally good and holy. The fundamental idea of a life according to the will of God brought with it a new conception of God and of man's relation to him. God is at once absolute Lord and absolute goodness; and by faith in him man is regenerated, that is, made capable of a new moral life, depending on new impulses. As in the aesthetic religions man is redeemed from natural limitations, so in the religion of Jesus he is redeemed from moral impotence and failure,

<sup>1</sup> *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, von H. Weinell. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr. 1911. pp. 603.

and receives power for doing and willing what is good. These points are all elaborated and illustrated by Weinel in a section which occupies about a third of his book, and in which his special qualities of vivid presentation and fresh perception can be seen at their best. He has done valuable service in asserting once more those great religious and moral elements of Jesus' teaching which a pedantic criticism would resolve into mere by-products of an apocalyptic message. At the same time he has not tried to make sufficiently clear the nexus between the apocalyptic and ethical sides of the teaching. In the closing chapters of the section he deals with Jesus' conception of his own person and office; and here again the treatment is somewhat inconclusive. Jesus accepted his Messianic vocation as a prophetic one. It is probable that he conceived of himself as in some peculiar sense the Son of God; probable also that when he spoke of the coming of the Son of Man, he thought of his own return in glory. But he claimed to be Messiah primarily because he brought to men the true knowledge of God and realized the Fatherly will of God in his own life. Though he recognizes the substantial authenticity of the accounts of the Last Supper, Weinel refuses to admit any idea of an atonement in the thought of Jesus.

After a chapter on the primitive community (which to our mind is too brief and inadequate), Weinel passes to Paul, from the canon of whose writings he excludes Ephesians and Colossians as well as the Pastorals. With Paul Christianity becomes subjective and psychological, an interpretation of the Apostle's own experience rather than an objective message. This is the chief difference between Paul and Jesus, though essentially they are far more closely related than is generally supposed. Paul was fully acquainted with the teaching of Jesus. Like him he insisted on an ethical redemption, and pierced the shell of the Law in order to reach the unity of an ideal. But while he grasped the true meaning of Jesus' teaching, he read it through his own experience and presented it in his own way.

What Paul seeks from religion is, above all, *power*—power to overcome not only moral hindrances, but the intrinsic weakness of the flesh and the dominion of evil spirits. The doctrine of Justification, therefore, is not the whole of Paulinism. Along

with the "righteousness of God," Paul aims at obtaining a redemption which is dynamical and metaphysical in its nature. The death of Christ is invested with a cosmical significance. It effects the overthrow of the powers hostile to man, in addition to its worth as an atoning sacrifice. Weinel is surely on doubtful ground when he seeks to explain the doctrine of the Atonement by Jewish sacrificial ideas. He puts the whole doctrine, however, in a clearer light by his proof that with Paul the guiding principle of the atonement is the love of God, not his honor or justice or holiness, as in the later theology.

The most suggestive part of the Pauline section is that which treats of Paul's mysticism. Weinel traces this element of the Apostle's thinking to three roots: the mystery-religions; the manifestations of the Spirit in the community; Paul's own experience of Christ. These influences all worked together, and it is wrong to emphasize any one of them to the exclusion of the others. The mystical side of Paulinism is regarded by Weinel as a sort of other religion, parallel to the redemption-religion, but never wholly identified with it. So far, indeed, as Paul relates his mysticism to the sacraments, he falls back on a type of religion which had no real place in Christianity. At the same time, his mysticism is ultimately independent of the sacraments, which only serve to focus for him the results of spiritual experience. In his account of Paul's Christology, Weinel assigns an altogether subordinate place to Jewish Messianic speculation. For the most part Paul thinks of Christ as the Heavenly Man; while at times he seems to conceive of him after the analogy of the mystery-gods, or as one with the Holy Spirit.

The theology subsequent to Paul is treated as a single whole, under the rubric of "The Christianity of the developing Church." This method of treatment has no doubt certain advantages. It brings to light the points of connection between the different theological forces which were working towards the catholicism of the second century; the later writings of the New Testament are made to illustrate one another, and stress is laid on the essential features of the development rather than on mere side-issues. But we are inclined to question the wisdom of the new arrangement. It is true that Ephesians, Hebrews, and the Fourth Gospel

all represent phases of a single movement, but each of them has an individuality which is blurred in the composite picture set before us by Weinel. To understand his view, say of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we require to turn to seven or eight different sections (Apologetic, Ethics, Mysticism, etc.), and piece together the references to the given writing. Even then, they are disconnected, and the relation, often so suggestive, of ethics to doctrine, ecclesiastical thought to mysticism, falls out of sight. The fault is hardly remedied by the rather clumsy device of an appendix in which the main conceptions of the various books are brought together in brief outline.

In this last part of his work, Weinel shows how sub-Pauline Christianity was moulded by historical conditions—the spread of the new religion among the proletariat of the great cities, the infiltration of Pagan and philosophical ideas, the strengthening of the church as an institution. The Jewish Christians divided into three parties, represented by Peter, James, and the extreme Judaists. Paulinism likewise took three directions: (a) Paul himself, who never absolutely broke with Judaism; (b) his heathen converts, whose anti-Jewish attitude we can discern in the Epistle to the Romans; (c) the radical, or Gnostic, sectaries. These various tendencies, by their conflict and interaction, produced catholic Christianity. Gnostic rationalism and the eschatological hope were both intensified; sacramental ideas became prominent; the Pauline doctrine of grace was maintained, but works were allowed a value alongside of grace. In the Johannine writings (i.e. the Gospel and the First Epistle) the Christ-mysticism of Paul merges in a God-mysticism, which is rendered possible by a new conception of God, peculiar to this writer. The simplicity of personal faith in God is transcended, and God is conceived under abstract categories as Spirit, Love, Light. Apocalyptic hopes are transformed into their inward and spiritual equivalents; and through the influence of mystical ideas, the Pauline certainty of salvation becomes metaphysical. In John, as in Paul, mysticism allies itself with sacramental doctrine, but with him also it is ultimately independent—the substance to which the sacraments supply a form. Weinel's account of the Johannine theology, though exceedingly fresh and able, is spoiled by the fault

of arrangement which we have already noted. The Fourth Gospel, more than any other New Testament writing, reflects a variety of interests, which are yet blended together harmoniously. When the ethical, polemical, ecclesiastical, philosophical, and mystical sides of its teaching are all detached from one another, we are apt to miss the peculiar essence which belongs to the Gospel as a whole.

The work of Feine<sup>2</sup> is mapped out according to the old divisions: the teaching of Jesus, the beliefs of the primitive community, Paul, the sub-Pauline writings taken one by one, the Johannine theology. Ephesians and Colossians are given to Paul, and even the question of the Pastorals is left open. It is considered probable that the Apocalypse is by the same author as the Gospel and Epistles of John, although due weight is allowed to arguments on the other side. About half of the large volume is allotted to the theology of Paul; and this, which is the most elaborate, is also, to our mind, the most valuable section of the book. The exposition of the teaching of Jesus is full and thorough, and like all the other sections is admirably clear in its summary of modern results; but we miss the vividness and penetration of Weinel. There is too much of an attempt to classify the ideas of Jesus according to a theological scheme, and their living and creative power is left unexplained.

As the guiding principle in his whole presentation, Feine takes the idea of the Messianic consciousness. Jesus claimed to be the Messiah, intrusted by God with the execution of his saving purposes, and on this claim all his teaching centred. The first disciples accepted the testimony of Jesus to himself, and verified it by religious experience. Paul interpreted this experience and brought it under theological conceptions, while John realized it in its fulness by finding in Jesus the absolute revelation of God. Now it may be granted that Jesus' consciousness of a unique relation to the Father was the ultimate basis and sanction of all his work; and in this sense the construction of Feine may be justified. But there can surely be little doubt that the Kingdom was the primary theme of his teaching, and that the claim to

<sup>2</sup>Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Von Paul Feine. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1910. pp. 714. 2te Auflage, 1911.



Messiahship grew out of his reflection on his own significance for the Kingdom. In reading the book generally, and the first section in particular, we have an uneasy feeling that the whole structure is made to rest on its apex.

Feine allows for a considerable development in the thought of the church before the appearance of Paul. He believes that the influence of the Jewish controversy on Paul has often been over-rated. Paul's doctrine was fixed in its main outlines before the controversy began, and was essentially the doctrine of the church from the beginning. Paul himself, though the first Christian theologian, was not a systematic thinker. Parts of his teaching were worked out with comparative fulness; parts were merely sketched, and were not brought into harmony with the main body of his thought. In fact, we are to regard Paulinism as a mosaic of doctrine, although it is also true that the whole is suggested by each part.

Feine examines with care and impartiality the various attempts to deduce the Pauline teaching from Jewish eschatology, Stoic speculation, Oriental Gnosis. To such views of its origin he concedes this much of truth, that Paul endeavored to express his doctrines, and even his most vital doctrines, in terms of contemporary thought. But he insists that the one true method is to start from Paul's religious experience. He clothes the revelation that came to him through Christ in forms provided for him by the thought of the age, not *vice versa*. Even in his Christ-mysticism he did not borrow anything essential from the Oriental cults, for none of these knew of an historical person, with a moral and religious significance. The two roots, then, of Paul's theology were (1) the self-witness of Jesus, (2) his own religious experience, especially that of his conversion. Paulinism cannot be understood except as the theological presentation of the historical fact of Jesus. What the age was longing for and striving to express in its myths and philosophies had for Paul become a reality.

In the doctrine of Justification the Pauline teaching finds its centre. Justification, indeed, is for Paul the whole of salvation; and we pervert his thought when we distinguish other processes supplementary to it. The man whom God has justified is also

actively righteous; he receives a new power, and is filled with the desire to attain to the highest moral ideal. In his statement of the doctrine Paul employs a Jewish conception, but entirely changes its content; and in like manner he deals with faith. In Judaism, faith was a work of merit; with Paul it consists in the willingness to receive God's grace, and even this willingness is wrought in men by God. Feine lays just emphasis on the idea, cardinal to Paul, that God always takes the initiative. Man is reconciled to God, not God to man; but the desire and capacity for reconciliation must be the work of God in a man's heart. Paul's whole teaching is based on this conception that everything is given by God, of his own free grace.

The mystical side of Paulinism is inadequately treated, and this is true likewise of the doctrine of the Spirit, which is so closely allied to it. Feine is over-anxious to maintain his thesis that Paul's one interest is in the moral and religious renewal effected by Christ. He acknowledges that the Spirit, in accordance with the thought of the time, is conceived semi-physically, and is supposed to work a change in man's nature as well as in his will. But he insists that all the time Paul is seeking to subordinate the natural to the moral categories. The affinities of Pauline thought with Gnosticism are barely recognized.

Before passing to the Johannine theology, Feine carefully reviews the intermediate writings; and his conclusions on most of them will be generally accepted, although he is apt to offer compromises which are not altogether happy. He grants, for instance, that first Peter is a sub-Pauline document, in which the teaching of Paul is diluted with popular ideas and used for the support of ethical exhortation. But he argues for the authority of Peter behind the Epistle, and concludes that Silvanus probably wrote it from hints which Peter supplied. In the chapter on the Apocalypse an admirable exposition is in some measure vitiated by the forlorn attempt to force the book into harmony with the Fourth Gospel. When he comes to the Fourth Gospel itself, Feine's attitude to the critical question is conservative, but he accepts in substance the modern view of the theology. John interprets the Synoptic picture of the life of Jesus through the medium of Pauline doctrine. He transcends the primitive escha-

tology, though in deference to the teaching of the church he makes occasional concessions to it which are inconsistent with his own thought. The Christology of the Prologue is that of the whole Gospel, and is based on the Logos-theory of Philo; yet the Gospel is something else than a history of the Logos. John fills the Philonic idea with a new content, and employs it in order that he may set forth in clear relief the divine character of the Person and work of Jesus. The conception of the Logos is blended throughout with that of Life, which, according to Feine, must be understood in a religious, not in a metaphysical or seminatural sense. Jesus, by the revelation of himself, brings us into a living fellowship with God.

In this brief sketch it has been possible only to indicate a few of the more characteristic features of the two presentations. As was inevitable, the writers differ continually, not only in their mode of treatment, but in their estimates and conclusions. More striking, however, than the differences are the many elements of agreement in these two works, written from points of view which we have been used to think of as conflicting. There seems good reason to believe that conservative and radical scholars are gradually throwing off their old attitude of mere antagonism. They are beginning to realize that, although they have set out from opposite sides, they are working towards the same goal and will finally shake hands.

Apart from numberless agreements in points of detail, we may note several of the broader lines of approximation which are revealed in the two books before us. (1) It is no longer denied that even the earliest Christianity was in some measure composite. Feine is no less willing than Weinel to allow for the influence of contemporary movements in philosophy and religion. He grants that the permanent message of the gospel was expressed in forms that were borrowed from the age, and requires, in some measure, to be disengaged from them. (2) These alien influences are coming to be recognized as secondary. For a long time yet we may have to reckon with theories that Paulinism was nothing but a Jewish or Oriental theosophy, that the Fourth Gospel was a belated Philonic treatise, that Jesus himself was concerned wholly

with the apocalyptic hope. But these extreme views are becoming less and less tenable, and the essential originality of the Christian movement is steadily asserting itself. Now that the first flush of discovery is over, the new factors which were supposed to explain everything are subsiding into their place. Due weight must always be assigned to them, but the New Testament scholar has to reach beyond them to that which was native and specific in Christian thought. (3) The theory of sharp antagonisms among the early teachers of the church has now been abandoned. Some conflict there undoubtedly was, but we are learning to realize that the different parties were far closer to one another than was formerly supposed. Instead of a development through strife, there was an orderly progress, due partly to the operation of new influences, and partly to the gradual unfolding of ideas that had been present from the beginning. (4) As to the general course which the progress followed, there is now little difference of opinion. It is admitted that after the death of Paul his ideas were combined with others of a more popular character. It is admitted, likewise, that the Fourth Gospel, whatever may have been its origin, presupposes the theology of Paul. In spite of many obscurities in matters of detail, the broad stages of the development are so well ascertained that New Testament doctrine can now be treated historically.

But while the comparison of these two books affords evidence of results now practically assured, it also reminds us of the many questions which still await a further investigation. It will be enough to mention only a few of the more important. (1) All scholars are now agreed that the thought of Jesus contained a large apocalyptic element, but we have still to determine its precise nature and extent. Above all, the relation of the apocalyptic to the moral and religious aspects of the teaching is altogether uncertain. (2) The beliefs of the earliest community and their connection with Jesus' message of the Kingdom have never been adequately examined. In the two books before us, just as in the older works, the primitive theology is treated in a meagre and perfunctory fashion. We are left with the impression that between Jesus and Paul there was a confused interval, in which the new religion was in danger of narrowing down into a mere sect of

Judaism. It can hardly be doubted, however, that this interval, of which we know so little, was the true formative period of Christian thought and belief. A closer analysis of the data, scanty and uncertain as they are, may yet reveal to us the line of continuity from the teaching of Jesus to that of Paul and the later church. (3) The whole subject of Paulinism is full of unsolved problems. It may be granted that the old conception of Paul as a systematic thinker was a mistaken one; but the modern account of his theology as a mosaic of disconnected fragments is even more unsatisfying. One cannot but feel that the true key to Paulinism has yet to be discovered. The apparent contradictions which it presents to us are due to our ignorance quite as much as to any want of system and cohesion in the Apostle's own thought. (4) The doctrine of the Spirit requires to be considered more fully, in its many-sided bearing on the life and theology of the early church. It is only in recent years that an intelligent study of this doctrine has become possible; and our understanding of it is still very far from adequate. Its background in Jewish, Oriental, and philosophical thought has only been partially determined, and the course of its development within the New Testament itself has never been traced out with sufficient thoroughness. Why did the idea of the Spirit assume such prominence in the early community? How far and in what sense was it derived from Jesus himself? Through what changes did it pass in its elaboration by Paul and the Fourth Evangelist? How was it related to the doctrines of baptism, the church, the new life? These questions have not yet been really answered, and they are vital to the whole theology of the New Testament. (5) A more careful inquiry must be made into the history of apocalyptic ideas in the early church. At present we are unable to determine whether the apocalyptic hope became stronger or weaker after Jesus' death; whether the evangelists, in deference to later feeling, have toned down this side of his message or exaggerated it. We cannot say how far the life of the church was controlled by eschatological and how far by purely moral and spiritual motives. The merging of apocalyptic in mystical thought, as we find it in the Fourth Gospel, has never been fully explained. (6) The great Christological problem still baffles us

—indeed it has become more difficult than ever. Modern investigation has all tended to make it certain that the divinizing of Jesus began much earlier than the criticism of the last century would allow. The process was already completed, as Weinel is willing to admit, in the lifetime of Paul. How are we to account for this estimate of Jesus, which overstepped the Messianic categories almost from the beginning? These are only a few of the more outstanding questions that are now pressing for a solution; and, apart from these, almost every book of the New Testament offers its own peculiar problems. In the case of many of the writings theological and critical difficulties are bound up together. The critical analysis must be carried a good deal further before any treatment of the theology can be other than provisional.

As yet, therefore, we have by no means reached the end in the investigation of New Testament thought. The field at first sight appears a narrow one, and multitudes of scholars have been working in it diligently for a hundred years; but all the progress has only served to reveal the largeness and complexity of the task. We were ready to believe at the close of the last century that at least the main positions had been securely established, and ever since then materials have been accumulating which have compelled us to build afresh. A dozen years ago the apocalyptic groundwork of Jesus' teaching was barely suspected; the influence of the Oriental cults on Paulinism was hardly dreamed of. These two factors, so recently discovered, have changed the whole current of New Testament inquiry; and who can doubt that others, no less significant, will yet come to light? It will be long before the final exposition of New Testament theology can be written; but meanwhile we are thankful for books so excellent as those which have been reviewed. They summarize with admirable clearness and fairness the latest results of scholarship, and define the points of departure for a fresh advance.

## THE REINSTATEMENT OF TELEOLOGY

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The question about the whence and whither of the drift of our cosmic weather is an old one and cannot be lightly brushed aside. It is both a forced and a momentous issue. It is a forced issue, because we cannot help taking an attitude towards it, whether we make it explicit to ourselves or not. It is momentous, because such an attitude is a serious index of our deepest practical faith as regards the value of life, and cannot help determining our conduct. There have been three distinct types of theory in the past as regards this drift—Mechanism, Finalism, and Vitalism.

### I. THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

1. *Mechanism.* In considering mechanism, we must be careful not to be misled by the name, which is after all but a figure of speech. The view of the scientific naturalist of today has little in common with the mechanical theory of the eighteenth century. His interest, as must always be the case with science, is in efficient causes, and in so far he is not committed to any special type of metaphysics. He is but trying to discover the determining factors in the series of dynamic situations which occur in experience. As regards the constitution of these situations he is not necessarily an abstract atomist. It is true that the atomic hypothesis in chemistry and Mendel's theory of unit characters in biology have proved highly convenient in studying chemical and biological processes, but recent scientific research has shown that such an atomism, if taken in the abstract, breaks down. The Mendelian units, for example, are not effective as abstract elements. They figure within dynamic situations which they enable us to predict. Sometimes two unit-characters may figure as one for the purpose of prediction. In any case we must take account of the dynamic context in order to have satisfactory explanation.

This is equally true of other biological abstractions, such as sex determinants. They are, after all, abstractions, and only efficient in the situations in which they figure and which we cannot afford to ignore. The mechanical view, in the science of the present day, amounts to this, that in the case of life as well as in the inorganic world we must examine the chemical constitution of the process. We must analyze the dynamic situation into its chemical factors and their positional values. The effects of the presence and absence of these factors must be discovered, their quantitative variations in the situations under experimental control must be studied, and the effects of external conditions noted. There is no metaphysical short cut to an understanding of the process of life, any more than to an understanding of other dynamic processes.

As for the unique chemical compounds which pertain to living organisms, natural science, accepting them as facts as it accepts other actual compounds, is inclined to assume continuity as between the organic and inorganic, and to reduce the difference to one of complexity. The chemist's success in artificially producing "organic" substances in the laboratory—a success which has been ever increasing since the organic compound of urea was artificially produced a century or more ago—has stimulated the naturalist to believe that it may hereafter be possible to produce living protoplasm out of what we call inorganic elements, or at any rate that our failure to do so in the past is due to our ignorance and not to any inherent absurdity in the idea.

Now if the attitude of mechanism be understood in this naturalistic sense, nothing can be said against its procedure. Its results in successful prediction have been truly marvellous, considering the short time for which the method has been seriously tried. The revising of special hypotheses must be dictated by the facts, not by any *a priori* objections. Thus it is now generally recognized that the Darwinian hypothesis of natural selection, epoch-making as it was and useful as it still is, is only a partial account of the facts. Natural selection is a negative factor in evolution. As Driesch puts it, to regard natural selection "as a positive factor in descent would be to confound the sufficient reason for the non-existence of what is not with the sufficient reason of what is."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, VII, 321.



The positive ground for variation and continuity must be found within the process.

The only question that can be raised as to the mechanistic hypothesis is whether it is adequate as an ultimate philosophy. Can this external and seemingly blind dynamism which appears in inorganic nature account for the direction of the process, and for the outcome as we find it in the higher stages of life? Can we read the whole history of the universe solely in terms of the categories which have proved so convenient on the simpler levels of existence? The postulate of continuity should apply, it would seem, as well when read from above down as when read from below up. And, after all, we have a much more intimate knowledge of processes and their implications in the highest stages, of which our will and ideals are a part, than we can ever possess of the dynamism of the lower stages of nature. In the former case we have a first-hand acquaintance with the inner transitions and unities; in the latter we are at best outside and speculative spectators.

2. *Finalism.* Finalism, as opposed to mechanism, has always taken the point of view that we must judge evolution by its outcome, its last stages. We know the potentialities of the acorn when we have seen it grow up as the oak, of the child when its capacities are displayed in the grown man. So we must know nature by its outcome in our own striving for ideals. Under the theory of mechanism, the process is accounted for by the factors discoverable in the previous stage of the sequence, together with the external conditions which play upon them; for finalism the causality lies in the future, in the prospective value of the process.

For working out this view we must go back to Plato and Aristotle as models. In opposition to the naturalistic method of their day, they insisted that evolution must be explained by its purpose, the idea, or form, to which it tends. The two Greek thinkers differ somewhat in details, but Plato must be regarded as the original master of this type of view.

For Plato the world of sense, the existence of which he does not deny, is but a poor effort to copy a world of eternal ideas. These alone are real. On this theory of a copy, Plato is driven to assume

that there are as many ideas not only as there are ideals and class-types, but as there are individuals and types of relations. This forces him eventually to regard mathematics as the type of the real, since only here can he find ideal possibilities adequate to the originals of the distorted shadows which make up the phenomenal world. With this phenomenal world Plato manifests a poetic impatience. He would not trouble himself with the mechanism of movement, so important to Aristotle. He would go directly to the end, which is the Good. Aristotle, while he largely copies his master, places more confidence in the world of actual process, in the potentialities of matter. The concrete process is the first reality. But this process finds its explanation in the conception of a goal to which it tends, its final cause. Here shows the artistic consciousness of the Greek; life and nature, too, work as the artist. In either of these views the end is conceived as the moving cause.

But obviously the end cannot be conceived to be consciously present in the case of the lower processes. How can they then develop in the direction of their characteristic activities? In other words, how can the form be effective? Since God is the goal and final cause of the movement of the universe, how does God act upon the world? Here Aristotle wavers between two methods. He sometimes speaks in quite mechanical terms. God gives a push from without to the outer circle of the universe, and thus makes it move. But the more characteristic method of Aristotle is to look upon God as self-contained activity and bliss, moving the world by his perfection. The beloved does not need to do anything to the lover; for the lover is moved by the beauty of the beloved. So the universe moves because it desires perfection. This perfection, moreover, is different for different classes; vegetable, animal, or human, each moves to realize its own proper function, its characteristic soul.

Hence it is necessary, in order to explain the diversity of the process, to assume in addition to God a multiplicity of forms,—entelechies, or conceptions. Just what relation these bear to the final form, God, Aristotle does not tell us; he takes them for granted from experience. His faith in the concrete process, however, gives him the advantage that he can regard the process

itself as really moving, and also that he can make this concrete process bear part of the responsibility. Thus the individuality of the process is due not to its form but to its matter. Hence forms are genera, not particulars. Here again his solution of the problem is tantalizingly vague. And naturally he has little to say about immortality, that is, the final significance of the individual.

A more serious question is why the process should desire the form. What relation do the conceptions, or entelechies, bear to the process itself? If they did not exist as second realities, would it make any difference to the process? Would not the process move by its own immanent tendency? In that case the conceptions, serving as final causes, would seem to be after-thoughts. But Aristotle is too anthropomorphic to be troubled by such questions; for him to the end it is the conceptions which move matter, although "only the master-workers know the reason why. Manual workers, like lifeless things, work by habit."

That there is truth in the finalist's contention we shall find abundant reason to see. But the solution suggested by Plato and Aristotle is far too easy and abstract. A biologist of the present day, Driesch, has attempted to give Aristotle's view a more modern and scientific statement. Driesch insists that we cannot account for the prospective value of the parts of protoplasm, as shown especially in restitution and heredity, unless we introduce entelechies. "An entelechy means the faculty of achieving '*forma essentialis*.'" Now these entelechies, while figuring in the process, are not on the one hand psychological entities, nor on the other are they energies. They can, however, be best understood from psychological analogies. They are selective. They perform functions which resemble judging and liking, willing and thinking. Yet, while they are not energies, they can under certain conditions suspend the energetic reactions; and they have a regulative function in the process. But while Driesch's attempt to get away from the anthropomorphism of Aristotle is commendable, it must be said that Aristotle's final causes are at least intelligible, being drawn from our experience of certain processes where they do hold. Driesch's entelechies seem to have no meaning at all; they are merely duplicates of the selective and

prospective tendencies of the process. Moreover, such a selective function is by no means limited to the organic realm; we find it, though with less complicated working, in the chemical affinities. In any case, it is hard to see what we have gained by hypostatizing such tendencies and giving them a Greek name.

3. *Vitalism.* Mechanism and classical finalism deal with partial aspects of the processes. Vitalism attempts to find a common denominator for the process as a whole.

Bergson and others have pointed out with great clearness that the correlative growth of organs and functions in organic life, for example in the eye, could not be accounted for by mere accidental variations and natural selection. If in any one part such variations were considerable and abrupt, as in the case of mutations, they would only interfere the more with the functioning of the organ. If they were small they might not interfere, but they would have to accumulate through ages, and correlative changes in this and other organs would have to take place, so as to produce harmonious adjustment or adaptive functioning. This is almost impossible to conceive on the basis of chance.

So with the different directions in which evolution has proceeded. These directions must be implied in the process, even though we can only read them backwards, as at sea we read the direction of the ship's movement from the silver wake where we have passed.

As between mechanism and conceptional finalism Bergson suggests the middle ground of *vital impulse*, in which is implied the complexity that afterwards appears when evolution splits up in the struggle with the environment, as the potential effects of the sky-rocket appear when it bursts in the air. The most important of these tendencies are the split of life into the vegetable and animal and the dissociation of mind into instinct and intelligence. Evolution is division. In the division, however, there remains a suggestion of the other side; some common characters, however secondary, abide. Plant-life carries a blend of the animal; intelligence, a blend of instinct. The progress and continuity of the process are to be accounted for by the push from behind of the common vital impulse.

Whether this vital impulse, as a distinct determinant in the

evolution of life, must be added to the chemical determinants with which naturalism deals, must be decided by scientific evidence. Once admit creative evolution in general, and recognize in particular that every compound must be regarded as a creative result, possessing a new and unique set of reactions, and not a mere addition of the separately known characters of the elements which enter into it, and the conceptual difficulty disappears. Whether, as externally viewed, life itself can be regarded as a compound, or whether, to produce in life some new factor must be supposed to have been added from without, must be decided upon evidence. At present the difficulties of conceiving that life was introduced from outside into our planet seem at least as great as those of the theory that it arose from certain antecedent conditions on our planet. In any case, we are dealing essentially with mechanism. Vital impulse, as pictured by Bergson, is no less blind than the elements of chemistry. Its structure, in order to account for all the diversity of life, must be no less atomic than science has pictured the physical structure to be. Moreover, synthesis would seem to be as characteristic of evolution as division; and if so, why may not life itself be regarded as a new synthesis, under specific conditions, in the creative process?

The trouble with the vital impulse is that, like any conception which tries to explain everything, it explains nothing. We still have the diversity of the process, with its direction, to account for. To say that what does happen can happen, is self-evident; and that is all that vitalism tells us. In trying to explain everything from below, the higher from the more primitive, it is pragmatically indistinguishable from the naturalistic mechanism which it condemns. The latter at least furnishes the only empirically fruitful method of investigating the apparent sequences of life. To account for the direction or meaning of the process we must have something besides a blind *vis a tergo*. What this means we must presently see more in detail.

It is at least infinitely improbable that mere chance or mere external conjunction, whether in terms of vitalism or of chemical mechanism, should have accomplished the results of organization, with the compensatory adjustments involved in the evolution of life and mind. There must be some continuity which

enables us to read down from the higher as well as read up from the lower.

It is also unlikely that *all* life is a compound having the potentiality of the development of the higher forms with their awakening ideals. It is easier to suppose that life, as Maxwell supposes in regard to matter, has its omniscient sorting demon who interpenetrates and selects in accordance with certain standards. In other words, the natural order must be thought of as interpenetrated by an intelligent order. Aristotle's failure to make form (in the sense of ideal conceptions) effective, and his recourse to mechanical push to move the universe, should show us that form, in order to be efficient, must dip into the dynamic process itself, whether in a personal or impersonal way. In the plastic responsiveness of the natural order to this, the unseen order, would in that case lie its capacity for progress. This plasticity becomes more and more apparent in the higher orders of life with their vast complexity of possibilities and their organization for action. The nervous system is peculiarly the type of plastic responsiveness both to the unseen order which overarches and permeates and to the sense-order which establishes the immediate conditions of survival.

## II. A NEW TELEOLOGY SUGGESTED

We have little sympathy today with Plato's "heavenly pattern" and Aristotle's "final causes," that is, with ideal conceptions as determining existence and survival. We are apt to think of the process of evolution as blindly accomplishing its course as a result of internal and external accidents. At best, some would say, it is only in retrospect that nature finds that some ways of doing things seem good and so strives to preserve them. Mind itself, with its ideals, some have come to treat in this retrospective way. And any emphasis on ideals has been promptly treated as an hypostasis of our own abstractions. Chance variation is regarded as the mother of mind and form, ideals are but indications of the drift, not its cause.

Even on this materialistic view, some use may be found for the "final form" of Aristotle. It represents, at any rate, the way

we look back upon the series after its conclusion. Ideals and types, as our measures, form *a posteriori* a convenient instrument for viewing the flux, and furnish a certain subjective satisfaction. But can we stop here? Is the type, the "final form," a mere result of accident? Could the direction of the organic process, or of social ideals, have been the opposite, if accident had so decreed? Is there no objective way of reading the series? Does it appear as it does simply because we happen to be at this end of it? And when life repeats itself, with seemingly new efforts to reproduce a type, is this sufficiently accounted for by accident? Could thought have been constituted entirely otherwise? Is the whole story of life, from the chaotic protoplasm from which it started to the striving for truth and beauty, all a matter of blind variations operated on by a blind environment?

However fully such a picture may do justice to our ignorance, it yet does not satisfy our reason. From the point of view of reason it is easier to read nature as striving to express certain types or ideals than to read ideals as chance. Nature seems to be, somehow, leading in the direction of human nature; the striving for a type somehow to be determining the direction of the series; and freedom and significant expression of life to be all the time the end to be realized.

I admit the difficulty of making this clear. But as a faith it ought to have at any rate the same opportunity as the materialistic faith in blind chance. If in our ignorance it makes the transitions of the facts easier for us, that gives it a pragmatic advantage over the more shocking rival faith. And I must confess that to me the conclusion of a process in the appreciation of truth and beauty is more reasonably accounted for in a universe which has a fundamental formal character and, as such, is selective than in a universe in which this idealization is an accident. On such reasonableness we may finally have to rest our mode of understanding the significance of evolution. Some may call this a mere temperamental preference. In that case the temperament remains to be accounted for. To me this seems like a fundamental demand for coherence and unity, while chance, formless happening, is fundamentally irrational—an apotheosis of our ignorance of the *modus operandi* of nature.

Whether the final cause operates through the inner yearning of the process for its type, its final realization, or whether the efficiency of the final cause means the operation in the universe of an ideal will, after the analogy of the artist, interpenetrating our finite world of process, selecting and rejecting with reference to the realization of the type—star type or man type—must again be decided by our experience, fragmentary as this is. Different ages and minds find one or the other of these attitudes more congenial. In any case the form would in some sense pre-exist in the process; and in any case evolution would mean the differentiation of the organs for the proper realization of this form and, in man at least, for the significant sharing of it.

The ultimate theory of evolution must include both mechanism and finalism. For the time being, in predicting and controlling the process, we must work by efficient causes. Science has no choice in this matter. On the other hand, we must admit that the ideal selection of the later stages has some continuity with the earlier stages. When we try to read the process in the large, at any rate, we must somehow recognize the direction within it. We may choose to ignore the final reason of things, and limit ourselves to the description of sequences; but it nevertheless remains true that in part of the process formal selection is a reality, and no fair account can be given of evolution without recognizing this part and its relation to the race. Invariable sequence, habit, recapitulation, and other external forms of linkage are but names for the facts. They merely indicate that facts do repeat themselves; they are not explanations. In some way the formal categories of which we become conscious in human nature must reveal to us the tendencies of nature; in some way the blossom on the tree of evolution must be indicative of the process which brought it into existence. The universe must be such as to account for the ideals which are a part of our experience as well as for the externality and blindness which we find. And as man in his small way, by his selection and emphasis of certain types of universe, is creative, so we must suppose that the process of which he is a part is likewise creative. This need not mean that the later stages are present bodily in the earlier, or that the earlier stages work by "conceptions," but it means that somehow the categories which



the later idealizing process brings to bear upon the earlier are germane to these earlier and not accidental.

Of the two conceptions, the mechanistic and the teleological, the latter is the one that overlaps. By means of laws familiar to us in the later purposive stages we can account for the automatism, the mechanism, the seeming deadness, of the world. By means of mechanism we cannot account for the seeming plasticity and value in parts of the process, at least not without falling back upon the miraculous, and so doing violence to our original concept. If we deny the reality of mind and ideals, we cannot account for the sense of promise of the world and of its openness toward the future, however convenient the conception of mechanism may be in epitomizing the past. In some way we must recognize emphasis and preferential selection, for human nature is part of nature.

That a universe should tend to realize a certain form is no more mysterious than that animals should turn toward or away from the light, or that the elements should attract or repel each other. In any case, in the last analysis we must fall back upon the constitution of reality as discovered in experience, and regard that as reasonable which works out. That a possibility of reasonableness should exist in a world which evolves reason seems certainly a reasonable demand.

It is the naturalistic materialist who has violated the principle of continuity in nature by cutting the higher stages of the process loose from the earlier. Why the materialist, who is always emphasizing continuity, should turn round when it comes to human nature and its ideals, and here insist upon discontinuity, a complete break, absolute irrelevance to what precedes, can be explained only as the result of prejudice. He had rather make any sacrifice than give up his faith in the adequacy of the mechanical method of reading the facts. If we would be fair, must we not insist that human nature, with the ideals which it brings to light, reveals truly and fundamentally the drift of nature? If we make nature responsible for evolution, then we must at any rate give nature full credit. We must keep in mind that thought, right, and beauty are as much expressions of nature as is the law of falling bodies. The whole history of evolution, including institutions,

science, and art, must be somehow prefigured in the nature of the universe as a whole. The after-form which we read in retrospect must somehow be foreshadowed in the process which terminates in it and which makes such reading possible. Consciousness but reveals, it does not make, the categories which guide mind in its higher activity.

Thus both the mechanical and the teleological categories must run through the various stages of evolution, however different their concrete richness and significance become with the varying complexity of the process. And this may be true irrespective of the stuff in which these categories express themselves. We have material mechanism and spiritual mechanism; and why not material teleology as well as spiritual teleology—just as the genius of the artist may express his meaning in marble, on canvas, in tones, or by means of words? The body is different, the limitations which the material sets are different, but the ideal laws are the same.

If we take even the categories of mechanism, we are most familiar with those which are expressed in terms of our own mental life, for memory and habit are categories of mechanism. As in the mechanical categories we can trace the identity between the higher processes of memory-association and the lower processes of perceptual habit and automatic activities, so we can trace the identity of the categories of external mental coherence with the categories of external coherence in the non-conscious world. Whether we use the term habit or some other term to indicate this universality of mechanism is a matter of convenience. If we cannot surely say, with C. S. Peirce, that matter is "mind hide-bound with habit," we can say that mechanism, in the sense of external determination, overlaps mind and matter, and has essentially the same categories in each.

On the analogy of memory, or rather by the use of categories which we must regard as identical and which are applicable both to the mechanism of memory and to the simpler forms of mechanism, we can account for, or at any rate throw light upon, processes which at first seem mysterious enough. In the case of memory, each part has by its position a certain function whereby it brings into the field of consciousness certain other parts. In other words,

the memory-mechanism is a constellation of mutually determining parts each able to restore other parts within the cluster. The mechanism is not absolute, there are minor fluctuations even in reproductive imagination; the situations are sufficiently identical for recognition with its feeling of familiarity, but new details have been added, old details have dropped out, and the tone of the situation may be greatly changed. In practical life we pass over these fluctuations as of no consequence to the process. In productive imagination, on the other hand, new types of universals are brought to light, which become permanent parts of our ideal activity.

In spite of the greater complexity of the process in the higher stages and the consciousness which accompanies it there, it is easy to see the fundamental identity of the operation of nature here with those operations which we find in the lower stages, such as heredity and the restitution (within greater or smaller limits) of parts. In each of these cases we have to do, whether in a material or mental way, with the positional value of a part within a constellation and its power to restore its context, whether this context be the space-context of a pattern of parts, simultaneously and mutually supplementing one another, or a time-context, where the parts blend into one another and constitute a sequential whole, as in the stages of the life of an organism or the movement of a melody. Some writers have called this positional potentiality of parts on the level of unconscious life organic memory. It is truer, however, to regard memory as a highly specialized form of the more universal tendency of reproduction of parts, with their fluctuations or mutations.

Thus it seems that certain mechanical categories are common to our minds and to the rest of reality. The preservation of a type, the tendency of one part to restore the rest of its complex, seems to be common to the mechanism of ideal and to that of lower activity. On the teleological side, too, we have reason to believe that there must be similar identity—elementary formal categories running through the process as a whole, whether inorganic, organic, or ideal selection—not limited to mind but present in some way, however unconscious, in the lower stages. There seems to be a tendency toward clearness and distinctness, toward

economy in relationships. That is why the fundamental postulate of simplicity has proved so convenient both in our theoretical and practical adjustments to our world.

That nature has, as it were, an aesthetic sense, that it operates so as to produce clearness and distinctness, is shown throughout its whole range of development. The inorganic world, as well as the organic, seems to respond to our ideal demands for simple formulation, for distinct types. Physical harmony follows the simplest ratios, as was pointed out by Helmholtz. The light rays move in straight lines, the chemical elements seem to fall into a "natural series," with relations that can be mathematically predicted. In the organic world nature likewise demands clearness and distinctness; the protean fluctuations fail to survive. Only the mutations, the distinct types, continue in heredity. Again, the mixture of species either gives rise to no offspring or produces sterility; or in the case of more approximate species a final reversion to the original type takes place in accordance with Mendel's law. Finally, in ideal creativeness and psychological heredity clearness and distinctness is the law. Here our conscious aim is to eliminate the irrelevant and make the type, or universal, stand out. Only the clear and distinct types succeed in becoming a permanent part of individual memory and social history. The infinite minor fluctuations come and go. We may therefore assume that the law which nature manifests in its highest creativeness and of which we are aware in our ideal production, namely, the law of clearness and distinctness, is identical with the law which governs nature throughout its various stages, and that the highest manifestations of this law differ from the lower primarily in the freedom and spontaneity with which the law realizes itself in the former. An immanent form in any case leads nature onward. While the law becomes conscious in the higher stages, it does not follow that it originates there. On the contrary it comes to our creative activity as a presupposition or command, as the voice of the universe.

This demand for clearness and distinctness in nature is seen even where there is mutation and instability. In a universal process the demand for clearness and distinctness necessarily

presents an infinite problem. In the case of the radio-active elements we seem to have such a case of mutation and instability in the natural series of elements. In the organic series periods of stability seem to alternate with periods of mutation. But in each case the spontaneity of nature illustrates the law or tendency which nature is ever striving to realize, and which is shown all the more strikingly because in places the process is still open and is striving for a new equilibrium.

Science, therefore, even of the most naturalistic kind postulates more than it knows, more than the blind mechanism with which it professes to work. It posits by its own faith and persistent effort, as it verifies by its success, that the universe must lend itself to ideals of simplicity and unity, that those laws which we discover for ourselves in the higher creative activities are relevant to our world, in brief that in a large sense the universe is fundamentally teleological. For us thus to strive to conquer the universe is part of the universe. The imperishable faith on the part of this piece of animated clay that, in spite of seeming defeat, it can yet make its demands prevail, that our will can in a measure reconstruct a world which shall be clear and distinct in its relationships in spite of seeming chaos—this faith is evidence of the voice of the universe, of its push toward ideal realization. By virtue of this, “hope springs eternal in the human breast.” This faith is more fundamentally pious than our short-cuts by way of an anthropomorphic God. The trouble with so much of our thinking, both of the mechanical and teleological type, is that it has been truncated. It lacks thoroughness.

Geometry, mathematical simplification, is but this faith in clearness and distinctness reduced to its ultimate terms. It is the idealizing process in the abstract, outstripping, as it comes to consciousness in us, its concrete limitations. And so form appears as limit to our finite experience; yet, when you bring back this faith to our motley world, how convenient it proves, how well our world lends itself to it, irrespective of stuff, so as to make it seem that the universe “geometrizes”! And in a deep sense it does; for both the seemingly opaque world we strive to know and our thought are part and parcel of one process; in their formal pre-suppositions they are one. Nature owns and moulds mind into

its own requirements. If the processes in the universe, from the stellar movements to the harmonic relations of music and the minute relations in the structure of things, seek geometrical and arithmetical patterns, this is not because our thinking regulates the processes, but because in the laws of our thinking we discover the pure manifestations of the inherent form, not obscured by the concrete transitions and changes of process.

That, again, our conceptualizing should prove approximate is inevitable in a moving world. In such a world form must ever manifest itself as tendency or direction—as an ought. Absolute our ideal formulations could only prove in a world which had completely settled or encrusted itself. But such a universe would be dead. Process, transmutation, creativeness, is of the nature of reality and must be accepted as such. That nature is creative and not merely reproductive of ready-made universals is shown both on the plane of the unconscious origination of the lower levels of nature and on the plane of ideal creativeness. Organically, nature is ever creating and fixing new types; and in our ideal constructions this is no less true. If on the organic level nature is prodigal in her experiment, she is no less prodigal on the ideal level. How few poems, pictures, laws, practical plans, out of the myriads evolved, answer the permanent ideal demands of the race!

If nature stands in relation to its processes as an artist attempting to express a form—a form not foreign to itself but its own implicit or explicit constitution—then we must regard natural selection and artificial selection as part of the same activity, differing only in their degree of conscious direction and significance. The latter is itself a result of the demand for clearness and distinctness of functioning on the part of nature. In natural selection this formal demand realizes itself automatically in the flux of process. Just as the stone rolls back again to the bottom unless it reaches the top of the hill, so life tumbles back to the inchoate plane from which it tried to rise unless it reaches a clear and distinct type. On the level of thought, however, where nature is more or less clearly conscious of her aim, the process of so-called “artificial” selection is far more economical and efficient. Not only can ages of unconscious experimenting be

foreshortened, but results of clearness and distinctness can be attained which blind groping never could reach. And with it all, there is added, on this plane, the consciousness of value with its infinite richness.

It is not a case of natural laws in the spiritual world or of spiritual laws in the natural world, but of certain laws prevailing throughout the process of the universe, expressing themselves in the limitations of each particular stage and stuff in which they operate, just as the categories of art are fundamentally the same whether the stuff be marble, tone, or the body of language. What makes the law in each case clear is the interpenetration of the same identical form. The various energies are fundamentally run through with the same categories. It is a case of our reasonable reading of our world.

Two questions yet remain, namely, the character of this formal constitution and the question of its effectiveness in our world of process. Before taking up these questions, it is necessary to say a word about the internal conditions governing the continuity of process. For the present purpose, the elementary facts in the constitution of process may be considered as three: (1) the fluency of process, which makes it overflow our abstract types, producing ever new fluctuations and mutations; (2) the mechanical aspect of process which makes its flow crystallize, provisionally at least, into certain structures, making it possible to predict and control its flow; (3) the formal requirements which condition the direction and intelligibility of the process.

Coming back to our first question, How do forms pre-exist, or what forms are presupposed? I do not believe that it is necessary to assume an indefinite number of forms as do Plato and Aristotle. True, Aristotle limited the forms to class-forms and depended upon the concrete process to differentiate these into individuals. I would make the formal requirements still more general—the same for the process as a whole. These formal requirements, as I have shown, can be reduced in the last analysis to the demand for clearness and distinctness as regards the transitions and relations within the process. Variations, smaller or larger are ever produced; they tend to crystallize—to be retained and to reproduce their contexts by virtue of the inherent mechan-

ism of process. But they survive in the process, so far as internal conditions are concerned, only if they fulfil the formal requirements of clearness and distinctness. Neither the types nor the individuals are predetermined as such. But when in the course of the transmutations they do arise, they must, in order to survive, obey certain formal laws—laws which are also fundamental in our understanding and appreciation of our world.

Of course, besides the internal conditions of survival, there are the external conditions which fix what types can survive in the particular environment, simple or complex, low or high, as it may be. But these can only eliminate, they cannot make types permanent.

These external conditions cannot be conceived in merely material terms. There is more than one level of environment. If we take into account merely the simplest environment, the micro-organisms are better adapted to it than we are. They were here before us, and will remain for ages after the earth becomes uninhabitable for the higher forms of life. Some of them are adapted to withstand the temperature of liquid air.

There seem to be certain plateaus, levels or crusts of life, more or less rhythmically formed. These have their own unique conditions for survival. In social life we have certain levels in the way of custom and tradition; then there comes a loosening of the crust and a period of agitation and rearrangement. This in turn is followed by a new level of equilibrium with new selective conditions for the individual. The same seems to be true of life on the organic level. Here, too, periods of stability of species are found to alternate with periods of mutation. And thus new levels are reached with new external conditions for survival.

As regards the effectiveness of form, Plato and Aristotle have shown that in higher ideal realization it is not necessary that the form should itself move in order to produce movement, that is, that the form should possess energy. The beloved may be indifferent to the lover. Beauty moves us by its perfection, not by its sensuous body. What is true in the higher activities may be true of the lower. Substituting energy or tendency for love, we may say that energy seeks a geometrical or arithmetical pattern, seeks simplicity of relationships, though the limits



which it seeks do not act upon it. They are in fact part of its constitution. The laws of logic do not act upon the process of thought. They are implied in it. And thought is but nature's reflection upon itself.

### III. MATTER AND GOD

In closing, something must be said about the metaphysical nature of the world in which form is realized. There has been in recent times much sentimental inveighing against the meanness and blindness of matter. Now that depends primarily upon definition. With some noble, rugged materialists the conception of matter is decidedly thick—rich in possibilities. Democritus, Hobbes, and Priestley deny nothing to matter that could make the world plausible. They attribute to matter all the pragmatic consequences with which experience makes us acquainted, including mind and ideals. With Democritus, while mind is reduced to fire-atoms, it loses nothing of its efficacy and dignity on that account. For Hobbes, consciousness itself is a property of matter and so not foreign to the world. Priestley's materialistic hypothesis does not interfere with his religious devoutness. The great prophets of Israel, who gave us our fundamental ethical and religious ideals, thought of the world, including the human soul—"the breath" of man, in material terms. With all these, matter covers the whole range of potentialities from inorganic nature to a deistic God. Tyndall could not cease to marvel at the potentialities of matter. When we should understand them, all would be clear. With this thick conception of matter, teleological idealism need not have any quarrel. Matter rises to any emergency, since the conception can be enlarged to meet the case. It would be principally a question of convenience whether we should use such a concept.

The tendency, however, has not been absent to narrow the conception of matter to the anti-teleological, or mechanical, interest, and thus to contrast matter with mind—which under such a view becomes a sort of miraculous accident. Such a conception still leaves much to admire; the body with its delicate adjustments and intricacies shows wondrous possibilities even when

contrasted with mind. Even the pale nobility of the face of a dead friend challenges our reverence by its wonderful expressiveness. The trouble with the mechanical conception is not so much its ignobility as its narrowness—its failure to take stock of all the facts, to furnish play for all the possibilities of life.

If we use matter in this narrower sense, as opposed to mind, what is the function of matter in the process of evolution? Those who have attempted to give a monistic, idealistic view of the world, in whatever form, have eventually been brought face to face with the problem of that upon which mind impinges, the non-teleological stuff against which our purposes seem to beat, and in struggling with which they discover themselves. If Plato insists that only the Good is ultimately real, and all else imitation and non-being, yet he has to recognize a reality at least in the limitations which the struggling elements of our mundane sphere set to our purposive striving. If the elements but reflect the eternal beauty, they also distort it. If Aristotle finds in matter the potential, yet it is not passively potential. It has an order of its own which may run counter to the purposive order. The Platonic dualism meets us again in Hegel's spatializing of the category of the spirit and its estrangement in its lapse to unconscious otherness. As Aristotle's potential, it meets us in Fichte's struggle of the ego with the irrational surd of our nature, while Schelling would make the physical energies merely lower categories in the history of spirit as it struggles toward its conscious awakening. Bergson would make matter the inverse of reality—the intellectual spatializing and degradation of a reality which is essentially a psychic stream of growing, blending, interpenetrating life-impulses. But, nevertheless, he has to acknowledge that it is somehow in the struggle with matter, in order to mould itself to its constitution, to maintain itself under its conditions, that life explodes like a shell into its inherent tendencies. In some sense, then, the reality of matter, as having a part in the realization of life, has had to be recognized even by those who have categorically declared its non-existence.

In giving an adequate account of mechanical matter as an external condition and instrument in the evolution of life, a pluralistic conception of the world has a decided advantage over the

monistic. It is not forced to smuggle in through the back-door what it has cast out through the front-door. It is free to follow the lead of experience in recognizing different types of reality. Among these are the physical types which, on the one hand, through their own structure and laws set definite conditions for the survival of life, and, on the other hand, furnish the intellect with the instruments by which life becomes liberated from slavery to the immediate present.

Even in dealing with the physical world, where mechanical conceptions have so long reigned supreme in our theorizing, it has become more and more clear that mechanism alone, convenient as it is within certain limits, is inadequate as a final philosophy. So far as the naturalistic aspect of the world is concerned, it would seem that the available energy must continually run down as the streams run into the sea, that heat must reach more and more a condition of equal distribution according to Carnot's law, and that the universe must eventually become stark still, or rather would have had to become so infinite ages ago. That this law has not thus operated must be due to the fact that mechanism is somehow a part of a larger constitution which is fundamentally teleological and in which life and mind are fundamental categories. Even to explain the activities of matter we find it convenient to think of it as somehow interpenetrated by intelligence; Maxwell's sorting omniscience keeps the universe from running down to a dead level.

On the other hand, I cannot feel that merely reducing the universe to metaphysical mind-stuff, as in the various types of panpsychism, necessarily ennobles life. The world is neither better nor worse for our metaphysical conceptions. And if panpsychism is indifferent to the realization of ideals, if it reduces the higher to the lower categories, if it fails to give us a preferential basis of values, if it offers no call to our creative abilities, it is teleologically indistinguishable from the crassest type of materialism. This is the logic of the fact that so many "Hegelians of the left" completely faced about from absolute idealism to absolute materialism, or rather found that the former, as impersonally conceived, was equivalent to the latter. The mere reduction of the stuff

of the universe to the type of mind-stuff is not sufficient to guarantee its value. The lowest things, as well as the highest, that we know in our experience are mental. The most degrading lusts are as much mental as the highest aspirations. Mind covers the whole range of value from heaven to hell.

The pragmatic difference in metaphysical conceptions for our ideals lies not in the stuff of our conceptions but in their friendliness to what we feel to be our higher nature, the re-enforcement of what we feel to be the best part of the universe, our ideal demands.

We must not be misled by mere words. We must recognize that pragmatically we have dynamic situations with their variations and their tendency toward types, whatever the metaphysical stuff may be. It is a mistake to suppose that by adopting more euphonious terms for these situations, such as "vital impulse" or "panpsychism," we have either explained or dignified the process. As general metaphysical entities they do not alter the problem of continuity and evolution one whit, though they may be more congenial to our imagination. The problem in any case remains for science to discover for our practical purposes of description and prediction the determining factors in the process, and for epistemology to discover the immanent categories which enable us to read the process with clearness and distinctness. We must conceive a world which makes our minds feel at home. Teleologically, it makes no difference whether we call the universe matter or spirit, if we only realize that it is such as eventually to demand and enforce ideals. This is its ultimate promise or potentiality. What name we give to reality does not matter so long as its properties, its pragmatic outcomes, are the same, so long as it can think and appreciate and furnish the object of our hopes; so long as it blossoms out into a sense for beauty, a demand for right, a worship of the ideal. It is true in any case that the universe makes us for itself, to express itself.

Our direct acquaintance with the effectiveness of form is limited to the operation of mind and to this in its higher ideal striving. When we try to imagine formal selection in the universe at large, it is at any rate easier to picture such selection to ourselves if we think of a greater and better mind interpenetrating the various

stages of the process with intelligent interest, re-enforcing the formal demands of the process and eliminating failures.

Even if the conception of an abstract, immanent form should satisfy our purely logical and æsthetic demands upon the universe, our ethical and religious needs would still call for an interpenetrating and overarching personal constitution which works for righteousness and beauty, which is sympathetically concerned in ideal realization, which in short makes warm and living the formal constitution of the process. We think of God as the master-mind, interpenetrating our minds and nature and, in a manner which we can but faintly grasp, guiding to a meaningful issue.

To be omnipresent and universally effective, this mind need not be the whole of things. Heat and gravitation are present throughout the physical world, but they are not the whole of the world. Take social history,—a great personality like Jesus may permeate history and make it converge toward him, may stamp and control history, and yet not be all of history.

Of this larger regulative and compensating universal constitution it must indeed seem that it does a wholesale rather than a retail business. This would indeed be deadening to our ethical and religious consciousness, except for the other analogy derived from our own organic economy, namely, that the regular adjustments become automatically purposive. So the wholesale operations of the universe require no attention. Maxwell's sorting demon can do his work automatically. Mechanism can take over the work of intelligence. It is only the retail unique relations which require interest. This leaves mind, in its higher reaches, free to deal with the rarer personal aspects of the situation, the spots where, by virtue of spontaneity and complexity, free and rational creativeness operates. And if even here personal interest or sympathy seems appalling, we must remember that the mind of minds is not bounded by our narrow limitations of space and time, but is capable of an infinitely larger field of interest. We may also imagine that the occasions for sharing in this larger life lie in us—this supra-finite life lying ever at our subliminal or supra-liminal door, ever interpenetrating and overlapping as gravitation overlaps, ever waiting, and ever welcoming, the proper organization and due awakening in us for its powers to be realized, as

light awaits the organization of an eye for its beauty of color to appear. Thus pluralism, and pluralism alone, with its conception of growth and organization of centres and their mutual and cosmic interpenetration, fills the need of the religious demands of life.

As, moreover, our finite minds can interpenetrate and mould various types of stuff into the unity of ideals, so the master-mind may interpenetrate the variety of the processes of nature, even though they are not mind. The statue can express ideals even if it is not mind-stuff. We may thus have teleological unity with variety of stuff and stages of development. We may in closing adopt the language of Emerson, even though we must conceive our relation to the Master-mind as more concrete and intimate than that implied in the Oversoul: "We live in succession, in division, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole, the wise silence, the universal beauty to which every part and particle is related, the eternal one."

*THE RELATION OF PLATO TO OUR AGE AND  
TO THE AGES*

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A few great books, for those who know them well, make unnecessary a countless number of lesser books. From the higher point of view, all can be seen that is visible from the lower, and much more. To have carefully studied the works of one of the world's great men is to have immensely widened one's own life. To comprehend the scope of his thought and the variety and extent of his sympathies is to have an essential element of a liberal education. An enthusiastic and indiscriminating discipleship, at least at first, is not to be deplored, for a realization of the limitations of great men and the incompleteness of all systems is sure to come later; but no one understands any view of the world who has never been able to feel its plausibility. There is no delight in life like the companionship of a noble mind. A long comradeship with a great man, one in whom intellectual power, ethical elevation, all-inclusive sympathies, and wholeness and wholeness of view are united, is one of the greatest of our human privileges. To it we turn for consolation in our sorrows, for a refuge from the petty irritations and vexations that so constantly beset us, and for help to rise above them to serenity and peace. Through these great souls we are able in some measure to realize the Emersonian ideal of a life of activity and at the same time of poise and power, the hands being in the world of action while the head is above the storm. No service is more real or precious than that which such men have rendered to humanity. By living on the higher planes, they appeal to our latent instincts; they help us to understand our own best selves, and to be what without them we could never be.

Of those who have served our race in this way one of the greatest is Plato. To speak of his mind, of its sweep and power, so

vast and with such insight that, as Lutoslawski well says, he summed up all that went before him and anticipated most of what has come after him, is happily unnecessary. His name is almost synonymous with intelligence. But, more than any of his successors, he is able to minister to one of our peculiar needs. He saw life sanely, and he saw it whole. This wholeness of view is something that, in the increasing complexity of life, the division of labor, the growth of knowledge and the specialization of research, we are constantly in danger of losing. And because we do so often lose it we ourselves become lost in the wilderness of the civilized world. Of course, it was easier for Plato than it is for us. The sum total of science, of philosophical and historical knowledge, in his time was so limited that it was possible for a mind of his order to master it all. He saw everything in relation to everything else. His was pre-eminently the synoptic mind. We feel, as we read his pages, that he is thinking in the light of all the great human interests and forgetting none. For this reason he is one of the wisest of men. Despite the archaisms and the elements that are peculiarly Greek, which make us aware that he lived in the fourth century before Christ, he still impresses us as one of the most universal and human of men. He did, indeed, belong to his age, but still more is he a citizen and contemporary of all ages.

Marvellous as were his intellectual powers, he was equally great in his life. In him the moral and religious interests were supreme. A consummate artist himself, a master, almost a magician, in literary art, the soul of beauty-worshipping Greece incarnate in him, his judgments of the epic and dramatic poetry and the music of his day had almost a Puritan harshness. There is even a suggestion of the attitude of Tolstoy. This is simply the consequence of the strength of his moral sentiment. The great question, he tells us in the *Republic*, is whether we shall be good or bad. To this all else is subordinate—art, literature, industry and politics, everything in public and private life. Surpassingly great thinkers as he and Aristotle both were, they are nevertheless to be regarded as primarily spokesmen of the moral consciousness, and their philosophy—for it is substantially one—is a moral philosophy. Their books are our moral classics. When



asked recently to name some books that would be useful to American citizens who desire to rear their children wisely and well, I was somewhat startled to find that I was placing Plato's *Dialogues* and Aristotle's *Ethics* among the first on the list. To be sure, these wonderful writings need to be supplemented, but they have given classic statement to some of the most essential elements in our composite moral ideal. It was some comfort in this situation to remember that President Eliot once said that Plato's statement of the theory of education has never been surpassed. One is tempted to quote many passages to confirm this estimate of the value of Plato's moral teaching. Consider, for example, the following page from the *Republic*:

But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from the earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.

There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly

blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.

We have here a perfectly clear and adequate presentation of certain fundamental principles that we must observe in the moral education of our children, and that the public must somehow apply in such living questions as the censorship of art, the supervision of moving-picture shows, and other forms of commercial amusement. Aristotle states the rule more tersely thus: The young must be so educated that the good will seem natural and the bad strange. President G. S. Hall only puts the same truth in a different way when he says:

The will especially is a trust we are to administer for the child, not as he may now wish, but as he will wish when more mature. We must now compel what he will later wish to compel himself to do. To find his habits already formed to the same laws that his mature will and the world later enjoin cements the strongest of all bonds between mentor and child. . . . Everything in conduct should be mechanized as early and completely as possible. The child's notion of what is right is what is habitual, and the simple, to which all else is reduced in thought, is identified with the familiar. It is this primitive stratum of habits which principally determines our deepest beliefs—which all must have over and above knowledge—to which men revert in mature years from youthful vagaries.

Plato's writings are among the very best material for moral education, for the reason that in them the highest thought is blended with the noblest emotion. Many of our ethical works are the expressions merely of the critical faculty. All feeling, all enthusiasm, is carefully avoided. If you have a moral life, such a book as Sidgwick's, for example, may help you to understand it. But although it is a treatise on ethics, it is not ethical in the sense of stimulating and strengthening the nobler nature, and is not meant to be. Such works as this have their value, even though it be small. The reader of Plato, on the other hand, not only is instructed, but he feels the contagion of the philosopher's enthusiasms for truth, beauty, and goodness. He realizes that in his own experience he is verifying the principle on which

Plato lays so much stress, that he who associates with good men is transformed into their likeness, and that good men who worship the ideal become like unto God, while the greatest penalty of wrong-doing is that one is thrown into the company of evil men and is inevitably conformed to their image. In the Platonic Dialogues there is neither pure ethical theorizing, which can make no man better, nor exhortation, which is equally futile and is usually and rightfully resented, nor the two together, which is not any more effective. What we have is the expression of a great life which is wholly present in all that it does. The intelligence is not the less vigorous and clear because it works in the atmosphere of moral and aesthetic enthusiasms and of religious faith in the Idea of Good as the source of all things. We have yet to learn that our separation of the functions of life is justifiable only when it is merely provisional and temporary, and that we mutilate ourselves unless we can recombine them in the unity of a concrete life and be whole and human once more. Even logic, which seems necessarily abstract, can, in my opinion, best be taught by more concrete methods. What a magnificent intellectual discipline, for instance, it would be for young men and women to read Plato's Republic critically, to follow the course of the argument in the various books with the object of determining its validity and cogency, and of seeing just where and in what respects it breaks down, and how it would have to be restated or modified or supplemented in order to be logically acceptable! But the moral influence of this book is still greater, especially if read in the impressionable years of early manhood and womanhood, when the mind is still forming and noble enthusiasms have not been rendered impossible by a too intimate acquaintance with the men and the literature of the cynical spirit. For these wonderful pages express not only great thoughts but a passionate love for the supreme human ideal, namely, that of a richly endowed nature brought to its highest perfection by education and using all its powers in the service of society.

To be sure, superficial readers will probably miss this fact; but then superficial readers of great books never derive much profit from their activity. They find that Plato's ideal is a philosopher, and since this term today suggests an epistemologist,

or logician, or a dealer in unintelligibilities about the Absolute, they suppose that this is what the Republic would have us all to be. Whereas what Plato means by the philosophic nature is, as Nettleship so well says, "simply the ideally good nature; human nature completely gifted and with free play given to all its gifts. The philosophic element in man is the essentially human element; it is what makes a man a man, and therefore in its fulness implies a perfect humanity." It is that in us which is akin to the divine, which is of the same nature as the truth we seek, as the ideal we worship.

Plato lays great stress on the first syllable of the word "philosopher." There are, he says, those who have ambitions, who love place and fame; others care more for wealth; some like to use their hands, and some are seekers after new sensations. Man is fundamentally and always a lover. The philosopher is no exception: he is a "lover of the vision of truth." He is dominated by the impulse to understand and be at one with the world, and his chief characteristic is a divine love and longing which will carry him to the utmost development possible to man. He becomes, in Emerson's phrase, "a lover of the uncontained and immortal beauty." Thus, as one of Plato's best interpreters remarks, we have here the Greek analogue of the New Testament conception of the charity, or love, which is the central source and vivifying power in all the virtues, that which "beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." "In this conception of philosophy there are combined the scientific spirit and the religious spirit in their highest forms. It is the desire to be at one with the laws of nature, and to live according to nature; and as to Plato the world is emphatically the work of a divine intelligence, being at one with nature is also in a sense being at one with God. This is why he speaks of such understanding in terms which we should apply to religious emotion."

This ideal union of the highest intellectual activity with the spirit of worship is perhaps best expressed in those two pages of the Symposium which sketch the normal course of love from its humble beginnings of attraction to the individual and physical to the perception and adoration of that which is beautiful in all beauty, good in all goodness, and true in all truth. It is sad to

think how this passage has been misunderstood, and what perverted meanings are given to the term "Platonic love." For, however curious the language may be, what Plato is attempting to describe, or rather to indicate, is the moral experience of all lives that attain to a high stage of development. Love, in its beginnings, is desperately unideal and matter-of-fact. There seems to be no romance in the sex-attraction of animals and savages. In higher stages of evolution, men realize in experience the capacity of love for transformation and spiritualization. Countless husbands and wives have found their natural affection deepening and being sublimated until it becomes a divine radiance shed over the whole of life. That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; nevertheless there is some spiritual from the beginning and some natural to the end. From idol to ideal—this is the distance we traverse in the development of love. We have only to keep love growing to find at last that it is transformed into worship. All the actual beauty we see in the lives about us becomes a hint of the perfect beauty, and the good in those who are dearest to us is a suggestion, or partial revelation, of the ideal goodness which alone we can adore. And not only do we come in time to realize what it is that we admire and love in one another and are inspired by in the great and good, but we also sometimes understand—and are kept modest by the thought—that those who love us really love the ideals which they believe us to embody. And we dare not take this love to ourselves, so far as we have not the qualities ascribed to us in the affectionate admiration of our friends.

Nothing can make this truth clear to him whose experience has not prepared him to understand it, and no paraphrase of Plato's wonderful pages can give the glow of the philosopher's enthusiasm for the great idea. He felt deeply that it is not man's destiny to remain absorbed in an individual attachment and entranced by personal beauty; but that, rising above the undiscerning loves of the slave, he should perceive that all beauty is of one family, that "the true order of love is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, thence to fair practices, to fair notions, until at last,

with the eye of the mind, he beholds absolute beauty, simple and divine, in the contemplation of which it is man's highest privilege to live." For Plato, as for Dante, the supreme delight was that blend of thought and emotion on the summit of life, the contemplation of the beatific vision, the worship of the ideal. He saw that our life essentially consists in a struggle for perfection, and that it therefore rests on ideal foundations. The best interpreter of his meaning is not any pedantic commentator, but a life of thought and love. The creator of beautiful things feels that he draws near to reality in proportion as he succeeds in portraying the ideal of loveliness; the seeker for truth is convinced that his mind perceives the real in so far as it thinks the true; and to those who hunger and thirst after righteousness everything is unreal compared to that toward which they strive. Always do the active imagination, the growing mind, and the pure and loving heart, see God, and in the worship of that ideal of perfect beauty, righteousness, and love, find their true life.

In Plato it is the whole man that philosophizes. This is one of the great sources of his power. His aesthetic, moral, social, and religious interests, and his passionate intellectual ardor do not impair his critical faculties. Indeed, one is most critical in the things that one loves. And the fact that he is so well balanced, and that every question is examined in the light of all the great human interests, saves him from the mistakes of doctrinaires. He does make mistakes, but he has too vivid a sense of the enormous number of impulses, instincts, needs, and longings in our nature to commit the folly of erecting a theory on such an abstraction as the idea of an "economic man," or that cold calculator of pleasures and pains which some have had in mind when constructing ethical systems and interpretations of history.

It is perfectly true that in strictly scientific investigation we must denude ourselves of all interests except that of discovering facts and laws; but when we are dealing with human life a complete endowment of healthy instincts is as necessary as intellectual clearness and power. Plato succeeded in the main thing. His was a nature as harmonious as it was rich and complete. He closely approximated his own dream of perfection, namely, health of soul. His ideal is, therefore, wholesome, and all the ages may

safely follow. Where he failed was in the means he sometimes recommended for its realization, as in his proposals in regard to family life. But even here, it must be remembered, only the small governing class was to be subject to arbitrary regulation, the mass of the people presumably being left to the customs which have the approval of centuries. Furthermore, the family life which he knew and was willing to surrender for the good of the state was not that which Christian ideals and Teutonic chivalry have combined to produce, but something far less noble and beautiful.

One of Plato's greatest services to his age and to the ages is through the conception he has given us of the good life. He regards the moral life as a problem in organization, which it essentially and normally is, and not as a fight, which badly born and unhappily situated natures find it to be for themselves, and which, generalizing from their own case, they suppose it must be for all. For Plato, the good life is the life that is set in order. There is a natural scale of values for all the many instincts, impulses, needs, tendencies, desires, and aspirations of human nature. None of these is bad, when in its subordinate and proper place. All are good when functioning normally in an organized life. The highest in man is reason, intelligence, together with the corresponding desire to use this power. Next is a group of nobler emotions, for which in English we have no adequate collective term. It includes that which makes men worthily ambitious, which gives them a sense of honor, and makes them capable of moral indignation at injustice and wrong. Lower still is a heterogeneous mass of desires, all useful and indispensable, but difficult to control, and frequently strong enough to throw the whole nature into disorder. These are the raw materials of the moral life. Our supreme task is to organize them, not out of enmity to any, but from regard to all. The ideal is *fulness of life through order*. When the hierarchy of impulse has been established, and the life, so to speak, has been graded, the result is such happiness as is possible to our nature. It is health of soul. This is the answer to the great question which Glaucon and Adeimantus put to Socrates at the beginning of the Second Book of the Republic. We want to know, they say in substance, what the good life essentially is.

Please do not tell us about the way it is rewarded in heaven or on earth. Suppose it did not pay in terms of external prosperity, suppose even that it brought suffering, what is the good life in itself? The reply is that the good life is the life which, through education and citizenship in a well-ordered state, is itself set in order, with the highest and divinest in our nature in control and everything else in its appropriate place. After sketching an ideal human career in which the soul rises to the greatest height, he outlines the reverse process of utter ruin through progressive disorganization.

There is one passage in which Plato, concisely and with entire clearness and adequacy, sets forth his conception of the good life, and which I always want to quote in every ethical discussion. He says:

In reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others; he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance. (Republic, 448, D-E.)

Observe here the apparently parenthetical but important words, "the intermediate intervals." Plato knows that his statement is merely schematic, and that he has not given a complete list of the impulses in our nature which it is our life task to organize. We must, he says, find for each power, or "part," of the soul its proper position in the structure of life.

The social problem is practically the same. He knows that men



differ, and that individuality implies organization. So he aims to utilize the fighting instinct, the artistic instinct, and the powers of the thinkers. His great problem is to prevent the waste of human resources, especially the highest. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. He strives for a form of social organization in which each member should render to society the particular service he could perform best. Each man would then have an organic place in human society. And as the danger to the individual moral life is from insubordinate impulse, so the structure of society is menaced by "the inorganic man."

This way of viewing the moral and social life is not antiquated, but something that we are now growing into and that will be more and more indispensable to our highest development. The comprehending student of our time realizes that one of our most urgent needs is that of a revised conception of goodness. The traditional conception is too narrow, too ascetic, and—I will not say, too Christian, but—too Pauline. The moral life is regarded as a fight between two parts of our nature, the flesh and the spirit; and the ideal, as stated in the letter to the Romans, is not to control the life of impulse but to destroy it. Mortify the deeds of the flesh. The aim is to kill one part of the self, and for the other part to live in mystic union with a divine spirit. Of course, there is something to be said for this view, and for those whose passions are so strong that they are constantly in danger of being swept away by them, it is perhaps the most practicable as well as the most natural view. If one is beset by devils, he must fight for his life. As the gospel says, "If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: for it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell." To be sure, if one is so badly born as that, he has no other resource. But normal, ordinary people have no such difficulties with their eyes or other members as this. In the complexity of modern life, and with so many factors to consider in each concrete case, it is for most people harder to know what is right than, when it is known, to do it. Paul, struggling and praying to be delivered from his "body of death," is exceptional. He is not a type. We may praise him, but we are misled by him if we fall into his way of thinking of the good life as a fight. The Platonic conception of our moral task as consisting essentially, not

in an internecine civil war in our members, but in an intelligent organization of the many elements of our richly endowed nature, is much more rational and wholesome. The ideal life is the abundant life, the abundance being attained through the establishment of inner order. Ideal goodness is simply the amplest expression of human nature.

It is no disloyalty to our Christian inheritance to acknowledge this fact. In the New Testament are teachings that are as the purest gold. That God is best symbolized by such terms as light and love; that evil is to be overcome, not by evil, but by good; that faith, hope, and love are the essential and the ultimate in religion; that we are children of the Perfect—these are truths that humanity must steer by for ages to come. We do not need to give them up when we follow Plato rather than Paul in our ideas of the moral life. All the true things, the beautiful and the good, are compatible, for they are of one family. And the Platonic view is not only truer to the experience of twentieth century Americans than the militant and ascetic view with which we are so familiar, but it is more in accord with the general conception we are coming to have of civilization. The old times, when men had to fight for their lives against savage beasts and still more savage men, are passing. More and more the life of civilized men is actually becoming a vast co-operative, constructive activity. We are being knit together in a tissue of relations of many kinds. Everywhere the call is for builders, not for destroyers; it is for those who can conciliate and direct, for those who can unite and organize men.

There is just one great defect in the Platonic ethics, and that is remediable. The main conception is fundamentally true and is clearly and adequately stated: still it is pre-evolutionary and consequently too static. We have come to think of life in terms of growth. It is a process, and while the elements that enter into it must be organized, the organization cannot be effected once for all. Nothing can be done once for all. Life means adjustments and unceasing readjustments. Since it is a process of development, good is that which promotes development, bad is that which hinders it. These two great ideas, that of organization and that of evolution, are complementary. Taken together, they

round out ethical philosophy. From this point of view, the ideally good life is the life that is set in order, but one whose organization is plastic and capable of constant adjustment in a world whose law is change.

An important corollary is to be noted. If our life task, personal and social, is fundamentally one of organization, then those who think of it as primarily a fight are behind the times. And if life is an evolutionary process, men of revolutionary spirit and methods are anachronisms. Furthermore, it follows that those who are militant revolutionists are doubly wrong, social misfits, reactionary and dangerous. The moral crusader, passionate in his hatreds and seeking to bring the kingdom of God by attacking somebody, belongs to the past. The social life of the future is to be directed by men of a more statesman-like type, men who are constructive in spirit and evolutionary in method.

The main defect of Plato's thought about human life is that it is pre-evolutionary. It is true that in a passage in the *Laws* he remarks that time is the maker of states—time and natural process; that "the change was not made all in a moment, but, little by little, during a very long period of time, the world came to be what the world is." Still, he cherishes the impossible ideal of finding the best institutions and laws and fixing them forever. Moreover, he does not realize, as many do not today, the danger of paternalism; he has not perceived that it is better for men to govern themselves than to be directed by a superior class. They do not manage things so well, but they are educated and developed by the difficulties and responsibilities of self-government. The reader of the *Republic* must, therefore, remember that Plato's description of the evolution of the state and his picture of the progressive disorganization of the state and the analogous process of ruin in the soul are to be taken in a logical rather than in an historical sense. He takes up certain tendencies in human life and shows what they ultimately come to, if unchecked. A New Testament writer practically does the same thing, when he says, "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." That is the logical goal of hate, its meaning and its direction from the beginning.

The problem of inculcating reverence in the young is often

treated in the Dialogues, and the discussions have a strangely modern sound. Plato faced the fact that the youth of his time were familiarized from their earliest years with Homer and Hesiod. This is magnificent poetry, which tells stories in the most fascinating way, and is well adapted to shape the admirations of impressionable children. Unfortunately, the stories were not always models of virtuous thoughts, and some of the tales about the gods are objectionable, the result being to confuse the moral judgments of the Greek race.

And since not reverence, but a discriminating reverence, is a prime need, Plato is driven to demand an expurgated scripture and a censorship of fiction. "God and the things of God," he says, "surely are perfect in every way," and the poets are not to be permitted to teach otherwise, for always do men tend to become like that which they worship. And to that question of perennial interest, How shall children be taught reverence for others? Plato gives the one answer that is valid for all time. It is found in a passage in the Laws which ought to be graven in the mind of all parents and teachers:

Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence. We indeed fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice.

Is it not strange that, although this was said so clearly and forcibly nearly 2,300 years ago, there are still people who imagine that reverence can be taught by precept, that it can be inculcated in children by criticising them for not having it? Would that twentieth-century Americans might learn from Plato that the way to teach reverence is to have it, to respect the personality of

children, to show to their own elders the beautiful deference and courtesy they wish their children to have, and to avoid the cynical and scoffing spirit as they would the plague.

If inspired writings are those which inspire us, the Platonic Dialogues constitute one of the most precious parts of the Bible of our race. They find us in the heights and in the depths of our nature, and appeal to every high instinct in our human endowment. When we feel dull and discouraged, when we have slipped down from the heights on which we wish to live, we have only to open these delightful books to find refreshment of spirit and renewing of mind. There is the *Gorgias*, which distinguishes the pleasant from the good and is a dramatic portrayal of the true and noble art of life. The immoralism of Nietzsche is here clearly stated and refuted 2,200 years before Nietzsche. As we gaze on Plato's idealization of suffering goodness, our hearts leap within us, and we realize once more in our experience the truth which the author of the Fourth Gospel had in mind when he makes his ideal Christ exclaim, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." The moral passion of Plato thrills us as he argues in support of the four great convictions:

1. It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.
2. It is better to suffer for wrong-doing than not to suffer.
3. We do not what we will, but what we wish.
4. To be and not to seem is the end of life.

The *Protagoras*, too, is a nearly perfect work of art, and doubtless contains reminiscences of some of the finest talk on our planet. In it are found the memorable words: "No one punishes the evil-doer under the notion or for the reason that he has done wrong—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished and the man who sees him punished may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention."

In the *Protagoras* Plato defends his beautiful faith in human nature—a faith which increasing knowledge justifies—that "no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature."

There has never been better preaching in the world, nor any less wearisome. Plato mingles humor and satire with moral earnestness as he expresses his life's exalted and beautiful ideal. Nothing can be more dramatic, for example, than the situations in the *Apology* and *Crito*, when Socrates is made to utter such convictions as these: "No evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death."—"The unexamined life is not worth living."—"Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued."—"We ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him."

In the *Phaedo* Plato treats of the problem of immortality. There are many verbal fallacies in it which are natural in the infancy of logic; yet, as Jowett says, "the arguments, taken in the spirit, and not in the letter, are our arguments." But this dialogue is more than a book of philosophy; it is also a work of art, in which scenes of suffering and death are clothed with beauty. A spirit of fine, sweet humanity pervades it, the contagion of which is like a precious perfume. Recall the crisis in the conversation, when the argument which Socrates had builded seemed to be overthrown by the objections of Simmias and Cebes. *Phaedo* remarks that the company was dejected, and for the moment had not only lost confidence in the discredited argument, but despaired of any more trustworthy reasoning in the future. Socrates, seated in the midst of the young men, stroking the head of *Phaedo*, soothed their disappointment, rallied them as a general rallies his defeated troops, and proceeded to rehabilitate the argument. But first he warned them against the danger of generalizing from such an experience. For just as a betrayal of confidence sometimes produces loss of faith in human nature, so the breakdown of an argument sometimes makes them despair of the possibility of knowledge. We must beware, said he, of "becoming misologists: no worse thing can happen to a man than this." This counsel is still needed; and I have never ceased to be grateful to a great Harvard teacher who twenty years ago told me that in my intellectual adventures I need never fear so long as I kept "faith in the worth of human nature and the reality of truth."

There is not, in my opinion, much of value in Pragmatism,

but what there is, as well as the sphere in which it is useful, was indicated in the brave words of Simmias in the *Phaedo*:

I feel myself—and I daresay that you have the same feeling—how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him.

The intellectual enthusiasm of the Greek race, an enthusiasm which Plato and Aristotle are still propagating by contagion in their readers, is naively expressed in these sentences from the *Phaedrus*: "There neither is nor ever will be anything more honored in the eyes both of gods and men than the cultivation of the mind," and "For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse?" Hundreds of these gems, or golden texts, are scattered through these wonderful pages. Even in the *Timaeus*, in which absurdities are mingled with insights, we find the statement that "he who neglects education, walks lame to the end of life, and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below." The *Timaeus* also reaches the conception of the ethical life as under law, as a voluntary taking of one's place in the order of the universe. Plato's final conclusions on the great ethical problem of the place of pleasure in life are given in the *Philebus*, the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* marking transitional stages of his thought. What he calls the "loveliest of lives" is, he says, not simple, but a mixture, a blend, first of measure, of beauty, symmetry and truth, then of mind and wisdom, of the sciences and the arts, and finally, in the fifth class, the pure and necessary pleasures, that is, those which accompany temperance and health. The *Philebus* is a solid ethical work, in which a serious attempt is made to find the proper place for the leading interests in life. It is almost modern in its technical

thoroughness and difficulty for the reader, but the ardent lover of the highest things still reveals, here and there, the feeling that accompanies his thought, as when he speaks of "the soul's power and faculty of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth."

The master work is, of course, the Republic. To praise it is like complimenting the stars or the moral law. What it is to those who know it best may perhaps be indicated by saying that, if they were to be banished from civilized society and allowed to take with them but one book, they would not hesitate long; they would take the Republic. For one of the greatest of earth's children has here discussed the most central of all problems—how to live best, and what is the form of human society in which the best life is possible. Here is a picture of the rise of the human soul through education to its greatest possible heights and of its ruin through progressive disorganization. It is at once philosophy, poetry, and preaching. It is a dramatic writing in which ideas are exhibited alive and growing, and truth is elicited by contact of view with view. His faith in education is as strong as ours, but his ideal is higher than that which most men cherish. He urged athletics that the body might be brought to its perfection; he prescribed music, including literature and the arts, in order that the young might be led to develop a true taste and an overmastering love of the beautiful in all things, not excepting conduct and life; and he considered that the object of scientific study was to produce statesman-like, synoptic minds, growing ever in the love of truth and the power to see the good, the consummate product of education being a life of "reason blended with music."

Plato's thoughts and ideals were no doubt timely in the fourth century before Christ, but they are not less timely in the twentieth century after. Great, rich, prosperous America needs his enthusiasm for the ideal not less than the Athens of his day. What would be the result for our modern society of an acceptance of the ideals of the Greek moral philosophers? Bosanquet, speaking of Aristotle, whose ideals in the large are the same as Plato's, concisely and happily answers:



The habituation of the young and the moral education of society are to be so guided and framed by the statesman that art and learning and religion shall always hold the highest place and so far as humanly possible shall have the lead in, and form the inspiration of, his country. . . . All persons are capable of religion and knowledge, and the tone and worthiness of their life is very different according as they are or are not, in their degree, conscious of an inspiration and an ideal pervading their society. . . . We have to think of the tone of a society in which saintliness and intelligence and science or, again, fine art and poetry, are respected, compared with one in which all things of that kind go to the wall. The two are different, not merely in including a few individuals of different types, but in the whole mind and spirit of every person, right down to the simplest and least fortunate citizens.

This last point is very important. The highest culture ought not to be the exclusive privilege of a few; it is rather the chief means of human happiness. Our democracy does not adequately realize this, but clings to the conviction that a man's life consists in the abundance of things which he possesses. But our human life is primarily social, and our happiness must be largely in one another. And we must learn that it is impossible to derive much happiness from association with lives which have no care for what gives worth to life. Society, in the true sense, is possible only to men and women with ideals. As Bosanquet puts it: "The highest form of human association is that in which human beings have come to care for that in each other which is the best and consequently the most real thing in them, namely, the highest goodness and intelligence. When this is so, the group-consciousness has become the consciousness of a response in the other to what is highest and best in the self. This response is a heightening of life by the extension of the awareness of our life to the life of the friend who shares our consciousness of the best things. We feel our life intensified in his."

One who has not studied Plato, but who has an inaccurate and exaggerated notion of progress, may feel that the readers of these old books are carried away by their enthusiasm, and that what they say of the great teacher cannot be true. But if the critic will read for himself, he will realize that, as Emerson said of the Yosemite Valley, "the facts are up to the brag." The feeling

is natural, however, for those who know Plato best are often astonished at the grasp of his mind and his anticipation of the best thought of today. For example, in the *Charmides*, Socrates remarks that, when a man comes to a physician to be treated for bad eyes, an inquiry is made into his general health. The Greek physicians knew better than to attempt to treat one organ while ignoring the body of which it is an organic part; and the *Phaedrus* quotes a saying of Hippocrates, that "the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole." In the *Charmides* Socrates then continues, "the Greek physicians are quite right as far as they go"; but they should go farther, for "as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this is the reason why the cure of so many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well." Apropos of the physicians, he remarks that in his day they were ingenious in finding "very strange and new-fangled names for diseases, and had also found out a way of torturing the world, namely, by the invention of lingering death." Indeed, the humor of the philosopher gives life and interest to many of his pages. He can laugh even with those who laugh at the idealist, and reports the jest of the Thracian handmaid about the philosopher Thales who was looking at the stars and fell in a well. She said, "He was so eager to know what was going on in heaven that he could not see what was before his feet." And in the allegory of the cave he makes us realize that it was in Greece as it is with us—the practical politicians ridicule the idealistic struggler for the world's betterment. They smile as he indulges in what they consider impotent talk; for do they not carry the primaries?

All this Plato sees, but he also knows that there is a point of view from which the little, sordid mind is itself ridiculous:

When he [the idealist] draws the other into the upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of gov-

ernment and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he, being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every one who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two characters: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in liberty and leisure—him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavoring a sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven. (*Theaetetus*, 175.)

Plato's thought and ideals are not dead, but alive still and fertilizing the minds of men. Being the very incarnation of the more permanent aspirations of mankind, of our inborn yearning for perfection, he has in all the ages since he disappeared into the unseen been an uplifting influence on the world's higher life. The theologians and Church Fathers, the great poets, the social idealists, groups of scholars such as the Cambridge Platonists, and practically all significant thinkers of the present time, have been profoundly influenced by Plato directly or through others who have learned from him, and usually in both ways. Open any serious modern work on philosophy, ethics, or religion, and in the index at the end you are almost sure to find a number of references to this great name. Professor J. S. Harrison has shown in his book, "*The Teachers of Emerson*," that Greek thought was the most important factor in Emerson's intellectual development, Plato and the Platonists being the feeding-ground of his mind. This is not a theory, but a demonstration, for "it was Emerson's habit to index his books and to mark the places which held his attention," and, when these marked passages are "studied in the light of his critical attitude toward Platonism, they appear as veritable sources of his thought." We thus learn that the Platonists inspired Emerson as he inspires us, and those who love

both Plato and Emerson love the same thing. We get, thus, a new sense of the fact that the great intellectual and spiritual traditions of civilization are the bread of life for mankind.

The chief difficulty in writing on this subject is to come to an end. There can be no question of adequate treatment of this great philosopher and great man, who has dealt with and illuminated all the main interests of our race from athletics to eugenics and religion. If we must try to sum up in sentence the chief service of Plato to our age and the ages, we perhaps cannot do better than to say that from him and from those whom he has inspired and taught we have best learned to perform our civic and social duties and yet live in the ideal realm, to have our conversation in heaven as we walk the streets of our earthly city.



## BOOKS RECEIVED

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PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. SECOND SERIES. VOLUME III. REPORTS AND PAPERS OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE REORGANIZED SOCIETY HELD IN NEW YORK CITY, DEC. 27, 1910, AND DEC. 27, 1911, RESPECTIVELY. *Edited by William Walker Rockwell, Secretary.* pp. 6+201. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. \$3.00 net.

THE RELIGIOUS FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. *By H. K. Carroll.* pp. 88+488. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. \$2.00 net.

IMMORTALITY. THE DREW LECTURE DELIVERED OCTOBER 11, 1912. *By R. H. Charles.* pp. 38. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1912. One shilling net.

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- RELIGION IN CHINA. UNIVERSISM: A KEY TO THE STUDY OF TAOISM AND CONFUCIANISM.** *By J. J. M. de Groot.* (American Lectures on the History of Religions. Series of 1910-1911.) pp. 15+327. New York, etc.: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. \$1.50 net.
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NUMBER OF THE HARVARD  
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW**

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# THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## *Editorial Committee*

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The Review aims to include discussions in the various fields of theological study and also in the history of religions, ethics, education, economics, and sociology, in their theological and religious aspects. It is designed to serve the needs not only of clergymen and scholars, but of all who are interested in religious thought and in the place and function of religion in modern life.

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VI

APRIL, 1913

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## *THE PRACTICABILITY OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE*

FRANCIS G. PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The unknown apostle who wrote the wholesome letter to Titus, "his own son after the common faith," re-enforces his general doctrine of Christian ethics by a special application to the circumstances in which Titus finds himself at Crete. The Christian life, the apostle writes, is practicable even there. The Cretans, where Titus had been left "to set in order the things that are wanting," were, as one of themselves had said, "liars, beasts, and gluttons." "This witness," the writer agrees, "is true"; but this truth is precisely what gives an opportunity for Titus to teach the Cretans a "sound" or "healthful" doctrine of chastity, discretion, and gravity. "The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto all men." Crete was a good place for a Christian "to adorn the doctrine of God." The problem of the Christian life was not to run away from a bad place, but to serve it and save it. We should live "soberly, righteously, and godly," not in a world of our own choosing, but "in this present world." Soberly as concerns one's self, righteously as concerns one's neighbor, piously in one's relation to God,—these three laws made, according to the Apostle, a practicable rule of conduct for a young man of the first century in a vicious and pleasure-loving world.

But could a Christian teacher speak so confidently now? Is the Christian life practicable in this present world? Is it possible to live in the world as it now is, accepting its methods, participating in its business, involved in its social, economic, and political machinery, and at the same time maintain a sober, right-



eous, and godly life, fit to adorn the doctrine of God? Amid the licentiousness and commercialism of modern society can a domestic life be so maintained that it may be with reasonable accuracy described as a Christian family? Amid the brutal competitions of modern industry can trade be administered and profits be made in ways which are consistent with Christian discipleship? Amid the plottings of national politics and the collisions of international interests can we fairly speak of a Christian civilization? Is the Christian life, in other words, practicable among the inevitable conditions of modern efficiency and happiness; or is it the survival of an idealism which, however beautiful it may once have been, has become impracticable today?

These questions have created in many thoughtful minds a profound sense of perplexity, and even of alarm. The world which confronts a modern man is very different from the provincial and primitive environment of the New Testament teaching; and even if this new world is less likely than that of Crete to produce liars, beasts, and gluttons, it seems quite as hard to adjust to the maxims of the Christian Gospel. A man in this modern world, for example, finds himself compelled by his circumstances to devote nine-tenths of his waking hours to the making of his living and the securing of a margin of income, but when he turns, in some hastily snatched interval, to the New Testament, he reads the unqualified command of Jesus Christ, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth." Another man is trained in habits of economy and thrift, and reads, "Sell all that thou hast and give to the poor." A student of modern methods in charity is taught to distrust as a social menace the practice of indiscriminate relief, and then finds his modern science confronted by the saying, "Give to him that asketh of thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away." An unjustified attack is made on one's self or one's country, and resistance to it has to meet the words, which to Tolstol made the central teaching of the Gospel, "If any man smite thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also." Must one not then choose between the idealism of the Gospels and the utilitarianism of modern life? Must he not frankly confess that the Christian law of conduct and the demands of commercial or political stability "in this present world" are incompatible with

each other, and that under the circumstances of modern civilization, which one can neither escape nor for the present transform, the Christian character has become an impracticable dream?

This conclusion, which shakes the very pillars of Christian loyalty, and leaves of Christian ethics nothing more than a picturesque ruin, overthrown by the earthquakes of modern change, has come to be accepted—sometimes with satisfaction, sometimes with grave reluctance—by many students who in all other respects are at opposite poles of opinion. On the one hand are the critics of Christianity who condemn it as incompatible with modern life; on the other hand are the apologists for Christianity who explain it as never designed for modern life.

“None of us are Christians,” a distinguished English philosopher has said, “and we all know, no matter what we say, we ought not to be. . . . We have lived a long time now the professors of a creed which no one can consistently practise and which, if practised, would be as immoral as unreal.”<sup>1</sup> “*Contemptus mundi*,” a great German teacher has written, “alone is not Christianity, nor, on the other hand, can there be Christianity without an admixture of *contemptus mundi*.”<sup>2</sup> “Christianity,” declares Nietzsche with reckless rhetoric,<sup>3</sup> “is the one great curse, the one great spiritual corruption.” “It is our more strenuous and instinctive piety which forbids us to continue Christians.” Far as such critics stand from each other in all other respects, they yet agree in the conclusion that the ethics of Christianity are impracticable for people who must live in the world as it is, and that we must turn to a Hegelian, or Hellenic, or Pagan law of conduct to find guidance among the conditions of the modern world.

The same conclusion is reached, from precisely the opposite side, by interpreters of the New Testament who find the record dominated by the thoughts and hopes of a special time and race, so that it forfeits all claim to universal significance. Such, for example, is the logical conclusion derived from the so-called eschatological, or apocalyptic, view of the Gospels. It has been of late pointed out with a fulness never before attempted that

<sup>1</sup> F. H. Bradley, *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1894.

<sup>2</sup> F. Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, tr. 1906, pp. 95, 96.

<sup>3</sup> *Sämmtliche Werke*, 1895, viii, 270; xiii, 317.

much of the language of the Gospels and much of the literature which lies behind the Gospels is colored by the anticipation of an approaching catastrophe, which was to make an end of the existing social order and to usher in the Messiah's kingdom. This great expectation made, it is urged, the central motive of the teaching of Jesus, and preparation for this millennial revolution must have been to the first disciples a supreme concern.

It must be admitted that many passages of the Gospels go far to confirm this eschatological view. A millennial hope unquestionably burned in the hearts of the Hebrew people, and the ministry of Jesus no doubt fanned this hope into a flame. "Ye shall see the Son of Man coming in his glory"; "The time is at hand"; "There are some standing here who shall not taste of death until they see the Son of Man in his glory"; "Watch, make you ready"; "The fashion of this world passeth away"—these, and many similar prophecies of a world-judgment, repeat the warnings of an impending catastrophe which abound in the Apocalyptic writings. If, therefore, as is confidently argued, the cardinal principle of New Testament interpretation is to be found in this feverish anticipation of the end of the existing world, then the ethics of Christianity must be shaped by this expectation and must be appropriate, not to social conditions which are fixed or permanent, but to a fleeting and perishing world. There must be an *interim* ethics, acceptable to those only whose minds are dominated by the millennial dream. Christian ethics was a product of this early expectation and must share its fate. *Interim* conduct, adapted to a world that is to pass away, cannot be appropriate to a world that is permanent. "The ethics of heaven," as Paulsen has said, "cannot be at the same time the ethics of earth." When, therefore, the dreams of the early Christians proved to be illusory, and the later followers of Jesus were forced to adjust themselves to an unregenerated world, it became necessary either to abandon the ethical teaching of the Gospels or to transform it into principles which could be rationally obeyed. Christian conduct could not be permanently inspired by a manifest, even though a magnificent, mistake.

This conclusion, though it be defended as contributory to conservatism, is in fact completely destructive of Christianity as an

historical religion. The foundation of faith becomes, not the simple teaching of the Synoptic Gospels, but the mystical visions reported after the Master's death. "The final tendency of advanced theology," Dr. Forsyth does not hesitate to affirm,<sup>4</sup> "is backward . . . and its great act of violence is the driving of a wedge between the Synoptics and the Epistles, between the message of Jesus and the Gospel of his apostles." The Synoptics exhibit, under this interpretation, "an incomplete situation, a raw audience, and an inchoate context of evidence." "It is in the Epistles that we have the essence of Christianity." The apostolic inspiration . . . takes as much precedence of his earthly and (partly) interim teaching as the finished work is more luminous than the work in progress." As another English writer has said, "Christ must be looked at in two ways; as the historical Jesus, who lived in Palestine, . . . and as the Eternal Christ. . . . When a man discards the claims of the historical Jesus he is guilty of the 'minor rejection'; but when he pushes away from him all desire or acceptance of the Ideal Christ, that involves what I may call the 'major excommunication.'"<sup>5</sup>

The first impression made by this new defence of the faith is that it turns the New Testament upside down. Paul, not Jesus, becomes the real founder of the Christian religion. The Epistles, not the Gospels, are its precious documents. Jesus was not understood until he was gone. Indeed, he did not understand himself. Orthodoxy thus becomes saved at the loss of historicity. The Sermon on the Mount and the Parables are subordinated to the mysticism of Christian tradition. "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*." Christian faith is not likely to find itself strengthened by this undermining of its foundations. The creeds are but poorly defended when they are set in sharp contrast with the facts. Even more obvious, however, is the fact that Christian ethics on these terms become impracticable. We are left, not with a teaching of duty, but with a rapt communion of the spirit which is possible to the elect alone. Phrases like "the imitation of Christ" and "the discipleship of Jesus" have lost their meaning. Contemplation has supplanted obedience. The knowledge of the doctrine supersedes the doing of the will. Eschatology has elimi-

<sup>4</sup> The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, 1909, pp. 133, 168, 169.

<sup>5</sup> Lloyd, Studies of Buddhism in Japan, 1906, p. 29.

nated ethics. "There is nothing," as Professor Burkitt frankly confesses, "in the creeds about Christ as a teacher of the higher morality; in fact he is not spoken of as a teacher at all."

This sense of impracticability for the Christian character, which is thus a consequence alike of radical criticism and of reactionary ecclesiasticism, is confirmed by many other tendencies of modern life. Among these the most obvious is the effect which is likely to be produced by the un-Christian conduct of many who profess Christianity. If the current moral standards of Christian believers do not radically differ from those which prevail among other decent citizens, why should the Christian teaching be regarded as having unique authority? If self-sacrifice, generosity, and integrity are often found quite apart from religious profession, may not the Christian character be regarded as superfluous in modern life? Is it not probable that the prevailing standards of a time or place, the "social ethos," as Professor Sumner called it, is in fact governing habit and desire, even where religious faith appears to control? May not many people deceive themselves with the belief that they are disciples of Jesus Christ, when in fact they are children of their own age, or tradition, or race? If one should scrutinize his own conduct, might it not appear that the ideals of Christianity have become impracticable in the life he is compelled to lead?

A similar impression of impracticability may be felt if one turns from these unconscious witnesses of failure to the more heroic lives which propose to make a literal and rigorous use of the Gospel in their modern needs. When, for example, an exalted nature like that of Tolstoi breaks away from social ties, scorning and rebuking modern civilization as inconsistent with Christian faith, and at last, in the dark and cold of a Russian winter, abandons wife and family to secure for his last days Christian peace, what effect does this conduct make upon the modern mind? Reverence, honor, the hush of criticism in the presence of death—all these are world-wide, but this emotional admiration cannot disguise the hopeless impracticability of such a faith. Like the charge of Balaklava, it was magnificent but it was not war. It did not win the battle of life: it ran away from that battle. The ethics of Tolstoi, instead of facing the world, counselled a flight

from the world. Europe and Asia, as Harnack once said, met in Tolstoi, and Asia conquered. Oriental quietism became the ideal of the Christian character. Instead of saving others, Tolstoi fled from others to save himself; and by a curious Nemesis this final desire for isolation and peace was pitifully frustrated. Never was Tolstoi so much before the eyes of the world, or of so much trouble to his friends, as in his death. The lonely railway station where he lay became a camp where family and disciples guarded his last hours, and a score of reporters watched at the bedside of the old man whose supreme wish was to die alone.

If, then, says the modern man, this is Christian discipleship, it is simply not for me. If this is the sober, righteous, and godly life, then it cannot be lived "in this present world." For me and for millions like me there can be no retreat from things as they are. My ethics cannot be those of the runaway. Home and family, money-getting and money-spending, the temptations of commercial and social life—these are not to be eluded as snares for my soul. They are the essential conditions under which my soul must be saved, if saved it can be. If the Christian life means non-resistance, asceticism, monasticism, then, however beautiful and unworldly such a character may be, it must remain for me nothing more than an impracticable and unrealizable dream.

From this impression of the inapplicability of Christian ethics to modern life there have followed two sorts of consequences. On the one hand is the sentimental approval of a faith which cannot be reduced to practice. One may cherish the teaching without any idea of obeying it. Christian conduct becomes regarded as a Catholic layman may view the *vita religiosa* of the clerical orders. It is a counsel of perfection which few can accept, but which an unsanctified world may admire from afar. Thus there may ensue a view of the Christian life which is practically that of a looker-on; a conventional conformity which does not even propose to itself a genuine obedience. Certain incidents of experience—birth, marriage, and death—are consecrated to God; but the long years of work and play, of love and struggle, are ruled by motives of the world, the flesh, or the devil. One

comes to live on a left-over piety, as he may live on an inherited estate, without much thought of its origin or responsibility. The surface of life is smoothed by Christian ordinances and consolations, while the depths remain unperturbed. Thus one may be in practice a citizen of "the present world," but in theory, or in moments of profound sorrow and joy, a patron of "the sober, righteous, and godly life."

On the other hand is the more candid and open reaction from a code which is inconsistent with modern demands. If, it is argued, all that can be substituted for an incredible theology is an impossible ethics, then, it would seem, the Christian religion must be frankly discarded as inconsistent with modern thought. As the Pauline cosmology has retreated before the advance of science, so the ethics of the Gospels have become social obstructions or indorsements of wrong, and those who commit themselves to the modern spirit must, it is concluded, turn away, some with sorrow, and some with scorn. Like the men of the parable, they go their ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise; while, here and there, bitterness and wrath possess one who recalls what was taught him as eternal truth, and he turns on these feeble arguments and slays them. It is folly to disguise from ourselves the extent of this defection, not only from the theology, but hardly less from the ethics of Christianity. The ominous fact confronts the modern world that a very large proportion, not only of the frivolous and superficial, but also of the serious-minded and cultivated, have simply dropped the motives of religion from among their habitual resources, and are supported in their experience by sanctions and consolations derived from science or art, from work or play. Much of this modern paganism is due, no doubt, to the reserve of science or to the preoccupation of business, but much is also due to the superfluous refinements of Christian theology and the unreal distinctions of Christian ethics.

Whatever may be the proportion of these various influences, the result is beyond dispute. We hear much of the alienation of the working-classes from religion, and new ways are bravely devised to reach the masses and to preach the Gospel to the poor. But this defection of the wage-earners, serious as it may be, does not compare in significance with the intellectual neutrality or

indifference of great numbers of the privileged and thoughtful. Fifty years ago Huxley, in a touching letter to Charles Kingsley, wrote: "Understand me that all the young men of science whom I know are essentially of my way of thinking. I know not a scoffer or an irreligious man among them, but all regard orthodoxy as you do Brahminism."<sup>6</sup> What was then but a half-recognized alienation is now unmistakable and conspicuous. A man of science, not long ago, when asked his conclusions about religious problems, answered, "We simply do not think of these things at all." A cause is in serious danger when it begins to lose the loyalty of the best trained minds; and in spite of much rallying of forces, and reckoning of statistics, and munificence of giving, it can hardly be maintained that the motives and aims which habitually govern the thought and work of the typical man of this present world are chiefly derived from the creed or the code of the Christian Church. If Christian dogma seems to ask more than reason can give, and Christian morals to involve more than social stability can endure, then the chasm between the church and the world has become permanently impassable. The church stands apart from the world, like a mediaeval castle on its inaccessible height, picturesque but remote, a noble but an unfrequented ruin.

If, then, this impression of impracticability is so general and so undisguised both among critics and defenders of the Christian teaching, must it not be concluded that Christian loyalty is likely soon to be abandoned by rational and practical minds? Must it not be confessed that the sober, righteous, and godly life commended to Titus, though practicable in Crete, is incompatible with the inevitable conditions of the modern world, and that new motives must be found for personal and social morals? On the contrary, the considerations which have been enumerated indicate with precision where the problem of Christian teaching for the moment lies. What is the fundamental fallacy in these discouraging conceptions of Christian ethics? It is the confusion of the temporary, occasional, and incidental aspects of the Gospel with its universal, spiritual, and permanent message. Literalism applied to the New Testament—however reverent it may appear to itself to be—is essentially unhistorical. It forces

<sup>6</sup> *Life and Letters*, 1900, i, 219.



each incident or phrase into the foreground of the picture, so that it has no environment of time or place, no shading or perspective; and that is to pervert history in the name of piety. A fact may be distorted quite as easily by false perspective as by false definition. The truth of history, as of nature, is to be found in the proportion and relation of facts.

When, for example, the eschatology of the Gospels is made the master-key of their meaning, it is not necessary to argue that this Messianic dream did not color the teaching of Jesus. He spoke the language of his own time and race, and he could clothe his spiritual purpose in no other form than that of the national expectation; but to drag this background of the Gospels into the foreground, and to find in Jesus merely a Hebrew enthusiast announcing a Utopian dream, is to distort the perspective of his teaching and to rob it of unity and insight. Nothing, in fact, is more unlike the teaching of Jesus than the apprehensive, excited, or nervous sense of an approaching catastrophe. His moral maxims are not based on an *interim* ethics adapted to a transitory world. On the contrary, they are—as the common sense of two thousand years has perceived—characterized by adaptability, universality, and permanence. “We cannot,” Harnack has lately said, “derive the ethical ideal from the eschatological.”<sup>7</sup> There is nothing of an *interim* ethics, nothing feverish and evanescent, in humility, forgiveness, purity of heart, sacrifice, or service; yet these, and virtues like these, are the pillars of Christian ethics. The habitual attitude of Jesus in the presence of the great problems of experience has a serenity, assurance, and sympathy, far removed from the excited anticipations of abrupt and final change; and it becomes quite as probable that the vein of eschatological allusion which runs through the Gospel betrays the preconceptions of the Evangelists as that it reveals the teacher’s mind. “Jesus above the heads of his reporters” is, as Matthew Arnold said, a wise canon of New Testament criticism. The eschatological interpretation of the Gospels, in short, confuses color with form, by-product with main intention, and finds the ethics of Jesus impracticable because it sees them out of that perspective which gave them beauty and truth.

The same conclusion may be reached as one scrutinizes more

<sup>7</sup> *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*, 1911, ii, p. 267.

closely the Christian quietism of Tolstoi. Much there unquestionably was in the teaching of Jesus which encouraged a retreat from the complexity of civilization to simplicity, poverty, and solitude. The ascetic life, through all the Christian centuries, has found itself fortified by many sayings of the Gospels. Unworldliness, serenity, and restraint are conspicuous notes of New Testament ethics. Jesus was an Oriental, and above the turbulent vicissitudes of his life brooded a spiritual calm like a spring sunset above the hills of Galilee. But to confuse Oriental imagery with universal principles, to single out a teaching of non-resistance as the core of the Gospels, to retreat from social obligations in the name of one who gladly shared them and was called a friend of wine-bibbers and publicans—all this, however heroic it may be, is not only an impracticable discipleship but a historical perversion. It mistakes the occasionalism of the Gospels for universalism. It pictures Jesus as posing before the glass of the future, proclaiming in every utterance a universal law, when in fact he is primarily concerned with the individual case immediately before him, and is applying universal laws to the interpretation and redemption of that single life.

The same false perspective may be observed in many other modern interpretations of the Gospels. Jesus was a friend of the poor and a critic of the rich. "The spirit of the Lord is upon me," he said, "to preach the Gospel to the poor." "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven!" "Woe unto you that are rich; blessed are ye poor." "It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." What, then, it is hotly urged, was Jesus but a prophet of social revolution, a class-conscious socialist; and what was the new religion but an anticipation of the modern programme of a rearrangement in economic production, distribution, and exchange? "Christianity," Professor Nitti has said, "was a vast economic revolution more than anything else." "The democracy of property," an American socialist has written, "was the larger revelation of Christ."

Here again the sayings of the Gospels must be accepted in all their solemn and permanent significance. The deceitfulness of riches, the responsibility of talent, the solemn alternatives of the

dedication of wealth or its abnegation—these warnings or rebukes are as convincing as ever. But it does not follow from these sayings that Jesus was a curbstone agitator, inflaming a class-conscious conflict. The modern revolutionist, if he listens at all to the teaching of the Gospels, hears in it nothing but the confirmation of his own social creed. He seizes on fragmentary utterances with no regard to their connection or intention. It is one more instance of literalism distorting the record. It mistakes the by-products of the teaching for its main intention. Whatever social changes Jesus may have foreseen, his mind was primarily fixed on spiritual change. He was not a reformer, but a revealer. He was concerned not so much with the production of goods as with the production of goodness. "Who made me," he said, "a judge or a divider over you?" A changed world might issue from his teaching, but it was to issue from a change of heart. He was not, first of all, a socialist but a saviour. He came to convert not things but men. "The preaching of Jesus," Harnack has declared with emphasis in his last volume, "and the establishing of a new religious brotherhood were not essentially a social agitation; that is, they did not issue from an antecedent class-conflict or annex themselves thereto, and in general had no direct connection with the social revolutions of the ancient world."

These considerations of the fallacies of literalism seem to point to the conclusion that the Christian religion is a much larger thing than many of its critics, or even of its defenders, have supposed. It assumes many forms, but is exhausted by none. Its fragmentary utterances may become impracticable guides, while its total view of life, its general law of conduct, may have permanent practicability. The Gospels are perennially perplexing to the literalist because they say so many different things. If each verse must be regarded as of equal weight, then each should balance and confirm another. The fact is, however, that at many points the teaching is self-contradictory. At one moment Jesus counsels non-resistance, and at another moment commends soldierliness. At one time he welcomes the peace of God; at another he burns with indignation. He blesses the poor without scorning the rich. He welcomes solitude, but serves society. He

proclaims the kingdom of God as coming in outward clouds of glory, yet finds that kingdom within the human heart. To one person he says, "Come unto me, and I will give you rest"; to another he says, "If any man will come after me, let him take up his cross and follow." In one saying he commends social equality—"I will give unto this last even as unto thee"; in another saying he announces a law of cumulative inequality—"To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." What do these apparent inconsistencies indicate? Do they condemn the teaching as illogical and wavering, swayed by circumstances rather than steadied by principles? Must one select a single saying, erect it as a monumental teaching, and discard as an interpolation or gloss whatever does not harmonize with this central law? On the contrary, it is precisely at this point that the teaching discloses a character and scope which makes it a practicable guide for modern men. A witty American once said: "It is easy to die for an idea, if you have only one idea." The greatness of Jesus is seen in his having so many ideas, for any one of which men have been willing to die. His teaching is marked by sanity and poise among solicitations to excess; by many-sidedness, by sympathetic wisdom. Thus the variations in the teaching are precisely what give the key to its interpretation. They forbid the attempt to fix one saying in the centre of the Gospel and all else in its circumference. They correct the reverent but misleading desire to study each occasional saying as a universal truth. They compel one to penetrate through the occasionalism of the teaching to the principles which these incidental utterances disclose, and to apply to new and unprecedented conditions a teaching which necessarily used the language and met the needs of its own time; in short, to pass from the letter of the Gospels to the spirit of the Gospels, and to confess, with Paul, that the letter killeth while the spirit giveth life. "True Christianity," a great English teacher has said,<sup>8</sup> "is not something which was published in Palestine and which has been handed down by a dead tradition ever since; it is a living and growing spirit, that learns the lessons of history, and is ever manifesting new powers and leading on to new truths."

On this conclusion depends the practicability of the Christian

<sup>8</sup> Edward Caird, *Lay Sermons and Addresses*, 1907, p. 67.

life. If the teaching of Jesus were a fixed deposit of revelation from which successive ages must draw their moral code, then the ethical supply might become exhausted as the demand of the world increased. A teaching fit for Galilee may become inapplicable to modern Europe. "Give to him that asketh of thee," may be good ethics in the simplicity of Nazareth and bad economics in the complexity of London. If the Christian life must conform to the conditions under which the Gospel teaching was originally given, then it is unquestionably true that we are "none of us Christians, and we know we ought not to be." It is, however, misdirected reverence which thus reduces the Christian religion to an unalterable fixity. The purpose of Jesus Christ was to free religion from this asphyxiation by the temporary, the technical, the external, and to give it room to breathe and to grow.

To reach this conclusion one has only to recall the characteristic language in which the general purpose of Jesus is described. As one reads the Gospels there meet him two great words which announce the nature of the teaching like recurring *motifs* reiterating a central theme. The first is the word Power; the second is the word Life. The first is the characteristic word of the Synoptic Gospels: "The multitude glorified God which had given such power unto man." "His word was with power." "Until the kingdom of God come with power." The second is the word of the Fourth Gospel: "I am the bread of life." "The life was the light of men." "He that hath the Son, hath life." "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." "I am come that they may have life." But Power and Life are words, not of opinion or tradition, but of expansion, vitality, momentum, growth. They are the symbols of a dynamic faith. Power is generated to be applied. Life is given to be transmitted. To restrict power is to waste it; to save life is to lose it. The Christian life is thus not a thing to keep, but a thing to give; not an ancient tradition, but a new creation; not a stopping-place, but a way. "I am the way," said Jesus. The first title given to the new religion by its followers was "The Way." It was the power of God unto salvation. "Salvation," a great English teacher said,<sup>9</sup> "is nothing else than the preservation, restoration

<sup>9</sup> Hort, *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 101.

and exaltation of life." The Christian character is thus a living and expanding growth. The kingdom of God is like leaven, or like a great tree ; but leaven is a pervasive influence, the tree is an unfolding growth. Christian ethics is a science of spiritual dynamics. It deals with a world in motion. Its purpose is to communicate Power; its aim is to increase Life. When the Council of Trent explicitly anathematized the opinion that "Christ was given to mankind as a Redeemer, and not also as a legislator," it made the issue clear. The Christian religion as a form of legislation stands forever over against the Christian religion as a way of redemption. On the one hand is the imperial conception of the Church of Christ, on the other the spiritual conception. A form of government, a legislating hierarchy, has in its very nature the qualities of inflexibility and fixity. A Life, a Power, a redemptive force, has in it perennial possibilities of expansion and adaptation. "Truth," said John Milton, "is compared in Scripture to a streaming fountain. If her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition."

We are brought through these considerations to a most obvious and yet a most challenging and humbling conclusion. "Not even now," said John Stuart Mill, "would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation for the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve of our life." Do not these reverent words disclose to us the nature of Christian ethics and the permanent practicability of the Christian life? It is a "translation from the abstract to the concrete"; the acceptance, not of a teaching, but of a teacher; not of a word recorded in documents, but of a word made flesh. The characteristic mark of the Christian life is its personal relationship. It is the intimacy of companionship, the loyalty of discipleship. Behind all the teachings of Jesus Christ concerning universal problems of God and man, of eschatology or ethics, lies his supreme concern for the individual and for the needs of personality; and behind all questions which the study of the Gospels may raise concerning the universe or the social order lies the response of the individual will to the summons of a Master. Jesus has been called the greatest of

socialists; but he may with no less justice be called the greatest of individualists. He had what the author of *Ecce Homo* called a passion for personality. He sought the one sheep, he found the one lost coin, he called the lost son back to his father and to himself; and from that time to this, however much the Christian life has been obscured and complicated by theologians or ecclesiastics, the vitality and continuity of discipleship have been secured by this perennial loyalty of the individual will, this translation of virtue from the abstract into the concrete.

This relation of character to character emancipates the modern Christian from all that is contemporary or incidental in the teaching of Jesus. One does not expect a teacher of another age to speak the language or answer all the problems of the modern world. His message must be given to his own time and colored by the habits of thought which then prevailed. But the teacher behind the teaching, the influences which he described as those of Power and Life, remain, independent of historical conditions and are applicable to all ages. Personality, character, spirituality, idealism, vision, communion with God, have in them a quality of timelessness, and are capable of expansion, transmission, and utilization in all the varied conditions of a changing world. The problems of life shift with the shifting years, but the nature of life remains unchanged, and responds to the Life which is the light of men. The machinery of the world must be renewed and amplified with each generation; but the power which makes that machinery move towards spiritual ends remains the same which once made the multitude glorify God who had given such Power unto men. The mechanism halts till the power is applied, and as that power finds its way, like the mysterious force of electricity, along all the avenues of life, and enters the homes and work and darkness and cold of the modern world, then the question of the practicability of the Christian life is supplanted by the question of its utilization; and it is as though the wires which carry the Power sang above our heads, "I am come that these may have my Life, and may have it abundantly."

*WHAT IS THE SUPERNATURAL?*

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What the supernatural is depends on what nature is. And nature is regarded from two widely different points of view. The first of these is shown in Richard Watson Gilder's sonnet:—

## THE CELESTIAL PASSION

O white and midnight sky! O starry bath!  
 Wash me in thy pure, heavenly, crystal flood;  
 Cleanse me, ye stars, from earthly soil and scath;  
 Let not one taint remain in spirit or blood!  
 Receive my soul, ye burning, awful deeps;  
 Touch and baptize me with the mighty power  
 That in ye thrills, while the dark planet sleeps;  
 Make me all yours for one blest secret hour!  
 O glittering host! O high angelic choir!  
 Silence each tone that with thy music jars;  
 Fill me even as an urn with thy white fire  
 Till all I am is kindred to the stars!  
 Make me thy child, thou infinite, holy night—  
 So shall my days be full of heavenly light!

The second attitude is expressed in Matthew Arnold's

## IN HARMONY WITH NATURE

*To a Preacher*

"In harmony with Nature?" Restless fool,  
 Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee,  
 When true, the last impossibility—  
 To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool!  
 Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,  
 And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good,  
 Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood;  
 Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore;  
 Nature is fickle, man hath need of rest;  
 Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave;  
 Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.  
 Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends;  
 Nature and man can never be fast friends.  
 Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!



Here are two radically different attitudes toward nature. The one sees in the stars the redeeming power, the cleansing bath. The highest to which man can look is that all he is "be kindred to the stars." According to the other attitude all that is of value in man is that which is above nature. "In that *more* lie all his hopes of good." If man is to live the life of freedom, he must not submit to nature, but overcome her. "Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave."

In the presence of a contradiction so radical we cannot have a mere contradiction, or a mere difference of opinion, of feeling, or of philosophy. Minor differences may be thus explained, but fundamental differences suggest an essential ambiguity. What is it that is meant by "nature" and by that which in Arnold's phrase is "*more*"? Can we get a meaning for the *more*? Can we get any conception of the supernatural that shall be free from ambiguities?

The road is indeed paved with ambiguities. Perhaps no word in common philosophical or theological use is more full of them than the word "nature," and, *ergo*, the word "supernatural." The word "nature" means, for example, the created world. It means the totality of all existence. It means the physical universe as distinct from man. It means essence or character. And the word "supernatural" of course shares these ambiguities. The supernatural may mean that which is above the created order of things. It may mean the spiritual as distinct from the physical. It may mean the miraculous, considered as an event outside the course of nature, produced by divine action. Popularly, it means ghosts. Ecclesiastically, it has been used to mean a sort of hypostasized grace conveyed by the church and sacraments. Here is confusion of every kind. No very cheerful prospect lies before one who would discuss the supernatural. It is like wrestling with Achelous. No sooner have you secured what you think to be a firm hold than the elusive adversary assumes another form. Is not the word an impossible one? To the scientific mind it smacks of offence. It suggests the irrational. The truth that it contains seems to be so imperfectly expressed as to arouse unnecessary opposition. Why not give up the word "supernatural" altogether?

I am not especially interested in the word. But the fact is that words lie largely beyond our control whether for use or disuse. "When I use a word," said Humpty Dumpty, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." But most of us are not so fortunate. We cannot get rid of a word. Others will go on using it. Can we find any consistent meaning for the word "supernatural"? Can we find any common meaning, or at least any common tendency, in its use?

Let us at first drop the word and then come back to it later. This much is evident. In dealing with the facts of the physical world there are two different attitudes in which we can approach them, two different questions which we can ask about them. We can ask the question "Whence?" and we can ask the question "Why?" In other words, we can concerning any event ask the question as to its mechanical or physical cause, that which in modern speech is somewhat loosely called efficient cause, and we can ask the question as to the final cause, or end, or purpose. By efficient cause in this sense is meant the antecedent conditions which lie behind an event and of which it is the outcome. By final cause is meant the purpose which the event is intended to serve. The fire is the efficient cause of the boiling of the kettle. Its final cause is to make the tea.

Now the study of efficient causes taken in this sense is the business of science. Every event that happens in the physical world is the result or expression of antecedent conditions. Science assumes, indeed rests upon, the regularity of sequence between these conditions and the resulting event. It may disclaim the study of cause in any metaphysical sense. It may know nothing theoretically of necessary connection. But cause in the sense of invariable sequence between phenomena is the subject of all science. In this sense, *Scientia est cognoscere causas*. It reduces all phenomena to physical laws, that is to invariable sequence. And it expects with unfailing certitude that, given the same conditions, the result will be invariable. If in any experiment the result varies, then it follows that some unknown factor has intervened, and the attempt is made to find that factor. Science claims rightly the whole field of physical phenomena as lying under invariable law.

I say the whole field of physical phenomena. But it is hard to draw any line. Will science be content to stop there? Should it not try to reduce mental phenomena to a similar uniformity? Through the study of physiological psychology it tries to detect an unvarying relation between brain movements and the facts of consciousness. Our methods of investigation are here extremely imperfect. The complexity of the relation is more fully recognized than it used to be. Few, if any, will now accept the saying that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. Nevertheless, the belief in uniformity is so strong that we can hardly escape the conclusion that brain movements are concomitant with psychical states. If there could be an exhaustive knowledge of a living human brain, it is at least conceivable that that knowledge would include a knowledge of the thoughts of the man to whom the brain belongs. Such a result would be a new triumph for science. The attempt to reach it is entirely legitimate. We can never say to science, "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further." There is no limit to the possible validity of the scientific explanation in its attempt to explain phenomena by antecedent conditions, as the result of efficient causes.

But now there is a great class of facts for which this explanation alone does not suffice. Pick up a book and ask what is its cause. One answer is in terms of the printing-press and the bindery and all the antecedent conditions out of which the book proceeds. Such an account may be exhaustive and inclusive. It may state every physical antecedent which goes to make up the book. Then, having got all this knowledge, we find our answer absolutely incomplete. The book was written for a purpose. It is the expression of intelligence and will. In reading it we are in the presence, not of the printing-press and the bindery, but in that of the mind and will of the author. In order to get any full explanation of the book, we must ask not after its efficient cause alone, but after its final cause, its purpose. We must ask not only, Whence? but Why? To leave this out is to leave out the most important matter. Some one finds a clay brick in Babylonia and brings it to a scientist, who analyzes the clay, and tells just what pressure was needed to give it that form and to imprint certain marks which are on it. There we have the explanation

of the brick, the full account of the antecedent conditions that produced it, its complete explanation in the terms of physical or efficient cause. Then comes along a Babylonian scholar, and he says to the scientist: "You are all right so far as you have gone. Only you have missed the target altogether. You have left out the essential thing. This brick was written by a king to convey to posterity the account of a victory." The scientist has given the efficient cause of the brick, the critic its final cause.

It is no easy problem to solve the relation between these two kinds of explanation. Here is the Brooklyn bridge. It is built strictly in accordance with the uniformity of nature's laws. Only by that uniformity does it stand. Every ounce of its material is supported by the physical conditions that surround it. The bridge is the inevitable result of the physical conditions that brought it forth. Given those conditions, no other result is conceivable. But the bridge was built to carry passengers from Brooklyn to New York and back again. It is the expression of that purpose carried out by human intelligence. Without that purpose and that intelligence no ounce of its material would stand where it does to-day. The bridge depends on the uniformity of nature's laws, and yet it would never have been the result of those laws unless they had been controlled by human intelligence and will.

The advance of science in the last century has been unparalleled. And that advance has been steadily in the discovery of the uniformity of the laws of nature. The reign of law, absolute, unyielding, rigid law, was the postulate, as it was the ever renewed discovery, of the scientific method. Yet through that uniformity man's control over nature grew apace and constantly produced results that were far from uniform. Man has subdued the powers of nature to his will. The face of the earth has been changed. Nature is under our control. In and through the deeper knowledge of efficient causes there has come the immensely greater opportunity for the display of final cause. Through the uniformity of nature we subject nature to our will.

Now in regard to these two sets of explanation we have a hard philosophical problem. How does mind, purpose, will, intelligence, come into relation with the uniform chain of physical

causes? How is it possible to maintain these two theses: first, that every physical event is the inevitable outcome of antecedent conditions; and, secondly, that intelligence and will can produce results that would not otherwise take place? I shall not attempt to deal with the various answers to this problem, whether from the point of view of materialism, of idealism, of mutual interaction, of mind-stuff, of pre-established harmony, or of concomitance. It is an unsolved problem. But this much is to be said. No solution can claim a hearing that leaves out the effect of the human will on the physical world. Man does subdue the face of the earth, and his past successes are but the prelude to mightier ones to come. No emphasis on the uniformity of law can lead us to disbelieve in the fact of human control of that uniformity. No reconciliation of the lion-and-lamb kind, in which the lamb of final cause lies down inside the lion of efficient cause, can be accepted. No philosophy is adequate that does not recognize the control of man over the physical world.

If all this be true, we have one element with which to approach the question of the supernatural. Natural science is exclusively occupied with the study of efficient causes, or, if you prefer, of regular uniformity, of natural law. Ever since Bacon it has been shy of final causes. Bacon said that in physics the investigation of final causes is like a consecrated virgin, it produces nothing. Physical science cannot use them, for they are not in its domain. Nevertheless, as soon as we begin the study of the phenomena in which man is concerned, then final causes enter in. The study of history may be a science, but it is not a natural science. Buckle's attempt is forever discredited. No one can explain history without taking into account the ideals, the aspirations, the intelligence, the will—in one word, the personality, of man.

If we accept the word "nature" as that which forms the subject of natural science, then we have in personality that which is in the strict sense super-natural. In the midst of physical conditions we have the guiding force of intelligence and will. The field of the supernatural is the field of personality, the field in which is manifest the activity of final causes.

If any one objects to this use of the word "supernatural," we

will not insist upon it. It is partly a matter of words. What I am concerned with is that we have a class of facts which demand a kind of interpretation with which physical science is not concerned, and it is by this interpretation that we are to approach the supernatural. It is a matter of terms as to whether we call human action supernatural. The real question of the supernatural is as to whether in and through the physical universe and the field of history there is active the force of intelligence and will other than that of man. Do final causes come from man alone? Or are there final causes which are the effect of a superhuman Being?

In this sense Bacon fully recognized the presence of final causes. But he assigned them to metaphysics and not to physics. "And I say this, not because those final causes are not true and worthy to be inquired in metaphysical speculations; but because their excursions and irruptions into the limits of physical causes has bred a waste and solitude in that track. For other wise, if they be but kept within their proper bounds, men are extremely deceived if they think there is any enmity or repugnancy at all between the two." (*De Augmentis Scientiarum*, Book iii, chap. iv.) According to Bacon, physical causes and final causes work together. Where the physicist sees the working of physical causes, the metaphysician may see the working of God. To trace the working of divine purpose in and through the physical world is the task not of physics, but of metaphysics.

It is also the task of religion. Herrmann has defined religion as the ability of a man to see in events the actions of a god. The definition may not be adequate as a definition of religion, but it is at any rate a description of that which belongs to the religious attitude. The religious man sees in nature and in history the action of God. He claims the right to interpret nature and history as the manifestation of a divine plan. He claims the right to apply the judgment of final cause to the whole field of his experience.

There are, then, two aspects under which the whole field of human experience may be regarded. It may be regarded as the resultant of previous conditions. That is the attitude of science. Or it may be regarded as the expression of divine intelligence and

will. That is the attitude of religion. It may be regarded as the result of efficient causes, it may be regarded as the working out of final cause or end. It may be looked upon as the result of natural forces, it may be looked at as the plan of a supernatural Being.

The difference between natural and supernatural is not therefore a difference in the field of experience. It is a difference in the attitude in which the whole field of experience is surveyed. It is all to be regarded as a natural product. It is all to be regarded as the expression of a supernatural plan.

The thought here presented admits of application to several different problems. And first to the somewhat worn theme of the relation between science and religion. The attempt is often made to reconcile the two by a division of the field. Certain classes of facts are assigned to science and certain other classes to religion. Such a division is not satisfactory and can never lead to a true reconciliation. It can at the best produce an armed truce. Science demands all the facts, and legitimately tries to reduce them to uniform sequence or law. Nothing can be held back from scientific investigation. But religion also demands all the facts, and claims the right to regard them all as the operation of God. No conflict is conceivable, for there is no division of the field. Each claims rightly the whole field, and each regards the whole field from its own point of view.

The position here maintained is similar to that of Bushnell in his great work, "Nature and the Supernatural." But there is one marked difference. While Bushnell considers the supernatural to be the personal, yet he never succeeds in overcoming the idea of an opposition between the personal and the physical. Thus he considers that, in order to find the supernatural presence of God, we must find the appearance from time to time of phenomena which cannot be accounted for by previous conditions, and which therefore reveal a new creative act of God. But that view leads to-day to an absolute antagonism with science, which will not allow any phenomenon to be outside the field of its investigation. Bushnell is excusable because he wrote before the modern view of evolution. "Nature and the Supernatural" was published in 1858, one year before the "Origin of the Species." But other more

modern writers offend in the same way with less excuse. Even Martineau seems to think that natural selection endangers teleology, and he looks for evidence of design in that which lies outside the reach of scientific explanation. The same half-hearted attitude prevails generally in Christian Apologetics. The last remnant of it ought to disappear. The scientific explanation is one thing, and has its rights everywhere. The religious explanation is another thing, and has its rights everywhere. Conflict arises only by a false and arbitrary division of the field. Each has the whole field, and the field is the world.

Objection may be made that the relation between these two modes of explanation is not clear. How can an event be at once the outcome of physical conditions and at the same time the expression of the divine will? The answer is that, if there be any difficulty, it is only the same difficulty that attends human action in its relation to the physical world. How is a house the result of natural law and at the same time the expression of intelligence and will? So long as the difficulty of answering this question does not prevent our belief that the house was made to live in, so long will the same difficulty not prevent us from seeing in nature the expression of the divine will. The theological interpretation is no harder than the anthropological.

Secondly, we may apply this conception to the idea of miracle. The religious man sees in all nature and all history the action of God. He looks at the universe and says, "Thou art a God that doest wonders." No dominance of natural law can prevent him from seeing the presence of divine action. So strong is his conviction that he will preserve it if necessary in the face of contradiction. If he is forced to believe that divine and physical action are opposed, then he will believe in the divine action all the same. In that case he will suppose that the laws of nature are occasionally set aside by the act of God. He will believe in miracles *contra naturam*. "Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind"—"Miracle is faith's dearest child." But a deeper insight will show that the sacrifice of reason was unnecessary. The opposition is a false one. Divine and physical action are not opposed. The miracle is the divine side of an event. It has been said that Saint Augustine's statement that everything is a miracle amounts



to saying that nothing is a miracle. But that does not do justice to Augustine's position. Augustine does not mean to confound the natural and the supernatural, to reduce the spiritual to the physical. In every event of nature he sees a divine side. And that divine side is the miracle. It is exceptional only to our knowledge. Augustine is right. To a deeper insight every event will be seen to have its divine side, its personal meaning, its place in the divine plan. We shall see in every event the working of God, without thereby supposing a disturbance of nature's laws. A man's house is a human miracle. It is that which nature alone could never produce. The universe is God's miracle. It is his house carrying out his plan. "For every house is builded by some one; but he that built all things is God."

Thirdly, we may apply this conception to the question of the transcendence and immanence of God. These terms are misleading. They are spatial. And spatial terms can never satisfactorily express spiritual realities. The result is confusion. The one term says that God is in the world and the other says that he is not. And we try to arrive at truth by a kind of compromise between the two contradictory statements, or by a union of both. Would that we could get rid of the terms altogether! As we cannot, we must translate them into terms of personality. Certainly no one wishes to think of God as apart from the universe, sitting on a distant throne. On the other hand, in trying to think of him as present in nature and history, we are too apt to identify him with naturalistic forces, and thus to make his presence not essentially different from that of nature itself. To escape the dilemma we must give up the spatial concept and introduce the spiritual. God is present in the same sense that a man is present to the material that he controls and by which he reveals his thoughts and purposes. Take the most trivial example. In a successful billiard stroke the player is present in the balls. His thought and purpose are manifested in the stroke. Yet that is true only because the player is superior to and in control of his material. The question is not one of distance. It is a matter of no importance how long the cue is, or where the player stands. Distance is annihilated when we deal with personal control. So the question of God's presence is the question of his control, and

of his character as manifested in that control. God is not identical with the physical laws of the universe. To conceive him as such would be to reduce his working to that of efficient causation, and thus to lose his personality. Rather, God is present in the universe in that the universe is his instrument and is carrying out his plan. He is present in no spatial sense. Yet the natural world if we could understand it, history if we could understand it, would tell us in all its parts of the divine plan, and would be the manifestation of the divine love. In no part of the world am I away from the immediate care and protection of our heavenly Father. "If I take the wings of the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." "Not a sparrow falleth to the ground without your Father. Ye are of more value than many sparrows." That is an infinitely higher concept than any that has been expressed in spatial terms. It sums up in the terms of a personal relation that which the awkward terms of transcendence and immanence have been trying to express.

Fourthly, let us go back to the two sonnets with which we began. Arnold's sonnet expressed the hard, impersonal concept of physical law. This side has been strikingly put by Mulford in "The Republic of God": "There is in nature no strain of sympathy that breaks its indifference, no love interrupts its inexorable course. No appeal can stay its falling rocks. No entreaty can restrain its beating waves. It has no power to help man in his calamity. It does not turn to avert his injury, nor to mitigate his pain. The clown says to the old man in the storm—

‘Here’s a night that pities  
Neither wise men nor fools.’

It is only in a figurative way that there is any declaration of a moral quality in the physical process. It is simply without the moral." And all that is true. Mere physical laws go on their way without regard to man. Nature is hard and cruel. "Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave." That is the account of nature looked at from the point of view of efficient causes, of physical laws. And yet the thought of Gilder's sonnet is true also. Nature can be looked at also from the point of view of

final cause. For we believe that in and through nature is manifested that which does "pass her." Here is the presence of a personal power. It is not the stars that save us. And yet the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork. We can cry out to the very stars, "Touch and baptize me with the mighty power that in ye thrills," for that mighty power is the power of the personal God.

And that brings me to the last suggestion that I have to make as to the general view I have been presenting, and that is as to its bearing on the sense of the beauty of nature, on the appreciation of and love for the beauty of the physical world. The sense of the beauty of nature is so ingrained in us, is so much a part of our present culture, that we tend to think of it as an original possession of man. We take it for granted that man must have always felt the subtle charm of sea and mountain and forest. But it is greatly to be doubted if this is the case. It is far more probable that to primitive man nature was an object of dread rather than of love. The love of nature in our modern sense is a rather late product, and arises only with a fairly well-developed civilization. The history of art seems to show that the appreciation of nature comes after the appreciation of personality, and is indeed the product of a personal interpretation. In painting, the representation of nature remained subsidiary to that of the human form until a comparatively late date. The love of nature arises in and through the appreciation of humanity. To put the matter in the form of a one-sided aphorism, the love of the country is the product of the city. That is, as men enter into civilizing relations with each other, those relations by which personality comes to self-consciousness, by that process is developed the love for and appreciation of nature. Nature must be reached through personality or its message is not received. To love nature and to despise persons is to forget the rock from which we were hewn, the pit from which we were digged. Wordsworth, the greatest of all poets of nature, was also equally the poet of human life.

Now all this has a bearing on our main thesis. I have tried to show that the concept of the supernatural lies in the personal interpretation of nature. Nature itself knows only efficient cause,

only physical forces. Yet we believe that there is above nature a personal will that uses nature as a means of expression. Does it not follow that the deepest sense of the beauty and charm of nature must always see in it the revelation of personality? It is not matter that gives us the "cleansing bath" of beauty. It is matter interpreted in terms of final cause, matter the vehicle of spiritual impulse. The deepest sense of the beauty of nature will go hand in hand with the ability to let nature reveal the supernatural. It will therefore follow that the highest appreciation of nature comes through personality. Where personality gets its rights, there will nature convey her deepest message. The Christian concept of the personal God is a sounder basis for the love of nature than is the pantheistic identity that loses the very key to nature's deeper interpretation. He understands, and therefore loves, nature best who sees in nature the instrument and revelation of creative love. He sees in nature that which is above nature, "the light that never was on sea or land, the consecration, and the poet's dream." He sees in nature all its hardness and all its brutality, but he sees more. And though the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together, he sees in all that groaning and travailing the working of a divine purpose, the birth-pangs of a new creation, the coming of the Son of Man, the preparation for the

"One far-off divine event,  
To which the whole creation moves."

*DUALISM OR DUALITY?*

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## I

Do we live in an intrinsically rent and warring world? or is the schism only apparent, veiling a fundamental and all-pervasive harmony? or is the universe of such a nature as to admit of a conflict which, though it has sprung up within it, is not of it?

These three possibilities offer themselves to the mind that is trying to push through the world of appearances into the world of reality. The first is the conclusion of Dualism. The second is the conclusion of Monism. The third is an undifferentiated, but long prevalent and well-grounded, conviction, sometimes wrongly identified with dualism, sometimes with monism, but in reality independent of both. For want of a better term we may call it the principle of Duality.<sup>1</sup>

If we look for exemplifications of the three attitudes, we readily find them, emphatically expressed, if not always clearly framed. Of the first the classic example is Zoroastrianism, with its close-drawn battle between good and evil, in which all forces, cosmic and human, are arrayed against each other. Here is apparently pure dualism; yet the further we press backward in Zoroastrianism the stronger does the emphasis become upon goodness both at the beginning and end of the cosmic process.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, Zoroastrianism as a whole is an intense and uncompromising dualism, primarily moral, but becoming metaphysical as well as moral. Less assertive than this personal dualism, but sharing its inherent dualistic attitude, are all forms of imper-

<sup>1</sup> This is not a case of a distinction without a difference, but of a distinction without a terminology. I assume that the term Duality avoids the sense of disruption and hostility implied in the ending "ism."

<sup>2</sup> See G. F. Moore, "Zoroastrianism," *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. v, especially pp. 224, 225.

sonal dualism, which sets matter, as in itself evil or base, over against spirit, as opposed to it. Such are Buddhism, Essenism, Gnosticism, Manichaeism, certain forms of Neoplatonism, together with all the vagrant fanaticisms which despise the material life.

The second attitude, the interpretation of all existence as one, of spirit as only a form of nature, or nature as a form of spirit, is that of all thorough-going pantheisms and monisms, including Brahmanism, Spinozism, Hegelianism, absolute idealism in all its forms, cosmism, and physical monism. These may vary in character from the rapt intellectualism of Spinoza to the bald naturalism of Ostwald, but they agree in obliterating any fundamental difference between matter and mind, the natural and the spiritual, good and evil.

The third attitude consists in the recognition of two distinct and uninterchangeable but complementary forms of reality, conceived now as mind and matter, now as spirit and nature, the one active, the other passive,<sup>3</sup> through whose right relation to one another, on the one hand, moral good is promoted, and through whose misrelationship, on the other hand, moral evil arises. Lying between the extremes of monism on the one side and dualism on the other, or perhaps beyond them both as their solvent and corrective, this theory of duality has had far more of influence and demands more of recognition than has been accorded to it.

The father and founder of this dual conception of the universe was Plato. Although Plato is universally called a dualist, strictly speaking the term is a misnomer. There is abundant material in the Dialogues to prove how far he was from dualism proper, both in its militant and its emanationistic forms. The non-dualistic attitude of Plato, as expressed in the *Timaeus*, for example, is evident in at least three particulars. First, he held a firm conception of the goodness of the world as a whole. "Why did the creator make the world? He was good and therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired that all things

<sup>3</sup> Dualism proper regards the second principle as well as the first as active. The Stoics, like Plato, regarded matter as passive. "Das wahre Charaktermerkmal der  $\theta\lambda\eta$  ist Passivität." Aal, *Geschichte der Logosidee*, p. 113.

should be as like himself as they could be.”<sup>4</sup> Secondly, Plato provides no place either for an Angra-Mainyu or a demiurge. In the *Timaeus* he represents God as employing assisting gods in creating, but these, too, are God’s own creation.<sup>5</sup> His only demiurge is Reason (Νοῦς). His universe is a rational universe, built upon the pattern of the eternal Ideas. Thirdly, Plato represents matter, or necessity, not as a hostile or evil principle but as the passive receptacle of the Ideas, and thus essential to creation. It is spoken of as “reluctant,” but yielding finally to the persuasions of reason.<sup>6</sup> For the union of forms with the formless is needed to make a world. Whatever the connection between Platonism and Christianity, a duality not unlike this is the actual attitude toward the world which from the first Christianity adopted and maintained.<sup>7</sup>

## II

Paul, the first and foremost representative interpreter of Christianity, defined the Christian attitude on this subject clearly and concisely in his well-known distinction between the natural and the spiritual man.<sup>8</sup> There is no dualism here, simply duality. But it is a duality that is positive and significant. It contains in germ the entire attitude of Christianity toward life, theoretical and practical. For, as the apostle goes on to demonstrate, while there is no antagonism between nature and spirit, still the one is first and the other second, the one lower and the other higher. “Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural.” In other words there is a difference in value, as well as in kind, between the natural and the spiritual. And in that difference lies the whole possibility and power of the new life—regeneration, self-development, resurrection. Here, too, lies the

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 30.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the dependence upon Plato of the Christian fathers in the Hexaemeron see an article by Frank E. Robbins on “The Influence of Greek Philosophy in the Early Commentaries on Genesis,” in the *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1912.

<sup>8</sup> 1 Cor. 15 44-49; also 1 Cor. 2 14.

possibility of that fatal schism between the inward man and the fleshly man (into whose members the law of sin has entered) described by the apostle in the seventh chapter of Romans. It is only as this dual constitution of the cosmos and of human nature enters into experience that the laws, the achievements, the hopes, of the Christian life are real and realizable.

Repeated attempts have been made to resolve Paul's duality into a metaphysical dualism. He does indeed (Gal. 5 17) make flesh and spirit hostile to one another, but never body and spirit. His "sins of the flesh" have been again and again misinterpreted as though they were sins arising from the flesh, instead of being, as he himself plainly indicates, sins connected with the flesh but arising from another source. In his enumeration of the works of the flesh, ten out of fifteen of those designated are mental rather than physical.<sup>9</sup> His words concerning marriage have been misconstrued as dualistic. It is true that Paul expressed his preference for celibacy. But his advice against marriage is almost entirely upon grounds of expediency, and he distinctly pronounces marriage to be of divine appointment.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, while he recognized the duality of nature and spirit, his whole attitude toward life and conduct is free, broad, and wholesome, based upon the principle that "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof."<sup>11</sup>

In this attitude there is every reason to believe that Paul had "the mind of Christ." He who was constantly throwing into antithesis the soul and the body, the earthly world and the heavenly, and who was the prince of the way of the cross, yet renounced the asceticism of John the Baptist and was called a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber. With this temper and spirit in its founder, communicating itself vitally to his followers, it would have been a complete subversion of the mind of its Lord for Christianity either to confound sense and spirit or to fall into a narrow and repressive asceticism.

The Christian church, though often crossing the border-line

<sup>9</sup> Gal. 5 17-21.

<sup>10</sup> 1 Cor. 11 12.

<sup>11</sup> "There is no reason why Paul should not have been familiar with dualism as it existed in Hellenic thought; but that he embraced it or held it is a supposition obviously incompatible with the general tenour of his teaching." F. R. Tennant, *The Fall and Original Sin*, p. 269.



of dualism, on the whole avoided it. Victoriously lifting the spiritual above the material, insisting upon conversion from sin and a new birth into the spirit, inculcating self-denial and self-sacrifice, yet convinced that this is God's world from dust to star, thrusting away Gnosticism, Nicolaitanism, Manichaeism, Christianity remained for the most part clear-sighted and firm in sustaining a sane and balanced attitude toward life, exalting the world of the spirit, yet never cursing the world of sense. And for this steadfast spiritual sanity of the early church Paul, interpreting as he did the mind of Christ, was largely responsible.

The Johannine outlook upon the world is in essential agreement with that of Paul. The conception of the Logos which is the key to the Fourth Gospel involves duality and excludes metaphysical dualism. The fundamental distinction between reason and nature, form and matter, requires at once their differentiation from, and their adaptation to, each other. Creative activity on the part of reason, inherent receptivity on the part of matter—this is the heart of the doctrine of the Logos from Heraclitus through the Stoics and Philo to the present time. It is true that Neoplatonism developed a tendency, latent in Plato, to regard matter as essentially alien to reason, thus suggesting the agency of the Logos as that of intermediary between the two, but this is not the true and original conception of the Logos.<sup>12</sup> The divine Reason traverses no abyss of separation, according to true idealism, to reach its constructive material. It is its own creative expression. The author of the Fourth Gospel gives every indication of holding the true and not the debased conception of the Logos. The Word is from the beginning not only with God (*πρὸς τὸν θεόν*) but *of* God (*θεός*). All things are made through (*διὰ*) him. To crown all, he became flesh. The assertion is not that he assumed flesh but that he became flesh. This is essentially Philo's conception, except that this last intrepid assertion of incarnation completely transcends his purview. Philo's description of creation, far from assuming, as is commonly claimed, an original intractable and base matter, is true to the optimism of Genesis. For instance, in describing the first man he writes:

<sup>12</sup> It is to this prevalent but unjust notion of the doctrine of the Logos that its present disrepute is largely due.

And one may form a conjecture of the perfection of his bodily beauty from three considerations, the first of which is this: When the earth was now but lately formed by its separation from that abundant quantity of water called the sea, it happened that the materials out of which the things just created were formed were unmixed, uncorrupted, and pure; and the things made from this material were naturally free from all imperfection.<sup>13</sup>

Nature fresh and unsullied is not base but good. The spiritual seer who wrote the Fourth Gospel seems to have looked upon the nature of the world and of man in the same manner, as originally and of itself pure and good, a Logos-world, a Logos-lighted man. "Without him was not anything made that was made." It is only by virtue of an alien factor entering through a wilful desecration that the whole world order has become disturbed. When our author writes of the light shining in darkness and the darkness apprehending it not, it is of the self-produced darkness of the mind that he speaks. Out of this natural order, not because it is evil, but because it is unspiritual, one must be born anew. This involves a forsaking, not of the natural world itself, but of the sin that has come to darken it. In brief, in the Fourth Gospel, as in Paul, we find ourselves in the atmosphere of ontological duality and moral dualism. This attitude, thus early assumed, continued to characterize Christian theology.

### III

Almost at the outset Christianity was exposed to the severest temptation to abandon this sane and simple duality for a profound and searching system of dualism, namely, Gnosticism. The full tide of this subtle and influential dualistic philosophy swept in upon Christianity, but left her unmoved. In gathering all her strength and summoning all her resources to resist Gnosticism, Christianity showed how thoroughly she was committed to a trustful and undivisive view of the world. She would neither yield nor compromise. In the *agape* and the *fides apostolica* are embodied the protest of the church against orientalism. Severe

<sup>13</sup> De Opificio Mundi, § 47.

as the early church often was in her attitude toward the world, encouraging renunciation and self-denial, on the whole in her great battle with both Gnosticism and Docetism she stood firm for a good, undivisive universe.<sup>14</sup>

After this victory Christian theology enjoyed a period of inner serenity and freedom in which Platonism was thoroughly assimilated and christianized. The greatest of the apologists were Christian Platonists, and both they and the great Alexandrians, Clement and Origen, who followed them, maintained the Christian-Platonic dual conception of the universe, the key to which is the Logos incarnated in Jesus Christ. Athanasianism, too, turning, as it did, more directly to the problem of humanity, found the antinomy of flesh and spirit resolved in the divine-human Son of God.

Latin theology drifted toward metaphysical dualism, but stopped short of it, held back by the very genius and spirit of Christianity. Augustine's Neoplatonism led him at times to an immoderate disparagement of the world of sensation and a sombre overestimate of the welter of corruption in which humanity is sunk. And yet when he formulates, with deeper thoroughness of reflection, his theory of evil, he rests upon the principle *omne esse bonum est*, and makes the essence of evil to be negation.

The great ontological controversy of the Middle Ages, that between realism and nominalism, turned largely upon this same issue of redefining the relation of the eternal to the material, of the One to the many. Although Plato had made a place for both unity and diversity, he had thrown the balance of his emphasis so strongly upon the eternal and universal as to leave the material and individual in unjust subordination. Aristotle's correction of this maladjustment—which, however, threw the balance too heavily on the other side—did not find its way into theology until the mediaeval period. The great controversy of realism and nominalism was the result. Is the one reality that of universals? or is the chief reality that of individuals? With more of

<sup>14</sup> "From the end of the second century it was for ever established in the church that the belief in an essential dualism of God and the world, spirit and nature, was irreconcilable with Christianity." Harnack, *Monasticism*, p. 23.

intuitive wisdom than of adherence to professional argumentative triumphs, mediaeval theology refused to accept either alternative, and held fast to a duality of reals, thus adding another testimony to the invincible duality of existence which from the first Christianity espoused. The distinction of a kingdom of nature and a kingdom of grace is another recognition of the fundamentally dual character of existence.

The Roman church, however, gradually yielded to a dualism stronger and more subtle than that of speculation—the ancient, obstinate dualism of superstition. Inconsistently, fatally, the church incorporated not only into its practice but into its theology the conception of a world alien to God, inhabited not only by corrupt men but by evil spirits, a world whose only hope lay in mediation and miracle, culminating in that incomparable concession to dualism, the perpetual miracle of the Mass. For, while the Mass is capable of interpretation in terms of the receptivity of the material elements to the divine spirit, as a matter of fact its remarkable hold has been due in large part to the assumed miracle of transformation by which that which in itself is common and undivine is made over by a wonder-working priesthood into the very body of Christ.

With the Reformation the bondage of this superstitious dualism was broken; and yet its fetters were not wholly cast aside. Luther, with a noble and enlightened faith, taught the wholesomeness of life, the sacredness of the family and of common toil; but side by side with this liberality he retained too strong a sense of the overshadowing power of a personal devil intrenched in the world itself. Calvin, with all his insistence upon a sovereignty of God that penetrated to every nook and corner of the earth and controlled every minutest act and event, managed to produce the effect of a practical metaphysical dualism, sadly distorting the joyousness of Christianity, wrapping its limbs in sackcloth and hampering its freedom with unnatural restrictions.

Yet on the whole Protestantism, while keenly alive, doctrinally and practically, to the moral dualism which has sprung up in the world, has never yielded to metaphysical dualism. It has thrown into the sharpest juxtaposition the goodness of creation

and the badness of man in abusing it. Still, its duality must be admitted to have been in the main an exaggerated and separative one, in which the immanence of the spiritual in the natural which characterized original Christianity and Greek theology has been almost wholly lost. Eighteenth-century rationalism represents the height of this hard, clear, cold separation of the two worlds. The arid poverty and frigid conventionality of this period prepared the way for the inrush of that tide of romanticism, pantheism, and orientalism which has carried us so far toward monistic and hedonistic attitudes.

Clearly and forcibly the truth has come home to our age that a hard-and-fast duality, which keeps the two realms of existence alien and apart, comes too near to a dualism that sets them against each other in implacable strife and hostility. Either monism or a duality of immanence in which the eternal finds its expression and embodiment in the natural—to one of these conclusions we seem to be moving. As to which of the two is the Christian attitude, there can be no doubt.

But has not Christianity, from the very first, and throughout its career to the present day, thrown into high relief the might and mystery of evil? Has it not spoken in tones of dread and warning of Satan and his angels, of principalities and powers, of wickedness in high places,<sup>15</sup> as well as of besetting sins and thronging temptations? Yes; but always it has attributed this disruption and conflict to self-corrupted and rebellious wills. It has never made a place for it in the nature and design of Being itself. Its cosmology has been duality; its ethics, dualism. The struggle of the spirit is not so much a struggle with nature or matter as a struggle to be true to itself.

Into the remoter reaches of the problem why spirit should contain within itself the possibility of denying itself and subverting nature to unholy ends, Christian theology has never successfully entered. It has in the main been content to refer it to the root principle of freedom, which belongs to the very

<sup>15</sup> Paul, who (together with the Johannine author) is as largely responsible for this conception of the superhuman character of evil as he is for the non-dualistic sanity of the Christian attitude toward life, seems to have intended by these vigorous terms to emphasize the power of evil rather than to define it metaphysically.

essence of spirit, a principle which requires the possibility of evil but not at all its actuality. Thus Christian theology tends to leave the origin of moral evil in that unexplored realm in which the finite will works out its adjustment to the Infinite Will.

#### IV

Turning now to a brief survey of modern philosophy with reference to the distinction before us, we find that, as a matter of fact, practically all systems of modern thought have adopted in some form, as a working principle, the distinction between matter and mind. Spinoza himself, at the fountain-head of modern thought, did so. Descartes set the two in such sharp contrast as to win for the initial type of modern philosophy the title of dualism.<sup>16</sup> But Cartesianism was not dualism in the proper sense, for it involved no necessary opposition between matter and mind, but simply their contrast. Descartes's description of the two has undergone radical reconstruction, yet the effort to resolve them into one seems as far from realization as ever. Static and mechanical as was Descartes's treatment of matter, his metaphysic was dual rather than dualistic.

Leibniz reduced matter to immateriality, but kept the distinction between body and soul by dividing his monads into ruling monads and subordinate monads. Here again is duality—though in a very attenuated form—without dualism. Still more tenuous is Berkeley's duality. Matter is but the sign-language of spirit. There are only minds and their ideas. But, even with material objects reduced to ideas, the inevitable distinction remains. There is something standing over against the mind, clothed in tangible and visible form—namely, its ideas. The fact that they can be used as food and clothing differentiates them from pure spirit.

With Kant the full recognition of ethical dualism comes into philosophy for the first time in its full strength, to interpret and accentuate metaphysical duality. Through Kant's insight that

<sup>16</sup> Thus Martineau says: "With Descartes we enter upon the true era of metaphysical dualism." *Types of Ethical Theory*, i, 128.

the real source of true knowledge, as of true action, is the moral reason, philosophy entered into a new understanding of personality. Personalism thus found its true basis and setting only in Kant. He first saw, in their united meaning, the three principles of the necessity of an external world of some sort for the mind to reconstruct, the regulative action of the mind upon that world, and the supremacy of the moral reason over every other function of the mind. His unknowable *Ding an sich* was doubtless an awkward factor in his system, but it stood for his fundamental conviction of the duality of existence, so essential to ethics and to theology, and not even Fichte's searching criticism could make him disown it.

It is true, however, that Kant's duality was not only ill-adjusted but overdrawn. Both its rationalistic and agnostic elements produced extremes. The former led to the rationalistic idealism and ultimate monism of Hegelianism, the latter to the agnosticism and ultimate scepticism of Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer. Since the disintegration of absolutism and of agnosticism, philosophy, aside from its lapse into the philosophy of the unconscious in Germany and its adventure into the *cul de sac* of pragmatism in America, has been moving toward personal idealism, in which duality is interpreted in the light of social personality. The essential realities are persons. The external world exists, but only as the material for the development and communication of personalities. Eucken in Germany, Rashdall in England, and Howison in America, as representatives of this newer personal-social idealism, are doing much to steer us safely between the Scylla of monism and the Charybdis of pragmatism. Eucken's philosophy is notably clear in its recognition of the fact and significance of duality.<sup>17</sup>

Contrasted with this idealistic duality is that of Bergson, reached by the scientific-philosophical approach, yet equally positive in its assertion of the twofold nature of existence—matter and life—and in its rejection of metaphysical dualism. Bergson-

<sup>17</sup> There can be no action, says Eucken, without this duality—keine Tat ohne Zweiheit—and the duality itself is indigenous to the action; it is both grounded within and overcome within it. Boyce Gibson, Rudolf Eucken's *Philosophy of Life*, p. 96.

ian matter, to be sure, though a "flux rather than a thing,"<sup>18</sup> is relatively inert and irresponsive, and thus far like that of Plato and Plotinus, but never hostile or evil. It might seem that a flowing philosophy, such as that of Bergson, which recognizes nothing as static or determined, would be monistic, like the energetics of Ostwald; but such is not the case. His whole metaphysic is constructed upon the interaction of two opposite, yet not opposing, movements, matter on the one hand, life or consciousness on the other. "Matter, the reality which *descends*, endures only by its connection with that which *ascends*. But life and consciousness are this very ascension."<sup>19</sup> This conception of matter gives it a distinct reality, and yet it only plays the part of foil, or rather protagonist, to consciousness. It is "a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive."<sup>20</sup> As such it stimulates consciousness to activity. "Above all, matter is what provokes effort and renders it possible."<sup>21</sup> One of the most definitive as well as far-reaching statements which Professor Bergson has made appears in the same article from which the above sentence is quoted. It is to this effect: And I believe also that neither the matter constituting a world nor the consciousness which utilizes this matter can be explained by themselves, and that there is a common source of both this matter and this consciousness.<sup>22</sup>

Here is both duality and also a strong suggestion of super-origin. Nevertheless, Bergson's duality, valuable as it is for both science and metaphysics, is tentative and incomplete. It fails to find the ultimate line of cleavage. The duality which is of chief concern for humanity is not that of life and matter, but that of nature and spirit. The personal and the physical—these are the two realms which together constitute the universe, the relations of which to each other form our imperative problem. Bergson's duality points toward this deeper duality, throws light upon it, but does not reach it.

Before going on to comment, in conclusion, upon the value of this conception of the dual nature of existence, we should pause

<sup>18</sup> *Creative Evolution*, p. 186.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 369.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>21</sup> "Life and Consciousness," *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1911, p. 41.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.



to note an objection. It has doubtless occurred to the reader that in this study there has been a confounding of different kinds of dualities. That recognized by Christianity is not the same as that of philosophy, and science has its own form of duality, differing from both. And yet, though the lines shift and change, these are seen to be after all but aspects of one fundamental duality, that of the two realms—the realm of nature and the realm of ends.<sup>23</sup>

## V

In many ways the principle of duality throws light upon the problems both of nature and of man. A dual universe, for example, is the only one in which development and freedom are possible. Good as the universe is in origin and in essence, it is not as yet the best possible world, in the Leibnizian sense, since it has not reached its own best. It is not static, finished, but on the way. The best thing in it is that it is bettering, advancing, developing. Now the possibility of progress implies diversity of structure. A world strictly and absolutely homogeneous would be either a dead world or a perfect world. The world of the absolutist cannot truly develop. There is for it no higher and lower. The Hegelian process of development is only an unfolding, a coming to consciousness of the Perfect One, a passing from implicitness to explicitness. Nor can the world of naturalism develop, because it has nothing to develop toward. It can evolve, pass through cycles, as Spencer held, but true development is alien to the very idea of naturalism. Only a world in which there is a higher and a lower can develop. Development involves at least a duality of higher and lower.

A being of a dual nature, like man, must inevitably be confronted by the task of adjusting the one nature to the other. In proportion as he fails to keep the rational in control of the sensuous, he sins. The entire use of the senses and of the material world must be governed by spiritual laws, that is, by one's relation to other persons. Temptation comes, not through any sensuous appetite

<sup>23</sup> James Ward has strikingly set forth the contrast of these two realms in the first two chapters of his recent volume, *The Realm of Ends*.

in itself, but in yielding to it in contravention of personal obligations.

It is further evident that freedom is the essential condition of this process of adjustment, and that freedom carries with it the inevitable possibility of maladjustment. That this freedom is strictly confined to man alone is not so certain as it once seemed, now that Bergson and others have unfolded the realm of evolutionary choices and thus of a certain kind of nascent freedom in nature below man. In man, however, is the exercise of true freedom. In ourselves we are aware of nothing more real than the interplay of the dual part of our nature—the tug of our lower nature, which yet is not low, and the power of assertion and control of reason. Often this interplay rises into a strife, a “warfare” as Paul calls it, in which the natural man and the spiritual man make havoc of our peace of mind. And yet the enmity is not essential and inherent, for sometimes the two fall into such accord and harmony that life flows into a hymn of joy in which no jarring note is felt. Has not Browning the right of it when he sings:

Let us not always say,  
 “Spite of this flesh today  
 I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!”  
 As the bird wings and sings,  
 Let us cry, “All good things  
 Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul!”

All nature-mysticism is built upon this deep accord of the outer and the inner, soul and sense, word and reason, beauty and truth,—an accord which has been disturbed but not broken. In our moments of finer insight, as in listening to music, we feel the harmony underlying all the discord of our life.

Clearly, then, the schism lies in a disturbance and not in an inherent disharmony of the two elements of our being. “The world is of the right stuff, but of wrong arrangement.”<sup>24</sup> The duality is as capable of harmony as of strife. It has become a dualism only through the corrupting act of will. Clearly, too, the dualism is not confined to the individual will simply, but is

<sup>24</sup> G. M. Stratton, *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 355.

a social as well as an individual schism. Whether this dissension is confined to human wills or embraces a wider circle, including mightier spirits, is a matter of conjecture only. It does not affect the principle; namely, that moral dualism is due to deflective will and is not original and essential.

## VI

It is not easy to realize the full significance and value of this uno-dual *Weltanschauung*, with the attitude of mingled confidence and watchfulness that it begets. It presents to us a world consisting of two mutually fulfilling forms of existence, which we call matter and mind, or sense and spirit, the one formative, the other receptive; the one non-spatial, the other spatial; the one subjective, the other objective; the one purposive, the other non-purposive. It is not a divided world, for these two forms of existence are neither hostile nor unrelated; indeed Christianity assigns them to a single Creative Source. It is, in fact, a consistent world, a *good* world. It is a good world in virtue of the fact that reason is dominant in it. There is in it no inherent conflict of light and darkness, no battle of gods and giants, heat and cold, Yang and Yin, no perpetual strife of angels and demons. And yet there is a real battle—*within the human soul*.

In the recognition of this schism which has entered into the world through human sin it is undoubtedly true that there has been a strong tendency on the part of those who hold the dual attitude to carry the disruption back toward the very centre and source of things and thus approach the dualistic attitude. For this reason they often appear to be thorough-going dualists. This is the case, in some degree, with Plato, with Paul, with Philo, with Plotinus, with Origen, notably so with Augustine; and from Augustine the tendency communicated itself to Protestantism. Disparagement of the body, asceticism, hostility to art and to culture, other-worldliness, have been the unhappy results. But this exaggerated duality, which has carried it, at times, to the very verge of dualism, has been in the interest of the life of the spirit in the ardent endeavor to throw the emphasis where it

rightly belongs. In the attempt to adjudicate values the adjustment of values has suffered. Yet, after all, this is a pardonable error, however disastrous, since committed in behalf of the higher life, the greater value.

Present-day thought and life, in its swing toward monism and hedonism, its overvaluation of material good, and its loss of the mystical element in religion, is in need of a restored recognition of the distinction between spirit and nature and of the inherent supremacy of spirit. It is only thus that life can be made normal, and humanity move toward the goal of the personal and social ideal. Unless the eternal transcendence of spirit over nature is kept in view, nature is certain to absorb and suppress all sense of the spirit. Unless, on the other hand, the immanence of spirit in nature is recognized, nature can never fulfil her highest uses and noblest ends. We have advanced from the separative duality of Plato and of the repressive type of Christian theology to the conception of a duality of immanence which is the heart of Christianity. Is it to be lost in a resurgence of monism or of naturalism?

There is no reason whatever why we should be forced into the alternative, monism or dualism. It is a factitious dilemma. There has always been a third point of view, more prevalent, more fundamental, more vital than either of these, obscured by its superficial resemblance to metaphysical dualism, yet now, through the light shed upon it by personalism, growing constantly clearer and more emancipating. Inconsistent with monism and with dualism, it is yet entirely consistent with a Unity that grounds in Theism and a Pluralism that centres in Personalism.

*CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE THE KEY TO CHRISTIAN  
HISTORY*

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No field of theological study surpasses in interest or in importance the history of the Christian Church. Here is a great complex of institutions and beliefs. Where have these come from? What was it that gave them birth? What is the secret of their persistence and power? What are they worth to mankind? Is there to be found beneath the variant, shifting forms of institution and life, of organization and creed, as they appear in Christian history, any underlying, unifying principle, which can account for their rise and explain their right to be? These questions must be answered. They involve the fundamental problems of the unity of Christian history and of the rationality and worth of institutions and confessions and rituals, which, unless they can thus justify themselves, cannot permanently survive.

It is the purpose of this article to show that there is such a unifying principle of interpretation, and that this principle is to be found in the reality of the Christian experience itself. Behind every movement in the history of the church, behind every institution which she has developed for the expression and perpetuation of her life, behind every doctrine and creed, there stands a human soul which has met God, and in the great silence, unbroken save by the cry of penitence or the exultant note of spiritual conquest, has found the path to peace.

The infinite variety of human life, the varying capacity of mind and heart, must of necessity lead to widely different types, both of religious experience and of its intellectual interpretation. The mystic will be found there, for whom the path of contemplation is the highway to God. The man of action will be there, to whom intercourse with the Infinite is the imperative to service and to the propagation of the faith. The genius of organization will be seen there, intent on incarnating experience in institutions

interpreting and perpetuating the emotions of the heart. Great thinkers will be numbered there, moulding into doctrines and systems of belief their own experiences and those of other men. All these and many other types of heart and mind will bring their offerings of intellectual discernment, or moral enthusiasm, or spiritual appreciation, and lay them upon the altar of the church of God.

Nor will we ever be satisfied with the consideration of these fruits of the Christian experience alone. The ecclesiastical institution, the activities which grow out of the Christian consciousness, the intellectual formulation of the Christian experience in dogmas, or systems of belief—these are in no sense adequate to express the primal experience which gave them birth. Between that experience as their source and the institution, or movement, or belief, which would interpret it, the stream has been polluted by many foreign elements and its course diverted by many a promontory of human interest, until it is hard to realize that behind the tortuous current, with its muddy waters, there ever was a clear spring of Christian experience, born of a soul's contact with God.

If we would ever come to understand the movements of Christian history, we must work our way back through forms and rituals to men, to the heart-throbs of human souls. Only so will the artificial and formal, the irrational, the grotesque, be shot through and through with meaning, as the inadequate interpretation of an experience of God which was itself both adequate and supremely significant. We must have a care never to confuse the interpretation of life with life itself. One is formal and intellectual, the other is vital and spiritual. One is created, the other is creative.

With this summary assertion of the primacy of the Christian experience in the history of the church, let us pass to the consideration of a few illustrations of this truth, drawn from the wide range of spiritual biography. And in the first place let us remind ourselves that the Christian religion began, not as an institution, nor as a ritual, nor as a doctrine or creed, but as an experience, a life, an inspiration. Jesus established no church, organized no system of worship, developed no institution, taught

no essentially new doctrine, wrote no gospel, left behind no constitution or system of laws. The uniqueness and everlasting worth of Jesus for our world rests, and must forever rest, in the fact that he met God face to face in the high, clear altitudes of an unclouded fellowship. His worth for humanity lies deep in his personal experience. "I know Him," he said again and again. The streams of beneficence that flowed from his lips and his life validate the claim. Christianity thus has its roots in the primal experience of Jesus' own soul. As has well been said, "The religious consciousness of Christ is the Holy Place from which gushes forth a living spring to water all future generations." He called other men to share in his consciousness, to drink at his fountain. He called others to him to introduce them to the Father. He did not undertake to institutionalize or intellectualize that experience. That he left to others. Rather did he seek to bring to his followers an experience kindred to his own, that there might be wrought in them the same type of spirit. He was not concerned, if only that were present, about the forms it might assume, or the instruments it would employ for its preservation and propagation in the world.

If we turn now from Jesus himself to those who have been influenced by Jesus, we shall be impressed anew to find, upon every page of Christian history, in the lives of the great, who have left the indelible impress of their personalities upon its manifold developments, or of the humble, who have contributed their littles to the sum-total of Christian achievement, that the basic and formative fact in the lives of all was that they had come to know God. Where shall we find, in the history of the church, three names which in the totality of their genius, the wealth of their creative power, the sweep of their influence, the manifold character of their contributions to Christian life and thought, are comparable to Paul, Augustine, and Luther? These three towering personalities stand, each at the entrance of one of the three great epochs of Christian history, the Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern, determining in large measure the movements of the succeeding centuries, the intellectual and spiritual problems of those centuries, and the direction, and, to some extent, the form of their solution. It is fair to ask, in view of these facts, Wherein

lies their chief value for the church? Does it lie primarily in the movements to which they gave birth, the institutions which grew out of their thought, the creeds which expressed their religious philosophy, or rather in the creative religious experience which was common to them all?

Paul stands in the front rank of Christian thinkers by his insight into those fundamental problems centering in the revelation of God in Christ that stirred the heart and engaged the mind of the church for centuries, until they were wrought out with hammer and anvil in the early creeds, which, whatever worth they may have for the church today, are an everlasting protest against slipshod, superficial thinking upon the central verities of faith. Whatever it was that Christ meant to Paul, whatever of new insight and content was given to his thought of God, what theories he built to account for the person and work of Jesus, what programme he evolved for the development of the church militant and the consummation of the church triumphant, all these facts and teachings, vastly important as they are, are not to be compared in importance with the fact that, on his way to persecute the church in Damascus, Saul of Tarsus met Jesus of Nazareth and surrendered to his sovereignty. "Christ liveth in me"—that was henceforth the overmastering consciousness of the apostle. Out of it came the answer to every doubt and difficulty, both intellectual and spiritual. Upon that rock was built the temple of his faith and the fortress of his belief. With the profound conviction, "I know Him whom I have believed," he went forth to evangelize the world and to establish the church. McGiffert is right when he says, "We can neither understand Paul the Christian nor Paul the theologian, unless we appreciate that experience and give it its true value. It marks him as one of the great religious geniuses of history."

What is true of Paul is equally true of his spiritual disciple. Augustine stands at the threshold of the Middle Ages. Their spirit is his. Their institutions are the legitimate offspring of his mind and heart. Monasticism, mysticism, scholasticism, papacy! To name these mighty movements, which gripped the life and moulded the institutions of the church through a period of a thousand years, is, in a large degree, to take the measure of



this man, who projects his personality across the Christian centuries. Unquestionably he gave direction to the ideals and furnished the mould for the shaping of the institutions of that complex age. His writings are the quarries from which master workmen shaped the stones they built into the structure of mediæval thought. Upon his *City of God* the papacy built its claims to world-sovereignty. The subtlety of his genius and the dialectic quality of his mind paved the way for scholasticism. He was a monk and a mystic combined, and contributed to the growth of both monasticism and mysticism. As a theologian he wrestled with some of the knottiest and most unyielding problems of Christian thought, determining the form of trinitarian teaching in the west, by his emphasis on sin and grace opening a new chapter in Christian thinking and paving the way for the religious awakening of the sixteenth century. Upon the roll of the great, who, from the close of the Apostolic Age to the present, have devoted their intellectual acumen to the interpretation of Christianity, the name of Augustine stands first, the master mind of the centuries, belonging to no one age or church, though claimed by both Catholic and Protestant—a teacher of the church universal.

Yet when we have done full homage to the intellectual and moral power that have shaped the thought of Western Christianity, we must not forget how much of that which he wrought, and of what was wrought out of him, has been outgrown, as the church of these later days has built for herself more stately and enduring institutions and beliefs. The papacy has been rejected as an institution by a considerable portion of the Christian world. The gate of the monastery has swung outward, ever since the monk of Wittenberg reopened the path for religion, out into the world of life and work. Scholasticism has given way to modern science and modern philosophy. Even the central teachings of Augustine, persistent and fruitful as they have been in the theology of the church, have experienced inevitable modifications with the progress of Christian thought.

Wherein, then, in view of the diminishing value which these later centuries have put on the greatest achievements of his genius, lies the supreme worth of this saint and theologian of the fifth century for us today? There can be but one answer. The

ultimate fact out of which all else came, and back to which all else must go, to be judged for its worth, was Augustine's personal religious experience. Not so much in his *City of God* or in his controversial writings directed against Donatists and Pelagians, not so much in his constructive theological works, *On the Trinity* and the *Enchiridion*, as in his *Confessions*, in the early centuries the finest fruitage of a deep and vital spiritual life, must be sought the secret of his charm and the power of his influence over the heart of the church. His greatness as well as his limitations as a thinker are to be traced to the fact that he walked in the footsteps of philosophers and theologians. His greatness as a man and as a Christian is to be traced to the fact that he met God and walked with him.

To understand this, we must turn from the arena of hot debate, from sound of hammer, where theological doctrines are in process of construction, to the drama of the man's inner life. Somewhere in the experience of every great soul there is a garden of Gethsemane, where the victory over self is won. Augustine's Gethsemane was a garden in the city of Milan, where the battle was fought with passions which had enfeebled his will and made him a yielding, though rebellious, slave. Within the corridors of his soul two spirits grappled in a death embrace, the spirit of the man and of the beast. There is the mighty conflict, the prayer for help, the divine command, "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ," the response of obedience. Augustine leaves his garden to fight his battle through to ultimate victory. No one will question, who has fathomed the deeps of his life, that that day of conflict gave direction and motive power to all his later activities. The marks of that battle he carried to his death. It was the point of departure and the creative inspiration in his thought. It determined his theology. It made of him a mystic and a monk. In all his writings there is constant appeal to this primal experience.

Nor can we say less than this of Luther, as he stands at the portal of the modern age, gathering up into himself the protests of many minds against the corruptions of the papacy. In him there meet and mingle the hopes and aspirations of multitudes who long to slake their thirst at the springs of pure religion, un-

defiled by the contaminations of priestcraft and the corruptions of false doctrine, the heritage of the Middle Ages. He sounds the bugle-call which stirs consciences and crystallizes thought. The Reformation is born. A new church comes into being, its ritual and laws, its organization and doctrine, echoing the mind and heart of him who gave the movement birth. Look at its polity, and you find the indelible impress of Luther's mind. Examine its Confessions of Faith, and you discover the formal organization of Luther's great ideas. Consider its spirit, and you look into the mirror of Luther's own soul, with its religious fervor and its inherited conservatism. The past few months have produced two notable lives of the great reformer, which have added materially to our knowledge of the man and of the spirit that was in him. Like every truly great soul, the personality of Luther only grows the greater with the flight of the years. We see his faults and note his limitations. He says things that grate upon the finer sensibilities of an age which without him had not been. Sometimes he battles for beliefs which the church has since refused to accept as adequate to her faith. He did all this, and more. Yet when all has been said that can be said, the figure of Luther assumes ever more heroic proportions as we see him across the years. To have shaken the throne of the papacy, broken the bondage of mediaeval institutions and doctrines, and opened the flood-gates of new intellectual and spiritual life; to have created a new church, and given her the weapons of offence and defence; to have sent forth wave after wave of influence to break in light upon western Europe—these mark him as one of the creative geniuses of history.

We ask for the source of that power which went forth from him into the world of thought and action. He wrote many books, stirring the conscience and informing the mind of Germany. Yet the secret of his power was not in his pen. He taught throngs of students, who became ardent disciples and propagators of his message. But his strength did not lie primarily in academic halls. He was the friend and confidant of princes; kings sought his favor and counsel. Yet his greatness was not that of the statesman and politician. Behind all these gifts of his many-sided genius; behind his varied powers, as teacher, preacher, author,

statesman, counsellor, behind all these, and as the inspiration of them all, without which they had never become effective forces for the achievement of his life's great task, lies one, fundamental, never-to-be-forgotten fact. Luther had met God, and that meeting transformed the monk in the Augustinian cloister in Wittenberg into the herald of the Protestant Reformation. Within his own bosom, as has well been said, "we discover the shaping of the whole movement with which his name is associated in history. . . . Its deepest and most intrinsic elements, indeed the very order of its development," we find "rehearsed in the workings of this man's soul, in the quiet of Erfurt and Wittenberg, before he had thought of breaking with the church, or had dreamed of inaugurating a spiritual revolution." Indeed, the Reformation in Germany was the spiritual biography of Luther writ large, a spiritual experience materialized in institutions and intellectualized in confessions.

We follow the evolution of his soul, from the time he leaves the quiet home in Eisleben till he becomes the observed of all observers in Europe. And the thing that most impresses us is this, that within the heart of this man, in the great silence, is being wrought out the problem of the relation of a human soul to God. There is a growing consciousness of God's holiness, so high as never to be scaled by the ladders of institutional religion; a sense of sin so deep as to be unfathomed by the plummet of any human excellence; a consciousness of alienation so wide as to be unspanned by any bridge built by the soul's noblest efforts. Through storm and stress to peace! From darkness to light! Such is the story of Luther's own experience. Nor did peace and light come at last till love had sounded the depths of sin, and faith had spanned the chasm from man's need to the infinite mercy and grace of God; "The just shall live by faith." Such, in brief, was the religious experience of Luther. The reformation thus begun made the Reformation possible. With undimmed vision and unclouded certitude, the great leader consecrated his powers to make real for others, in a redeemed life and a transformed church, the central realities of his own soul.

So much, then, for the primacy of Christian experience in the life and work of these three epoch-making personalities of Chris-

tian history. If now we turn for a moment to the more specific problem of the development of Christian doctrine, we shall be impressed with the same fact. There is a tendency today, both within and without the church, to decry creeds and dogmas as useless bits of worn-out intellectual machinery, to be cast upon the scrap-heap of the centuries. If that is what they are, then that is where they belong. The sooner we rid ourselves of them, the better. But we are not ready to consent to such a judgment. Creeds and dogmas are the religious experiences of human hearts, intellectualized, formulated, and evaluated. They are the judgments of meaning which the mind puts upon feelings too deep for words. Back within the shadow, behind every formulation of doctrine which has taken hold of the mind and conscience of the church, are human hearts which have held converse with the Eternal, and in the wonder of it have sought to interpret to their fellows what eye hath not seen nor ear heard, but which has entered into the heart of man with the grace of the Evangel.

I can illustrate my meaning in no better way than to refer to a single great doctrine, than which none other, except it be the Person of Christ, has been esteemed so pregnant with worth for the life of the Christian church. I mean the doctrine of the Atonement. Like some mediaeval cathedral, spanning the centuries in its growth, upon which many men of many minds have labored, nor always with the same plan, building and rebuilding, casting up a buttress here, opening a window there, whence new light might shine upon the altar of the "lamb slain from the foundation of the world," so stands this central teaching of the church, the building incomplete, waiting the reverent thought of future generations; perhaps never to be finished on earth, from man's finite incapacity for the full thought of the Infinite.

Among the builders was Anselm of Canterbury, the first in the history of Christian theology formally to define this doctrine. "He first compelled men to look at it, and to study it, and to see the Evangel in it." The theory of the atonement which he built has not proved altogether adequate to the growing thought of the church. The question of a measureless guilt demanding a measureless satisfaction, to be applied to man's need by processes neither wholly rational nor wholly moral, has given place to con-

ceptions more fundamental in character and more in accord with our growing appreciation of the character of God. However much his views still influence the thought of the church, we cannot express ourselves today in the terms of Anselm. The intervening centuries have brought us nearer, we believe, to an understanding of the mind and heart of God. The value of Anselm's theory of the atonement for us lies, not in the adequacy of his religious philosophy, but rather in the adequacy of his experience of the redemptive power of Christ to which his philosophy attempts to give utterance. Behind the theory stands a great soul in touch with God, finding its highest satisfaction, forgiveness, peace, and power in that divine fellowship. Religion, rather than speculation, was fundamental in his life. His central interest lies here, as is revealed in his letters and meditations. His deepest satisfaction was in that which had been wrought within his own soul. The play of his keen intellect over these experiences of the heart had as its one end their illumination, both for himself and others.

What is true of Anselm is true of every other great Christian thinker who has reverently approached this central problem of the Christian faith. Aside from the offering of the mind which each has brought to its solution, this is their great worth, that each speaks a message out of his own heart of the forgiving grace of God. Intellectual interpretations of the atonement change from age to age, but the experience of the atonement, as it came to Christian on the way to the Celestial City, will never change. "So I saw in my dream, that just as Christian came up to the cross, his burden loosed from off his shoulders, and fell from off his back, and began to tumble, and so continued to do, till it came to the mouth of the sepulchre, where it fell in, and I saw it no more."

The greatest value, then, of dogmas and systems of belief, is not so much in what they say as in what they do not say, in what they imply of thoughts and feelings too deep for words. They are revelations of human souls, and as such are to be given due measure of appreciation.

The past has, moreover, bequeathed to us its heritage of beliefs and institutions which appear meaningless in the light of

present-day Christian thought, or else outgrown in the progressive unfolding of the Christian consciousness. Protestantism is repelled, for instance, by that exaggerated veneration of the Virgin Mary which prevailed in mediaeval Christianity. It has little sympathy for the institution of monasticism, which was one of the strong pillars of the church in the Middle Ages. If, however, we should approach these and kindred doctrines from the standpoint of their origins, and could enter into the spirit of those who gave them birth, we would find that they were prompted by the same needs which are today the foundation facts of Christianity.

If the church had remained true to the primitive conception of her Master as of one who, whatever his origin, had yet lived a veritable human life, with the limitations of humanity, its joys and sorrows, its privations and toils, its temptations and achievements, the worship of the Virgin Mary would never have had so great a place in the church. It was because theology took him from the haunts of men and exalted him to a position far removed from the conditions of humanity, clothing him in the mystic glory of eternity, that the human heart rebelled, and in the place of the Jesus whom it had lost found satisfaction for its craving in the compassion of the Virgin. Protestantism has sought with sympathy and sincerity to find again the Christ who "is touched with the feelings of our infirmities," and to restore him to the heart of the church. In so doing, the church has unquestionably arrived at a truer conception of her faith. We should never forget, however, that this very achievement of Protestantism bears forceful testimony to the fundamental worth of that cruder experience unconsciously protesting against ecclesiastical dogma and voicing the common need of the heart for sympathy and love.

O Saul, it shall be a Face like my face that receives thee;  
A Man like to me thou shalt love and be loved by, forever;  
A Hand like this hand shall throw open the gates of new life to thee!  
See the Christ stand!

The presence of the primal Christian experience in doctrines which no longer adequately express the content of the Christian

life is equally apparent in institutions once useful, but today outgrown. It requires no great insight to criticise monasticism, for example. Its flight from the labors and duties and joys of life, the extravagances of asceticism, the immorality which it sometimes sheltered—these and many other points of attack it offers to the critical spirit of our age. Yet it may be reasonably asked whether in monasticism, as illustrated in its noblest representatives, a Gregory or a Bernard, an Aquinas or a Savonarola, there is not expressed a Christian experience which is vital and essential, the mastery of the flesh by the spirit, the protest of the soul against enslavement to the material interests of life. And it may also be asked whether there is not something of permanent worth in that experience which we are in serious danger of losing in our easy-going, pleasure-loving, luxury-fostering age. It is easy to see how institutions, once the incarnations of a living spirit, crumble and pass away. But the imperative need that the Christian experience shall embody itself in institutions will never pass away. It is fundamental; for life must create for itself the instruments of its expression.

We might leave the subject at this point, were it not for certain practical reflections which grow out of the consideration of this theme. What has been said must not be taken as depreciating in the least the task of the theologian, of taking the raw material of Christian experience, defining it, systematizing it, and giving expression to it. Next to the imperative of the Christian experience itself, no need can be greater than that of adequately interpreting it to the minds of men. Theologies may pass away, but theology never. New experiences teach new truths, and old ones are seen in new lights and assume new significance. As long as this is so, new theologies will be propounded for each new age with its increment of truth, for each new life with its increment of experience. Only we must discover how to use these creatures of the mind, and how to re-create them when the need demands.

The second reflection is set forth in the closing words of Sabatier's *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, where he says, summing up his argument in that illuminating book: "The labor of philosophical reflection is nevertheless not the



essential thing in the order of the Christian life. . . . There is something more urgent, more necessary, than to explain the experiences of piety, and that is to create them." If the Christian experience is fundamental in the history of Christianity, it follows that the first business of the church is the creation of that experience; its creation, I repeat, not its embodiment in institutions nor its interpretation in terms of thought. Religion is primary. All else is secondary. The first great task of the church of Christ is to lead the souls of men into the presence of God and of eternal realities. It is to lead them into the presence of Jesus, to teach them to see with his eyes, to hear with his ears, to understand with his mind, to feel with his heart the divine interpretation of the meaning of life. There, and there only, will be born the reverent and holy fear, the sublime assurance, the power of faith and hope and love from which flow the streams of spiritual refreshment.

It sometimes seems as though the church were more vitally interested in the science of religion than in religion itself; in the task of criticism and historical interpretation than in the creation of the Christian experience. This ought she to do, but not to leave the other undone. For of what vital worth are her scientific interpretations, if with them there is not born that consciousness of God which makes sacred the ground on which we stand; the sense of sin that humbles, and of grace that exalts, of faith that sends us out with joy into the Promised Land of work, of love that unlocks the treasure-house of life? We need all the light which historical criticism can cast upon the Psalms and Prophets. But more than that we need the experience of God, from which the soul itself springs into song, voicing its needs and its satisfactions in cadences that pulsate with life and power; the experience of God from which the spirit of prophecy awakes, heartening the souls of men for deeds of heroic achievement in righteousness.

Whatever other varied tasks belong to the Christian ministry and the Christian church, these two are central and paramount—first of all the creation, afterwards the interpretation, of the primal Christian experience.

*CONSERVATISM IN RELIGION*

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Human progress depends on the discovery of the forces which are active in the universe and of the way to use them so as to accomplish desired ends. Power is in itself non-moral, and may be used for either moral or immoral purposes. All experience proves that conservatism is an immense power in human nature, and in religion probably more than in any other sphere of human life. It seems strange, then, that more attention has not been given to the nature and source of this power, and to the methods by which it may be so employed as to help and build up rather than obstruct and destroy the spiritual life of men.

The power of conservatism affects doctrine, ethics, ceremonial and liturgical forms, and polity in unequal degrees, although it affects them all very greatly. This essay, however, is concerned only with conservatism in doctrine, and leaves the other fields to other students.

By conservatism in this sphere we understand the clinging to old forms as opposed to new. In saying that conservatism is a non-moral power, we mean that we cannot regard the old view as true or right because it is old, nor the new as right or wrong because it is new. Those who stand for the old because it is old would always, consciously or unconsciously, have a reason for their higher valuation of the old other than its mere age, and we propose to consider various reasons which can be given for a preference for the old. It should be understood that what we are here concerned with is not the age of a doctrine as known in the history of thought, but its familiarity or novelty to a certain circle of hearers or to a given generation of mankind. It is, for instance, at least conceivable that certain so-called modern views of theologians were held by Jesus, or even by some of the Old Testament prophets; but if they are new to a given person or congregation or generation, the power of conservatism will in-

evitably oppose them so long as they are novel, although it may support and apply them when they have become familiar, and thus acquired for the individual or generation the prescription which attaches to the old.

We may roughly divide our investigation of the nature of conservatism into two parts: *first*, the elements in older views and their relations which secure their support; and, *second*, the elements in new views and their relations which repel, and tend to cause their rejection.

### I. THE MAINTENANCE OF THE OLD FOR ITS OWN SAKE

From the natural inertia of human thought in society, the number of those adhering to the older views will always be much greater than the number of those accepting the new. The children of any generation receive religious truth from the mature people of their time—their parents, teachers, and preachers—ready-made. These doctrines, in the forms in which they are presented, are, of course, in normal conditions, held to be true by the adults who transmit them to the children; and this in consequence of the experience which these adults have had of the world, or in spite of it. They are, therefore, correlated with the facts of experience and harmonious with them; and, having been psychologically possible in the parents, they will be psychologically possible in the children in the measure in which the experience of the children resembles that of the parents.

What they are taught will at first be accepted by the children as true, on the authority of their teachers, and the doctrines thus instilled will be woven into the children's whole view of life, and remain there, unless withdrawn or destroyed by some later experience. A system of doctrine developed through ages of study and experience will be sure to have so much in it to commend it to those to whom it is presented, and professional religious teachers will have at their command such well-tried arguments in support of it, that only the most active and powerful minds will go beyond or aside from what they have been taught. The teachers of new views of religious truth in any generation will therefore necessarily be few, and the proportion of people who

adhere to a so-called new view will depend chiefly on the length of time that the new view has been actively disseminated. It may be that two men in different parts of the world independently discover or invent the telephone, or phonograph, or wireless telegraph; but even then it is rarely more than two of the millions of the race who make the same discovery at the same time, and their contemporaneous action is to be explained by the action upon them of common forces. So a new view in religion or philosophy begins with a very few, and spreads only slowly and gradually to the multitude.

This is not a *a priori* theory but well-recognized fact. It is a common observation that most preachers, although their profession requires them to be thinking theologically, remain in substantially the doctrinal position which they reached in their theological schools and the earliest years of their ministry. How much more will the members of their churches, most of whose time is occupied with thinking about other things than religion or theology, retain with little change the forms of doctrine received in early youth! In any generation, then, in which newer and older ideas of religious truth compete, the vast majority of people who have any definite religious views at all will adhere to the older forms, unless influenced by some very unusual and powerful movement, like the Reformation in Germany.

From the natural inertia of thought in the individual, most men are prone to cling to the old and familiar rather than accept the new. This principle is to be distinguished from the one previously considered. There we were concerned with the probability of the presentation of newer forms of doctrine to the people of a generation; and we saw that in a given generation the newer ideas are likely to be presented for consideration to only a few. Here we have to do with the acceptance of opinions when they are presented. Of all those to whom the newer views are presented after the older ones have once been accepted, it is likely that but a small proportion will change their views. If all minds were constantly and actively logical, of course, there could be no such rule as this. The most reasonable form of doctrine would be accepted and adhered to, whether it were old or new. But very few minds are thus rationally active, except in those spheres of life which occupy

their time and energy most directly; and even within those spheres the men who, by logical thinking, improve on the ideas and methods transmitted to them by others are the exceptions. The familiar psychological laws of mental habit explain the tendency of early ideas to become permanent in a given mind. The further fact that where definite and extended religious instruction has been received, it becomes interwoven with all the principles, ideals, and aspects of life, and the more completely, the more seriously the religious views are held and applied to conduct, must make it apparent that any considerable change of religious conceptions would mean for the most earnest religious persons a mental revolution, a recasting of the whole outlook upon life, and thus be a difficult process, the tendency to resist which would be very strong.

As religious views concern and affect the emotional ties which bind men to persons, human and divine, the whole strength of these emotions opposes any change which may seem to imperil the position or relations of the objects of these emotions. The first class of such emotional ties is that uniting the individual with his friends, kinsmen, and forefathers. To discard a belief which has been earnestly held and defended by some hero or saint whom I honor, some parent or grandparent whom I love and reverence, some friend with whom I have the most intimate and affectionate relations, seems to be a reflection on his judgment and mental powers, if not his character; to be exalting myself and my own mind as superior to his; or even to be—what it often really and tragically is—the erection of a barrier between my friend and myself. The more noble the nature, the more it revolts from such apparent disloyalty, and the stronger the motive to distrust the newer view, even though it may seem to the reason the more probable one.

This kind of conservatism is illustrated in the story of the African chief who was about to submit to Christian baptism at the hands of a missionary. Before doing so, he asked the missionary what had become of his ancestors—whether he should meet them in heaven. When the missionary replied that this was impossible, they were all hopelessly lost in hell, the chief decided to share their fate rather than separate himself from them by

accepting Christianity; and we say that it was the nobler strain in his character which moved him to that decision. Again, apart from the dogma of the superhuman (i.e. essentially non-human) origin of the Scriptures, our reverence for the Prophets and Apostles, as well as for the later Fathers, might lead us to say that their views of God and Christ and salvation must have been right, and that it is very presumptuous for us to set up our views against theirs. This feeling is sometimes manifested in ludicrous ways, as in the case of the woman who, when the minister began to read from the Revised Version of the Bible, indignantly left the church, saying that if the King James Version was good enough for Saint Paul it was good enough for her. The nature of the conservatism was the same as in the other instances, although it was not so logical.

The second class of such emotional ties is that existing between a man and the objects of his specifically religious thought. For example, most Christians have been taught to think of Jesus as being God, and therefore as having at all times had the attributes of God, omniscience, omnipotence, and the rest. No matter how contrary this position is to the teaching of the Bible and to the necessities of thought, any attempt to convince them that Jesus was even for a time limited, and without the full powers of God, seems like degrading him—a lowering of the estimate in which they have held him, a derogation of the honor due him, an impeachment of his character; and in proportion as they realize that they have been saved from sin and death through him, and thus feel bound to him by the strongest bonds of love, gratitude, adoration, and reverence, they resist any teaching which seems to lower his position or diminish the glory which belongs to him.

Older views of religious doctrine are generally conceived as having been revealed or accredited by superhuman agencies, divine or angelic, and having therefore the authority of God behind them; the newer views are consequently regarded as opposing God, contradicting his Word, denying his veracity, having their origin, at the best, in fallible human reason or vain imagination, but not infrequently ascribed to the inspiration of devils, or at least to malignancy and a wilful resistance of God and goodness. Hence the newer forms of doctrine are abhorred and feared by

the pious, and looked upon as traps and snares, the more dangerous as they are the more reasonable and thus more likely to seduce the unwary. This feeling and attitude exist in all degrees, from the sorrowful disapproval of one who is thought to be mistakenly teaching what is different from God-revealed truth to fanatical persecution, torture, and crucifixion or burning at the stake of the man who dares to "blaspheme God" by teachings contrary to the popular religion. It is almost a universal phenomenon, and by no means confined to Christendom. Several of the philosophers of ancient Greece were accused of impiety and in danger of death, because they combated some popular religious ideas. This was one of the charges on which Socrates was put to death, and Aristotle was compelled by a similar charge to flee from Athens. In Hinduism and Mohammedanism religious doctrine is regarded as having been revealed by God rather than consciously discovered or unconsciously developed by man. Jesus was put to death for blaspheming God by teaching what was contrary to his revealed truth, and on similar grounds martyrs have suffered from the earliest to the latest times. An interesting illustration of this feeling in our own times occurs in a book of poems called *Canadian Heart Songs*, in which are the following lines:

"You teachers in the colleges supported by the church,  
Who pretend to wondrous knowledge and to marvellous research,  
Who are really jackals, tearing at the vitals of all truth,  
Sowing seeds of dire disaster in the fertile minds of youth,  
How dare you say that that is false which Jesus says is true?  
And palm off long-exploded lies, and claim they're something new?  
Your 'new theology,' all false, is old as sin and death;  
It bites just like the Serpent's fang; it smells of Satan's breath."

As bearing on the same principle, it is worth noting that propagators of fabricated religions like Mormonism, or of erratic sects like those of Dowie and Elijah Sanford, or of strange doctrines like those of Christian Science, find most success with the multitudes when they claim that their peculiar teachings are not the result of their own invention, discovery, or study, but are divine revelations made to them, which are not subject in any respect to revision or the test of reason. Indeed, the general disrepute

in which rationalism and rationalists stand with pious people generally is a symptom of the lack of confidence in the power of human reason and the consequent demand for some other authoritative source of truth which is still very wide-spread. We are not here concerned with the theory of revelation or the question of the real source of religious truth, but are noticing the actual psychological situation in the religious world of the past and present, of which religious leaders must take account.

The peculiar place of earlier beliefs in memory and in the history of the life of the individual, even when they have been subsequently supplanted by newer beliefs, is such that, in periods of great excitement, strain, depression, weakness, sorrow, pain, and dying the older beliefs are apt to resume their original place in the mind and feelings, and cause the man to abandon the later ones. Illustrations of this fact are common enough, and seem simple enough to understand. The principle of the Roman Catholic Church, that in the first seven years of a child's life it can imprint its doctrines so firmly upon the mental nature that they will be practically ineffaceable, is a recognition of this fact. The case of a very prominent evangelist and religious teacher who, after a "modern" theological education, was "converted" and returned to the earlier forms of belief, is probably to be explained in this way.

The fact, often made much of, that conservative evangelists, preaching the "old" doctrines in the old forms, are generally far more successful in persuading large masses of people to a definite profession of the faith which they were taught in childhood, and to a change of ethical direction in their lives, than those evangelists whose doctrines are more unfamiliar, is without doubt largely due to this principle and to the one next to be explained. So also we shall understand the stories, doubtless in some cases true, of dying persons who turn away with repugnance from the words of the minister who tries to comfort and sustain them with a modern gospel which they may have accepted and approved in later years, and find satisfaction only in the old doctrines presented to them in the forms familiar in childhood and early youth. The earlier beliefs were accepted with a whole-heartedness and perfect faith which, from the nature of the case, cannot be given to the



later ones. The associations of the earlier beliefs are with the most optimistic and innocent period of life, and with those memories which are most vivid and most dear in later years. There will therefore be a glory and strength about the earlier forms of faith which only in rare instances can be equalled by later forms, however sincerely accepted; and the later will seldom be so harmoniously adjusted, or so intimately interwoven with the general views of life and its interests and affections, as the earlier. Hence the frequently preponderating power of the earlier forms.

The popular, pseudo-pragmatic test of doctrines by the character and efficiency of the lives of men who hold the older and the newer forms will probably, in a considerable majority of cases, be more favorable to those who hold the older, for two reasons:

*First*, the enthusiasm, confidence, and energy of a man in affirming and propagating his beliefs will be commonly in proportion to the degree of assurance with which he holds them, and this is almost necessarily greater in the case of one who holds without change the faith first presented to him than in the case of him who has become convinced that his earlier beliefs are untenable, and that other forms of faith are nearer the truth. Just as the river confined between narrow rock walls in the canyon will be deeper than one that freely meanders over the level prairie, so the man who has never admitted any doubt or question with regard to the truth of his faith will be more intense than the one who recognizes a measure of truth in doctrines which he does not accept and a measure of error in doctrines which at first he accepted unreservedly, and who admits the possibility that some elements in the faith which he still holds may be mistaken and have to be abandoned when the fuller light shall come.

While we cannot here enter into epistemological questions and problems of theological method, we may observe that all more thorough theologians are constrained to make the distinction between faith and knowledge, and to recognize the relative uncertainty of the former, and the voluntary element in it which does not belong to knowledge in the strict sense. But it is probable that the great majority of laymen, and even a considerable proportion of preachers and religious teachers, do not recognize this distinction, and that, especially in cases where

faith held has never been subjected to tests of severe doubt, it is assumed that its certainty is of the same kind as that of matters of every-day experience in the realm of sense-knowledge. In such cases, doubtless, the faith will have the element of assurance in it, which, although based on ignorance and error, will be as powerful for him who possesses it as if it were securely founded.

Again, as has been noted above, faith, when rightly distinguished from knowledge, has in it a voluntary element. That is, it requires a certain effort of will to apply the faith to life, and a greater effort as the application is more difficult and the doubt more serious. Now, in any given individual at a given time the available amount of energy is limited. If he have a given theory (article of faith) to apply to life and a particular task to accomplish, he cannot spend on the task the energy exhausted in clinging to the theory. This seems to explain, at least partially, the unusual success in social and religious work of some High Church celibates, Salvation Army officers, Jesuits, and others, who assume the doctrine transmitted to them as unquestionable and turn all their energy to the accomplishment of the practical moral task at hand. This principle is illustrated in Ruskin's *Seven Lamps of Architecture*, in the chapter on "The Lamp of Obedience." Ruskin there maintains that, unless one particular system of architecture is universally adopted in England, there can be no real architecture at all. The principle is that if the energy of the architect is dissipated by learning various systems and weighing their relative merits for the problem at hand, he will have too little left for the solving of his problem and the true development of any given system.

*Second*, religious and moral revival or conversion is far simpler and easier on the basis of accepted and familiar doctrines than on that of unfamiliar ones. Attention has been called to the fact that most successful evangelists are conservative in theology, that is, they preach the doctrines which are most familiar and most generally accepted by those to whom they speak. We have already pointed out one reason for this in the peculiar place which the earlier beliefs have in the lives of those who have subsequently abandoned or changed their faith. But in most cases the old faith is the only one with which the converts in revivals are really

familiar at all. In many cases they have never questioned the truth of this doctrine, even though they have not given it effect as the guiding force in their lives. In other cases, the failure positively to assent to the doctrine has been due to carelessness or frivolity and not to any serious logical or philosophical difficulty. In all cases, the fact that it is familiar and is known to have been or to be held by many of the best people with whom the converts are acquainted is a far more effectual ground for accepting it and acting upon it than any logical arguments which the speaker could bring to bear upon them in the few minutes for which he has their attention. The average man has very little skill or capacity for reasoning on religious subjects; and the man who is converted in the revival meeting will ordinarily be below the average in this respect, as he is not the one who has been faithful in attendance on religious exercises and in Bible study, but rather the one who has been quite indifferent to these matters and given his whole attention to supporting or amusing himself. The appeal to such people is through the conscience and the emotions, not through the intellect; and that which is novel to the mind, however true it may be, will only confuse and disturb rather than convince and convict. Thus it comes about that the older doctrines will almost invariably be more effective in arousing morally such masses of people as are converted in missions and revival meetings, and hence they naturally come to be regarded as the saving truths, whatever their actual relation to the truth may be.

Convincing evidence of the seriousness of the difficulty of getting common people to accept unfamiliar doctrine is the experience of missionaries in work among non-Christian peoples. When the work is begun, almost always the preaching will have to continue months or years before the first converts are made, and the higher the stage of culture of the people and the better their religious ideas, the longer and more difficult will the process of conversion be. Thus in China the work of the early missionaries was very slow; and in Mohammedan lands, where the prevailing religion is monotheistic and more like Christianity than any other great form of religion at the present day, there have been, up to the present time, only small numbers of converts.

We spoke of this test of the truth of doctrines by the character of those who hold them, preach them, and are converted by them as a *pseudo-pragmatic* test. This term has been partially justified by the preceding discussion. We have showed that the tendency would be for evangelists to preach more effectively, and for people to be more readily converted, where the familiar doctrines are preached than where the doctrines are in less familiar or newer forms, regardless of the truth of the forms used, whether old or new. The conservative doctrine will be more effective on account of its familiarity. To the extent that this is a correct explanation of its force, it is evident that the effectiveness of the doctrine is no proof whatever of its real truth or value. By this we do not mean that it is conceivable that men might be led to righteous, loving lives by their acceptance of false doctrine. We would insist, rather, that, wherever the faith leads to improvement in the life, it must be because of the truth which was in the faith. But the situations which we have in mind are those of a larger or smaller measure of truth, of more or less reasonable forms of the statement; and our contention is that it is entirely explicable that preaching which presents familiar doctrines and motives should be more effective in reforming and converting men than a preaching of the same truths in forms more reasonable and adequate but less familiar. This we believe to be incontrovertible. The pragmatic test of a doctrine is the effort to determine its value or truth by its effect upon life. But, as has been shown, in the ordinary community it is impossible to put older and newer doctrines or forms of doctrines to comparative tests on the masses of the people, because the psychological conditions under which they would have to be tried are so dissimilar. All the power of conservatism which we are examining and estimating in this essay makes for the greater effectiveness of the older forms of doctrine, and frustrates any attempt at direct comparison of results.

Those whose money maintains and extends religious work are most apt to be conservative, and therefore the propagation of conservative views will be much more strongly aided by the publication of literature, building of churches, commissioning of missionaries, and education of students than the propagation of

newer or more unfamiliar views. The tendency of the possession of property to make a man conservative in general character is well known. As a rule, capital is conservative in politics and in business. Any change of government, of law, of social situation, may imperil trade, depreciate stocks, diminish incomes, make labor more costly or customers scarcer. Especially is this true with men who accumulate their money in legitimate ways. The gambler may remain a gambler, make his fortune one day, risk and lose it the next; but the man who by steady hard work through many years has accumulated a fortune will not lightly risk his money in new enterprises and under new conditions; and he opposes any reduction of the tariff or interference with existing business methods, because any change may unfavorably affect his business or property. Gamblers are not generally good church members, enthusiastic in the propagation of religion; but faithful, steady, hard-working business men very frequently are. The qualities which have made them successful in business are the qualities which make them useful in the church, and which make them view life seriously, religiously.

The conservative temper of their life as a whole is very apt to prevail also in their religious life. Such steady, reliable men, sufficiently interested in religious enterprises to give them their financial support, are ordinarily those who have been connected with the church for a good part of their lives. They became familiar with the prevailing theological doctrines and formulas and accepted them in youth, when their minds were fresh and active, and have had no time or occasion for such study or thought as would lead to a revision of their beliefs in later years. They go to church to worship, to be encouraged, comforted, or put to sleep, not to be instructed in Christian doctrine, least of all in doctrines different from those they have learned to regard as the final truth, supernaturally revealed by God. They have more confidence in older preachers, with seasoned judgment, than in the younger ones, with their new-fashioned, and perhaps foolish, notions. If they assume the part of dogmatists, they are frequently certain of their own infallibility in proportion as they are ignorant of other views and the grounds for them, and are more conservative than the conservative preachers who have

instructed them. The more earnestly they believe the doctrines they hold, the more conscientiously will they support those ministers, churches, missionaries, and schools which teach and maintain what they believe to be the truth.

Fortunately most church-members have learned to trust experts, and are willing to leave the examination into the theological beliefs of candidates for the ministry and theological professors to those who have made a study of theology. But the popular support of Bible Schools, where earnest young people without adequate education are drilled for a few months or years in the conservative forms of doctrines derived from the Bible in traditional ways, and then sent out to convert the heathen or feed the flocks of Christendom, is a demonstration of the appeal which conservative religious forms make to conservative men of business. The circulation, at the expense of two Christian laymen, of booklets in defence of such conservative forms and formulas among two hundred and fifty thousand Christian teachers and leaders is an illustration of this fact. A Bible School which the writer recently visited in Great Britain, where, at the expense of such conservative laymen, splendid provision had been made for dormitories, lecture-rooms, and the physical needs of the students in general, but none for modern theological books or periodicals in the library, is another example. The transference by such conservative men of their membership and financial support from churches where the preaching is out of harmony with their views to others in the community where it better accords with them is a common and effective expression of the earnestness of their faith and their conservatism in form and feeling.

It is said that when the financial agent of one of the Western colleges in the United States was planning to collect money in the East for the college, he was advised by one who was familiar with conditions not to waste his time on the liberal churches. That meant, if the adviser was correct, that in those churches which, in comparison with others in the community, had the reputation of being liberal, either the men of means would be absent or they would not be so ready to give their money for denominational education. The reason for this has already been explained, but it will perhaps appear more clearly, and the significance of the

reputation of the church in this connection will be seen, as we go on to the second part of this study.

Doctrinal standards fixed by the law of the state or recognized by it, ecclesiastical organizations, and institutions of every sort have great stability. The importance of a definition of sound doctrine has always and rightly been recognized, although the reason of its importance has very generally been misunderstood. All organized associations for common worship have felt the need of an explicit formulation of their faith. Once stated, members are received into the church or the denomination, and particularly into its ministry, with implicit or explicit assent to these confessions or, as they soon become, rules of faith, or symbols. It is generally assumed that only those who assent to these creeds will unite themselves with the church; and it is held that men who, after being admitted into the ministry or priesthood, change their views for such as were not in harmony with the symbols should resign their ministry voluntarily, or be removed from it by ecclesiastical authority. When once such tests have been adopted, it is almost inevitable that a considerable proportion of the membership and the clergy of the denomination will adhere strictly to the creeds in their original letter, and, in intention at least, in their original meaning; and any within the body who desire to have them set aside or revised are regarded by them as recreants who ought in honesty to withdraw from the church, and are sometimes stigmatized as heretics and false teachers, if not as hypocrites.

In cases where a religious body, by a large majority, has modified its creed, it has repeatedly been held by the courts that the minority which adhered to the original creed was legally the church, and as such entitled to hold the property, of which the majority is thus deprived. The civil courts are more strictly bound to the letter and original intent of a document than the ecclesiastical leaders, who might feel morally justified in letting the outgrown letter fall into desuetude or even in setting it aside, if they believed themselves in so doing to be faithful to its spirit. It is clear that where the church is under state control there is still greater difficulty in changing its doctrinal basis, as the general public has no particular interest in making such a change, and

those who desire a change would under ordinary circumstances always have the weight of prejudice against them. "If they did not like the creed, why did they enter the church; if they do not like it, why do they remain?"

Theological schools have often been bound by their charters to teach certain doctrines, and to engage only such instructors as shall hold and defend those doctrines. The fastening of prescribed forms of doctrine upon self-perpetuating institutions possessing endowments which are in the eye of the law charitable trusts, and as such under the cognizance and protection of the courts, thus obstructs progress, and puts under suspicion any one who proposes change, thereby depriving him of his influence in the institution with which he is connected, even if it does not make him immediately liable to removal or to an ecclesiastical penalty.

Finally, the liturgical and sacramental forms of a church are conserved with great tenacity, and perpetuate the doctrines which they embody or with which they are associated. The Scriptures read, the prayers repeated, the songs sung, and the creeds recited, all have doctrinal implications and correspondences; and the richer and more venerable the liturgy is, the more serious would be any attempt to alter it in consistency with a change in the doctrinal point of view, and the more strongly those to whom it is familiar and dear would resist any such proposal. Being associated with the worship of God, the source of truth, the forms of worship are felt to partake of his sanctity and veracity, and hence to be rightly immutable.

## II. THE REJECTION OF THE NEW AS SUCH

Men frequently ignore the newer doctrines and decline to consider them at all, because they are prejudiced against them or their defenders by those who, professing knowledge of the matter, condemn them. So much is spoken and written about these subjects that no one has time to consider or competence to judge it all, and every one has to rely to a large extent on the judgment of others. But such judgments are not always either intelligent or impartial. It is often enough to condemn a teaching that it



disagrees with some familiar conceptions. Sometimes a man's views will not be considered because of the denomination or school or persons with which he is associated. In other instances prejudice is aroused against the opinions of a writer because of some eccentricities in his character. Anything, in fact, which can be said against a man from any point of view may be sufficient to prevent his ideas from receiving attention from those who would otherwise consider and perhaps accept them. Thus, an orthodox congregation often refuses to consider a candidate who has been educated at a school which is tainted with heterodoxy; conservative men take care to send their sons to schools which have the reputation of being "sound," and choose the church, the periodicals, and the books which are esteemed orthodox.

A social penalty, sometimes almost an interdict, may be imposed upon religious views of certain sorts and those who propagate or accept them. A man's connection with one church or another may seriously affect his success in business, and in most cases the body holding the more conservative views offers an advantage. Since it is well understood that men are strongly influenced by their teachers and by the opinions of those about them, it is not strange that those who believe the new doctrines to be false and harmful should be unwilling to expose themselves or their friends to them at all, lest they be tainted or led astray. There is thus a large probability that any new doctrine will not receive fair consideration from the average man. It is true that among young people, if the new is given consideration at all, it is likely to be overvalued and have undue influence, from the same undeveloped judgment that we have been referring to, and that this to some extent counterbalances the conservative prejudice against the new. But it remains true that any new view, good or bad, has the weight of popular prejudice against it, and is sure not to receive impartial consideration from the mass of men so long as it is new to them.

People of well-balanced and sober judgment are likely to be repelled by the temperament and character of those who defend and those who readily accept opinions while they are new or because they are new, and to reject the opinion out of distaste for their adherents. As the reaction of thought and life upon

each other in any given social condition tends to adapt each to the other, and thus to relate and harmonize thought and action in their various normal forms, so any new form of thought is likely to be out of harmony with the whole social condition in which it appears, and to cause friction and abnormal action in various ways. This may be illustrated by considering various classes of people who are predisposed to accept the new, and their relations to harmonious and normal social conditions.

Thoughtless and frivolous people are apt to be attracted by the new and to accept it solely because of its novelty. We cannot imagine that there was any considerable depth of character in the Athenians and the strangers sojourning there, who "spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing." Those who are only interested in the new are those who have no serious occupation or view of life. There is a class of people who desire to be entertained by novel things, whether in the material or the mental world; and they cannot but be repellent to those who are earnestly trying to do their duty and make the world better. Such adherents are therefore more of a hindrance than a help to any cause which they take up; and it is a matter of observation that they are most attracted by those teachers, those churches and that literature which have a reputation for novelty, or heresy, or liberalism. If a preacher of the newer views avoids the name of innovation, he will hardly draw hearers of this class, however new and radical his views may really be; and, on the other hand, the man who advertises his radicalism will have a train of novelty seekers, though at bottom his teaching may be innocuous and even commonplace. This helps to explain the weakness of churches having the name of being liberal; for the kind of people we have been describing will not sacrifice money or time or strength to assist in propagating the faith which they assume so easily and hold so lightly.

Erratic people are prone to accept new doctrines because they seem to promise the satisfaction of some need they have felt, which the older churches and the more familiar doctrines have not met. Individuals who for any reason have developed abnormally and entertain peculiar notions or aspirations are likely to be discontented with churches and systems of doctrine

which do not emphasize those ideas or desires as they do. Thus ill-balanced persons of all sorts are likely to leave conservative surroundings and to consort with circles in which new ideas are welcome, and especially where satisfaction seems to be offered to their individual bent. The mystic will be attracted by Theosophy; the sick, by Christian Science; those who have an appetite for the supernatural, by claims of a special revelation from God and the power to work miracles; the seeker for industrial and social reform, by the church which gives special attention to that subject; and thus those who, in comparison with the average man, are excessively interested in any phase of thought will be drawn to each new teaching which promises satisfaction for the particular need felt, or is thought possibly to afford it. But of course the ordinary man feels uncomfortable in the society of extremists of any sort, and is likely to avoid that which pleases them just for that reason.

Self-seeking people are often attracted by the new because it seems to offer them opportunity for gain, or honor, or other advantage not attainable in conservative organizations, or because the new doctrine seems to license some desired course of action condemned by the old. Men whose ambitions for office or preferment are disappointed in a certain church, or who feel themselves slighted or aggrieved in some way, often for that reason go off and form a new organization, or join a different denomination, or at least another church from that in which they have been. It frequently happens, also, that people who have been in congregations where certain methods of business or forms of pleasure are frowned upon leave such congregations and go to others which put less narrow restrictions on their desires or habits. This change may take them from one church to another in which the form of doctrine is at least as old and familiar as in that which they have left; but it also carries others over into newer organizations or more liberal churches, to which they sometimes contribute an element not wholly desirable. A similar result comes about in a somewhat different way. Morality and religion are closely bound together, particularly in the consciousness of religious persons. Thus people who in a certain denomination are taught that card-playing, dancing, theatre-going, and the like are wrong,

will regard such moral standards as inseparable from the religious teachings which are their counterpart. If, then, they are led to accept newer views of religious truth, and thus to reject, at least partially, those which they had before held, they will easily feel themselves emancipated also from the rules of conduct that were associated with the older views. Sometimes other principles of conduct are taught in connection with the new doctrine, and sometimes not; but the release from the older rules may be felt as much in the one case as in the other. Thus the conservative in thought and action, seeing the liberal doing things which he (perhaps rightly, perhaps mistakenly—it is immaterial to the psychological situation) regards as sinful, is inclined to condemn the newer doctrine as naturally and necessarily leading to loose living, and its teachers and adherents as immoral. On the other hand, the newer doctrine may be rejected because it is seen that it would require better and more unselfish living, greater self-sacrifice and labor, than that which is more familiar.

The newer doctrines are likely to be accepted by the young and immature, who, without an adequate appreciation of the truth and value of the old, are more impressed by the contrasts between the old and the new than by their agreements, and go to extremes in their zeal for the one and their repudiation of the other. Without doubt, the rejection of newer forms of doctrine by conservatives is often entirely rational: they know well the value of their beliefs and the foundations on which they rest, and find this value unrecognized and the reasonable arguments which support their views ignored by those who represent the new view. The preceding discussion will have made it clear why young people much more readily accept new views than older people. But from the limitations of their knowledge, experience, and judgment which belong to their age, they cannot be expected to have the broader outlook which perceives the truth in the forms of thought which they reject as well as in that which they accept both in form and substance. They are, therefore, very likely to be impatient with the old fogies who refuse to see the new light, and in an unreasonable spirit to condemn the older views, of which their own are in reality always largely the product, often agreeing in principle though differing in details and

form of statement. Such young people, then, to a certain extent misrepresenting the newer conceptions, just as they fail of sympathetic understanding of the older, arouse in more mature minds both reasonable objections to their views and prejudice against them, and alienate some who might otherwise be more hospitable to the new doctrine.

### III. PRACTICAL DEDUCTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

In the search for truth, the student should not be misled by the pseudo-pragmatic appraisal of the conservative doctrine, as such, but patiently test the doctrine itself. This principle has been explained above, and need here only be summarized. The pragmatic test of any theory is the value which it has, or would have, in practice, when properly applied. But no doctrine held doubtfully can compare in working efficiency with one held with unquestioning assurance; no doctrine held by an individual of general eccentric habit of mind can be compared in value with another doctrine held by a man of normal character; and, in general, no doctrine with the power of conservatism behind it can be properly compared in effect upon a community or an individual with a doctrine which is not supported by this power. In measuring the value of a doctrine by its effect upon life, great allowance must therefore be made for the psychological condition of those upon whom its effect is to be noted. In certain classes, as we have seen, there is a presumption in favor of the new rather than the old, which must be also allowed for; but among the maturer, wiser, and more stable part of the community, the psychological influence of the conservative form will be far superior to that of the newer, as such. In comparing older with newer forms of doctrine, then, where they really differ, the student will be obliged to fall back upon the judgment of his own mind as to which is the more reasonable and the more applicable to the problems of life, and on the feeling of his own heart as to which is the higher and nobler conception of God and life, and which would the more effectively prompt himself and other men to the most helpful and altruistic action.

There is great possibility of mischief in the labors of the honest

liberal who does not understand the right attitude toward older forms of doctrine and toward conservative people, nor know how to establish the new without losing the value of the old. It is not to be denied that there is a great deal of truth in the old doctrines in the historic forms in which they are held by the mass of Christian people today, and that this historic faith has shown itself in noble and self-sacrificing life. It is a very much easier thing to unsettle faith in good religious doctrine than to implant effective religious faith in one who does not possess it. Superficial ideas of the newer forms of religious faith have been spread far and wide by their friends as well as their enemies; and while their adversaries would be most certain to emphasize the differences rather than the agreements of the old and the new, the same mistake has often been made also by the supporters of the new.

In either case the tendency is to shake the faith of many in the older doctrines without giving them sufficient reason earnestly to accept and vitalize the new. A journalist, writing from the conservative standpoint of the harm done by liberal preaching, truly says: "The strength of all churches is in believing, not in doubting and denying—'This is the victory that hath overcome the world, even our faith.' And a man does not need to be an expert, a scholar, or a theologian, to see when the effect of a preacher's discourses is to weaken faith and to fill the minds of his hearers with doubt." Where a minister believes the newer view to be the truer, he may well give care that the instruction of the children, so far as he can influence it, is in the better form. For the older members of his church, his best method will be the preaching of the truth contained in both the older and the newer forms of doctrine, with such care and sympathy that he may lead his hearers to see that the truth they have long believed is not to be questioned, but to be made even more firm and effective by some changes in the form in which it is held. Thus, if a man actually has a new view of truth which is more adequate and of greater worth than the older views—and here, again, we must beware of thinking that the new is true merely because it is new—he will be able to present it far more effectively, wherever conservative forces are active, by maintaining the most sympathetic

attitude toward the older beliefs than by impatience or intolerance of them. How difficult it is to do this, those know best who have tried to argue with firmly settled conservatives in whose minds there was little or no hope of any change. But that it is worth while, and required by faithfulness to God and man, cannot be doubted. The meaning of the term "conservative" is equivalent to "preservative," and for any intelligent conservative it signifies not the preservation of the old because it is old, but because it is good. The wise liberal must be as anxious to preserve all that is good in the old as the most zealous conservative.

A very serious temptation to insincerity comes to the liberal who realizes the power of conservatism. Knowing that in certain situations the reputation of being liberal, or loose, in his doctrine will prevent him from getting desired positions, or from winning the adherence of certain people, or, in general, militate against his usefulness or success, there is danger that he will endeavor to create the impression that he believes what he does not believe, that he accepts the old formulas and creeds in a degree which he really does not do. Cases are not unknown in which religious teachers have spoken or written in terms unequivocally indicating adherence to forms of doctrine to which they could not honestly assent. We need not here discuss whether such equivocation could in any circumstances be justified. The man with new and unfamiliar views of truth cannot hope to be completely and correctly understood in any expressions which he may use. Should he use more unusual and radical expressions, he may be successful in showing his hearers that he disagrees with them; but generally not nearly so successful in helping them to understand what he actually does believe and desires to teach them as if he used more familiar phraseology, which some will interpret more conservatively than he means it. He cannot be held responsible for all the ways in which his words may be misunderstood, even though he may be able to some extent to foresee such misunderstanding.

He is responsible, however, for false impressions of his own belief which he intended his words to convey. If, for example, he preaches on the atonement, and begins by pointing out how wrong the prevailing ideas of the atonement are, he is likely to alienate

the support and interest of those who have held them, and perhaps do more harm than good. If he expresses himself in such a way as naturally to convey the impression that he accepts the prevailing view in all respects, when that is far from being the case, he is a liar or a hypocrite. If he preaches so as to emphasize the truth in the familiar views, stating positively the changes which he believes necessary to the understanding of the truth, but without specifically calling attention to the fact that these views are new or different from the familiar ones, his work will probably be most helpful, and above reproach, where a part at least of his congregation is conservative.

We must frankly face the very serious situation which exists in most of the larger historic branches of the Christian church; namely, that creeds made centuries ago are still prescribed as tests for entrance to the ministry, and are, therefore, professed or subscribed to by hundreds of men who do not, in their true minds and hearts, assent to them in their original meaning or the modern popular interpretation of them. Without discussing here the morality of seeking ordination under such circumstances, which must be a matter for the careful consideration of candidates for the sacred office, we may urge upon the churches the necessity of doing away with the conditions which put its ministry in such a position. How this can be done does not fall within the scope of this article; but the changes which, as every intelligent man must recognize, are taking place in religious beliefs make it imperative that some way be found by which men who are compelled by all that is worthy, mentally and morally, in them, to accept some changes in view, may enter upon the service of their churches or continue in it without compromising their conscience.

The example of Jesus is instructive to his followers. He was in some ways much too conservative, and in others much too radical, for the people of his time; but he was always sympathetic to all that was good in the old and familiar beliefs and customs, and very judicious in his efforts to reform them. He did not fulfil the hopes of John the Baptist as a stern judge of sin and evil, nor the hopes of those who desired a Messiah that should free the people from Roman domination; but he did not roughly



and inconsiderately denounce these hopes. On the other hand, he taught a spiritual Messiahship and a spiritual and moral Kingdom of God which were so at variance with the popular hopes and expectations that even his most intimate and loyal disciples could only slowly apprehend and assimilate them. He announced, therefore, that he was come not to destroy, but to fulfil, the Law and the Prophets; and he put his new and revolutionary teachings in the form of parables, which would in time be understood by the more thoughtful and spiritual, but would not, by the novelty of their truth, instantly repel those who were less advanced. This sympathetic method arose from no selfish desire for power or popularity; for he took no step to avoid the death which came to him as a result of his righteous life and the novelty and unpopularity of his teaching. He was fearless, but not reckless, in his teaching of truth, connecting himself and his teaching with the great truths of the Scriptures, while correcting and transcending them and the current interpretation of them as the teaching of the highest truth required.

*THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND RELIGION*

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There is no subject about which popular psychology just now has so much to say as the "subconscious." Since the name came into wide use a dozen years ago, it has come to be regarded as something so definite and well understood as to be itself the explanation of many other things. Its bearing upon questions of religious experience has been particularly emphasized, and, in fact, it is largely on this account that it has aroused so much popular interest. In short, the word "subconscious" is spoken so glibly and taken to be the self-evident solution of so many spiritual problems that it will be worth our while to consider what we really know about it, and especially what its actual relation to religion may be. For, though often misused, there can be no doubt that the term stands for something very fundamental in our mental life, and that its connection with religion is in one way or another extremely important.

The conception of the subconscious, or the unconscious, originated, I suppose, with Leibniz. It was made popular as a philosophic doctrine by von Hartmann in his fascinating work, *Die Philosophie des Unbewussten*. But it was not until relatively recent times that it was imported from philosophy into psychology in the strict sense of the term. This was done partly by F. W. H. Myers and his followers, partly by various neurologists and medical men whose researches and practice led them into the field of pathological mental phenomena. Coming into psychology through this double doorway, the conception of the subconscious has had a rather varied development. The physicians have groped and grubbed and worked their way through a mass of abnormal and often very unpleasant cases, mining what facts they could; while the Myers school has been borne, often on the wings of intuition, to conclusions far more interesting, and, if true, metaphysically far more significant.

Myers's hypothesis was that the conscious self of each of us is

only a small part of the real self; that underneath the conscious personality there extends a much larger "subliminal" self, below the threshold of our immediate awareness, behind the door, dominating many of our actions and our thoughts by powers not known to us, and constituting the real and essential personality, of which the conscious self is but a broken gleam. He writes:—

The conscious self of each of us, as we call it,—the empirical, the supraliminal self, as I should prefer to say,—does not comprise the whole of the consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty, which for the most part remains potential only so far as regards the life of earth, but from which the consciousness and the faculty of earth-life are mere selections, and which reasserts itself in its plenitude after the liberating change of death.<sup>1</sup>

This does not mean that we have two selves: it means that the one true self is the totality of which the supraliminal part is but a fraction.

He continues:—

I mean by the subliminal self that part of the self which is commonly subliminal; and I conceive that there may be, not only co-operations between these quasi-independent trains of thought, but also upheavals and alternations of personality of many kinds, so that what was once below the surface may for a time, or permanently, rise above it. And I conceive also that no self of which we can here have cognizance is in reality more than a fragment of a larger Self—revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited through an organism not so framed as to afford it full manifestation.<sup>2</sup>

Within this subliminal part of us, as within the supraliminal part, there are various kinds of phenomena, some lofty, some "dissolutive." To illustrate this, Myers uses a simile which has become famous, the comparison, namely, of our empirical consciousness to the visible spectrum and of our subliminal faculties to the ether waves which we cannot see.

At both ends of this spectrum, I believe that our evidence indicates a momentous prolongation. Beyond the red end, of course, we already

<sup>1</sup> Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, i, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

know that vital faculty of some kind must needs extend. We know that organic processes are constantly taking place within us which are not subject to our control, but which make the very foundation of our physical being. We know that the habitual limits of our voluntary act can be far extended under the influence of strong excitement. It need not surprise us to find that appropriate artifices—hypnotism and self-suggestion—can carry the power of our will over our organism to a yet further point.

The faculties that lie beyond the *violet* end of our psychological spectrum will need more delicate exhibition and will command a less ready belief. The active energy which lies beyond the violet end of our solar spectrum is less obviously influential in our material world than is the dark heat which lies beyond the red end. Even so, one may say, the influence of the ultra-intellectual or supernormal faculties upon our welfare as terrene organisms is less marked in common life than the influence of the organic or subnormal faculties. Yet it is *that* prolongation of our spectrum upon which our gaze will need to be most strenuously fixed. It is *there* that we shall find our inquiry opening upon the cosmic prospect, and inciting us upon an endless way.<sup>3</sup>

It is, according to Myers, from this violet end of the spectrum, so to speak—from the supernormal part of our subliminal selves—that come the insight of the poet and the intuition of the prophet. Art and religion, mysticism, love, invention—these and many other striking facts of human nature are thus made intelligible by one hypothesis. “An ‘inspiration of genius’ will be in truth a *subliminal uprush*, an emergence into the current of ideas which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas, which he has not consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his will, in profounder regions of his being.”

All readers of the *Varieties of Religious Experience* will remember how much Professor James was influenced by these views of Myers. Not that he accepted Myers’s hypothesis in its totality. James was too keen a psychologist and too empirical a philosopher to consider Myers’s view a demonstrated truth. Nor did he feel at all sure that the subconscious part of the mind had sufficient unity to be regarded as a personality. The evidence, in his opinion, was as yet far too scanty for us to come to any conclusion on the exact nature and organization of these subliminal facts. But he was convinced that the conscious self came into

<sup>3</sup> Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, p. 18.

touch with, and was influenced by, psychic forces that psychology has as yet hardly recognized. This he regards as of prime importance to the subject of psychology. "We have," said he, "in the fact that the conscious personality is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes." And his own "over-belief" was that our being upon its further side plunges "into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely 'understandable' world."

It is not surprising that a view in itself so romantic as Myers's hypothesis of the subliminal self, presented with such charm of style, and having the sympathy, if not the positive support, of our greatest psychologist, should make a very strong appeal not only to that large class which is ever eager for the mysterious, but to many serious thinkers, theologians, and religious men, who find in the works of Myers and James a new source of religious hope and faith. Had not this discovery of the subconscious self come, indeed, in the very nick of time, when the old foundations were being undermined by criticism and thrown down by science? What an unforeseen, unhoped for reversal of the rôle of science this was! No longer the foe, science was now become the ally of faith. Hereafter Higher Criticism and Rationalism and Naturalism might do their worst. Only the outworks of religion were open to their attack, and the man of faith might when he chose retire to the impregnable fortress of his Subconscious Self.

The rapidity with which this view has spread is one of the most interesting facts in the intellectual history of recent years, and a witness to the wide-felt need of a belief in something somehow supernatural. The popular magazines have got hold of it, and the man in the street knows that there are two of him. Preachers have made their congregations familiar with this new basis for religion, and books written by scientific—and by unscientific—men have taken it for granted. I quote a typical passage from one of them:

"The subconscious mind is a normal part of our spiritual nature. There is reason to believe that it is purer, more sensitive to good and evil, than our conscious mind. . . . Though it is doubtless

more generic and in closer contact with the Universal Spirit than reason, yet its creations bear the imprint of individual genius.”<sup>4</sup> Another writer puts it thus: “Man’s mind is something far larger than he is conscious of: his consciousness is but a speck of light illuminating one part of his whole self. . . . Or, to put the matter in a still simpler metaphor, the mind is like an iceberg of which the greater part is hidden under the sea.”<sup>5</sup> A distinguished theologian varies the figure, likening the mind not to an iceberg, but—as well as I can make it out—to a sort of bottle with a narrow neck and no bottom. The narrow neck is our consciousness, the main part of the vessel is our subconscious, and from it “filters” up the contents of our minds. Moreover, “the narrow-necked vessel has an opening at the bottom, which is not stopped by any sponge. Through it there are incomings and outgoings, which stretch away into infinity, and in fact proceed from, and are, God Himself.”<sup>6</sup>

It is evident that we are here dealing with a question of prime importance for more things than psychology. If the mind is the sort of thing described above, we ought to know it; and we ought to consider carefully the evidence on which the conclusion is based. To get at the evidence, however, on which the belief in the subconscious rests is made doubly difficult by the fact that the term in question is exceedingly ambiguous. Like other amiable beasts of burden, it has been so overworked that it is now good for little but a vacation—a reward which it might be well to grant. The many meanings which it has had to bear can, however, be reduced to three or possibly four principal ones, which we shall now examine in turn.

The first of these uses of the word “subconscious” makes it synonymous with the *fringe* or *background* of the mind. This is, of course, a part of our immediate experience, of our direct awareness, with nothing subliminal or supernormal about it. If our consciousness be represented by a series of concentric circles, the innermost of these will stand for the centre of closest attention, and the outermost zone for the fringe-region or back-

<sup>4</sup> Elwood Worcester, *Religion and Medicine*, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Dreamer, *Body and Soul*, p. 39.

<sup>6</sup> William Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*.

ground. Between the two there is no break, no "dissociation," but one shades off into the other by a gradual decrease in vividness of content. This outer zone of our consciousness, however, though not attended to, is often of decisive importance in guiding both our thought and our action. We seldom realize all the factors that go to determine our decisions and our judgments. The syllogism is really a very poor representative of the way we think. There is a great deal more in our consciousness at any moment than we pay attention to; and this great, vague, unanalyzed mass of what Marshall calls our "sub-attentive consciousness" furnishes a large part of the data for our judgments, and often forms our opinions when we think we have reasoned our way to them. "The inventor, in working on his particular invention, has a mass of accumulated material and experience, indispensable for the development of the invention, but which is in the background of his consciousness. Similarly, the mathematician, in solving his problem, which forms the focus of his consciousness, possesses a body of knowledge or a mass of material which, though it lies in the periphery of his consciousness, still forms the mainstay of his particular investigation."<sup>7</sup> Both our rougher and more general opinions and our more exact discriminations depend in large measure on what Jastrow calls "mass impressionism"—the total unanalyzed effect which the object in question has upon the background of our minds. The bank cashier may be able to detect the counterfeit bill with unflinching certainty, and yet be quite unable to tell you how he does it, or to describe with any exactness the earmarks of genuine paper money.

The influence of the background upon life and action is no less marked. In Professor Ward's opinion, the background or "continuum," as he calls it, is the original form of psychic life, and it is from it as a matrix that all the more sharply defined forms of consciousness have developed. It is not at all to be considered as a mere reservoir of sensations unattended to. Besides the sensations and the hazy ideas, and more primitive and fundamental than they, there are in the fringe all manner of latent and incipient impulses, attitudes, tendencies to reaction, partially suppressed feelings, wishes, volitions. "The instinctive

<sup>7</sup> Sidis and Goodhart, *Multiple Personality*, p. 241.

desires and impulses have their roots in it, and get their power from it; the inborn reactions upon the environment, so far as they are conscious, the native antipathies and tendencies, our deepest loves and hates—all these are parts of it and grow up out of it." Moreover, as I have written elsewhere,

It is the inheritor of our past, and forms what might be called a feeling memory. At every moment our whole outlook is colored by our past impressions and ideas. These are not present as such—they are not distinctly remembered—but a general feeling-tone and tendency to reaction is established by them and is modified by each event of life; in short, the total feeling background is affected by all our thoughts and experiences in such a way that they influence every passing moment. Our total past experience is in a sense summed and massed in the background, and thus becomes a compendium of our history. But it is much more than that; it is largely the store-house of heredity as well. It is in the line of direct descent, and inherits an endless amount of wisdom gained with so much toil by our entire ancestry.<sup>8</sup>

Thus it has a kind of "*racial* or *instinctive* wisdom which seems to put it in touch, in a perfectly natural manner, with forces hidden from the clearly conscious personality and which makes it wiser in many ways than the individual."

There is nothing mysterious about this, nothing supernatural, nothing that is in any sense a discovery. The fringe region is in no way "higher" or "purer" than the centre of consciousness. It contains evil as well as good, or, rather it contains neither the one nor the other, but the materials for both. Only conscious personality is moral—nothing is good except a good will. The background is only a background; it is there not for its own sake but for the sake of the total personality. The best and purest aspect of the mind, the aspect of it most highly developed and the most nobly human, is to be found not in the obscure shadows of the background, but in the clear sunlight of full consciousness.

A second meaning sometimes given to the term "subconscious" makes it identical with the unconscious, and interprets the unconscious as the purely physiological. It is a generally accepted hypothesis that brain facts accompany mind facts, either as causal substratum or as correlate. While it has not been absolutely

<sup>8</sup> Psychology of Religious Belief, pp. 15 and 23.



demonstrated, it seems most probable that certain brain events are so correlated with certain mind events that the former are regularly followed or accompanied by the latter. If this is true, then many of the phenomena of consciousness are to be explained by reference to the unconscious, that is, to physical phenomena in the nervous system. Moreover, the physiological mechanism of the body performs many purposeful acts without direction of consciousness, such for example as the numerous organic, reflex, and instinctive movements. May we not, therefore, explain the various phenomena commonly attributed to the action of the "subconscious" as due to the unconscious, that is, to the automatic activity of the nervous system? Many of these phenomena were thus explained by Doctor Carpenter over sixty years ago as due to "unconscious cerebration," and a large number of psychologists today insist that there is nothing in the facts that have come to light since Carpenter's *Mental Physiology* was written to force us to any other principle of explanation.

It is plain enough, however, that this explanation will suit neither the Myers school nor the majority of the pathologists. Nor are these gentlemen any better satisfied with the first meaning of the word "subconscious" suggested above. They will insist that the subconscious is not merely the physiological, and that it is not to be identified with the content of the fringe. For them the real question of the subconscious, therefore, is whether this fringe material is the last thing in the way of psychic stuff, or whether there is genuine consciousness not felt by the personal centre and yet connected with the same physical organism. Does the consciousness of which we are aware exhaust all the psychical phenomena centring in our bodies, or are there pulses of consciousness entirely outside the circle of our awareness? In other words, to use at last an unambiguous term, is there such a thing as a *co-consciousness*?

I said above that there were three or possibly four meanings which the word "subconscious" at times bore. Its interpretation as a co-consciousness is, of course, the third of these. The fourth, if there be a fourth, is very hard to state. We sometimes find the word "subconscious"—or more commonly the word "unconscious"—"*das Unbewusste*," "*l'inconscient*"—used to

mean some kind of psychic state which is yet unconscious. Bergson, for example, appeals at times to such unconscious mental states. Freud, in some parts of the *Traumdeutung*, insists upon unconscious psychic states in no uncertain terms, and in one passage quotes Professor Lipps as an upholder of the same view.

Just what can be meant by "unconscious psychic states" it is a little hard to see. The term, of course, immediately suggests round squares and true falsehoods. Freud's own explanation of the anomaly seems to be that it is "something, I know not what." It is, he insists, "the genuinely real psychic [das eigentlich reale psychische], as completely unknown to us as to its inner nature as is the reality of the outer world, and given to us through the data of consciousness just as incompletely as the outer world is given through the sense organs."

This appeal to the unknowable to explain the contradictory is not very enlightening. Hence some of his admirers—and who that has read the *Traumdeutung* can fail to be of that number?—insist on other interpretations of the *Unbewusste*. Dr. Bernard Hart suggests that the word as used by both Freud and Jung should be taken merely as a concept, a short-hand expression for the manipulation of our experience, rather than as a name for anything thought of as really existing. Other readers of Freud, in spite of the passage referred to above, will insist upon interpreting his "Unbewusstes" in terms of co-conscious mental states. And, in fact, if the term is to be taken as referring to anything real, it is hard to see what else it can mean. Hence we shall now turn to the question of the existence and the nature of the co-conscious.

The facts to which appeal is made to prove the existence of a co-consciousness are of two general classes: first, those found in normal subjects; and, second, those found in abnormal subjects, whether their abnormal condition be natural or induced temporarily by artificial methods. Limits of space make it impossible to present here a critical exposition of the facts in question, and we must, therefore, content ourselves with the conclusions (so far as there are such) to which the weight of scientific opinion inclines. In brief, then, the evidence does not seem to

be such as to force us to the hypothesis of a co-consciousness in normal human beings. Many facts, indeed, have been adduced which strongly suggest such a view, but none that make it indispensable. They can, I think, invariably be explained in terms of the fringe or of the nerve processes, or by the accepted laws of psychology. Several competent psychologists, to be sure, would not concur in this view, and further investigation may yet show that their position is preferable to the one presented above. The fact, however, that these psychologists regard the split-off states of normal persons as of rare occurrence and of slight importance, and the difficulty of drawing any hard and fast line between normal and abnormal subjects, make the difference between the two positions relatively unimportant. It is almost indifferent whether we say that normal persons may occasionally have fleeting, split-off conscious states, or that normal persons never have such states, but that many or most of us are occasionally abnormal.

When we turn to the pathological cases, we meet a very different state of things. The evidence here for co-conscious mental life is so strong that, if one adopts an empirical point of view and refuses to decide the matter on *a priori* considerations, it is very difficult to resist the conclusion that within the same mind there may exist at the same time both a principal and a subordinate centre of conscious life, split off from, though mutually influencing, each other. I must hasten to add that this conclusion is not shared by all psychologists. It is, however, the opinion of the majority of those who have had first-hand experience with these pathological phenomena. The facts which they cite seem to show indisputable marks of the presence of consciousness, and of some consciousness other than that of the patient's leading personality. The only alternative explanation is unconscious cerebration; and the ascription of so much intelligence to purely physiological processes as that hypothesis would require would be enough to make one seriously doubt the consciousness of one's fellow-beings.

It may indeed very well be, as suggested above, that even in some of us so-called normal persons there are at times fleeting gleams of conscious life split off from the main psychic stream;

or, if we prefer another way of putting it, that any of us may occasionally become temporarily abnormal. After the investigations of Prince and other alienists, it is difficult to doubt that mental shocks and emotional excitement tend not only to confuse but to dissociate consciousness. If this be the case, there will be all degrees of dissociation, ranging from cases of complete or approximate mental unity down through greater and greater degrees of dissociation, until at last we find several fairly independent and fairly unified separate "personalities" or "complexes" functioning in one body, or until even these are disintegrated into more elementary groups of psychic states, each narrower, less unified, and less stable than the last.

The nature and content of the co-conscious states of persons only incipiently abnormal—and of normal persons, if normal persons have them—can be pretty well made out from some of Prince's and Sidis's investigations. They are invariably limited and disintegrated, and usually quite unimportant and unrelated to any purpose. Sensations, feelings, and impulses unconnected, and simply flickering into life and out again, like the light of the firefly in the dark, constitute as a rule their content. They are seldom combined into anything that can be called a *thought*. They are without self-consciousness, and there is "no evidence to show that the dissociated consciousness is capable of wider and more original synthesis than is involved in adapting habitual acts to the circumstances of the moment." "There is no hard and fast line between the conscious and the subconscious, for at times what belongs to one passes into the other, and vice versa. The waking self is varying the grouping of its thoughts all the time in such a way as to be continually including and excluding the subconscious thoughts." The split-off states, except in thoroughly pathological cases or in artificially produced abnormal conditions, give rise to no "automatisms" or independent and disconnected actions and hallucinations.\*

In extreme cases, such as that of Miss Beauchamp and BA

\*The substance of this paragraph and the quotations in it are taken from Prince, "Some of the Present Problems of Abnormal Psychology," *Psychological Review*, xii, 136-139. See also Sidis and Goodhart, *Multiple Personality*, *passim*.

reported by Morton Prince, we have, indeed, in the co-conscious, something approximating much more closely to the popular notion of the "Subconscious Self." Miss Beauchamp's third alternating "complex" (known as "Sally") not only claimed to be co-conscious—and proved it to the satisfaction of Dr. Prince and most of his readers—but developed also a very definite character, which she retained with consistency from her first appearance until finally "squeezed."<sup>10</sup> She was, namely, throughout a rather pert, interesting, immature young girl, differing noticeably in tastes and manners from both the other personalities, considerably inferior to both in knowledge and intellectual power, and markedly inferior to one of them in conscience and character. In Dr. Prince's other case, B, who has given pretty conclusive evidence of being co-conscious with A,<sup>11</sup> maintains, like Sally, a perfectly distinct and consistent character throughout. She does not resemble Sally in immaturity, but is decidedly inferior to the complete and normal integrated personality. It should be added that both these co-conscious "personalities" have written their autobiographies, that of B in particular being highly intelligent and instructive. It is, to be sure, questionable whether either "Sally" or "B" is as much of a personality as each claims to be. No doubt they are well-developed, *alternating* personalities, but it is far from clear that as co-conscious entities they have sufficient unity and completeness to deserve the title *personality* or *self*. My colleague, Professor John E. Russell, has made the suggestion that in the co-conscious state such "personalities" are merely "complexes" or groups of ideas, and that the claim of each to unbroken co-conscious *personal* life is due to an illusion of the memory. However this may be, it is interesting to note that "Sally" and "B," the only "co-conscious selves" whose histories have been investigated, have originated out of "complexes" or groups of feelings, ideas, and impulses within the central consciousness, complexes of the same sort as are to be found in any of us. Who is there that has not

<sup>10</sup> See Morton Prince, *Dissociation of a Personality*, 1906, *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> See Prince, "Experiments to Determine Co-conscious Ideation," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, iii, 33-42. Prince and Peterson, "Experiments in Psycho-galvanic Reactions from Co-conscious Ideas," *Ibid.*, iii, 114-131.

noted in his own experience how the emotion due to some insult, slight, or injury can gather to itself special ideas and tendencies and become a little centre of relative independence within the mind?

It is in some such general way that a dissociated "personality" originates. It does not start as a "subconsciousness." It was not there in the beginning like the submerged two-thirds of the iceberg, nor like the bottom of the "narrow-necked vessel" which is "not stopped by any sponge." It originates as other ideas originate, and is as much a matter of the common day as they. There is nothing mysterious or supernatural about its origin—unless, indeed, disease be supernatural. And this is true, not only of its origin but of its content and its powers. The co-conscious ideas, complexes, and personalities that have been investigated show little evidence of being in any way "higher" and "purer" than the normal personality. It was perhaps natural to suppose that the subconscious was wiser and better than the normal self—until it had been seen. But now at length we have two subconscious selves "flowering" and walking out upon the scenes and writing their autobiographies; and they turn out to be nothing very wonderfully wise, but just B and Sally.

I have dealt thus at length with the co-conscious because it is as a co-conscious that the "subconscious" is usually interpreted by popular writers, preachers, and lecturers. It is important for the serious student of this subject not to be misled by glowing pictures of the "Undermind," but to realize that the co-conscious, so far as the evidence goes, is either non-existent or practically negligible in normal persons; while in pathological subjects, though sometimes, indeed, the source of valuable ideas and useful actions, it is always limited and inferior to the waking self, and likely to be very far from beautiful or sublime. What I have said of the co-conscious, however, must not be taken as a failure to recognize the immense importance and the unquestionable value in each of us of the "subconscious" in the broader sense. And in this broader sense the word "subconscious" may still be of use. If we put together under this term all those factors of ourselves which are not to be identified with the attentive consciousness—the physiological, the fringe, and the co-conscious

in those who possess it—we cannot fail to be impressed with the enormous influence exerted by these upon our lives.

I have already spoken of the importance of the fringe region, and I need add nothing here; nor need I point out how our nervous systems unite us to the distant past of the race and to our own past, preserving for us both instincts and habits, and enabling us to use our memories and thus utilize our past experience. If we interpret the subconscious as meaning both the fringe and the nervous system, we may say that it is largely this that makes us what we are. "The whole of our past psychical life," says Bergson, "conditions our present state, without being its necessary determinant; while also it reveals itself in our character." It is plain, therefore, how important an influence the subconscious in this broader sense exerts upon each man's religion. To the work of Starbuck and James, in particular, we owe a great deal for the insight they have given us in this matter. A man's religion is not merely a matter of his clear-cut conscious processes: it is bound up with his whole psycho-physical organism. Truly, he who loves God loves him with all his heart and soul and mind and strength. He loves God not only with his soul and mind, but with his body, too. Our religion goes deeper down into our lives than most things, and is knit up with all that we are. It springs out of our connection with the past; it involves our individual, and even our racial, history; it is one aspect of what we are and all we hope to be. This is the truth at the heart of much modern writing about the subconscious and religion—only in "ein bisschen andern Worten."

The influence of the subconscious upon the religion of most of us is due to our racial inheritance and our individual history. By nature and heredity we come into the world with certain instincts and needs and ways of reacting which respond to our condition of dependence in such a way as to make most of us "incurably religious." Here, then, is one of the "subconscious" roots of our religion. The other root of it, as I have said, is to be sought in the particular environment and experience of the individual. We are born as babies into a world of grown-ups, and our parents, our teachers, and, in fact, society as a whole bring the irresistible might of their combined influence to bear

upon our pygmy selves to make us religious. This influence is never outgrown. Though in our later reasonings we may think we have freed ourselves from it, it is present and ineradicable in our subconsciousness, influencing our conscious lives in ways that we do not recognize. The whole drama of our maturer years is presented before a background determined almost entirely by our social inheritance and our early experiences. Freud has recently shown how very large a part of the material of our dreams is made up of childhood memories—memories, some of which had seemed to be quite forgotten. Sir Francis Galton years ago pointed out the fact that even in our waking hours our minds are incredibly full of ideas to which we pay little or no attention, a large part of which are memories drawn from childhood and youth.

And it is not merely ideas and visual and verbal images that fill the backgrounds of our minds. More important and influential are the moods, emotions, impulses, and prejudices, the “complexes” which have their roots in some half-forgotten past and twine themselves all through our mental history. Their abiding place is in the darker region of the fringe, or possibly in the quite unconscious cells of the nervous system, but they influence our sentiments, our creeds, our actions, in ways that might surprise us, were they fully recognized. Especially influential in determining the background of our lives are our desires and early ideals. Freud has shown (with some exaggeration, to be sure) how large a rôle desire plays in forming our dreams, and it is certain that not only in dreams but in our waking moments desire, whether suppressed or recognized, has a leading part in shaping our whole subconscious or unconscious life. Thus it comes about that the ideals, the longings, the ardent wishes of youth sink into the subliminal region, and constitute a large part of its ultimate return contribution to conscious life. Hence the ideal nature of much that springs from the subliminal region of lofty souls. Hence also much of the religious trend that we find shaping so large a part of our lives. The religious ideas, promptings, emotions, and ways of viewing things, impressed upon us during youth, or resulting naturally from inherited tendencies, become so ingrained into the very texture of our minds that we can never



get away from them. They tinge and influence our feelings, our opinions, and our total reaction upon the world in ways that we know and in ways that we know not.

This is another way of saying that the subconscious is eminently conservative. And in whatever way you interpret the "subconscious" this remains true. The conservative nature of the physiological is painfully evident to every one who has tried to break a habit. And after what has been said on previous pages of this essay, nothing need be added to show how the fringe-region and the co-conscious treasure up the past and use it to influence the present and predetermine the future. This is the ultimate explanation of religious conservatism. Theology, the explicit formulation of religious belief, usually lags behind science and philosophy because the two latter make sense perception and clear reason their criteria, whereas religion is a matter of the whole man, and is determined to a very great extent by the racial and personal past, by the ideas that have become ingrained and are now revered, and by the feeling of profound respect for tradition, all of which, though they are at times matters of attentive reasoning, have their roots very largely in the background of the mind or even in the purely habitual reactions of the nervous system.

The great source of the content of the subconscious is, then, the conscious—the experience of the past, both the race and the individual being taken into account. Is there any other source for this content—some supernatural source, different in kind from that already described? I do not see that psychology can answer this question with any definite proofs. It will, of course, proceed on the assumption that there is no such source, until the necessity of the contrary hypothesis is demonstrated. A super-human source of revelation, though something in which the philosopher may well believe, is not something which the man of science can ever verify. Leaving aside hypotheses that involve the supernatural, he must seek—very likely in a plodding and prosaic fashion—to find out what can be done with the natural. And in our particular problem his methods have not as yet proved inadequate. The prophets and mystics have, indeed, been greatly influenced by the subconscious, but it is far from clear that there

is anything mysterious about the ultimate source of this subconscious influence. The highest ideals of the community or the nation, accepted with enthusiasm and emotion by the youthful mind, "apperceived" by the great mass of man's instincts and inherited impulses, pondered over carefully and repeatedly, and allowed to continue their activity in the fringe or in the form of unconscious cerebration—these certainly go far towards explaining so much of the messages of the prophets as need be attributed to subconscious origin. Nor does this view necessarily exclude the possibility of divine influence, inspiration, and communion with God. It is difficult to see why God should choose to communicate with a split-off complex or a brain cell rather than with the man himself. What is highest in the religious genius is to be sought in his conscious states rather than in some form of insensibility.

It has often been suggested that telepathy is one source of the subconscious, and this is of course quite possible. The evidence in favor of the existence of telepathy is strong, and, if there really is such a thing, the subconscious—however interpreted—would very likely be influenced by it. There is, however, no good reason for regarding the subconscious as the exclusive channel of such influence. In advance of empirical data on the subject, telepathy, if it exist, is as likely to affect one mind state as another, and the conscious mind seems quite as likely to be directly open to its influence as the subconscious. And, of course, even though it should be proved that telepathy from other minds is one source of the content of the subconscious, it would still remain true (in default of evidence to the contrary) that the *ultimate* source of this content should be sought in the social environment—that is, in the past experience, the ideas, ideals, impulses, and longings of the race.

Though the ultimate source of the content of the subconscious is thus perfectly natural, its influence upon the mind of the individual often makes itself felt in ways that inevitably seem to him extremely mysterious, and that are consequently interpreted by him and by those who know him as tokens of some supernatural power. Particularly is this true in the case of those who have a tendency toward abnormality. And, inasmuch as many of the most influential representatives of the religious life have

been at times and in some respects slightly psychopathic, this influence of the subconscious upon the conscious is of special interest to the student of religion. The psychologist, however, though understanding how natural, and indeed inevitable, it is for the religious individual to interpret the strange things that come into his mind as of supernatural origin, insists upon looking for a natural explanation. And this he finds in a series of phenomena outside the field of religion which exhibit the same peculiarities. Thus he is enabled to subsume his religious facts under the more general classes furnished him by psychology.

The religious facts which I have here in mind are such things as violent but unaccountable impulses to do certain things, fixed ideas whose source cannot be traced, "inspirational speaking," so far as this is not to be accounted for by the ordinary laws of association, motor automatisms, visions, and the like. These all bring with them the sense of external origination—of being *given* or imposed from without. Now this feeling is a well recognized characteristic of the working of the co-conscious, wherever found. Moreover, all the phenomena above referred to have parallels in non-religious cases, where the explanation is plainly to be had in terms of a dissociation of consciousness. The impulses and fixed ideas found in many religious persons are not different psychologically—though they be ethically at the antipodes—from the "phobias" that Freud is finding in the "unconscious" and Sidis in the "co-conscious." The "inspiration" of the prophet, like that of the poet or of the inventor, often seems to have its immediate source in the deeper and unconscious parts of his being. Just how the subconscious acts in these cases is of course not certain, but that there is some subconscious mechanism here at work, as even in our every-day search for a forgotten name, seems evident. The prophet ponders long over the condition of his people and the will of God. Then some day suddenly the sought-for solution rushes into his mind—he finds a message ready-made upon his tongue; and it is almost inevitable that he should preface it with the words: "Thus hath Yahweh showed me!" As for the extreme cases of religious visions and motor automatisms, one has only to look at a single page of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* for parallels to both.

I would not be understood by this to imply that the religious geniuses who have been slightly psychopathic are *mere* "psychopaths." I have said, indeed, that dissociation probably is an abnormal state; but this means simply that it differs from the normal human condition. It does not mean that such dissociation is always an impediment to human usefulness. That the ordinary man should be without this characteristic is doubtless best for the race, just as it is best we should not all be poets or have the "artistic temperament." But that does not mean that we should be better off with no poets or artists. Prince is coming to the conclusion that, though the dissociated states (except of a most elementary sort) are abnormal, the susceptibility to them under quite common conditions is normal. It may very well be that for certain purposes dissociated mind states have their special value; they may, for instance, function more readily than purely physiological formations, thus enriching the controlling consciousness with more possible ideas from which the laws of association may choose, or possibly endowing the psycho-physical organism with more immediately available force. The value of such mental conditions, in any event, must be determined not by asking ourselves whether they are usual or result from usual physical or psychical conditions, but by looking to the results which they achieve. As James puts it, the true criterion of value is expressed in the words, "By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots." Now if we examine the fruits of such psychopathic dispositions we find that they are varied. In the great majority of cases they are bad, hence the emphasis I have put on the absurdity of looking to the "subconscious" as nobler and purer than the conscious self. But in the case of some noble but psychopathic personalities the split-off states do seem to be of real use; though even here, it must be remembered, the highest and noblest part of the man is his conscious personality. Especially in the case of many great religious leaders do we find psychopathic conditions that seem to have contributed a good deal toward making them the useful men they were. Consider, for example, Ezekiel, Mohammed, George Fox, Saint Paul!—the reader will be able to add to the list many other names. In these men and women much of the force which made them great and useful seems to have been

connected with their psychopathic disposition. Professor James writes:

In the psychopathic temperament we have the emotionality which is the *sine qua non* of moral perception; we have the intensity and tendency to emphasize which are the essence of practical vigor; and we have the love of metaphysics and mysticism which carry one's interests beyond the surface of the sensible world. What, then, is more natural than that this temperament should introduce one to regions of religious truth, to the corners of the universe, which your robust Philistine type of nervous system, forever offering its biceps to be felt, thumping its breast, and thanking Heaven that it hasn't a single morbid fiber in its composition, would be sure to hide forever from its self-satisfied possessor.<sup>12</sup>

In quoting thus from Professor James, however, I am going beyond the immediate subject of this essay, for the psychopathic state is not synonymous with the dissociated state, and a psychopath with all the advantages claimed for him in the passage just quoted need not possess a co-consciousness. The converse is certainly true—the great majority of those possessing dissociated mind states have none of the superiorities set forth by James. Moreover, while some kind of co-consciousness has probably characterized many of the religious leaders of the race, and while they have owed much of their influence to it, it still remains true, as it seems to me at least, that such dissociations can be of advantage only under special and unusual conditions, and, I may add, under conditions less likely to recur in the future than in the past. Split-off states are never an end, but are at best a means only. At best, they are sources of weakness as well as of strength. The highest type of man in the religious life as well as elsewhere is the unified and rational self. For our ideal we look not so much to Ezekiel as to Amos, not so much to Fox as to Luther, not so much to Paul as to Jesus.

<sup>12</sup> Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 25.

## TWO STUDIES OF THE GOSPEL OF MARK

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The current essays to disentangle the literary history of the material which now forms our Gospel of Mark were described in an article by Professor Moulton in a recent number of this *Review*.<sup>1</sup> Of the attempts to solve the problem there mentioned two seem plausible enough to warrant fuller exposition in these pages. They are the reconstructions by which Professor Hermann von Soden,<sup>2</sup> of Berlin, and Professor Emil Wendling,<sup>3</sup> of Zabern, have tried to resolve our Gospel into its constituent elements.

Von Soden begins by distinguishing two strands of narrative, so easily separable on grounds both of matter and style that the great differences between them betray two different sources of the material. As the clearest instance of the earlier strand, he takes the passage Mk. 2 1-3 6, which he contrasts with 4 35-5 43. In the former passage all the interest is centred in the words of Jesus, in the latter in the events themselves. "Let one," he says, "compare the story of the Gadarene demoniac, with its twenty verses, and the debate about fasting, with its five verses, and estimate the religious value of the thought expressed in the two sections." Similarly, the sections Mk. 7 32-37 and 8 22-26 (the healing of the deaf man and of the blind man) are quite distinct in character from such stories as those in 2 1-12 and 3 1-6. "In the former the miracle of healing is itself the subject of the representation; in the latter the miracle is merely a part of the story, the real subject of which is Jesus' forgiveness of sins and his violation of the Sabbath laws."

In this way Von Soden picks out his "*Kernstücke*." To these certainly belong the group of narratives in 1 21-39, 2 1, 3 6,

<sup>1</sup> "The Relation of the Gospel of Mark to Primitive Christian Tradition," *Harvard Theological Review*, III (1910), 403-436.

<sup>2</sup> *Die wichtigsten Fragen im Leben Jesu*. 1904.

<sup>3</sup> *Urmarcus*. 1905. See also *Die Entstehung des Marcusevangeliums*. 1908.

12 13-44, 3 20-35, 6 1-6, 4 1-8, 4 26-32, 10 13-31; perhaps also 7 24-30, 6 14-16, 1 4-11. To these narratives, which go back to Peter, may also belong the brief notices concerning the stages of growth of the apostolic circle in 1 16-20, 3 13-19, 6 7-13, 8 27-9 1, 9 33-40, 13 9-13. To these passages Von Soden adds 13 1-6, 23-37. And he says that at the basis of the story of the days in Jerusalem, 11 1-12 12, and the passion narrative in chapters 14 and 15 lie narratives of a similar style, but he does not include the latter in his "*Kernstücke*."

The passages thus referred to Peter, or to the Petrine tradition, Von Soden prints in full, "undisturbed by all that our Gospel of Mark has interwoven with them."<sup>4</sup> The result is extremely interesting. The Petrine nucleus of the Gospel appears as follows:

John the Baptist and the baptism of Jesus.

A Sabbath in Capernaum.

The offence of the Jews at Jesus' forgiveness of sins, at his association with sinners, at his breaking of the Sabbath, and at the fact that his disciples do not fast.

The attempt of the Jews to take him.

How Jesus meets the general misunderstanding.

Parables about the kingdom of God.

The question who shall enter that kingdom.

The development of the apostolic circle.

Glimpses into the future.

This certainly makes (after some readjustment in the order of certain of the sections) a remarkably straightforward and connected narrative. Von Soden's remarks concerning it are well worth quoting:

These narratives are without any embellishment or secondary interest. They are plastic and concrete in every feature. The local coloring is strikingly fresh, and yet is in no way artificial. No edifying remarks, no reflections; only deeds and striking sayings. No story requires its secret meaning to be explained by symbol or allegory. In no one of them does one feel any occasion to inquire for the meaning, which is always perfectly obvious. Situations and words are too original to have been invented. Everything breathes the odor of Palestine. Not a

<sup>4</sup> For reasons which he does not explain he somewhat rearranges the sections.

reminiscence of Old Testament stories. Miracles appear only here and there, and incidentally. . . . The christological or soteriological question never constitutes the motive of a story. Not once is there any expression from the language of the schools; especially not from that of Paul. Words and sentences are reminiscent of the Aramaic. The figure of Jesus itself bears in every reference a human outline. He is stirred and astonished; he is angry and trembles; he needs recuperation, and feels himself forsaken of God. He will not have the thoughtless, conventional designation "good" addressed to him, and confesses that he does not know when all that he sees to be approaching shall be fulfilled. His mother and brothers fear that he may be out of his mind. This and much else is told in the simplest possible way. So Jesus lived; so he expressed himself; thus they received him; thus the apostolic circle was formed and developed—this is what the writer will tell.

It must be admitted that these sections of Mark have a very primitive character, and so far as their content is concerned might well go back to the Petrine tradition.

With these sections Von Soden contrasts the remaining parts of the Gospel, in which he finds not only much interruption of the primary narrative, but much interpretation, much allegorizing, much absence of actual situations, much reminiscence of Old Testament stories, much influence from Paul, and many reflections of the experiences of individual Christians and the Christian church. No one can work through this analysis without feeling that it is easy to distinguish between primary and secondary elements in the Gospel of Mark, and that Von Soden has at least pointed out many of the junctures between the two.

The critical analysis of Wendling is still more thoroughgoing. The basis of his discussion is the fourth chapter of Mark, where he thinks the primary and secondary material most easy to separate. Mark 4 1-9, 26-33, belong to the original. Verses 10-25 are later, having been inserted mechanically, yet so as to respect the older text; they have no organic connection with the rest of the chapter and even contradict its situation. Jesus is teaching from a boat, and other boats are with his; then, without indication of change of scene, in verses 10-25 he is alone with his disciples, who ask him the meaning of the parable of the sower. He gives his explanation, and, again without any



indication of change of situation, is in the boat, surrounded by the other boats, and the storm comes up and is stilled.

Moreover, this insertion (4 10-25) expresses theories of its author quite inconsistent with those of the writer of other parts of the Gospel. In other places Jesus speaks to all the people in parables "as they were able to hear him." He stretches out his hand over the crowd and says, "These are my mother and my sisters." He is the teacher of the multitude, who understand him better than his own family. There is nothing in his parables that needs explaining. But in 4 10-25 the theory of the writer is that the parables are "mysteries," enigmas which not only require to be explained (by the allegorical method), but are spoken for the express purpose of preventing the people from understanding. Indeed, without the key which Jesus gives, even the disciples do not understand them. Pauline influence is also obvious.<sup>5</sup>

Besides the interruptions of the narrative, two clews are thus given by which the work of a second writer may be detected. He has the "*Geheimnistheorie*" of the parables, and he has in thought and vocabulary reminiscences of the Pauline school. Applying these tests to another section which seems to interrupt the narrative where it stands, Wendling adds a second insertion, 3 22-30. This is the passage containing the controversy about Beelzebub, and it comes in inappositely between vss. 20, 21, which introduce, and vs. 31, which continues, the story of Jesus' family who have come to take him home. It seems to have been inserted in this place because the Pharisees likewise said, "He hath a devil." By repeating in vs. 30 the words *ελεγον οτι* which he found in vs. 21, the redactor or evangelist preserves for the continuation of the original story precisely the same connection it would have had without his interpolation; and by the use of the same words in vs. 22 he connects the interpolation with the opening narrative. His hand is to be seen in the superfluous repetition of words, especially in the repetition of the subject, as in 3 24, 25.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Note especially the words *μυστήριον, μετὰ χαρᾶς λαμβάνειν, διωγμός, επιθυμῖαι, καρποφορεῖν*, and see Wendling, *Urmarcus*, p. 35, note 11.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. 2 19<sup>b</sup>, 20, also the work of Ev.

To these two insertions is added a third, Mk. 3 6-19. The motives running through this section are copied from narratives in other chapters. It contains much generalization and interpretation, both of which are marks of the work of the redactor or evangelist (Ev). It also refers to his "*Geheimnistheorie*."

Another is 1 34<sup>b</sup> ("he suffered not the demons to speak, because they knew him") on account of the implication in it of the same theory. Mk. 1 45 also does not fit where it is; the connection without it is good; it too implies the theory of the writer (part of his "*Geheimnistheorie*") that the more Jesus told people not to proclaim him the more they did so, and the more he tried to seclude himself the more they found him.

With these, again, on somewhat different grounds, and not so certainly, belong the little group of loosely strung sayings which are found in 6 7-11, 8 34-9 1, 9 40-50, 10 42-45, 11 23-25, 12 38-40, 13 9-13. The ground for assuming these to be additions is that these sayings are not closely connected in the passages in which they occur, and that they share this characteristic with the similar group of disconnected sayings in the first and best attested interpolation, 4 21-25.

In 1 1-3, 14<sup>b</sup>, 15, the word *εὐαγγέλιον* arouses a natural suspicion. The same word occurs in four other places (8 35, 10 29, 13 10, 14 9), all of which are in passages which are suspicious upon other grounds. Consequently, with the three instances in chapter 1, they are to be ascribed to Ev.

With the exception of the interpolation in 4 10-25, the section 1 16-4 33 appears to be a unit, and belongs to the oldest stratum. But with 4 35, says Wendling, begins a new section, easily distinguished from that just mentioned. It copies the motives and characteristics of other sections.<sup>7</sup> The writer is to be discriminated, however, not merely from the writer of the earliest stratum, but from the author of the insertions already identified. None of the criteria of the latter's manner appear in the author of the section beginning at 4 35. He shows no trace of Pauline conceptions, has none of Jesus' prohibitions to the demons, his "*Heimlichkeit*" is of a different sort, and goes back to Old

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 5 2 with 1 23; 5 6, 7 with 1 24; 5 8-13 with 1 25; 5 13 with 1 26; 5 14-17 with 1 27, and see Wendling, *Urmarcus*, p. 11.

Testament exemplars. Since the insertion in 4 10-25 presupposes the story of the storm on the lake in 4 35-5 43, this latter is older than the former. The writer of this section, 4 35-5 43, therefore stood between the writer of the original strand and the evangelist or redactor. The last writer (Ev) worked over the combined work of his two predecessors.

To the author who is intermediate between the first writer and the evangelist (M<sup>2</sup>) Wendling assigns twenty-nine different sections, some of considerable length and some of only a verse or part of a verse. They are as follows: 1 4-14<sup>a</sup>, 4 35-5 42, 5 43<sup>b</sup>, 6 14, 17-30, 35-44, 9 2-8, 14-27, 10 46-11 10, 14 12-20, 26-35<sup>a</sup>, 36-37, 39-41<sup>a</sup>, 42, 47, 51-56, 60-62<sup>a</sup>, 63, 64, 66-72, 15 16-20, 23, 24<sup>b</sup>, 25, 29-30, 33, 34<sup>b</sup>-36, 38, 40-43, 46-16 7<sup>a</sup>, 8—about 200 verses or parts of verses in all.

The contributions of the author of the Gospel (Ev) are more extensive than those of his predecessor. They comprise: 1 1-3, 14<sup>b</sup>-15, 34<sup>b</sup>, 39<sup>b</sup>, 45, 2 15<sup>b</sup>-16<sup>a</sup>, 18<sup>a</sup>, 19<sup>b</sup>-20, 3 6-19, 22-30, 4 10-25, 30-32, 34, 5 43<sup>a</sup>, 6 1-13, 15, 16, 30-31, 45-8 26, 30<sup>b</sup>-33<sup>a</sup>, 33<sup>a</sup>-35, 38-9 1, 9-13, 28-50, 10 2-12, 24, 26-30, 32<sup>b</sup>-34, 38-40, 45, 11 11-14, 18-25, 27<sup>a</sup>, 12 14<sup>b</sup>, 32-34<sup>a</sup>, 38-44, 13 3-27, 30-32, 37, 14 8, 9, 21, 35<sup>b</sup>, 38, 41<sup>b</sup>, 57-59, 62<sup>b</sup>, 15 39, 44, 45, 16, 7<sup>b</sup>—in all about 270 verses or parts of verses.

This leaves to the original writer (M<sup>1</sup>) the following sections: 1 16-34<sup>a</sup>, 35-39<sup>a</sup>, 40-44, 2 1-15<sup>a</sup>, 16<sup>b</sup>-17, 18<sup>b</sup>, 19<sup>a</sup>, 21-3 5, 20, 21, 31-4 9, 26-29, 33, 6 32-34, 8 27-30<sup>a</sup>, 33<sup>b</sup>, 36, 37, 10 1, 13-23, 25, 31-32<sup>a</sup>, 35-37, 41-44, 11 15-17, 27<sup>b</sup>-12 14<sup>a</sup>, 14<sup>a</sup>-31, 34<sup>b</sup>-37, 13 1-2, 28-29, 33-36, 14 1-7, 10, 11, 22-25, 43-46, 48-50, 65, 15 1-15, 21, 22, 24<sup>a</sup>, 26-27, 31-32, 34<sup>a</sup>, 37,—in all about 212 verses or parts of verses.<sup>8</sup>

Wendling calls the writers of these three strands M<sup>1</sup>, M<sup>2</sup>, and Ev. Printing the texts of the first and second writers, M<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>2</sup>, without rearrangement but with the omission of all matter assigned to Ev, he finds them to make a continuous story, well connected and without breaks. As to whether M<sup>1</sup> alone makes such a story, he is in doubt; and therefore as to whether

<sup>8</sup> In the *Entstehung des Marcus-Evangeliums* (p. 204) Wendling arranges the verses from M<sup>1</sup> in chapters 13 and 14 as follows: 13 1-2, 33, 28-29, 34-36, 14 1-2, 10-11, 3-7, 22-25, 43-46, 48-50, 65. Some minor differences in the analysis, affecting words or clauses, are registered *ibid.*, p. 237.

M<sup>2</sup> found M<sup>1</sup> as a connected discourse or himself first assembled the sections of it in connection with his own additions. The passion story of M<sup>1</sup> by itself seems to be a connected account; it may therefore be assumed that so much of M<sup>1</sup> was found by M<sup>2</sup> as a whole and in its present order. Further, since the work of Ev in the passion story is so slight, it is to be assumed that the combination of M<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>2</sup> in this story was more carefully done than in many other parts, and also that for this part of the gospel history Ev possessed very few traditions which had not already been embodied in M<sup>1</sup> + M<sup>2</sup>. This would agree with the natural assumption that the earliest part of the gospel tradition to be carefully treasured would be that relating to Jesus' death, and that only later was the attempt made to preserve with equal care the story of his whole public career.

When one remembers the fine-spun analyses of the historical books of the Old Testament, which, long ridiculed for their elaborateness, have finally been accepted by most scholars, one hesitates on this account alone to pronounce an adverse judgment upon Wendling's theory. Yet his analysis certainly seems to be over-elaborate. It is, indeed, helpful to the student of the Gospel to distinguish between the more obvious work of Ev and the earlier document (or material) upon which he worked. All students will feel this with reference to chapter 4, and the advantage in chapter 3 is perhaps only less great. Still more welcome is the assignment of 6 45-8 27 to Ev. The particular stumbling-block of this section is its feeding of the four thousand, so manifestly copied from the feeding of the five thousand. That one and the same author should have written both these accounts has seemed strange to many readers. But this duplication is as easily disposed of upon Von Soden's theory as upon Wendling's. Von Soden's analysis into two strata (without the assumption of two *writers*) is much simpler than Wendling's analysis into three, representing not merely different strata of tradition, as in Von Soden's hypothesis, but different *writers*. Wendling's theory is more secure where it goes with Von Soden's, and less convincing where it goes beyond it. In other words, some distinction has in any case to be made between the final writer of the Gospel and the earliest tradition upon which he

worked; and Wendling has indicated the criteria which such a distinction must employ. Von Soden's division of the Markan material into a Petrine and a later source amounts to the same thing. The two critics do not differ very greatly about the passages which they regard as secondary. Von Soden's Petrine narrative does not differ greatly from Wendling's  $M^1 + M^2$ . But the line of demarcation between  $M^1$  and  $M^2$ , and Wendling's reasons for drawing this, are not as self-evident as the line which Wendling and Von Soden agree in drawing between the earlier document, or source, and the work of the evangelist.

A tabulation of the results shows the following agreements and disagreements between Von Soden's Petrine narrative and Wendling's  $M^1 + M^2$ .

Von Soden: 1 4-11 16-20 21-39 2 1-28

Wendling: 1 4-14<sup>a</sup> 16-34<sup>a</sup> 35-39<sup>a</sup> 40-44 2 1-15<sup>a</sup> 16<sup>b</sup>-17 18<sup>b</sup> 19<sup>b</sup> 21-28

Von Soden: 3 1-6 13-19 21-35 4 1-9 21-32

Wendling: 3 1-5 20 21 31-35 4 1-9 26-29 33 35-41 5 1-42 43<sup>b</sup>

Von Soden: 6 6-16

8 27-38

9 1

33-40

Wendling: 6 14 17-30 32-44 8 27-30<sup>a</sup> 33<sup>b</sup> 36 37 9 2-8 14-27

Von Soden: 10 13-45

Wendling: 10 1 13-23 25 31 32<sup>a</sup> 35-37 41-52 11 1-10 15-17 27<sup>b</sup>-33

Von Soden: 12 13-44

13 1-6 28-37

Wendling: 12 1-14<sup>a</sup> 14<sup>a</sup>-31 34<sup>b</sup>-37

13 1-2 28-29 33-36

Wendling: 14 1-7 10-20 22-35<sup>a</sup> 36-37 39-41<sup>a</sup> 42-56 60-62<sup>a</sup> 63-72 15 1-38 40-43  
46-47 16 1-7<sup>a</sup> 8

The comparison shows Wendling's analysis to be much more complex than Von Soden's. This results from his separation of his main document into two strands. It also shows that Wendling assigns considerably more to  $M^1 + M^2$  than Von Soden gives to his Petrine source. This Wendling can afford to do, since he supposes two documents instead of one. The matter assigned by Von Soden to the Petrine source is in part assigned by Wendling to  $M^1$  and in part to  $M^2$ . Of the 177 verses assigned by Von Soden to his Petrine tradition, up to 13 37 (where it comes to an end), Wendling assigns about 124 to  $M^1$  and only 10 to  $M^2$ . Though he assigns some verses to  $M^1$  which Von Soden

does not give to the Petrine source, and omits some (assigning them to Ev) which Von Soden does so assign, yet up to 13 37 the M<sup>1</sup> of Wendling agrees very closely with the Petrine source of Von Soden. After 13 37 the material assigned to M<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>2</sup> is about equally divided between them. Wendling makes no claims for the Petrine origin of his M<sup>1</sup> or M<sup>2</sup>, but after these are subtracted from the whole Gospel there is a smaller amount left for the work of Ev than remains after Von Soden's Petrine source is subtracted. Since Wendling distinguishes between two sources and the work of a redactor, and Von Soden only between the Petrine tradition and other matter, this result also is what would be expected.

The relatively great agreement of the results of these two independent investigations seems to prove that it is possible to distinguish an earlier and a later tradition in the Gospel. Beyond this, the difference between Von Soden and Wendling is that the former makes no assertion about the identity of the final editor with the writer who recorded the Petrine tradition (and so permits the view that one hand wrote the whole Gospel, though part of his tradition went back to Peter and part came from later sources), while the latter asserts that Ev was a different person from either M<sup>1</sup> or M<sup>2</sup>. Is this latter position of Wendling's capable of proof or disproof?

Perhaps the simplest criterion, and the one to be most safely applied, is that of vocabulary. Sir John Hawkins in his *Horae Synopticae* has compiled a list of 41 words which he regards as characteristic of Mark. Do these words occur indiscriminately in M<sup>1</sup>, M<sup>2</sup>, and Ev, or are they confined, some of them to M<sup>1</sup>, some to M<sup>2</sup>, and some to Ev? Or is there sufficient difference in the frequency with which these words occur in the three strata to justify the assumption of three different authors, and especially that Ev was distinct from the writers of the two documents? If not, the division between earlier and later material in Mark may still stand, while it was yet one and the same writer who put the whole Gospel together out of these earlier and later materials.

Characteristic of Mark is the historical present. Hawkins finds one hundred and fifty-one examples of this use in Mark as

against seventy-eight in Matthew (twenty-one of these taken from Mark) and four in Luke.<sup>9</sup> Of these one hundred and fifty-one historical presents in Mark, forty-nine occur in passages assigned by Wendling to M<sup>1</sup>, sixty-nine in M<sup>2</sup>, and thirty-three in Ev.

Of the peculiarly Markan words, some prove nothing in this connection. *Εὐαγγέλιον* is used only by Ev (seven times). But since Wendling uses this word as a criterion of Ev's work in six out of the seven passages where it occurs, this adds nothing to the proof. *Ἄλαλος* is used once by M<sup>1</sup>, twice by M<sup>2</sup>, and not at all by Ev. But since Ev adds no story of a deaf man, he has no occasion to use the word. (He does add a story of a stammering man, where he uses the word *μογιλάλος*.) *Κλάσμα*, used once by M<sup>2</sup> and three times by Ev, signifies little; since the three uses in Ev occur in the same passage, and this passage is taken from the passage in M<sup>2</sup> (the feeding of the multitude). *Σταχύς* occurs three times, all in M<sup>1</sup>, but this also signifies nothing, since no passage in which it could occur is assigned to M<sup>2</sup> or Ev. *Ἐκπορεύομαι* is used twice each by M<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>2</sup>, and seven times by Ev; but since five of these seven occurrences are in the same passage, they cannot establish any particular fondness for this word on the part of Ev as against the other two. *Ἀκάθαρτος*, three times in M<sup>1</sup>, four times in M<sup>2</sup>, and three times in Ev; *ἀπὸ μακρόθεν*, three times in M<sup>2</sup> and twice in Ev; *διδαχή*, three times in M<sup>2</sup>, twice in Ev; and *φέρω*, five times in M<sup>1</sup>, eight in M<sup>2</sup>, and twice in Ev, do nothing toward establishing a distinct vocabulary for any one of the three.

Only three words seem to tell at all in favor of Wendling's hypothesis: *εἰσπορεύομαι* occurs once in M<sup>1</sup>, twice in M<sup>2</sup>, and five times, in separated passages, in Ev; *διαστέλλομαι* is used four times by Ev, in four different and separated passages, and not by M<sup>1</sup> or M<sup>2</sup>; *ἐκθαμβέομαι* occurs four times in M<sup>2</sup>, in three different chapters, and not in M<sup>1</sup> or Ev. But the absence of the third of these words can certainly, and of the second probably, be accounted for by the subject-matter.

¶ There is here practically no evidence of distinct vocabularies. And even if there were more than there is, it would be fully offset

<sup>9</sup> Not including parables, where the present is not historical.

by the use of words having no necessary or natural connection with any particular subject-matter, and therefore equally likely to occur in any part of the gospel. Five such words are the adverbs εὐθύς, πάλιν, πολλά, οὐκέτι, οὕτω. Of these, the first (Mark's favorite and most characteristic word) is used seventeen times by M<sup>1</sup>, fifteen by M<sup>2</sup>, and ten by Ev. Considering the amount of narrative material ascribed to the three respectively, this usage seems to indicate an equal fondness for this word among them. The second (πάλιν) is used ten times by M<sup>1</sup>, eight times by M<sup>2</sup>, and nine times by Ev; πολλά (used adverbially) occurs three times in M<sup>1</sup>, six in M<sup>2</sup>, and three in Ev; οὐκέτι occurs twice in M<sup>1</sup>, twice in M<sup>2</sup>, three times in Ev; οὕτω is used once by M<sup>1</sup> and four times by Ev.

Characteristic of Mark is also his use of the imperfects ἔλεγεν and ἔλεγον. They are found fourteen times in M<sup>1</sup>, fifteen in M<sup>2</sup>, and twenty-one in Ev.

The cumulative effect of the above study makes strongly against Wendling's hypothesis of three different writers for Mark. At the very least, it shows that confirmatory evidence is entirely lacking where it would be most easily found and most convincing, while to those who cannot believe that three different writers should have had the same partiality for the same peculiar words it will be regarded as practically disproving the assumption that there were three authors.





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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## *A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE FIELD OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION*<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE HOWARD PARKER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Readers of the popular scientific magazines and papers of to-day are often confronted with the statement of the downfall of evolution; and, though this statement is usually not made in a way that carries conviction, there is a growing feeling among the educated public that behind all this smoke there is some fire. It is the object of this article to make clear the real grounds for this suspicion, and at the same time to give a brief survey of the present state of the theory of organic evolution.

One of the most profound and wide-spread movements of the last century was a growing interest in the historical aspect of nature, a movement in which the theories of the older cosmography gave place to those of modern cosmic evolution. In the midst of this movement stands the theory of organic evolution, the object of which is to explain the steps by which plants and animals have come to their present state. This theory includes the theory of descent with modification and certain explanatory hypotheses, such as Lamarck's hypothesis, Darwin's natural selection, De Vries's theory of mutations, and others. In dealing with organic evolution, I shall give, first of all, a brief account of descent with modification, and afterwards take up, for fuller consideration, the explanatory hypotheses already mentioned.

According to the theory of descent with modification, the existing species of organisms, both plants and animals, have arisen by

<sup>1</sup>The substance of this article was given in four lectures delivered before the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July, 1900.

the modification of pre-existing species. This theory is usually put in strong contrast with that of special creation as contained in many of the ancient sacred writings. Although descent with modification was a conception not unknown to the ancient Greeks, it is essentially a modern view. Even Linnaeus, the father of systematic botany and zoölogy, firmly believed that the number of species of plants and animals was strictly limited to those originally created. The first man of science who advocated seriously the theory of descent with modification was the French naturalist Lamarck, who lived between 1744 and 1829. His efforts, however, were without avail, chiefly because of the overpowering opposition of Cuvier; and it was not until the time of Darwin, nearly half a century later, that descent with modification was accorded a fair hearing. After the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859, the theory of descent steadily gained ground till at present practically every biologist of any standing whatsoever accepts it. This change on the part of naturalists from an attitude of hostility toward this theory to one of general acceptance was brought about by the accumulation of evidence from at least four independent lines of research: palaeontology, zoögeography, embryology, and comparative anatomy.

The work of the palaeontologist has shown that notwithstanding the enormous obliteration of organic remains in the past, enough have been preserved in the form of fossils to give some idea of the ancient faunas and floras of the earth. When these are compared with one another, it is quite evident that the more ancient the deposit the less do its organic contents resemble the animals and plants of today, and yet between any ancient deposit and that of the present the organisms exhibit a continuity such as would be presupposed by the theory of descent with modification. In many species, as for instance the modern horse, the genealogy of the animal has been worked out with wonderful completeness and detail.

Zoögeography, the study of the distribution of animals, has also contributed much to the advancement of the theory of descent. As a result of such studies it has been shown that the existing animals of a given region are more nearly related to the fossils of that region than they are to the fossils of other parts of

the earth's crust. This is strikingly illustrated by the sloths and armadillos. The modern representatives of these animals are limited to the American continent south of the United States. The fossil sloths and armadillos, though very unlike the modern species, are restricted to approximately the same area of the globe. Such facts in zoögeography are easily understood from the standpoint of descent with modification, but are not particularly significant from that of special creation.

One of the chief generalizations of embryology is to the effect that in the course of the development of the higher animals, they pass through stages that resemble permanent conditions in the lower forms. Thus it has long been known that the embryos of reptiles, birds, and mammals, the air-inhabiting vertebrates, exhibit in the region of the neck gill-clefts which disappear before birth but which correspond to those permanently present in the water-inhabiting forms, the fishes. Many other like examples might be cited. Why the embryos of higher animals should resemble in certain particulars the permanent conditions of the lower animals is not clear from the standpoint of special creation; but from that of descent with modification these conditions in the higher animals are easily interpreted as repetitions of the steps in their evolution. So much of the development of individual animals is made up of a succession of features of this kind that it is now generally believed that each animal in its growth from the egg to maturity passes through a series of stages that portrays, at least dimly, the evolution of its race, or, to put it as Huxley has facetiously done, each animal in the course of its development climbs its own ancestral tree. This state of affairs has been expressed in the generalization known as the Law of Recapitulation, a generalization entirely in accord with descent with modification but quite meaningless from the point of view of special creation.

Finally, from the standpoint of comparative anatomy a fundamental similarity has been discovered in organs correspondingly situated in different animals. Thus it has been shown that the front leg of a quadruped, the wing of a bird, and the arm of a man all possess an internal structure strikingly similar, and are all based upon the plan of structure seen in the pectoral fin of the

fish. These facts have no particular significance from the point of view of special creation, but they are full of meaning when regarded in the light of descent, for they are indicative of blood-relationship.

Furthermore many animals possess organs that are useless and rudimentary, though in other closely related species the corresponding parts may be of the utmost functional value. Thus man possesses muscles for moving the external ear, a vermiform appendix, and other parts, none of which is of any apparent importance to him, though these very parts in the lower mammals are highly developed and functional. Wiedersheim enumerates over a hundred such organs in man alone. What rudimentary organs signify from the point of view of special creation has never been clearly shown. From that of descent with modification they are obviously organs in process of disappearance, and as such lend support to this theory.

The accumulated evidence from the four lines of research, palaeontology, zoögeography, embryology, and comparative anatomy, has gradually grown to such a volume and is in such close accord with the theory of descent that biologists have completely abandoned any other explanation for the present state of the plant and animal kingdoms. Descent with modification is so universally accepted at present that one seldom hears it even mentioned. It may be regarded as one of the established facts of biological science. Whatever there is of uncertainty and dispute concerns not descent with modification, but the way in which descent is supposed to have been accomplished. On this point there is room for much difference of opinion. Of the chief questions in Darwin's day, descent with modification and the methods of accomplishing this, the first, for reasons already given, has been definitely answered in the affirmative; the second is still unsettled. It is my intention in the remainder of this article to take up the three most important explanations that have been brought forward for descent with modification, namely, Lamarck's hypothesis, Darwin's natural selection, and De Vries's theory of mutations.

The substance of the Lamarckian hypothesis is perhaps best stated in Lamarck's *Philosophie zoologique* published in 1809.

In this work the author emphasizes the great importance of the influence of the environment, and he distinguishes what may be termed a direct and an indirect method of influence. Of these the first is well exemplified in many plants. Lamarck, who was a trained botanist as well as a zoölogist, observed that the white water-crowfoot, a common European plant, had finely divided leaves where it grew under water and longer and more simply lobed leaves where it grew in the air. Thus the same plant took on quite different aspects, depending upon its immediate surroundings. The environment then, according to Lamarck, affects *directly* the form of the organism, and hence a changing environment may be a potent factor in bringing about descent with modification. But the environment also exerts a very important *indirect* effect on organisms, an effect which is best seen in animals. To meet a change in the environment, an animal may change its habits, and in changing its habits it may exercise its body so as to increase the development of certain parts or decrease that of others. These bodily changes, the product of use and disuse, when inherited from generation to generation, may so change the individuals that the transformation of one species into another may be accomplished; in other words, descent with modification may take place. Lamarck illustrated this form of environmental influence by his well-known example of the giraffe. He believed the peculiar form of this animal to have been produced by the conditions in central Africa, where the earth is nearly always dry and without herbage and the animals, according to Lamarck at least, are in consequence obliged to browse on the foliage of trees. As a result of this practice, the front legs and especially the neck of the giraffe have been exercised and lengthened generation after generation till the modern form of the animal has been assumed. Thus the ancestor of the giraffe through a change of habit induced by the environment was metamorphosed into the present animal, an *indirect* product of the environment. These in brief are Lamarck's views of the way in which the environment directly or indirectly moulds the organism and thus brings about descent with modification.

Two serious objections can be brought against Lamarck's principles: first, they apply to only a limited range of the features



and activities of organisms, and, secondly, they necessitate a belief in the inheritance of acquired characters. Although Lamarck's principles seem to hold for structures such as bones, muscles, and the like, in the development of which use and disuse may obviously play an important part, it is difficult to understand how these principles can be made to apply to other aspects of organisms, such as protective coloration. Many animals have a most striking resemblance to certain features in their environment; thus moths resemble in coloration the bark of the trees on which they habitually rest, the walking-stick insects are scarcely distinguishable from the twigs amongst which they live, the northern hare has a dun-colored coat in summer and a white one in winter in conformity with the covering of the earth at these seasons. These conditions and a host of others can scarcely be supposed to depend upon the direct or indirect effect of the environment; use and disuse can have had no part in bringing them about. The Lamarckian principles do not seem to afford any very satisfactory explanation of the origin of these phenomena. Many Lamarckians meet this situation by belittling or even denying the existence of protective coloration, but though this attitude may be correct as regards certain extreme examples of so-called protective coloration, it certainly does not hold for the majority of such cases. It therefore follows that even if we admit that the Lamarckian hypothesis is a real factor in explaining descent, it can be successfully applied to only a limited range of the phenomena which any complete explanation of descent must take into account.

Lamarckism, however, is not only thus limited in its application, but even where it seems to apply, it must meet the very serious difficulty of the inheritance of acquired characters. The ground for this criticism, which is one of the cardinal points with the neo-darwinists, is Weismann's chief contribution to evolutionary theory. Weismann very clearly pointed out that in animals that reproduce sexually the body is composed of two fundamentally distinct classes of cells: the reproductive or germ cells (the egg cells in females and the sperm cells in males) and the body cells or somatic cells, such as the cells of skin, bone, or muscle, which make up the great bulk of the body of any indi-

vidual. Weismann further pointed out that since acquired characters are those characters which an organism gains in the course of its individual life by the direct or indirect effect of the environment, by the use or disuse of its parts, they are of necessity changes in its somatic cells, such as the muscle-cells or skin-cells, and since these cells have no observable means of impressing their changed states on the reproductive cells, and die with the death of the individual, there is good reason to believe that acquired characters are never inherited. If this is so, Lamarckism, as Weismann argues, is an impossible explanation of descent with modification.

To ascertain whether the somatic cells have such an influence on the germ cells as to reproduce in the offspring conditions acquired by the parent, Weismann undertook a long series of experiments on the heritability of mutilations. Most mutilations are, of course, changes in the somatic cells, and the question that Weismann had in mind was whether these changes would so affect the germ cells of the individual on which they were wrought as to reappear in its offspring. To test this question the following experiments were tried. The length of the tail was measured in a certain number of mature mice, and these animals were then mutilated by cutting off their tails. They were then bred among themselves, and the lengths of the tails of their descendants were measured after these descendants had become mature. The tails of the first generation of descendants were then cut off and from these animals a new generation was bred, and so on. After nineteen such generations had thus been produced and mutilated, the average length of the tails of the last generation was found to be still the same as that of the first. These experiments have been confirmed on rats and mice by numerous other investigators; and it is now generally admitted that acquired characters, such as mutilations, are not inherited. This conclusion is supported by what is known of many practices of the human race, such, for instance, as circumcision, which has apparently had no influence on the size of the foreskin of the Hebrews.

Although the outcome of the experiments and discussion called forth by Weismann's declaration that such acquired characters as mutilations are not heritable has led most biologists to accept

this conclusion, it is far from proved that acquired characters of another kind, such as those that depend upon the normal action of parts, may not be transmitted. Conclusive experiments of this kind are, however, extremely difficult to devise and carry through. One of the most satisfactory lines of work in this direction is that which is based upon transplanting germ cells. If the somatic cells can impress their characteristics on the germ cells, then germ cells taken from an individual having one set of somatic characters and allowed to develop in another individual with a different set of somatic characters ought in time to show the effects of the new somatic environment. Experiments based upon this line of investigation have been carried out recently by Castle and Phillips on guinea pigs.

The question tested by these investigators was the influence of color of the hair of the guinea pig on the germ cells contained within its body. That the nature of the experiment may be fully appreciated, it is necessary to state in advance that when a pure race of albino guinea pigs is crossed with a pure race of black guinea pigs, the offspring in the first generation are always all black. Bearing this in mind, the following experiment was performed. A female albino guinea pig just attaining sexual maturity was by an operation deprived of her ovaries and in place of the removed ovaries there were introduced into her body the ovaries of a young black guinea pig. Thus the germ cells of a black stock were placed under the influence of a white body. Will the white-haired body of the foster-mother influence the introduced germ cells of the black stock? To test this the foster-mother was mated with a pure albino male. She bore three litters of young, the first about six months after the operation, the last about a year after it. These three litters consisted in all of six individuals and all were as black as the female from which the ovaries had been obtained. Thus it is clear that, so far as the color of the hair is concerned, the somatic conditions of the white stock had no influence in the course of a year on the germ cells of the black stock. Experiments and observations of this kind are not numerous, but, so far as they go, they support the contention that somatic changes in the nature of acquired characters do not influence the germ cells so as to reappear as such in the offspring;

in other words, they support Weismann's contention that acquired characters are not inherited.

Viewed from the standpoint of daily experience, this conclusion seems contrary to all we know. Most persons believe that the industrious or slothful habits of the parent have their influence on the child, but, as a matter of fact, the question in man is a much more complex one than in most other animals. Man is a social being with powers of imitation, and much that we say we have inherited from our parents has come to us in this way. Human inheritance in a broad sense may be said to be made up of physical inheritance, such as that illustrated by the color of the hair, and of what may be called social inheritance, which is dependent upon imitation and is, therefore, mostly educational. In the case of a given trait in an adult man or woman, it is not always easy to say whether it has been inherited physically, that is, is congenital, or whether it has been inherited socially, that is, has been learned. The socially inherited traits, our educational activities from childhood onward, have no bearing on the question of the inheritance of acquired characters as this term is used by the biologist, but they do afford the material which in the popular mind often leads to an acceptance of this view. Yet if the distinction in man or other colonial animals of the two forms of inheritance, physical and social, is kept in mind, confusion will be obviated and man, like other animals, will be found to have afforded thus far no conclusive evidence for the inheritance of acquired characters. The principle of the inheritance of acquired characters is apparently essential for the Lamarckian hypothesis and, since it has thus far failed to receive the support of observation and experiment, the most that can be said for Lamarckism is that, though it may be a possible factor in organic evolution, it is a very improbable one.

The second important explanation offered for descent with modification is Darwin's theory of natural selection, or, as it is often simply called, Darwinism. This theory, which was simultaneously advanced by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, is most fully and exhaustively presented in Darwin's *Origin of Species*, published in 1859. From early manhood Darwin had been interested in the problem of the origin of species, and this

interest led him to look into the origin of domesticated stocks such as the various kinds of dogs and pigeons. On examining the methods employed by animal-breeders, he found that to obtain a stock with a given trait the breeder selected for breeding purposes those individuals that showed some evidence of the desired trait and, continuing this process with the offspring generation after generation, eventually obtained a stock with the desired character in full development. This operation of selection Darwin called artificial selection. He believed that an analogous process could be shown to occur in nature; and this process, which he called natural selection, was in his opinion a sufficient explanation for the origin of species.

The grounds given by Darwin for his belief that natural selection actually took place, may be stated briefly in the following way. Darwin saw clearly that even in plants and animals that reproduced most slowly there were more descendants formed than could possibly reach maturity. He estimated in the case of the elephant, probably the slowest-breeding animal known, that the descendants of a single pair, supposing all the young to live to maturity, would after about 750 years amount to almost nineteen million. That elephants are not increasing at this rate is obvious; hence it is fair to assume that all organisms are producing more offspring than can possibly reach maturity.

The second fact that Darwin recognized was that all individuals, plants as well as animals, differ from one another. As every one knows, even animals of the same litter differ in color, strength, disposition, to such a degree that they are easily and quickly distinguishable. This variability occurs in nature as well as under domestication, and is one of the most conspicuous as well as the most fundamental properties of organisms.

If, now, more offspring are produced than can possibly survive and every individual in the race differs from the others, it follows, as Darwin argued, that those individuals that show slight advantages over the others will in the long run tend to survive, and thus, through a process of natural selection, the individuals possessing advantageous variations will be preserved and allowed to breed and those with disadvantageous features will be eliminated. This process, often spoken of as the struggle for existence, or the sur-

vival of the fittest, would tend to adapt organisms more and more closely to their surroundings, and if the environment was in slow but continuous change, descent with modification would result.

It will be seen at a glance that Darwin's method of explaining descent is based upon fundamentally different principles from those used by Lamarck. The contrast between natural selection and Lamarckism can perhaps be more fully appreciated if we attempt to portray, from the standpoint of the two theories, the steps by which the giraffe's neck may be supposed to have originated. According to Lamarck, as already pointed out, the giraffe's neck was believed to have been lengthened by adding together from generation to generation the slight increments due to the exercise of each individual in reaching upward into the foliage. According to Darwin this lengthening may be considered as due to the elimination in periods of stress of the individuals with shorter necks and the preservation till the breeding period of those with longer necks. Thus Darwinism supposes that lasting modification is occasioned by inborn differences rather than by acquired characters, and it must be evident that it covers all the cases that Lamarckism does. But Darwinism not only covers the same ground that Lamarckism does—it covers more. It explains with complete success such cases as protective coloration, which were by no means easy to understand from the point of view of Lamarckism. Animals whose coloration blends less successfully with their environment are more likely to fall a prey to their foes than those whose markings imitate more truly the backgrounds on which they rest. Thus natural selection can be as effective in cases of protective coloration as in those which have to do, for instance, with muscular activity.

Furthermore, Darwinism does not necessitate a belief in the inheritance of acquired characters. Selection is supposed to be accomplished on the basis of inborn traits which appear in the course of the development of the individual and which, being congenital, are consequently handed on in the germ cells from generation to generation. In this respect natural selection is free from the most serious obstacle that Lamarckism has to contend with.

Weismann, as the central figure among the neo-darwinists, in denying the inheritance of acquired characters, has declared that

natural selection of itself is a complete and sufficient explanation of organic evolution, while others, the neo-lamarckians, have in many instances been inclined to take the opposite view. But though there are well-marked contrasts, as just pointed out, between Lamarckism and Darwinism, it must not be supposed, as many investigators seem to have done, that there is any fundamental antagonism between the two theories. Both may be effective at once. The real question is whether either of them is a true factor in organic evolution. An interesting and significant combination of the two theories has come from several recent investigators, namely, Osborn, Baldwin, and Lloyd Morgan. This combination has been called by some "organic selection" and rests on the idea that a trait which has appeared as an acquired character, and which is retained generation after generation by the continuous action of the environment, may help to preserve a certain stock of individuals till natural selection can reproduce and establish this trait as a germinal character. Thus organic selection is to a certain degree a combination of the principles of both Lamarckism and Darwinism.

But Darwinism, like Lamarckism, is not without its serious objections. For almost half a century it has served as a convenient and acceptable theory for biologists to use in explaining the origin of useful traits in organisms, but in the last decade, during which evolution has changed from a speculative to an experimental science, objections to it have become stronger and stronger, till not a few botanists and zoölogists have come to regard it, not merely as an inadequate and partial explanation, but as absolutely ineffective. It is this charge of ineffectiveness made by a few of the more radical biologists that has unsettled the public mind about evolution in general. But from what has already been pointed out, it must be clear to the reader that this charge affects only Darwinism, one of the explanations of descent with modification, and has nothing whatever to do with descent itself. Those who oppose Darwinism most strenuously are as a rule vigorous supporters of the theory of descent; their contention is that Darwin's particular explanation of descent is probably incorrect.

The chief objection that has been raised against natural selec-

tion is one which was well known to Darwin himself, but which has been gathering strength for some years past. It is to the effect that the initial phases of a favorable variation, as conceived by Darwin, are too slight to be of use to the organism, and consequently they cannot come under the influence of the selective process. When the slight individual differences that Darwin laid so much stress upon are closely scrutinized, it seems scarcely conceivable that they could be, even in the long run, of life-and-death importance to an organism; in other words, that they could afford a starting-point for the formation of a new species. And when closely related species in nature are examined, such as the different kinds of warblers, or of sedges, it seems impossible that the slight differences separating them should represent gaps produced by natural selection through an elimination of intermediate forms. Thus an inspection of nature reveals a state of affairs which many investigators have come to believe to be much too refined to be a product of natural selection.

Attempts to show that natural selection is taking place have been more or less successful, and their results are extremely instructive. Bumpus has reported the selective effect of a severe winter ice-storm on sparrows. After a storm in Providence, R.I., on February 1, 1898, many of the sparrows of that region were found to be much spent and exhausted. Of these birds, 136 were collected and brought within doors, and of this number 72 revived and 64 died. Do these two groups represent two classes of animals, one with slight advantageous the other with slight disadvantageous traits? Careful measurements of spread of wing, weight of body, etc., revealed the fact that the birds that died were less near the normal than those that survived, showing that a heavy body with small wings, or a light body with large wings, etc., was disadvantageous under stress of circumstances as compared with a body of average weight carrying wings of average extent. In this instance, then, natural selection was certainly effective, but it eliminated only the most unfit and was not concerned, so far as could be seen, with those slight differences that make up the distinguishing traits of species. Observations of this kind, as well as the general impression made by inspecting closely related species in nature, has led to the conclusion that



natural selection, though a real factor in explaining descent with modification, is only a partial one. To state the matter in a figurative way, natural selection may be said to be capable of rough-hewing a species but not of putting on the polishing touches. If this conclusion is admitted as substantially correct, it is evident that Darwinism, unlike Lamarckism, must be admitted to be an effective factor in bringing about descent with modification, though its rôle in descent is apparently much less significant than was formerly supposed to be the case.

The objection to natural selection discussed in the preceding paragraphs is not the only one that has been raised. It is, however, the chief one. Students of this subject have called attention to the fact that many organs in animals and plants seem to be more highly specialized than is needful, a valid objection to natural selection as an all-sufficient process. It has also been pointed out that even if we grant that through natural selection advantageous characters were to get a foothold, yet in the beginning individuals possessing these characters would be obliged to pair with others that did not possess them, and thus the new traits would tend to be swamped out and so obliterated. To meet this objection subsidiary hypotheses having to do with isolation, either geographical or physiological, have been devised and put forward, but many of these minor objections have now been minimized, if not entirely swept away, by the recent advances in our knowledge of the laws of inheritance. These have afforded the basis of the modern experimental treatment of evolution, and centre particularly around the names of Mendel and De Vries, the latter of whom is the author of the mutation theory.

The mutation theory, together with what it implies, is undoubtedly the most important single contribution to the theory of organic evolution since the promulgation of the theory of natural selection. Historically it is the third of the major attempts at explaining descent with modification. It is well set forth by its author, Hugo De Vries, in his work entitled *Die Mutations-theorie*, the first part of which appeared in 1901.

According to De Vries the characteristics of organisms are made up of elementary units which are as sharply separated from one

another as the chemical elements. These unit-characters show no intergrades, and any combination of them constitutes what De Vries calls an elementary species. Although these general statements were based by De Vries on a study of plants, particularly on the evening primroses, they have been found to be equally applicable to animals. Thus the color and other conditions of the hair of guinea pigs afford excellent examples of unit-characters. Some guinea pigs are entirely white, others entirely black, and still others are piebald; again some have short hair, others long hair; some have smooth hair, others rough. All these characters are unit-characters and any combination of them may be made, and constitutes, according to the views of De Vries, an elementary species. Thus a guinea pig with smooth, short, black hair belongs to a different elementary species from one with rough, short, black hair, and these two species differ in only one unit-character.

Guinea pigs are known that have rough, long, white hair, thus differing from the first elementary species just mentioned in all three unit-characters. In fact each new combination is a new elementary species. To the older systematists the guinea pig was supposed to be a single species, but from this point of view it is an aggregate of elementary species. De Vries, therefore, calls the species of the older naturalists collective, or Linnaean, species, and this newly described kind, elementary species. Elementary species, then, are separated from one another by the possession of different unit-characters and hence by a cleft unbridged by any intergrades.

De Vries investigated with great care the origin of elementary species and the principles on which unit-characters are inherited. In the course of this work he rediscovered much that had already been brought to light by Mendel nearly fifty years before, but had escaped the attention of biologists. These generalizations, now usually known as the Mendelian principles, are thus the independent discoveries of Mendel and De Vries, and have been abundantly confirmed on both animals and plants. They may be illustrated by the results obtained from breeding guinea pigs, and they are most clearly followed when individuals differing in only one unit-character are used. If a guinea pig of pure breed

whose coat-color is black, is mated with a pure white one, all the offspring, constituting what is known as the first filial generation, are black. If these guinea pigs are now bred among themselves, they will produce a population composed of definite proportions of white and of black individuals. Twenty-five per cent of this population will be composed of pure white individuals and seventy-five per cent of black ones, of which one-third will be found on being tested to be pure black and the other two-thirds to be black, but capable, like their parents, of producing white individuals. Thus the second filial generation is composed of one-quarter pure whites, one-quarter pure blacks, and one-half blacks which, however, will produce some whites. As Mendel pointed out, this second filial generation contains in these remarkable proportions individuals that represent perfectly the parents and grandparents of the stock; for the pure white individuals and the pure black ones are like the grandparents both in appearance and in breeding capacity, while the fifty per cent blacks that will produce some whites are exactly like the black parents in the first filial generation. One of the most remarkable features in simple Mendelian inheritance is that the larger the number of plants or of animals bred, the nearer do the numbers of the several classes in the second filial generation approximate the proportions given, so that there is good reason to believe that these proportions represent real relations.

Mendel was so impressed by the invariableness and definiteness of these hereditary relations that he was led to formulate an explanation the assumptions of which seem even at present to be admitted by most workers in this field. He pointed out that, since the second filial generation was composed of individuals some of which had the character of one grandparent, others the character of the other (in the case of the guinea pig a white coat or a black coat), therefore the first filial generation, although apparently entirely of one character (black in the guinea pig), must carry the other character hidden in it. Hence he declared that in the case of a pair of characters, such as white and black coat-colors in guinea pigs, one might dominate over the other, and that character which thus gained the ascendancy he called *dominant*, the hidden one *recessive*. In guinea pigs it is well established

that black—or in fact any color, including the piebald state—is always dominant over white, which is, therefore, recessive. It is also known that short hair is dominant over long hair, and rough over smooth hair.

The second assumption that Mendel made was to the effect that the germ cells, both egg cells and sperm cells, were pure in respect to the unit-character they carried, and this he believed gave an explanation of the very remarkable proportions met with in the several classes of the second filial generation. He assumed that each egg cell or sperm cell could carry only one of the two opposing unit-characters, and that in this respect it could be said to be pure. With this assumption in mind we may now consider the course of events in the three generations of guinea pigs already described. In the two individuals with which the experiment is assumed to start it makes no difference whether the male or the female is white, the outcome will be the same in either case. If we assume that the male is of pure white stock then, on the basis of Mendel's belief as to the purity of the germ cells, we should expect that all the sperm cells produced by this individual would carry the character white and no other. If the female is of pure black stock, then all her egg cells would in like manner bear the character black. Since every organism that has been produced by ordinary sexual methods arises from an egg cell fertilized by a sperm cell, it follows that each offspring resulting from the mating of this pair of animals would come from an egg cell with the black character combined with a sperm with the white character. This combination would in all cases give individuals in which both traits were present, but in which, of course, the black would be dominant over the white, so that all the members of the first filial generation would be black. If now we continue to assume the purity of the germ cells, the males of this generation, since they contain both characters, ought to produce two kinds of sperm cells, those with the character white and those with the character black. Similarly, the females ought to produce two classes of eggs, which we may call, for the sake of brevity, white eggs and black eggs. If, now, we imagine that the two classes of eggs and the two classes of sperms are produced in equal numbers and that their combinations in fertiliza-

tion are purely fortuitous, an interesting proportional relation is arrived at for the second filial generation. It is obvious that there are four possible combinations among the two classes of sperm cells and of egg cells. Once in four a white egg will be fertilized by a white sperm, and this combination will give rise to the twenty-five per cent pure white individuals in this generation. Once in four a black egg will be fertilized by a black sperm, and this will produce the twenty-five per cent pure black stock. Once in four a white egg will be fertilized by a black sperm and also once in four a black egg will be fertilized by a white sperm, and these two classes will produce together the fifty per cent. of black individuals, which, however, are capable of bearing white young. Thus the assumption of the purity of the germ led Mendel to an explanation of these remarkable proportions so frequently observed in the second filial generation. Because of this correspondence and many others based upon other combinations, the purity of the germ, or, as it is often called, the segregation of characters, is believed to be of fundamental importance in breeding; and this conception together with that of dominance, already alluded to, constitutes the chief features in what are often called the Mendelian principles.

These principles, as must be evident, are in complete harmony with De Vries's idea of elementary species, for they show how unit-characters act in heredity, how they are handed on from generation to generation unimpaired and unconfused. They afford in this way a firm basis for De Vries's mutation theory. De Vries maintains that when the differences between individual animals or plants are closely scrutinized, they are found to fall into two distinct categories: the small fluctuating differences that Darwin laid so much stress on in his theory of natural selection, and the larger unit-character differences such as we have seen to exist between the so-called elementary species. The small differences De Vries calls variations; the larger differences, which Darwin considered under the head of sports, De Vries calls mutations. De Vries believes, contrary to the opinion of Darwin, that variations, as just defined, have nothing whatever to do with organic evolution, but that evolution is effected by mutations, by sudden considerable jumps. This in brief is the essence of

his theory. Organic evolution, then, is accomplished by occasional strides rather than by many oft-repeated short steps. This theory is in no sense antagonistic to natural selection. In fact, it works effectively only in conjunction with natural selection, for, after all, what determines whether a race showing a trait produced as a mutation will survive or not is natural selection. The great advantage that the mutation theory has over natural selection, as stated in the old way, is that it obviates at once the difficulty of explaining how a new trait which in its incipency was too slight to be really useful to an organism could be brought forward to a useful condition by natural selection. Mutations do not arise by any such gradual process but spring fully formed into existence and therefore are at once in a condition to be acted upon by natural selection. The mutation theory, then, affords a most successful means of overcoming the chief obstacle to natural selection, but, as De Vries himself rightly maintains, the mutation theory is significant only in connection with natural selection.

The Mendelian principles and the mutation theory both imply in the process of inheritance a certain rigidity, a certain inelasticity, not ordinarily associated with organic nature. Under these conditions the guinea pig may have either a white coat or a black coat; it cannot have all the intermediate grays, as is implied, for instance, in Galton's theory of ancestral inheritance. And it must be confessed that there is some justification for this idea of rigidity. Evidence of this kind of reproductive inelasticity is not easily obtained from organisms that reproduce by cross-fertilization (a male individual fertilizing the eggs of a female individual) as most animals do, but is more clearly seen when self-fertilization is accomplished, as in many plants, or where the organisms reproduce without fertilization, as among the protozoans, the simplest animals. Investigation in this direction has given rise to what are known as pure-line cultures, first worked out among plants by the Danish botanist Johannsen and among animals by Jennings, who has studied inheritance in the slipper-animalcule, or paramoecium. This animalcule, which is shaped somewhat like a slipper and is just visible to the naked eye, grows in great numbers in stagnant water. If a large popula-

tion is examined, it will be found to be made up of individuals that vary considerably in size, the largest being perhaps seven to eight times the size of the smallest. These animalcules ordinarily reproduce by the simple process of dividing in two and then growing in size. If, now, one of the largest individuals is taken and its descendants observed through many generations, it will be found not to be able to reproduce the condition of the whole population, for its descendants will always be more or less large. In a similar way small individuals will give rise to a stock whose members never attain to the size of the larger members of the whole population. Thus it is clear that in a population of animals—and the same is true of plants—where reproduction is not accomplished by the continual crossing of individuals, the population is composed of separate lines kept within certain bounds,—a condition which supports the general conception of the relative inflexibility of the hereditary process.

But notwithstanding the fact that many characters are inherited in a strikingly rigid way, others are apparently inherited quite differently. Thus when the black race and the white race cross, the offspring is neither a black nor a white individual, but a person of intermediate tint, a mulatto. This form of inheritance, which is often called blended inheritance, is also illustrated by certain characteristics in the lower mammals. If a long-eared rabbit is crossed with a short-eared one, the offspring have ears of intermediate length, and if the rabbits with ears of intermediate lengths are crossed with the long-eared or the short-eared stocks, new intermediate stocks are produced with lengths of ears midway between those of their parents. Thus blended inheritance presents conditions apparently wholly unlike those met with in the ordinary Mendelian scheme. It is true that some investigators have maintained with a good deal of reason that blended inheritance after all is only a disguised form of Mendelian inheritance in which dominance is absent; but, however this may be, blended inheritance shows very clearly that under certain circumstances the rigidity of inheritance is not so marked as it appears to be in the true Mendelian cases.

But more or less direct evidence for the modification of the so-called unit-characters has from time to time also been forthcom-

ing. Castle and Phillips have described a case of this kind in hooded rats. These animals have a whitish coat except for a black, hood-like splotch on the head and a similar streak down the middle of the back. This character behaves as a Mendelian recessive when crossed with the ordinary gray of the common rat. By long-continued selection, as prescribed by Darwin, there were obtained from the ordinary hooded rats two extreme conditions, one in which the hood and stripe were so reduced that the animal was almost an albino, and the other in which these areas were so expanded as to give the animal almost the appearance of a gray rat with a white belly. These two extreme stocks, nevertheless, bred true, and on being crossed with the common gray rat the extreme conditions reappeared in appropriate Mendelian proportions. It appears, therefore, that though many characters are inherited in Mendelian fashion, all are not necessarily so inherited; and even Mendelian characters are open to modification by selection. This is perhaps the most significant criticism that can be made against the mutation theory, the introduction of which has revolutionized the field of organic evolution from that of an observational science to an experimental one. Till this new method of attack has yielded further results, it is perhaps premature even to attempt to pass judgment on the mutation theory.

In conclusion, the substance of the preceding pages may be summarized as follows. The theory of descent with modification is an established fact. As an explanation of descent, Lamarckism is a possible but unlikely factor because of the improbability that the inheritance of acquired characters takes place. Darwinism, or natural selection, on the other hand, is apparently a real factor in organic evolution, at least roughly outlining natural species. Its chief defect, the inability to produce useful traits from small beginnings, is apparently fully met by the mutation theory, which, however, is too novel to be passed on with any degree of certainty. The popular distrust which has recently arisen concerning evolution is based on a confusion of natural selection with descent. As to the effectiveness of the former the biologist has good reason for doubt, as to the reality of the latter he has none whatever.



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*FINALISM AND FREEDOM*

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One of the things difficult to explain in the world of thought was the sudden and overmastering impetus given to the theory of development by the publication of the works of Charles Darwin. The main idea of that theory, namely, that the higher orders of life had come into being through evolution from lower types, was by no means new; and there is so much among the plainest features of the world's life to suggest the idea, that one can only wonder why, if the scientific mind was waiting for, and wanting, the theory (as it appears to have been doing), it should not have taken it up long before Darwin's time.

Apparently, Darwin invested the theory with just sufficient philosophy to make it immediately the subject of world-wide debate. He gave it enough philosophical dress to permit the rising power of mechanistic belief to claim it and rely upon it; and to make it also, for the time being, the chief bugbear of the church. On the favoring tide of acrimonious discussion the new theory swiftly rose to eminence, and was soon enjoying one of the most notable triumphs of modern times. There are many who still speak of it, in its Darwinian form, with awe-struck tones and bated breath, as if it were a kind of sacred thing which must be held above suspicion and reproach. That, however, is the way in which the populace is apt to regard any popular idol; and it is not a very good certificate of divinity.

We probably owe Darwin an immense debt in that he was the instrument through which the idea of development became available in the world's thought. But concerning what may be regarded as his philosophy of development there has arisen much question; and it is likely to be found more and more deficient as time goes on. Its radical weakness is that it is obliged to rest everything ultimately on a basis of pure chance; for that is a foundation which is intolerable to the rational mind. That mind may be willing enough to allow for a considerable fortuitous ele-

ment running through existence; but it cannot make chance the fundamental ruling principle of the universe, without abandoning its own rationality.

And Darwinism really had nothing else to offer. Its "variations from type" were immediately due, of course, to changes of environment, or to different combinations of the two sexes employed for reproduction; but that those variations appeared in such wise as to enable the struggle for existence to build out of them something like a continuous progressive line, was, so far as it could explain, nothing but chance. That will not answer, in reason. It is impossible for the thinking mind to accept this as a solution of the riddle of the universe. Some further explanation of these variations must be found, before the hypothesis of development can claim to stand on a reasonable basis.

It would seem that in either of two ways the theory might be pieced out and amended to make good the deficiency. It might be supposed that, in the stream of life itself, the power of desire helped to bring forward the needed variation at the opportune moment. The antelope with longer legs was born, that is to say, because, in part, antelopes had a sense of wanting longer legs to enable them to escape from lions prowling in their vicinity. Or one can suppose that above the stream of life there is a power capable of determining the main direction of its flow. But either of these suppositions involves the assertion of a certain amount of directing intelligence; and when we put mind in charge of the process, it is not enough to say that this satisfies the intellectual necessities of the case. We have then to go back and consult the actual facts in order to learn how far they will bear out the hypothesis.

It is just at this point that the battle now rages, and seems likely to rage for some time to come. What do the facts say? What is the evidence in the case? If we had only to produce a satisfactory intellectual scheme of things, at least the main outline of such a structure is not so very difficult to sketch. But, having made a coat for the universe, we are now under the unhappy necessity of trying it on. We must see how it will fit; and there are plenty to tell us, at this moment, that the above suggested alterations in the cut of the garment do not improve the set of it in the least degree.

As to this, however, it is permissible to ask whether such denial of improvement is or is not the testimony of an unbiassed mind. Where there are signs of strong prejudice, we distrust a verdict upon the evidence even though rendered by an expert. Is the scientific mind perfectly dispassionate in its unwillingness to admit that the process of development has been noticeably shaped by a directing intelligence? It rather seems as if the controversial temper in much of this unwillingness were too plain to be altogether ignored or disguised. One does not know why we should expect human nature in scientific circles to be so very different from human nature in other spheres of thought and action; and it is nowhere easy for the mind, in dealing with any set of facts, to divest itself altogether of the prejudice which controversy has engendered.

Certainly, the man of rigid and thorough-going scientific training is now apt to be less scared about being caught in a situation which would put his moral reputation in serious jeopardy than of being betrayed into a manner of speaking which might indicate that he harbored the awful doctrine of "finalism." Better be a drunkard than a finalist, we can almost hear that man murmur, as he looks into the black depths of unreason to which belief in final causes may lead. Even in Bergson one can detect the inveterate feeling of strong disfavor and dislike for an idea which still carries the taint of scientific heresy. And it is not surprising that this feeling should still exist, or that it should have considerable weight in determining those views of existence which many people entertain. The special pleading of theology on behalf of its favorite notion of "design" has been enough to irritate a much more saintly person than the scientific man sets up to be, and the fight to win its freedom which science has been forced to make against the church is too recent to be wholly forgotten. On the whole we cannot wonder if the man of science is still nervous about being brought into too amicable relations with the theologian. He will edge away if he suspects a risk of being tarred with that brush which brands him as the friend and champion of theological ideas. Small blame to him, one must say! There are not so many theologians, even yet, in whose society one can feel either entirely comfortable or very proud; and it is

too much to ask of men who have for the most part sought the truth in entire simplicity and sincerity, that they should cease to remember the unmitigated disgust with which they have seen churchmen resorting to every known device to get away from the truth. But out of such a controversy as the last half-century has witnessed neither side is likely to emerge with an entirely unbiassed mind. And that fact ought to be remembered in estimating the soundness of positions taken on the main question now in dispute, the question, namely, as to what the evidence says about the presence of intelligence within, or over, the process of development.

The answer made to most that has heretofore been urged as an argument for design, is that it is easy enough to make out a case by selecting such facts as happen to agree with it. It is a perfectly good and sufficient answer to much that has been put forward in the past as a doctrine of finalism. But it can also be said that many a case which on the evidence as a whole is fairly entitled to stand, is wrecked if it be judged only by careful selection of the facts that do not agree with it. And one must say that the consensus of opinion among men of science still appears to lie somewhat open to the reproach of that kind of unfair judgment. It has not yet dealt dispassionately with the whole array of facts before us for inspection. It is disposed to make much of one part of the evidence and to belittle another part of it. It will not quite close with the question whether any amount of finalism seems to be involved in progressive development, being much intent upon the slaughter of a certain kind of design which theologians of the past have advocated and upheld. All this is so much in the partisan spirit that we outsiders have some right to discount the testimony which such experts give. The prisoner at the bar being "finalism," we may be inclined to say with them, "guilty, as charged in the indictment," but also we feel moved to say, "not so guilty as you seem to think." We do not consent that the culprit should be ordered to immediate execution. Rather we think he should be given a chance to amend his ways, and we strongly hope that he may yet prove to be a useful member of our household of ideas.

It seems probable that, when the evidence at our command can

be fairly weighed and sifted, it will abundantly justify the conclusion that some amount of intelligence is characteristic of life in all stages of its unfolding. At the present time, whatever may come afterward, we are not in sight of any scientific demonstration of a perfect mind at work in the process of organic development. The contention of religion that nature displays everywhere the unlimited power and skill of such a mind, science will not countenance. But science will have to admit in the end, we may reasonably conjecture, that what we know in ourselves as the phenomena of mind are not altogether absent from the behavior of life in any of its forms.

One may say about this admission, as a certain boy is said to have remarked about learning the alphabet, that it scarcely seems worth while to go through so much to get so little. And yet, all things considered, it is doubtless an achievement to get the scientific intellect to agree that in some measure the universe appears to know what it is doing. The difficulty of screwing that intellect up to this sticking-point is one that makes the career of Bergson, at this moment, decidedly interesting. It would not seem that the amount of wisdom which he is inclined to put into the process need frighten any one very much. Apparently, however, many are quick to suspect that if any wisdom is put back into nature, religion will have been killed all in vain.

However, Bergson appears to have taken that common-sense view of the situation which every candid mind will have to come to in the end. The point at issue is never likely to be settled by a demonstration, one way or the other. It is a question of the balance of probability, as all the evidence attainable is brought under survey. And when we come down to it, there appears to be likeness enough between ourselves and external nature to make it seem absurd to say that life is intelligent in us and wholly unintelligent outside. We may have all kinds of fine-spun theories to show how this other life gets on and makes progress, without in the least degree knowing what it wants, or seeing any next step before it. But after all, what is the good of these theories? They only serve to lead us back to that unthinkable foundation of chance. Meantime, the obvious conclusion is that life, everywhere, shows at least traces of mentality. What is the use of

asserting over and over that instinct in animals is not, and cannot be, but only looks as if it were, intelligent? That is the way it looks, and that is the way it is. If there be any mind in us, there is some mind there; and wherever there is mind, it is entirely proper to predicate purpose, finalism.

The quality which the theory of development needs to lift it out of the category of chance, where it stands as the despair of a rational intelligence, is the quality which can be read into it without difficulty from the most indubitable of all records; that is to say, a mental quality, sufficiently conscious of its needs and wants to determine the direction in which the stream of life shall run. The biologist, for his purposes, is not required to suppose anything like a perfect mind guiding the course of development. Indeed, he is likely to insist, to the end, that, so far as the evidence goes, it will warrant only the hypothesis of a quite limited intelligence. But so much he might grant without doing violence to any of the probabilities of the case. And the sooner he does grant this, the sooner he will free himself from a burden of useless and thankless labor; for the only great difficulty is that of thinking up ways by which to evade the rather patent certainty that, in some measure, the great powers of being understand what they are about.

This may do for the biologist; but obviously it comes far short of the requirements of the theist; though if the latter shall limit himself as he has latterly shown some disposition to try to do, to the idea of divine immanence, it is hard to see why he and the biologist are not practically one. A God who is merely "in the machine" has, it would seem, to accept the limitations of the machine. If there be no more of him than what is involved in, and implied by, its working, then its character is substantially his character. Theism, when it will have none but an immanent Deity, rather ties itself down to the biologist's standards. The only way by which it can then escape his thought of a limited mind at work in the world is to deal with the facts in a fashion which no biologist can sanction. Some people profess a theism thus capable of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds at the same moment; but probably their system of thought, stripped of pretence, would show only in rabbit-like

proportions. Other people frankly accept the alternative presented to them, and put up with a Deity who knows rather less than they do themselves; one who has perhaps something like equal power with them to guide the course of events; though why they should call this poor being God, and try to build their belief on him into a religion, is one of the surprising mysteries which an unaccountable human nature is always presenting to us.

By theism I do not mean anything bound up in these infantile swaddling-clothes. It is now sufficiently evident that, when the intellect proceeded to grind the world into mincemeat through its process of development, it did not grind the idea of creation out of it; though for a time it thought, with some glee, that this was what it had accomplished. By the same token, one might say, the idea of transcendence still survives that process of desiccation. Two atoms or two worlds swimming round each other, what does it matter? You have the same mystery in either case. Nothing constrains modern theism to give up the thought of divine transcendence, or to limit itself to the thought of immanence, unless it may be a kind of frantic desire to get rid of every last vestige of the idea of miracle; and if that be its purpose, decidedly the game is not worth the candle. Miracle, also, can be chopped up into very small pieces; but only to the superficial sight does it thereby disappear.

Let us boldly say that theism demands a Deity who, however he may be "in the machine," is not altogether of it; one who may not choose to interfere with the ordinary sequences of nature, but who is nevertheless big enough to upset them if he were so inclined. And if anybody asks where theism can get a Deity like that, perhaps it is enough to say that he can easily be found in that same storehouse which has furnished atoms and ions and light-bearing ether and various other things which eye never saw nor ear heard. That modern science, after some of its excursions in speculative fields, should come back accusing theism of being too fanciful, is simply a piece of what is called on the street "colossal cheek." Some philosophers may still say of God that they "have no need of that hypothesis." But a good many of us seem to realize a considerable need of that kind; and there is no



reason why we should be bashful in anybody's presence about taking what we want. Only, of course, we too have to reckon with the facts.

But what I should wish to point out is that our reckoning is by no means required to be identical with that of the biologist. He, so to speak, limits himself to a study of the machine, and he does not intend to go one step beyond what that study discloses to him. Theism starts out with an idea which transcends these limits. It is all folly to ask whether or not the facts of the outward world will prove its assumptions. It knows, or ought to know, at the beginning that it cannot prove its case from external nature. It does not get its ideas from that source, and it can hear without the least dismay that they have never been discovered there.

What theism has to do is to reconcile its ideas, in some measure, with existing facts. Where the biologist can only say that nature seems to display some limited degree of intelligence, theism is required to explain how that might be, though the intelligence behind nature were practically unlimited. And so long as it can make such explanations, in a fairly satisfactory way, it is not likely to ask leave or license of anybody for cherishing its faith.

Without doubt the difficulty of getting our theistic belief sufficiently in line with our knowledge of the world about us to relieve it from the charge of extravagance and unreality, has been of late somewhat increased. This thought of a low kind of mentality and an inadequate degree of energy evinced by the story of development looks like one that might be hard to get over. If all that we have to trust to is Life,—with a big L, to be sure, but only a feeble and fumbling life, after all,—that leaves us so far short of those heights where religion has heretofore supposed itself to be walking that climbing back seems quite out of the question. For with this millstone of a verdict hung about our necks, that the record proves a strictly limited intelligence at work, how can we climb at all? We could almost wish that the biologist had stuck to his former opinion of no intelligence at work; for then we knew he was simply guessing, and we were at liberty to disregard his guess.

But just here there is a suggestion to be made which appears

not to have received thus far the attention it deserves, and which much eases the situation. Theism has always had some trouble in adjusting itself to the facts of human life. The evil and sorrow of the world, as many have thought, could not be reconciled with the idea of an infinite goodness presiding over the life of man. Indeed, this difficulty must long ago have extinguished theistic belief, but for one of the assertions of our consciousness which no theorizing could ever quite put to silence. That, of course, is the assertion of an element of freedom in our life. Faith can take refuge in the thought that God does not intend or design these miseries which afflict mankind. They are the products of man's wrong use of the alternatives left to his choice; and God bears these miseries, with man, for the sake of having him trained and educated in freedom. The price of suppressing them would be the abandonment of man's essential being; and that price God is unwilling to pay. I do not see why, both in theory and practice, this is not an entirely sufficient answer to one of the difficulties which theism has to face. Not only so, but it appears to contribute to faith some of the noblest features it has ever attained. Both the character of God and the nature of his creative task are thereby much ennobled and enriched.

And now, I desire to ask, what hinders us from applying this same explanation to the whole field of organic life and the whole process of development? What right have we to assume in ourselves a monopoly of freedom any more than we assume there a monopoly of mind? It becomes increasingly probable that the roots of our faculty of conscious knowing go far down into primitive types of life below us. In this respect the creation of man begins very early in the history of development,—for aught we know, indeed, with the very first cell of living protoplasm. Is it not probable that our faculty of will is brought from an equal distance, and begins its training somewhere on the lower levels? And if one of the properties of life, from the very start of its career on the planet, has been some power of self-determination, then the method which we apply at the top to account for what we take to be shortcomings in humanity, will apply all the way down. What appears to be the work of a limited intelligence is just that; only it is not God's intelligence which is thus shown to be imper-

fect, but the intelligence of his creatures painfully learning to take some tiny steps alone.

In other words, are we not apt to be still rather incomplete evolutionists, making too sharp a line of division between ourselves and the orders of life beneath us? and when we fully realize that we can be what we are only because there was some promise and potency of us in that out of which we have come, shall we not learn to regard the whole gradually unfolding line as something which was on its way, by the admixture of an element of freedom, toward the higher reaches of personality?

As for the tiger in man, we explain his persistent survival by saying that God has no power to stop him off; no way, that is, which would not involve desertion of the method by which personal life is brought into being. Have we any reason to think that this view of the case does not apply with equal force to that tiger which precedes man in the order of creation? If an element of freedom or self-determination runs through the whole course of organic development, in some measure that process has always held its fate in its own hands and cannot be judged as if it adequately or accurately represented at every moment the wish and purpose of an intelligence presiding over its course. The moment we stop thinking of development in mechanical terms, and begin to think of it in terms of life (as we know life in ourselves), we are able, it appears to me, to adjust our theism to the facts without doing damage either to them or to its essential meaning. And I see no more difficulty in combining the thought of divine oversight of the world with the thought of a certain amount of autonomy granted to what we call life than I find difficulty in asserting this of the relations between parent and child.

Meantime, if there is nothing to forbid our entertaining the suggestion that both freedom and purpose should be reckoned into the process of development, something remains to be said more positively concerning its applicability to the facts as we know them. That same "tendency to variation" which the original theory so calmly assumed might well be used to support such an interpretation.

Perhaps no bigger problem was ever more deftly covered up by a specious phrase than when this form of words, "a tendency

to variation," was adopted. For the whole behavior of life, as contrasted with that of other forces, is thereby summarized. It is as if one should speak of gravitation as a tendency of bodies to approach each other; supposing himself, by this description, to have explained all that needed explanation. Surely this inward pressure of life against the limitations that hem it in, to find some new outlet, speaks of a power that has a certain wilfulness or waywardness of its own. I do not mean to say that we can prove it to have freedom; but I do say that it will bear that hypothesis, if one is inclined to make it, rather better than it bears the character which mechanism puts upon it.

Still more, when we come to contrast those fields of existence in which development is manifested, with the larger fields of existence outside, the thought that some freedom must be affirmed of the former realm gains enormous probability. When we try to picture to ourselves what is going on in any cubic inch of space above our atmosphere, we see that we are face to face with an inconceivable perfection. Through that little point in the wide heavens pass an innumerable number of lines of light and gravitation, perhaps also of electricity, at every conceivable angle. We can only figure these as lines of pulsation or wave movement. At all events it is movement of some kind. In fact, at every point it is such a bundle or network of movements as our imaginations cannot begin to grasp. These different lines of force pass through each other, at staggering velocities, making such a texture as was never woven on any of our looms; and not the slightest jostling or inaccuracy can ever be detected where they thus meet and pass. The universe, in this broader aspect of it, must strike us as an entirely perfect machine. It is such a product as infinite skill and infinite power might well bring forth. It so far surpasses all the inventions we have made and all our imaginations of what human wisdom may one day achieve that we can only gaze in mute wonder upon these triumphs of a creative mind.

But when we turn to the province of life, we get a different impression. There we are not made to feel such precision of movement or such superabundance of power. We are shown, indeed, remarkable adaptations and contrivances; but they do not rise to the standard of perfect workmanship. It is said by

oculists, for example, that nowhere is there an entirely perfect eye. A few of the forms of nature seem finished and complete. The cat tribe, perhaps, might be considered the last word in physical perfection of a certain sort. But other forms appear clumsy, unfinished, and grotesque. As Hamlet said of certain men, one could imagine that "nature's journeymen had made them and not made them well." If at this moment we have anywhere a fresh, unbiassed, and original impression of the character of the life-stream as a whole, we get it perhaps through the mind of Bergson. Plainly it is the impression of a stream of energy barely sufficient to carry through the enterprises it begins; not always indeed sufficient, but sometimes failing or only succeeding by chance in surmounting the obstacles in its way. It is either a stream which holds some measure of a remarkable intelligence, or which simulates the possession of such intelligence in a curious way; but it does not impress Bergson, and can scarcely impress us, as the kind of intelligence one would like to worship.

Is not this, then, a very striking contrast? Throughout interstellar space, and pervading the form of every planet and sun, forces are at work whose action, so far as we can judge, is absolutely perfect. The movements of the heavenly bodies so synchronize, down to the minutest fraction of a second, and their revolutions are so maintained without halt or tremor, that we are left without the smallest chance to find fault in their behavior. Whether the universe grew or was made, at all events it is in this aspect a piece of work which we might fitly ascribe to the Almighty as being in every way worthy of his limitless mind. But with regard to the force that we know as life, it is a different story. There we have a manifestation of being which appears to feel its way, somewhat uncertain of its immediate ends, proceeding often by indirection toward what appears to be its destined goal, and displaying sometimes marked inadequacy to reach its end at all.

Are we not entitled to ask what such things mean? And what explanation can we devise for these facts better than that which theism is able to present? All that is, we say, comes forth from Infinite Mind, and in the larger mechanism of the universe this mind displays a power and skill, so far as we can judge, without

limit. But in our little corner of the universe this mind appears to have started a process whose end has been the evolution of personal beings. This process has not been merely mechanical. All along its creations have taken form, not alone as they were stamped in a mould of circumstance, but as they themselves have in part determined. To some extent this world of living things has created itself. An overruling intelligence has worked with it in such wise as to prevent utter failure on its part; yet, as we may conjecture, has trusted it to the utmost verge of safety to make its own way, and has displayed endless patience with it for the sake of bringing out its gift of self-determination. From first to last life shows limited intelligence, because God has waited for it to try its own experiments. No doubt it has brought forth much that is useless and much that is not seemly, but it has found its way at last to the creation of man; and may we not say that the whole of its history, whether of failure or success, stands thereby justified?

Is it not reasonable to affirm that the creation of such beings as we believe ourselves to be could have been brought to pass in no other way? The old Hebrew tradition has it that God fashioned man of the dust of the earth and then breathed into him the breath of life. But such a method, one may perceive, could have produced nothing better than a mechanical toy. Personality, as we know it, could only come, as it has come, out of long ages of free endeavor. Once we are accustomed to the thought that all growth implies an element of freedom, we can see that the failures of growing things give us no ground on which to impeach the divine wisdom and goodness. And with man here finally as the ultimate fruit of the great tree of life, shall we not declare that, whatever his cost, he is abundantly worth the price?

The price has been, indeed, incalculable, bewildering to think of. The groaning and travailing of creation to bring forth this son of God has been so awful that the little we can see of it almost overwhelms us. Yet give man the immortal career which religion proposes for him, and who will say that the suffering has been too much? If we might personify Mother Nature, let us rather imagine that, with all her agony, she was glad when her man-child was born.

*THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY*<sup>1</sup>

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What is absolute certainty? Where is it to be found? Does it exist? Is there any belief of mankind which can be claimed as absolutely certain?

It is difficult to define an absolute in any kind. One can only say that the absolute is that which wants nothing to make it complete. The absolute does not even want a philosopher to tell the world what the absolute is. So long as it wants a philosopher to expound it, to that extent it is not complete, and is therefore not the absolute.

Spinoza saw this, and made it the corner-stone of his thought. He saw that Perfection must be capable of telling its own story. It cannot at one and the same time be perfect and yet in need of a human spokesman to explain it. A dumb absolute which needs you to give it a tongue, an unintelligible absolute which needs you to make it rational, a dead absolute which needs you to make it live and interesting, would be no absolute at all. So Spinoza begins his great treatise with admirable humility by defining God as the being who defines himself; who, just because he is all-perfect, needs no explainer, being fully competent to explain himself. God asks for no champions; wants no apologist; seeks for no witnesses. If he did, he would not be God. But Spinoza went too far.

Among those whom I am now addressing there are many who might be called, without extravagance, the champions of God. They have taken upon themselves vows which justify me in so describing them. The world recognizes them in that character, and with a certain "high humility" they so recognize themselves. It is pretty plain therefore that the God whom you serve is not the Absolute in the strict sense of the term. If he were, he would

<sup>1</sup>An address delivered before the Provincial Assembly of Non-subscribing Ministers of Lancashire and Cheshire, England.

not need your championship, and your occupation would be gone. An Absolute who needs nothing cannot need *you*.

Let us apply this to the question of absolute certainty. What do we mean by the words? An absolute certainty, if it is strictly absolute, will be insusceptible of further attestation. The process of verifying it is complete. Being complete, all further witness on its behalf is a work of supererogation. Being absolute it has passed the point where doubt can assail the truth. Being perfect it has got rid of all the germs which would lead to its disappearance or decay. Nothing that you can do, nothing that you can say, will make it more certain than it is; for a truth which is in danger of perishing or capable of becoming yet more certain cannot be absolutely certain.

Why, then, do you propose to enter your pulpits next Sunday for the purpose of bearing further witness on behalf of your faith? You may answer, "Unless I were absolutely certain of my faith I should not bear witness to it." Granted. But if *it* were absolutely certain, everybody else would be in the same condition as you are, and your office next Sunday would be a mere mission to the converted.

I infer, therefore, that the truths to which you are all bearing witness are not absolute certainties in the strict sense of the term. Risks still attend them which it is your office to meet. Doubts assail them which it is your office to ward off. They lack something of their full manifestation and convincingness, which it is your office to make good. And you love these truths for that very reason, though not for that reason alone. Just as a mother's love for her child is partly rooted in the knowledge that the child needs her for its sustenance and for its development into a full-grown man, so your love for these highest truths, your very devotion to them, is partly rooted in your knowledge that they need you for their witness, and without you cannot be made perfect. And just as there is no more tragic moment in a mother's life than that when she realizes that her first-born needs her no longer, so it would be a tragic moment in your life if truth declared itself independent of your testimony.

However widely our views of truth may differ in detail, on one point at all events we are likely to be agreed. Truth in its total-



ity is not a fixed quantity but a growing organism. It is always passing on into a future which is richer and fuller than the past. Not all parts of the kingdom of truth grow at an equal rate. Some portions are relatively stable, others are relatively fluid. Thinking of the whole kingdom as a circle, we might say that the centre is occupied by the mathematical sciences; next to these come the sciences of nature; from them you pass to the science of man, until at last you reach the highest and subtlest form of truth, which is the science of God. Here you reach the very growing point of truth. The theologian stands at that point. He, less than any other, is entitled to treat the truth as something which lies neatly packed within the four rigid corners of any formula. He more than any other must be careful to state the truth, in forms which admit of further development. He must leave the way open for the more which is yet to come. If he fails to do so, he will deprive truth of the chief interest it has at the point where he handles it. And for that reason he must beware how he affixes the word "absolute" to the certainty which he seeks, or professes. A certainty whose very nature is to grow ever more certain, a certainty which needs him to aid in its enrichment, cannot be called absolute, unless the term is used in a purely subjective sense.

Now it cannot be denied that plenty of certainties exist which it is practically impossible for any human mind to doubt. I say practically, and by that I mean that nobody could act upon the doubts he might choose to profess. If he had to do so, he would be destroyed, and his destruction would be an element in the proof that he was wrong. But theoretical doubt is always possible. There is no truth either of science or common sense which cannot be theoretically placed in question by a person who is determined to question it. Many so-called unquestionable truths owe their air of finality to the fact that nobody, or scarcely anybody, does question them. But granted the will to raise questions, and there is not an axiom of logic or of science which might not be put upon its trial. Absolute in the sense of being forever exempt from the possibility of cavil none of them are or ever can be. "Two and two make four," you say. To which the caviller replies, "Two drops of water added to two drops of water do not make four

drops, but one drop four times as big as each of the constituents." "The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," you say. "There is no such thing as a triangle," answers the caviller, "there is only this triangle or that triangle, and if you put this or that triangle under a microscope, you will find inequalities in its angles which invalidate your conclusion." And in general it requires no great ingenuity to show that the alleged absolute certainties of mathematics are artificial. They assume the constitution of the human mind to begin with, and you have only to suggest that other minds may be differently constituted and the absoluteness of mathematical truth vanishes. Mathematics is like a game played according to certain rules or conventions. These rules or conventions—conventions as to the nature of space and the nature of number—can always be called in question by anyone who has a mind to do so; and when questioned all the results which follow from obeying them are seen to be hypothetical. Now such questioning is perfectly safe so long as it leads to nothing but argument. But act upon your doubts, and swift repentance will follow.

Or take what one may call the primal certainty of life. I mean the belief a man has in his own identity. There is nothing of which I am so sure as I am of my personal identity, and yet there is nothing I am less able to prove if challenged for a proof. There is nothing, moreover, about which I could raise so many doubts myself, were I determined to raise them. How, for instance, can I make it absolutely certain that I, who am delivering this lecture, am identically the same person as he who received the invitation to deliver it three months ago? I may be under an illusion. I may have been dreaming. An evil spirit may have deluded me. Perhaps I am the wrong man. "But no," you reply, "the committee who invited you are here to testify that you are the man they invited. And the audience is here to support their testimony." I answer, How do I know that the committee are not the wrong men? Before their testimony can make me absolutely sure of my identity, they must be absolutely sure of their own. Perhaps the committee is under an illusion. Perhaps the audience is composed of people who are not the people they think they are. Whatever reason I have for doubting my own

identity, they have equal reasons for doubting theirs; and either party must beg the whole question before it can accept the testimony of the other. How then can we make sure that we are not all in Bedlam together? We cannot make it sure by any manner of means. But why? The answer is simple,—we cannot make it sure, simply because it is sure already. No one who was really and utterly in Bedlam would ever raise the question whether he was there or not. Be that as it may, the instance is interesting because it shows how much easier it is to raise doubts concerning our primal certainties than to give proofs of them. Provided you *choose* to raise them, provided you are determined to raise them, the scope for doubt is simply limitless. But what difference do the doubts make to our certainty? Not one iota. Our inability to solve the conundrums I have just suggested leaves our belief in identity untouched. Nay, I go further. Were some heaven-born philosopher to appear on the instant and present us with an irrefragable proof that we are the men we think ourselves to be, we should tell that philosopher that he had brought coals to Newcastle, we should be unmoved by his logic, we should go away not one whit surer of our personal identity than we were before the proof was offered. Possibly the proof might work in the opposite direction. Our belief in our personal identity, we might feel, loses something of its security by being made to rest on an argument. The argument may be good, but on the whole we prefer the grounds on which we believed before the argument was given. I am reminded of a saying attributed to Samuel Greg. He could always believe, he said, in the immortality of the soul, except when he was listening to arguments in defence of it. And I imagine there are quite a number of important beliefs which are all the more secure when we refrain from defending them. In the intimacy of personal relationships we entertain beliefs concerning the character and fidelity of those we love which certainly would gain nothing by being made the subject of an argument. They are rooted in the silence, and would actually lose something of their cogency if we tried to justify them before the public. We resent the notion of putting them to the test of argument, rightly feeling that such a proposal is itself an act of treachery.

We are now in a position to give a summary answer to the question with which we began: Where is absolute certainty to be found? The answer is, Nowhere. And the answer may be given with entire lightness of heart. There is no need to make a long face over it, as though some cherished ideal were being abandoned. Absolute certainty is, for beings constituted as we are, simply a meaningless phrase,—a phrase which expresses no human ideal, which represents nothing we cherish and nothing that we suffer by giving up. A truth so certain as to stand in need of no further witness; a truth so accurately stated that a finer accuracy is unattainable; a truth so utterly proved that no ingenuity of man can raise a doubt against it; a truth so indubitable as to defeat the perverseness which is determined to question it; a truth so rich that a fuller enrichment is impossible; a truth so self-sufficient as to call for no champions, no defenders, no prophets, apostles, and martyrs,—truth absolute in that sense never has had and never can have the slightest interest for any human being. Were truth of that kind to arrive upon the earth, the mind of man would simply be put out of commission, and the curtain would fall irrevocably on the drama of human life. The one instance in which we seem to have attained this absolute certainty—the science of measurement and number—is not a real exception. We attain finality in these sciences only because we agree in advance to discount everything which would prevent our doing so. That is the rule of the game. But the rule is not applicable to any concrete reality of human life and is wholly impossible in all reasoning on the things of the spirit. When the geometrician informs us that the triangle whose properties he has proved to be such and such, is not any actual triangle as drawn by a human hand, but an abstract triangle drawn by the pure intelligence, his statement is at once accepted as in harmony with the rules of the game. But what should we say to a philosopher or theologian who should tell us that the man whom he has proved to be immortal and free, is not any concrete Smith, Brown, or Robinson, but an abstract man, who is neither Smith nor Brown nor Robinson, nor anybody else in particular? We should reply at once that he has answered a question in which we have no interest, and failed to answer the question we origi-

nally asked. We should say that whether or no there be such a thing as an abstract triangle, there is certainly no such being as an abstract man. Nor should we be greatly reassured if this philosopher were to reply that by proving man in the abstract to be immortal, he had proved man in the concrete to be not far short of immortality, not far short of free, not far short of a child of God. This, we should say, is nonsense. In short, may we not say, without further laboring the point, that certainties so established have no application in the field with which we are here concerned. The process of making them absolute, the process of abstraction, has the unfortunate effect of making them worthless. We let them go therefore without a sigh. We are abandoning no ideal. We are declaring no skepticism. We are merely arming ourselves against the disastrous mistake made by the hunters of the snark, who, you may remember, set out on their famous enterprise without first inquiring whether there was a snark to hunt, only to find in the end that the animal they had made such elaborate preparations to catch was not a snark but a boojum.

And now let me call your attention to a paradox which rears its head in a very sudden and startling fashion at the present point of the discussion. If there are in this audience, as surely there must be, persons with a turn for dialectics, they will have perceived this paradox and be ready to use it as a means of convicting me out of my own mouth. The paradox is this. In my efforts to get rid of this bogey—I will not call it an ideal—of absolute certainty, I seem oddly enough to have stumbled by accident and in spite of myself on something which upon the face of it looks as though it were absolutely certain. Have I not committed myself, with perhaps an excessive air of dogmatism, to certain unequivocal propositions concerning the nature of truth? Have I not said that the nature of truth is such that it stands in need of a perpetual witness? Have I not said that truth lives in the living witness which is borne; that no truth can be considered absolutely certain so long as it can be made more certain, or even more illustrious, by the testimony of your life or mine? Yes, I have said all this; and because it happens to be the basis of my convictions, and because also

I have learned not to be afraid of dialectical traps, I desire to say it again and to say it with all the emphasis I can command. I repeat, then, that truth in its essence is not a theorem but a Cause; a cause forever sacred, and forever incompletely victorious; forever needing such service as I can render, and for that very reason far dearer than if it were independent of me. I go further. In thus defining truth I am introducing a whole philosophy of life. Who and what is man? He is a witness to the truth. Bearing testimony sums up the end, the fundamental business, of his life. For this cause he came into the world. I speak to many who have taken upon them the office of minister of the Word. The Word needs your ministrations to complete its work; otherwise you would not be what you are. But in being what you are you have only made explicit what is implicit in the office of every man. All ages, all races, are involved in the task of bearing witness. History in its manifold and endless phases, whatever is tragic, whatever is victorious, whatever is fiercely combative, or calmly expectant, or submissively resigned in the chequered life of the ages—the truth needs it all as testimony, and needs ever more to the end of time. Great is the company of the preachers. All nature is involved; the whole universe is confederate. So that you who have vowed yourselves to the service of Truth have grappled to the central purpose of the world; you have hitched your wagon to the stars; you are marching in step with the cosmic forces; the ark of the testimony goes before you; and there is not a flower by the wayside, nor a bird singing among the branches, but wishes you god-speed as you pass.

Well, here are statements enough—enough and perhaps to spare. Are they absolutely certain? If they are, what becomes of my consistency? If they are not, what is the use of making them?

I do not pretend that any one of these statements is absolutely certain. If it were so, it would not require me to advocate its truth on the present occasion. That a measure of certainty has still to be made good is implied in the very fact of my taking all this trouble to win your assent to what I have to say.

But vary your question a little and see what a different answer

you will get. Ask me not what the truths are in themselves, certain or uncertain, but what my state of mind is regarding them. Am I absolutely certain that I am speaking the truth? Yes, I am. Like many another man who has made bold assertions, and subsequently been found in error, I take my risk. But I could not take it with more willingness, nor with less hesitation. In that sense, and in that sense only, can I claim to be absolutely certain.

Will you forgive me if for a brief moment I indulge in a chapter of what I venture to call my philosophical biography? My only excuse for doing this is that I know of no other way of illustrating the obscure statement which has just been made.

Long ago it was borne in upon me by a series of painful experiences that the Author of my being was bent upon compelling me to face a certain intellectual risk, or rather risks, for there were many of them. I did not understand at the time that this was a most beneficent arrangement. I thought it was unkindly done and tried to escape from it. But by no manner of means could I succeed. Do what I would to find a position of absolute safety, I was continually haunted by the sense of my own fallibility, so that whenever I found a position that seemed to be safe, the thought instantly occurred that perhaps I had made a mistake. In this distress I had recourse to the various infallible systems which had come into existence for the express purpose of relieving distress such as mine and which continue to exist by the support of people in my then condition. But I soon found that the authors of these systems were almost as fallible as I was myself. It was the old difficulty of trying to prove your personal identity by the witness of people whose identity is just as much in question as your own. So that had to be given up. Then somebody advised me to trust my own reason and look to that for guidance, assuring me that I should thus reduce my risks to a minimum. This, like most young men, I was very willing to do, and I well remember the self-satisfaction with which I entered on the undertaking. But the self-satisfaction was of short duration. A wholly unexpected difficulty presented itself. I soon found out that the thing I trusted, and took for my reason, was very frequently nothing of the sort. In the name of reason I

began making the most foolish, the most childish mistakes. "Reason no doubt is a very good guide," I said to myself, "provided you know when you are reasonable. But this is precisely what nobody knows. Such is the frailty of man that many a one who thinks he is trusting to reason, is in reality on the point of becoming insane." And, looking round, I saw a multitude of men who in the name of reason were doing the maddest things under the sun. So thus, instead of minimizing my risks, I found I had increased them to a maximum: that also had to be given up.

Next I turned my attention to various philosophers. I understood them all fairly well but liked some of them far better than others. At last I found one who seemed to me to have the root of the matter within him. And so I still think he had; but he was unfortunately obsessed by the passion for absolute certainty, and in order to gratify it he ran out his thought into a perfect knife-edge of dialectical subtlety so fine that the least error in the understanding or even in the emphasis of a single word was attended with the most appalling consequences. If that philosopher had been more modest, or less ambitious, I should have remained his disciple to this day. But as it was he caused me to feel that the fate of the universe hung upon a breath; his certainties became synonyms for everything that was most precarious; and at last I literally ran away from him after a frightful fit of panic, caused by trying to balance myself on the knife-edge of his dialectic.

At this point things began to grow very black all round me. Universal skepticism was not far off, and began to beckon me on with a promise of freedom from every kind of intellectual risk. Nor was I long in yielding to the promise. But in all my life I was never less sure of anything than I was of my universal skepticism. I soon realized that of all my experiments this was quite the most disastrous. As I groped about in the confusion it seemed to me that instead of escaping danger I had found my way into the breeding-place of all the risks before which human spirits cower and quail. The very air was tainted—tainted with the spirit of cowardice; for the place was crowded with people who, like myself, had run away from the risks of life. We were



all cowards there; there was not a man among us who was not secretly ashamed of himself, so that I verily believe a more feeble or miserable crew was nowhere to be found under the wide compass of the heavens. Nevertheless, on looking back, I am glad to have been there. I learned some lessons that have served me well. I learned, for example, that this world is so arranged that skulkers always get the worst of it—I got the worst of it myself. I learned that running away from one's risks is precisely the way to encounter them in their most overwhelming form. I saw what an essentially ignoble thing the cult of safety is. I saw that its devotees are of all men the least secure and the most unhappy. I saw that I must face my risk once and for all, if I would be a man.

The rest can be briefly told. Bitter experience had taught me that the quest for absolute safety—which is the same thing as the quest for absolute certainty—is the most surely self-defeating of all human enterprises. I saw that the will of man, as well as his intellect, is involved in this affair; that there is a will to doubt as well as a will to believe; and it became very plain to me that many of the doubts which are most ventilated have their origin in nothing better than a love of argument and a desire to prove other people in the wrong; and that many notable skeptics, with a great reputation for impartiality, have deliberately manufactured the whole body of their unbelief.

Such were my conclusions. But I am far from professing that they were absolutely certain, or that they are so now. There is not one of them for which I would not welcome further evidence, and I hope to continue the search for it as long as I live. But though I am not absolutely certain of these things, I am more certain of them than I am of anything else. Life is a choice among difficulties. We have to stake our existence on something. Let us be content therefore to choose the risk which has the better reasons on its side. I say "the better" reasons, and these are seldom the most numerous, and they are never the most plausible. If you go on the principle of merely counting heads you will always find that doubts are in the majority. But it doesn't follow that they ought to rule. Perhaps they are there to be ruled. At all events we shall do well to allow a certain

principle of aristocracy to guide us in this critical choice. Let us choose our risk in terms of quality rather than number. Perhaps the biggest risk of all is precisely that one which it most becomes our manhood to choose. Better be wrong with the eagles than right with the owls. Better the real danger of the mountain heights than the spurious safety of a hole in the rocks. Better far the tragedy of the cross or the hemlock-cup than the slow putrefaction of a soul which has surrendered the noblest of human rights,—the right to purifying pain, the right to suffer for the cause! If fall we must, let us fall with the loyal. Absolutely certain? No! But tell me, if you can, of anything that is more certain than this.

The world has never fully made up its mind as to what it expects of philosophers. I have often thought that one reason why philosophers have not done more for mankind is that mankind has never clearly stated what it wishes the philosophers to do. Philosophy after all is a social function. Philosophers exist not merely by the toleration but by the connivance of society. Their office, like that of the doctors, the lawyers, and the statesmen, corresponds to the demand for some sort of service; the difference being that while the demands on the others are perfectly definite, no one seems to know exactly what this particular function is. No profession suffers so much from the vagueness of the demands that are made upon it. It is as though a patient came to a doctor and said: "Something serious is the matter with me, but I don't know what. There is a pain somewhere, but I cannot tell you whether it is in the head, the heart, the foot, or the hand. I cannot describe my symptoms. Nevertheless I expect you to discover the disease and to provide the remedy."

I am not here to plead for philosophers. I will only suggest that some of their more serious failings are due to the constant vagueness and the occasional absurdity of the demands which the public make upon them. Not knowing exactly what society expects them to do, they are only too ready to take any hint, no matter how unenlightened the source may be from which the hint proceeds. Thus many of them have embarked on the quest for absolute certainty simply because absolute certainty is what

a thoughtless section of the public asked for. Another demand, equally thoughtless but somewhat more pathetic, comes from that bewildered class in the community who, at the present day, are crying out for positive construction. Yielding to this there are some philosophers who have deliberately set themselves the task of constructing the truth. Some have even gone the length of what they call "constructing experience." You might as well try to construct a living soul. I cannot repress a suspicion that these philosophers, among whom are to be found some of the greatest intellects, have been taken in. They have not paused to reflect that the very persons who are crying out for construction will be the first to knock the constructions to pieces. They always have done so, they always will. We are making a very great mistake if we suppose that the will to doubt will ever be appeased by feeding it with constructions. I have had some experience with these would-be constructive thinkers, and my impression is that they are the most rapidly disillusioned class among all those who are now handling the things of the spirit. They are fighting their battles on ground which has been chosen for them by the enemy.

The chief service which philosophy can render seems to me of another kind. Unfortunately the service is one of which few of us perceive we have need; and even when the need is revealed to us, we are none too anxious to confess it. We are all the victims of many illusions, and the best philosopher, if I am not mistaken, is precisely he who helps us to get rid of them. Philosophy is not the process of teaching the blind to see; still less does it make eyes to see with. Its function is rather to push aside the veils and tear off the bandages and destroy the unnecessary spectacles with which we obscure and distort our own vision. In setting out to explain the universe, I think philosophy has been too ambitious. A more modest programme would be more successful: that, for example, of teaching us so to think as not to prevent the universe explaining itself. The universe is not as dependent on us for its elucidation as we are apt to think. If we were a little less eager to tell the universe what we think about it, and a little more willing to hear what the universe thinks about us; if we would admit, occasionally at all events, that there are some things in the uni-

verse that can not only take care of themselves, but take care of us as well, I think we should all learn more in the long run and come out better philosophers in the end.

There are many voices in the world; and the voice of man is only one of them. There are many voices in each of us; the voice of our argumentative faculty is only one of them. All these voices claim attention; all are worth hearing; all have something important to say. None of them can claim an exclusive right to declare the truth. The witness which truth requires is in the harmony of them all. But our philosophy has been too much of a monologue; the logician has silenced the other speakers and done all the talking himself. But there is nothing the head can say which does not evoke an answer from the heart. To every thought which the thinker utters concerning life, life replies by a reaction, by a comment; and the answering comment thus provoked is fully as significant, nay, often vastly more significant, than the thought which provoked it. The universe is apt at repartee, especially when a philosopher is talking. A true philosophy would recognize this. It would give all voices a hearing. It would let the universe have its say. It would become a dialogue. History and metaphysics would converse across the table. Concrete life and abstract thought would talk to one another. Logician, poet, man of action; the head, the heart, and the hand; the reason, the imagination, and the will,—all these would speak, and each would be as eager to hear the other as he was to utter himself. What a running commentary on life such conversations would be! How much richer than the monologues in which we now indulge! It is thus, perhaps, that angels and purified spirits philosophize, and such things may never be in this world of vain contentions and loud disputes. Yet, even here and now, those other voices cannot be utterly silenced. They do answer. They do compel us to listen. We work ourselves to the fever heat of eloquence and are on the point of clinching our argument, when suddenly another voice breaks in. "Be still," it says, "be still and know that I am God."

*TWO FORGOTTEN CREEDS*

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For the modern theologian there is an all-encompassing bond of perfectness in the New Testament in the doctrine of the Logos, found in the Johannine gospel and epistles. It links together the christology of the Synoptic writings, Mark, Matthew, Luke-Acts, and that of the epistles. It combines the primitive doctrine of Jesus the faithful "Servant" of God, glorified and exalted to God's right hand—a doctrine of "apotheosis," as Baur called it—with the Pauline doctrine of "incarnation,"—Christ a pre-existent being, agent of creation, in the form and likeness of God, but self-emptied and abased, made for a little while lower than the angels, that for the suffering of death he might be made eternally higher than they, heir and lord of the creation. In the one—the Petrine christology, as we may call it because it is mainly represented in the speeches of Peter in Acts 2-5—the residence in heaven is an episode. God has taken up his faithful Servant for a short interval to his own right hand, delivering him out of the power of death, that, when his people have repented of their wicked rejection of him, he may send him again as the Christ, to restore the kingdom to Israel and reign forever on the throne of David in the renewed and glorified Jerusalem. In the other christology—the Pauline—the residence on earth is the episode. The drama's beginning and ending is in heaven. Viewed thus "under the aspect of the eternal" the brief period of abasement, poverty, and suffering, undertaken for the "reconciliation" of the animate world, is scarcely a moment of time. For our sakes the eternal Son of God "became poor," he emptied himself and took upon him the form of a slave, and became obedient unto death, yea, even the (slave's) death of the cross; but therefore also "God highly exalted him and gave him the Name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."

Here, combined already by Paul, are two doctrines of the sonship of Jesus literally as wide apart as heaven and earth. The one had been propagated on Hebrew soil, where the Messianic hope had been gradually transcendentalized until the Redeemer of Israel could only be conceived as operating from "the clouds of heaven." The other had been propagated on Hellenistic soil, where doctrines of the descent, conflict, and ascent of redeemer-gods (*avatar*-doctrines) furnished the moulds of thought, as having long been the most vital element of popular religion.

Centuries of perpetual adjustment and adaptation have veiled for us the difficulties of harmonizing these two opposite modes of religious thinking. Having been taught the creeds of Christendom from our childhood, we think it nothing strange that our religion should have this double ancestry, and throughout its history should have found the chief task among all its doctrinal debates to be the work of so defining its doctrine of Jesus as Lord as to lose no atom of value from either its Hebrew or its Hellenistic inheritance. But time was when the amalgamation was still a problem. Beyond all other factors in the adjustment wherein the church ultimately rested was the Johannine element, an adaptation to their problem of the logos-doctrine of Heraclitus and the Stoics. A full generation after the death of Paul there appeared at Ephesus, birthplace of Heraclitus and chief seat of the mission work of Paul, a gospel which reinterpreted the story of Jesus as it had become current through the Synoptic writers. Everywhere the new gospel was recognized as "the spiritual gospel," because it presented the story of Jesus in its theological significance. At the beginning it supplied that Pauline doctrine of pre-existence so conspicuously lacking in its predecessors. Indeed, it exhibited the entire life of Jesus, including his death and resurrection, as a "manifestation of the glory" of the incarnate Logos, enlightening and "reconciling" the world. The gospel story no longer appeared merely that of a man who from time to time in his earthly career, and ultimately in his resurrection, had been "glorified." The transfiguration extended throughout.

In view of its late appearance, and the fact that it does not seem to have been originally put forth under any apostolic authority, the march of the Fourth Gospel and its accompanying epistles

toward general acceptance in the church must be deemed rapid. Opposition was made at Rome, and lasted well into the third century; but this opposition assailed the Ephesian canon as a whole, being particularly directed at the Book of Revelation. It arose through dislike of the doctrine of Montanus and his followers, who had brought with them from Phrygia these "Johannine" writings and rested on them. The obnoxious feature accordingly was not the *logos*-doctrine of the gospel, but the millenarian doctrine of Revelation, which is not really akin to the gospel and epistles. For this reason we hear much less of the opposition to these. With the exclusion of the Montanists and the very general discrediting of Revelation, opposition to the gospel soon faded out. "Johannine" christology became the generally received orthodoxy of the church Catholic, as indeed the doctrine of the *logos* in somewhat different forms had already found acceptance in Ignatius (A.D. 115) and Justin (153), though without appeal to "John." In these two writers, both intimately connected with Ephesus, it is just possible (in Ignatius scarcely possible) to make out traces of acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel. But both, while the authority to which they appeal is drawn from Synoptic tradition, yet have a doctrine of the *logos* kindred to that of the Johannine writings. Justin's form of the doctrine may even be said to be modelled after it. Here is the great and significant difference between the last quarter of the second century and the earlier time. It is not that there is no *logos*-doctrine in the earlier (Paul himself has a pronounced doctrine of the *logos*, though he avoids the word), but that after A.D. 175 the doctrine begins to be "Johannine" and to appeal to the Fourth Gospel as authority. When we come to Irenaeus (185-200), the battle for Johannine christology is already almost won. Now the authority of the Apostle John is directly invoked in its favor. Irenaeus, indeed, still inveighs against "those wretched men" (anti-montanists) who in their dislike of "the gift of the Spirit" recently poured out (in Phrygia) "reject that aspect of evangelic truth presented by John's gospel, setting aside both the gospel and the prophetic Spirit" (in the book of Revelation). But the opponents of the Ephesian scriptures were fighting against fate. Already the canon of four gospels which Irenaeus advocates had been generally

adopted in Syria (Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch), and Irenaeus himself was quite in harmony with the prevailing disposition of the church. Men were ready to welcome the Fourth Gospel as at least on a par with its predecessors. For the orthodox mind of the second century it met a long-felt want. Gentile thinkers, trained in the school of Paul but unable to find in the older gospels adequate anchorage for their doctrines of pre-existence and incarnation, felt that at last the story of Jesus had been adequately presented. Clement of Alexandria expresses the mind of the age in asserting that John had read the work of his predecessors and had approved it as correctly relating "the external things," but wrote his own gospel at the solicitation of friends (an inference from Jn. 21<sup>24</sup>) to present the spiritual significance of the matter.

How interesting, then, it would be, might we but bring again to life some unsophisticated Christian of Rome of the period before the doctrine of the logos had made its way thither, and draw out his christological ideas! There is the letter of Clement, written to the Corinthians on behalf of the church in Rome, about A.D. 95. Clement knows the letters of Paul and quotes them. He refers specifically to that which the Apostle had written to the Corinthians (our First Corinthians; Second Corinthians is not mentioned). With the anonymous Epistle to the Hebrews he shows himself very familiar. He has traces of acquaintance with First Peter and James, though they are not referred to under any names. He also in two passages quotes at some length words of Jesus. The first quotation corresponds to Mt. 5 7, 6 14, 7 1, 2 and Lk. 6 31, 36-38; the second corresponds to Mt. 26 24, 18 6 and Lk. 22 22, 17 1, 2. Neither quotation employs the terms of either of our gospels. Both are introduced with the formula, "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus." Beyond this Clement is scarcely affected by any New Testament writing. "Scripture" to him, as to the New Testament writers, is still simply "the Law and the Prophets"—with considerable latitude as regards canonicity. Clement recalls, and expects his readers to recall, "the good Apostles Peter and Paul," who after many labors and sufferings had "gone to their appointed place of glory." He repeats in one or two passages expressions which remind us of Paul's



doctrine of pre-existence. He tells us (42 1) that "Jesus Christ was sent forth from God." In particular he adopts the phraseology of Hebrews 1 3-5, 7, 13 in speaking of Jesus (ch. 36) as the adopted Son of God, a mirror of the Father. In short, catholicity is almost his distinctive trait. But Clement is too strictly dependent for his religious ideas<sup>1</sup> on training of Jewish type, to show any trace of real sympathy with Hellenistic doctrines of redemption. One may question whether even his reverence for Paul makes him actually share the doctrine of his christological authority with regard to the self-abasement (kenosis) of Christ Jesus, though he seems to echo Paul's thought in referring to Christ (ch. 16) as "the sceptre of God" who "came not in the pomp of arrogance or of pride, *though he might have done so*, but in lowliness of mind, according as the Holy Spirit spake concerning him," quoting thereupon Is. 53 1-12. In reality Clement's fundamental conception of Christ is identical with that which forms the small distinctive element of First Peter. There are even many passages where he unmistakably rests upon this epistle, though his conception of Jesus as the suffering "Servant" of Deutero-Isaiah cannot be solely derived from it. This conception is fragmentarily traceable in nearly all the New Testament writings, though in none does it form the distinctive note save in documents which directly or indirectly put forward the name of Peter. Luke-Acts has a special application of it; First Peter mingles it with its copious borrowings from Paul; Clement makes it predominant. Elsewhere it comes to the surface only in a few ritual prayers and other incorporated early material distinguished by a peculiar employment of the Isaian messianic title, the "*Servant*" (*παῖς*) of God. We naturally expect no traces in Clement of the Johannine doctrine of the logos. As already stated, it is not even clear that he fully entered into the doctrine of pre-existence which he found in Paul and Hebrews.

With greater reason we might expect to find in Clement's christology some trace at least of the primitive "Adoptionism"

<sup>1</sup> Harnack (Sitzungsberichte of the Berlin Academy, 1909) takes exception to the general critical judgment which pronounces Clement a Jew. Harnack, however, would not deny that his religious ideas show in marked degree their Jewish schooling.

which characterizes our Gospel of Mark. This gospel represents the earliest known attempt to outline the career of Jesus. It is so early that although many allusions exist to further evangelic material, scarcely any of it has survived save that here included. When our first and third gospels were written (90-100), scarcely anything else of a *narrative* character was deemed worthy of admission. The Gospel of Mark, we should infer, was a writing of extraordinary influence and authority, and ancient tradition and modern criticism concur in assigning its origin to Rome, not far from A.D. 75. Now the anecdotes of Mark are put together in the supreme interest of the evangelist's christology. The purpose, from the story of the baptism with the voice from heaven to the testimony of the centurion at the foot of the cross, and of the angels at the empty tomb, is to prove Jesus to be the Son of God. For this the words and deeds of Jesus are related, especially the wonders wrought by him, and the voices and signs from heaven at the beginning, middle, and end of his ministry. But Mark's picture of "Jesus the Son of God," while unavoidably embodying certain traits of the portrait of the suffering Servant, makes a radical alteration of the type. Not "the meekness and lowliness of Christ" are the predominant traits, but a "demonstration of the Spirit and of power."

To Paul, as doubtless to other evangelizing "apostles" of the new faith, the phenomena of the Spirit, miracles, "prophecy," "tongues," had been the proof that Jesus *after his exaltation* was endowed with "the powers of the age to come." They were the ocular proof to hearers of the gospel message that he had ascended to the right hand of God, from whence he was "pouring forth" the Spirit. The "gifts" and miracles were a guarantee to believers of their inheritance "reserved in heaven" for a new age about to dawn. Neither Paul, nor Hebrews, nor First Peter suggests in any way any occurrence of them before Jesus had been glorified. On the contrary, "he was crucified through weakness." Mortality, suffering, subjection to the common lot of those "born of women," are the features emphasized in his earthly career. In Mark's collection of anecdotes the "gifts" and "powers" are carried back into the hitherto neglected period of Jesus' earthly career. The reader now learns—for the first time, so far

as we are informed—that Jesus was not first “declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead” (Rom. 1 3), but that he was so declared from the moment when the Baptist (the promised Elias) anointed him, and “the Spirit” with all its gifts of revelation and power descended “into” him. At that moment a “voice from heaven” declared his true character. The manifestation, as Mark further relates, had been repeated and emphasized in the presence of three intimate disciples immediately after Jesus’ declaration that as the Christ he must suffer the death of the cross, and pains are taken to explain how the story had failed to become current until “after the Son of Man was risen from the dead.” In fact, the most brilliant characterization of the Gospel of Mark which has appeared in our generation finds its distinctive editorial characteristic to be just here. The evangelist has introduced a supernatural Being upon the stage; he finds himself continually obliged to explain how this could be and yet produce so slight effect even on the disciples; and he meets the difficulty by an adaptation of Paul’s doctrine of the hardening of Israel.<sup>2</sup> Jesus purposely “concealed” his messiahship.

The appearance of the Gospel of Mark could make nothing less than an epoch in the history of christology. It is not likely to have been the only, or even the first, attempt to prove Jesus the Son of God from the events of his earthly career; but it was at any rate so much the most important that it practically superseded all others. But from Mark alone it is impossible to derive any doctrine of the person of Christ which transcends “adoptionism.” As Wellhausen says: “In Mark Jesus descends into the Jordan a simple man. He comes up out of it the Son of God.” “The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ” in this gospel parallels the beginning of the Christian life of every believer. Normally, the convert’s experience is expressed in the phrase, “And when they were baptized, the Spirit fell upon them and they spake with tongues and prophesied” (Acts 10 44 ff., 19 5 ff.). To Paul life under control of the Spirit had been the proof of “adoption” (Rom. 8 14). It was natural that Mark should conceive the sonship of Jesus in similar terms. But Paul had also

<sup>2</sup> With Mk. 4 11 f. compare Rom. 11 8.

a doctrine of a pre-existent Christ, a doctrine which he nowhere brings into express relation to the primitive christology of exaltation of the "Servant" (Is. 52 13, Ps. 110 1), and this finds no expression whatever in Mark. That Jesus had been exalted to "the right hand of God" far above all angels, principalities, and powers was matter of common belief. That was implied in the common confession of Jesus as Lord. The distinctively Pauline doctrine, which finds no place even in the later Synoptic literature, though adopted in Hebrews and First Peter, is the identification of the glorified Christ with the pre-existent Spirit. To Paul "the Lord is the Spirit" (2 Cor. 3 17), through whom, as the divine Wisdom, the world was created, and by whom "all things consist." The creation of the world was to him in so real a sense the act of Christ that those who "have Christ's mind" are thereby admitted to the secret (*μυστήριον*) of the cosmos, in a manner which no mere cosmological speculation can rival (1 Cor. 2 6-16, 8 6). As Christ was manifest in the creative Wisdom of God, the agent and "artificer" of the universe according to Hebrew philosophy, and the "effluence" from God that "holdeth all things together" (Wisd. 1 7, 7 21-8 1), so also he was manifest in the giving of the Torah, always to orthodox Judaism the supreme Wisdom (Dt. 4 6; compare, for instance, Ecclus. 24 23-29). Paul agrees with the author of Baruch (Bar. 3 9-4 1) that the words of Dt. 30 12, 13, on which he builds his own, "Say not, Who shall ascend into heaven? Who shall descend into the abyss? The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart," apply to the divine Wisdom-Spirit. He goes beyond Baruch and orthodox Judaism when he specifically identifies this redemptive Wisdom-Spirit with Christ (Rom. 10 6-9), and the "word" with "the word of faith which we preach."

This was the new point of Pauline christological doctrine, not that Jesus had been exalted far above all angels, principalities, and powers, but that "he that descended [into the lower parts of the earth] is *the same also* that afterward *ascended*" (Eph. 4 10). This, accordingly, is what Paul labors to prove from Scripture, as well as from the present testimony of the outpoured Spirit. We observe, then, that it is from the Pauline epistles and not from Synoptic tradition that our fourth evangelist derives

his conception of Jesus as having unbroken remembrance while on earth of "the glory which he had with the Father before the world was," and as able to tell "heavenly things," the things which he had "seen with his Father," as none but an incarnate heavenly being could (Jn. 3 12 f., 31 f., 17 5). Paul thought of Jesus as a being who, "though he was rich, yet for your sakes became poor," who "emptied himself" and took on him "the form of a slave," and yet in the "emptying" had not relinquished identity of consciousness. His "mind" still retained the consciousness of the creative purpose, his will was the same will which set the example of supreme self-abasement and obedience unto death (2 Cor. 8 9, Phil. 2 7 ff., 1 Cor. 2 11-16). To understand the New Testament, nothing is more vital than an appreciation of this amalgamation of Pauline with Synoptic christology as we see it ultimately accomplished in the Johannine writings. Our present purpose is to look at two relatively forgotten writings from the very midst of the transition.

There was small reluctance on the part of Paul's fellow-laborers in the faith to accept his "mystery of godliness," even though it did not profess to have been "received." The pre-existence of Jesus as the divine Wisdom-Spirit seemed to them a perfectly reasonable belief. But how and when the descent and incarnation of this Wisdom-Spirit had taken place Paul had omitted to state. Hence the incessant restatements regarding "the beginning of the gospel." To Mark, as we have said, the beginning was Jesus' *adoption* to sonship by the descent "into" him of the Spirit at his baptism, impelling him to his career. Jesus had experienced to the full what to believers is partial. In the language of an early uncanonical gospel, "The whole fountain of the Holy Ghost descended upon him." The obverse of this emphasis on the baptismal adoption in Mark is the omission of an important element of the primitive christology—the fact that Jesus had been "of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. 1 3, 9 5; compare Heb. 7 14, Clement of Rome 32 1). Mark not only omits the genealogy, but places in the mouth of Jesus an argument to prove that the basing of the claims of the Christ on his Davidic pedigree is a mere fallacy of "the scribes" (Mk. 12 35-37). With the author of Hebrews Mark holds that the office of the Christ is "without a genealogy."

The average modern Christian naturally reads the Gospel of Mark through several pairs of spectacles furnished by later evangelists and interpreters. Are they not all orthodox men, Christian men? And does it not follow that they all say the same? But ancient readers saw decided differences. Cerinthus and those who drew a distinction between the spiritual aeon Christ and the man Jesus, preferred this gospel, because (to their view) it represented that the man Jesus became at his baptism the "receptacle" of the Christ-Spirit, which again withdrew from him before the tragic end.<sup>3</sup> Conversely, orthodox evangelists hastened to amend its all too vulnerable "beginning." Matthew and Luke not only restore the genealogies establishing Jesus' descent from David, but present independently new narratives of his birth, to prove in forms the most emphatic the Jewish mind could conceive that Jesus had not become "the Son of God" at his baptism, but had been such from his mother's womb. But even this, as our fourth evangelist perceives, is far from satisfying the requirement of the Pauline doctrine. The "beginning" according to John is with the logos "in the bosom of the Father" before the foundation of the world.

The facts we cite indicate how great readjustments of thought would be sure to follow, and did follow, the appearance of our Gospel of Mark. Its doctrine of the sonship of Jesus was not a mere commonplace of the times. If Clement, writing his long epistle from the same community and only a score of years thereafter, shows no trace whatever of acquaintance with it, and presents a conception of Jesus modelled wholly after the pattern of the suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah and First Peter, we must lay it to predisposition and not to ignorance; for Mark cannot have been unknown to him. To some of Clement's contemporaries at Rome its christology must have come as the solution of a great problem. There is evidence that the Roman church was agitated over the questions raised by the opening chapters of Matthew about A.D. 119. Certainly it had then not yet been affected by the logos-doctrine of the Ephesian evangelist. Mark's gospel was to Clement far from new, but it surely stands for what was then advanced christology. Especially would it appeal to the

<sup>3</sup> Irenaeus, *Haer.* i, 30 13, iii, 117.

convert of gentile birth, harmonizing his ideas of the divine Lord, the Son of the living God, whom he had learned in the church to worship as redeemer and giver of eternal life, with the little he could learn from tradition regarding Jesus' earthly career. How instructive, then, if we could light upon the testimony of some primitive Roman Christian, a convert from paganism, forced as best he could to adjust to the doctrine of the church his ideas of the attainment of immortality through aid of redeemer-gods! How would he deal with Paul's "mystery" of Christ on the one side, and with Petrine tradition on the other?

Now in the things which we are saying the chief point is this. We have such a witness, a contemporary of Clement at Rome, one who refers to Clement by name as still charged with the particular duty of "sending to foreign cities" such writings as we know he had sent to Corinth, and that which our author hopes he will now put in circulation.<sup>4</sup>

Hermas, the Roman freedman, author of the primitive Christian allegory entitled *The Shepherd*, is better known to us in matters of personal character and history than almost any other Christian of his day. Much appears in the book itself. In addition we learn from the Muratorian Fragment (A.D. 185) that it was "written very recently [as compared with the apostolic writings], in our own times, in the city of Rome, during the bishopric of his brother Pius" (A.D. 138-154). The lateness of the date thus assigned is probably an exaggeration due to the fragmentist's strong disapproval of the canonical standing others were according to the book. The contents are quite too primitive to admit it. Obviously it would be irreconcilable with the mention of Clement as foreign secretary of the church, unless this reference were the subtle device of a forger, and the *Shepherd* is anything but subtle. Moreover, the heresies of Marcion (140) and Valentinus (145) have not yet appeared above the horizon. Finally, the remarkably strong position occupied by the book among the writings admitted to public reading in the church, in spite of its more than meagre literary pretensions, would be unaccountable after 140. The fragmentist, an opponent of the "Cataphrygian" (Montanist) heresy, is forced to protest against the *Shepherd* being "read

<sup>4</sup> Hermas, Vis. ii, 4.

in church to the people" as if it could be numbered "among the prophets" or the "writings of the apostles." Still, he does not treat the book with the severity of Tertullian. It is not to him "adulterous" or apocryphal. He thinks "it ought to be read" as edifying, though not as authoritative. The fragmentist accordingly, at about A.D. 185, stands at the parting of the ways. He has a double battle to fight. Hermas must be excluded; the Johannine writings must be included. But the support of the *Shepherd* could hardly have been so strong, had the book been as "recent" as its opponent declares. In A.D. 185 at Rome Hermas represented the old theology, John the new.

Hermas, then, may be regarded as a later contemporary of Clement. But what a difference! Clement's sixty-five chapters are occupied in about one-third their length by copious extracts from the Greek Old Testament, a Bible which he almost knows by heart, not only making its exposition the basis of all his own instruction but commending it to his readers as "oracles of God" which "cannot be broken" and must be "searched into" for all truth. Of the ideas of Hellenistic redemption-religions he shows no trace whatever. No wonder his conception of Christ is almost a transcript of the suffering "Servant" of Deutero-Isaiah. Hermas, in a writing of considerably more than twice the length, has but one "Scripture" quotation. It is not too long to cite in full: "'The Lord is nigh unto them that turn unto him,' as it is written in *Eldad and Modat*, who prophesied to the (chosen) people in the wilderness."<sup>5</sup> The contrast is not all to be accounted for by difference of subject. Hermas does indeed rely upon his "angel of prophecy" as the source of authority and edification rather than "the Scriptures" which are looked to by Clement. But while he knows something of their general story, and certainly would not have denied their authority, he has nothing of the control over them which to a teacher of Jewish training like Clement makes them the indispensable medium of both his thought and his expression. The contrast is that between a convert from Judaism and one who, like Ignatius, uses moulds of thought inherited from the pagan world.

<sup>5</sup> Hermas, Vis. ii, 3. *Eldad and Modat* was an apocryphal romance of which little is now known. Its characters were taken from Num. 11 27.



In respect to New Testament writings the contrast is far less marked, though mainly because Clement himself quotes so little from them. Hermas too has probably read Hebrews, though as compared with Clement his reflection of its phraseology is very slight. He has, however, a relatively large number of reflections of the so-called Epistle of James. Here and there he shows traces of acquaintance with the two epistles of Paul most used by Clement, First Corinthians and Ephesians, and also some with First Peter.

But these relations, while of value as showing the type of Christian thought prevalent at Rome at the beginning of the second century, are of subordinate interest. What most concerns us is to observe how the mind of Hermas is affected by the doctrine of Jesus as redeemer of the world; for such was the missionary proclamation of the new faith.

Hermas' employments of gospel material are too slight for the determination of literary dependence with precision. In most cases the utmost we can say is that he shows acquaintance with Synoptic tradition, passages recalling the phraseology of Matthew being, as usual, relatively frequent, with no certain trace of either Luke or John. On the other hand, if we ask by what influence his conception of Jesus as "Son of God" has been formed, the contrast with Clement is marked. For the first time outside the New Testament itself we come upon traces of the employment of our second gospel. Actual passages from Mark are not cited, but Hermas' doctrine of the person of Christ is hardly explicable without it. In particular his employment of the title "Son of God" seems to show Mark's influence, standing as it does in extraordinary contrast with Clement. The latter in all his long epistle has but one occurrence of the title, namely, that where (36 4) he briefly reproduces the argument of Heb. 1 5 ff. Equally striking is the total absence from Hermas of any mention of the names "Jesus" and "Christ," which occur forty-eight times in Clement.

We come thus after preliminaries which, if protracted, have not been without their definite purpose, to the particular phenomenon which justifies the title under which we write. Hermas' doctrine of "the Son of God" is emphatically a "creed outworn."

If any reader doubts the fact, we shall venture to class him with those who, if once familiar with this practical but somewhat prolix father, have not recently refreshed their memories, and who may therefore be willing to take a second look.

At the outset we encounter little that need seem strange in a church nourished upon the Pauline epistles. In the ninth Similitude the interpreting "Shepherd," who (be it observed) is not Christ but "the angel of repentance," explains the significance of Hermas' vision of the great tower founded on a rock in the midst of waters. It represents the church, the (new) chosen people, the stones which compose it being brought through the water (in baptism) and built into it by angels. Chapter 12 runs as follows:—

"First of all, sir," say I, "explain this to me. The rock and the gate,<sup>6</sup> what is it?" "This rock," saith he, "and gate, is the Son of God." "How, sir," say I, "is the rock ancient but the gate recent?" "Listen," saith he, "and understand, foolish man. The Son of God is older than all His creation, so that he became the Father's adviser in His creation. Therefore also he is ancient." "But the gate, why is it recent, sir?" say I. "Because," saith he, "he was manifested in the last days of the consummation: therefore the gate was made recent, that they which are to be saved may enter through it into the kingdom of God. Didst thou see," saith he, "that the stones which came through the gate have gone to the building of the tower, but those which came not through it were cast away again to their own place?" "I saw, sir," say I. "Thus," saith he, "no one shall enter into the kingdom of God, except he receive [in baptism] the name of his Son. . . . Didst thou see," saith he, "the multitude that is building the tower?" "I saw it, sir," say I. "They," saith he, "are all glorious angels. With these, then, the Lord is surrounded as a wall, but the gate is the Son of God; there is this one entrance only to the Lord. No one, then, shall enter in unto Him otherwise than through his Son. Didst thou see," saith he, "the six men, and the glorious and mighty man in the midst of them, him that walked about the tower and rejected the stones from the building?" "I saw him, sir," say I. "The glorious man," saith he, "is the Son of God, and those six are the glorious angels who guard him on the right hand and on the left.

<sup>6</sup> The doctrine of Christ as the gate (πύλη; not θύρα, "door") plays an important part in early Christian apologetic (cf. Hegesippus' account of the martyrdom of James in Euseb. H. E. ii, 23 s). The reference is to Ps. 118 20. "This is the gate of the Lord, the righteous shall enter in by it."

Of these glorious angels not one," saith he, "shall enter in unto God without him; whosoever shall not receive his name, shall not enter into the kingdom of God."

We are familiar from the Pauline epistles with the idea of Christ as the creative Wisdom of God, which in Pseudo-Barnabas (*cir.* 133) already takes the definite form that "God said to the Son, Let us make man in our image."<sup>7</sup> Revelation (1 4, 3 1, 4 5, and 5 6) has familiarized us more or less with the (Persian) "seven spirits of God" ever before his throne and "sent forth into all the earth." If we can adjust our minds to the mixture of metaphors by which at the same time the "Beloved Son" of God is first the Rock on which "the whole creation is sustained," including the tower the stones of which are the redeemed people of God, and secondly the Gate which admits to the tower, and thirdly the great and glorious Man surpassing in stature the tower itself (though he walks around it and in it)—if we can further deliberately close our minds to any thought of the historical Jesus, and think only in terms of "the heavenly Man," the second Adam, and similar transcendental beings of the unseen world, we shall have no great difficulty in taking Hermas' point of view. From having had practically no significance in Clement, that phase of the doctrine of the person of Christ which is concerned with the pre-existence has suddenly occupied the field of vision. Hermas adopts almost the language of 1 Pet. 1 20, sharing Clement's use of this epistle but with a widely different christology. As Wisdom-Spirit Christ was the counsellor and agent of God in creation, "sustainer of the universe" and Rock of its foundation. He had also become by incarnation and glorification at the end of time, the Gate of access to the kingdom of God. First Peter 1 20 adopts in similar phrase the doctrine of Paul. But how does Hermas relate this transcendental drama of divinity to the story of the Prophet of Nazareth? What of the work of his ministry, his cross, his resurrection? Do these actually have no place in Hermas' scheme of salvation? The answer to our question is contained in Hermas' fifth Similitude, his "parable," as he terms it, of the vineyard.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Barn. 5 5. In Irenaeus the utterance of God in Gen. 1 26 is said to be addressed to "his Wisdom."

<sup>8</sup> Hermas, Sim. v, 2-7; cf. Mk. 12 1-8 and Is. 5 1-7.

Hear the parable which I shall tell thee relating to fasting.<sup>9</sup> A certain man had an estate and many slaves, and a portion of his estate he planted as a vineyard; and choosing out a certain slave who was trusty and well pleasing, held in honor, he called him to him, and saith unto him: "Take this vineyard which I have planted, and fence it till I come, but do nothing else to the vineyard. Now keep this my commandment, and thou shalt be free in my house." Then the master of the slave went away to travel abroad. When, then, he had gone away, the slave took and fenced the vineyard; and having finished the fencing of the vineyard, he noticed that the vineyard was full of weeds. So he reasoned within himself, saying, "This command of my lord I have carried out. I will next dig this vineyard, and it shall be neater when it is digged; and when it hath no weeds it will yield more fruit, because not choked by the weeds." He took and digged the vineyard, and all the weeds that were in the vineyard he plucked up. And that vineyard became very neat and flourishing, when it had no weeds to choke it. After a time the master of the slave and of the estate came, and he went into the vineyard. And seeing the vineyard neatly fenced and digged as well, and all the weeds plucked up, and the vines flourishing, he rejoiced exceedingly at what his slave had done. So he called his beloved son, who was his heir, and the friends who were his advisers, and told them what he had commanded his slave, and how much he had found done. And they rejoiced with the slave at the testimony which his master had borne to him. And he saith to them: "I promised this slave his freedom if he should keep the commandment which I commanded him; but he kept my commandment and did a good work besides to my vineyard, and pleased me greatly. For this work, therefore, which he hath done I desire to make him joint-heir with my son, because, when the good thought struck him, he did not neglect it, but fulfilled it." In this purpose the son of the master agreed with him, that the slave should be made joint-heir with the son. After some few days his master made a feast, and sent to him many dainties from the feast. But when the slave received the dainties sent to him by the master, he took what was sufficient for him, and distributed the rest to his fellow-slaves. And his fellow-slaves, when they received the dainties, rejoiced, and began to pray for him, that he might find greater favor with the master, because he had treated them so handsomely. All these things which had taken place his master heard, and again rejoiced greatly at his deed. So the master called

<sup>9</sup> The preceding chapter relates to the fast which Hermas has been observing, and which he calls "keeping a station." The Shepherd has applied to it doctrine reminding us of Is. 58 and Mk. 2 18-22.

together again his friends and his son, and announced to them the deed that he had done with regard to his dainties which he had received; and they still more approved of his resolve, that his slave should be made joint-heir with his son.

In spite of some apparent reminiscences of the gospel parable of the householder who, going to a far country to return again, appoints to his slaves their various tasks,<sup>10</sup> we have little difficulty in recognizing that here, as the Shepherd presently explains, "The lord of the estate is He that created all things and set them in order and endowed them with power." We might perhaps also recognize, without resort to the key, that "the vines are this people whom He himself planted (Ps. 80, Is. 5 1-7); and the fences are the holy angels of the Lord who keep together his people; and the weeds which are plucked up from the vineyard are the transgressions of the servants of God." But where does Jesus Christ appear? Is Christ the "slave," who was intrusted with the vineyard and did more than he was commanded? Or is he "the beloved son, who was the heir" of the master, whose place is never regarded otherwise than in the mansion, along with "the lord of the estate" and "the friends who were his advisers"? The slave is a faithful and obedient worker, who when he has done all is not restricted to the confession, "We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do" (Lk. 17 10), but can lay claim to more. His obedience earned him his freedom. His works of supererogation drew to him the gracious favor of the lord of all, who with the approval of the beloved son, the heir, and the counsellor friends (afterwards explained to be "the holy angels which were first created"), gave him participation in the inheritance. As a foretaste of this he receives "dainties" from the master's table, and these he shares with his fellow-slaves, obtaining thus their intercession which still further assures his master's favor. In some respects this may correspond to our idea of the ministry of Jesus, but it certainly is not that of Mark, nor of the Synoptists, still less that of John. So far as sonship is attributed to the slave at all, it is only by anticipation. He is, indeed, destined to ultimate exaltation, and receives a token of it in gifts of "dainties" from the heavenly table, which are subsequently explained to be

<sup>10</sup> Mt. 25 14-30 and parallels.

"the commandments which God gave to his people through his Son." But aside from this there is nothing in this present world, if ever, to separate the slave from his fellow-slaves. He does not even intercede for them, but they for him. On the whole one is more disposed to look to "the beloved son, the heir," as the representative of Christ, and the slave as only a type of faithful Christians who in the end become sons according to Paul's saying: "If children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ" (Rom. 8 17).

It is time, then, that we called in to our aid the angel-interpreter. For Hermas, too, had misgivings as to the propriety of this representation, and asks: "Wherefore, sir, is the Son of God represented in the parable in the guise of a slave?" The answer is instructive:—

"Listen," said he; "the Son of God is not represented in the guise of a slave, but is represented in great power and lordship." "How, sir?" say I; "I do not understand." "Because," saith he, "God planted the vineyard, that is, he created the (chosen) people, and delivered them over to his Son. And the Son placed the angels in charge of them, to watch over them; and the Son himself cleansed their sins, by laboring much and enduring many toils; for no one can dig without toil or labor. Having himself then cleansed the sins of his people he showed them the paths of life, giving them the law which he received from his Father. Thou seest," saith he, "that he is himself Lord of the (chosen) people, having received all authority from his Father. But how that the lord took his son and the glorious angels as advisers concerning the inheritance of the slave, listen. The holy pre-existent Spirit, which created the whole creation, God made to descend into the flesh which he chose and dwell there. This flesh, therefore, in which the Holy Spirit dwelt, was subject unto the Spirit, walking honorably in holiness and purity, without in any way defiling the Spirit. When, then, it had lived honorably in chastity, and had labored with the Spirit, and had co-operated with it in everything, behaving itself boldly and bravely, he chose it as a partner with the Holy Spirit; for the career of this flesh pleased the Lord, seeing that while it possessed the Holy Spirit upon the earth it was not defiled. He therefore took the Son as adviser and the glorious angels also, that this flesh too, having served the Spirit unblamably, might have some place of sojourn, and might not seem to have lost the reward for its service; for all flesh which is found undefiled and unspotted, wherein the Holy Spirit dwelt, shall receive a reward. Now thou hast the interpretation of this parable also."

At first glance the reader of this succinct history of redemption is not likely to be struck with the resemblance to the prologue of the Gospel of John, though in point of fact the author of John 1 1-5, 9-14, 16-18, is really dealing in his own way with the same problem. The confusing thing to the modern reader is the use of the term "Son of God," which is the *only* term used by Hermas for the Redeemer. He applies it primarily to "the holy pre-existent Spirit, the creator of the whole creation," and thinks of the entire work of redemption (wherein the cross plays no part whatever) as effected by this Spirit. The Spirit-Son, accordingly, resembles the "Wisdom of God" in the Sapiential books much more closely than the Greek *logos*; for it is not merely a creative, but also a redemptive, Spirit, "loving mankind," going to seek them as they wander in the paths of folly, "in every generation entering into holy souls and making men to be prophets and friends of God."<sup>11</sup> In this sense the Spirit-Son "cleansed the sins of the (chosen) people." As the creative *logos* in John 1 1-18 was from the beginning "the light of men" coming into the world and enlightening it, though unrecognized, "coming to his own though his own people received him not,"—as the *logos* ultimately "became flesh and tabernacled among us," so also in Hermas' more primitive christology the Spirit-Son received charge of "the people" from the beginning. He at once appointed the angels, who in Jewish angelology are called "the watchers," "to watch over them." This is represented in the allegory as the "fencing" of the vineyard. The Spirit-Son next engaged in the disciplinary process of the Old Testament revelation, "weeding out" the wickednesses of the (chosen) people, and "giving them the law which he received from his Father." At this point in the interpretation no distinction is made between the Mosaic and the Christian law, though previously the "dainties" of the "parable" had been explained to be the "commandments which [God] gave to his people through his Son." Hermas makes no real distinction. Both are thought of together as "showing the paths of life." But at this point comes a break. The Shepherd, having shown how the Spirit-Son had been in his own person "Lord of the (chosen) people,"—as against the "watcher" angels

<sup>11</sup> Wisdom 1 6, 7 23-27.

of the gentile nations,<sup>12</sup>—proceeds to the specific incarnation of gospel story. It belonged to God's administration of his vineyard to cause the Spirit-Son to "dwell down" in the flesh that he chose. When in the particular instance in view (the ministry of Jesus) "this flesh in which the Holy Spirit dwelt had been completely subject to it, walking honorably in holiness and purity," doing even more than the commandment, the glorious first-created angels<sup>13</sup> were called in council together with the Spirit-Son, with the result that "this flesh" was made immortal. As specific type of mortal man, he was given a "place of sojourn" in the heavenly court and made co-heir with the Spirit-Son. Such is Hermas' understanding of the doctrine that Jesus was "declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1 3). He was the supreme exemplar and nothing more.

We are dealing with a naïve attempt to explain how "the holy pre-existent Spirit which created the whole creation" can be the son and heir of God (according to Paul's teaching that "the Lord is the Spirit"), without at the same time doing injustice to the "Petrine" christology of the "exalted" Servant. Hermas' creed is the antithesis of that of his earlier contemporary Clement; for he approaches the matter from the standpoint of Greek dualism, while Clement approaches it from that of Hebrew messianism. Neither could survive; for both lack the solvent of the Johannine doctrine of the *logos*. Hermas is not in reality a trinitarian at all. For all that logic requires, he might be a unitarian. In point of fact he is neither. We can call him nothing else than a "dualitarian." The only strictly divine beings in his heavenly court are the Father and the pre-existent Spirit-Son. He has an "adoptionist" doctrine of a certain sort, but it does not affect the earthly life of Jesus; for the slave does not really become the Son of God until taken up into heaven. The title is applied to him generally, but only in a proleptic sense. While on earth Jesus was a "vessel of

<sup>12</sup> Compare Clement's interpretation in ch. 29 of Dt. 32 8 f. (LXX).

<sup>13</sup> That is, the six archangels "that were created first of all, unto whom the Lord delivered all his creation to increase and to build it, and to be masters of all creation" (Vis. iii, 4). Hermas' heavenly court has points of strong resemblance to the Mazdean. Alongside of Ahura and Mithras stand the six Amesha-spentas and the host of Fravashis.



the Spirit" in the same sense that Paul is so called in Acts, though in higher degree. This sense is made unmistakable by the Shepherd's application of the "parable" which immediately follows:

"I was right glad, sir," say I, "to hear this interpretation."  
 "Listen, now," saith he. "Keep this thy flesh pure and undefiled, that the Spirit which hath descended to dwell in it may bear witness to it, and thy flesh may be justified. See that it never enter into thine heart that this flesh of thine is corruptible, and so thou abuse it in some defilement. For if thou defile thy flesh, thou shalt defile the Holy Spirit also."

Like his orthodox contemporaries, Hermas is emphatic on the doctrine of "the resurrection of the *flesh*,"<sup>14</sup> and applies to it the practical teaching of Rom. 8 1-17, whether he can see his way to reconcile it with 1 Cor. 15 50 or not. But except as to the slave's taking the lead and setting the example for his fellow-slaves, who also receive the "commandments" the Spirit gives him, there is no distinction between its "dwelling down" in him and its "dwelling down" in Hermas or in other men.

Especially instructive is the contrast between Hermas' interpretation of the "cleansing of the sins of the people" and Clement's. In Clement, as in First Peter and the New Testament generally, this is the work of the suffering "Servant," by whose stripes we were healed. Not so here. In Hermas it is the work of the pre-existent Spirit-Son, who "weeded out the transgressions of the servants of God" not by a vicarious sacrifice, but by the laborious husbandry of the Old Testament dispensation. Death of the Spirit-Son was of course inconceivable. The death of Jesus is never mentioned, or even alluded to.<sup>15</sup>

These two almost contemporary writings from the church at Rome in the sub-apostolic age, Clement and Hermas, may probably be taken as fairly typical respectively of the Jewish and gentile elements among Paul's converts. We see in them the effect produced upon their minds by the doctrine of Jesus as the

<sup>14</sup> The original Greek of the so-called Apostles' Creed has "I believe in the resurrection of the flesh" (*σάρκός*), not "body" (*σώματος*).

<sup>15</sup> Harnack, in his recent reconstruction of the primitive Aramaic source Q, notes as the most astounding fact in connection with it, that it yields "no trace of that which in Mark is the chief theme, Jesus' death and resurrection." *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 171.

Son of God as it came to them from Petrine and Pauline sources respectively. "Creeds outworn" they are; and such are not generally esteemed to be interesting or profitable. But when one is seeking a genuinely historical understanding of his own creed, there is nothing like a return to this forgotten past, a time when the great problem of adjustment of Jewish and gentile religious thought was still unsolved, and when the Gospel of John was still below the horizon.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Since this article was placed in the editor's hands an important study by J. v. Walter, of Breslau, of the christology of *Hermas* as exhibited in the passage here considered (Sim. V.), has appeared in the *Zts. f. utl. Wiss.* xiv 2 (1913). Von Walter explains the inconsistencies as due to later supplementation by the author. Sim. V 6 4<sup>b</sup>-7 was added to obviate the objection to the parable which would be felt by any orthodox reader of Heb. 1-2, that the slave (*Jesus*) was placed on a lower rank than the angels. In this interpretation the slave is only "the flesh" in which the holy, pre-existent Spirit dwelt, and which served it, whereas the parable both calls the slave himself the Son of God, and speaks only of his service to "the people" in obedience to "the Lord." If this reasoning be admitted, we have still further interesting evidence of the clash of christological opinion before the introduction of the *logos*-doctrine as a solvent. In fact the very pages of *Hermas* in themselves considered will exemplify the collision between apotheosis doctrines and incarnation doctrines.

*THE MYSTICISM OF A MODERNIST*

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The current conception divides religious from scientific belief, so that it seems almost as if religious belief supplied our emotional needs and scientific belief did not. Put into crude terms, this is the sense in which all maintainers of old creeds, who are not merely obscurantist, oppose the dismemberment of tradition. They even say that it is not the mere sentiment which attaches to an inheritance from the past that makes an old creed seem necessary to an intelligent man. For this intelligent man must have in his life a glamor such as science can never give, and the glamor comes from the religious creed. On this ground the mysticism which has always accompanied and exalted intellectual views of the universe must be sought from our traditional creeds, for it can never arise from science and history.

It is our purpose here to maintain the opposite. We shall endeavor to show how a mysticism may arise from the acceptance of science and history as the only possible intellectual views of the universe. So that what has been the chief argument for the maintenance of inherited creeds will be seen to be false. It does not in fact follow that the highest religious life can *only* arise from the acceptance of traditional creeds, simply because in the past there has been this connection. We are willing to admit that in the thirteenth century mysticism and deep religious feeling depended upon a belief in the eucharist as the physical body of Christ; but it by no means follows that the intellectual disagreement with such a belief implies a desertion of mysticism. This may seem very obvious; but we mean more. We mean that the highest mysticism does not depend even on the belief in a personal God, for the emotional needs of man are just as completely supplied by science and history as they ever were by any theology.

This is not, however, an argument against any form of theology. It is to be understood that if the evidence seems to show the

existence of a personal God, we must believe in his existence. But if the evidence shows nothing of the kind, we cannot excuse the continuance of our belief in a personal God on the ground that such a belief satisfies our emotional needs. We cannot, if we think that the evidence does not prove the resurrection of Christ, continue to teach children to believe it on the ground that it may give them comfort; because as much comfort may come from scientific formula or the statements of history.

Our argument depends on a conception that the continuity of religion is a continuity of form and not of content. What is called religion by the most orthodox today is no more like the "religio" of the old Romans than the religion of the fortieth century will be like the orthodoxy of today. We use the word religion therefore to indicate a life of enthusiasm for the ideal, implying some sort of belief in the value of that ideal, at least to the minds of men. Whether the ideal is conceived as a force outside us or within us is merely a matter of metaphor. "Inside" and "outside" have no meaning with reference to what is not spatial.

It will follow from this conception of religion and of religious knowledge that mysticism cannot refer solely to a form of theological sentiment; for an emotion flows from modern science, history, and philosophy, which is at least as transforming as any that ever came from theology. The new belief is not less valuable for the emotional needs of men. I shall not attempt to explain why it is possible to conceive religion and religious knowledge in such a way as I have expressed. There is indeed a law of development in this as in other kinds of experience; but for the sake of the present argument I shall assume that the enthusiasm connected with social reform and ideals of individual life is what in our day takes the place of the old devotion to the will of God and the attempt to reach heaven. I have called this enthusiasm "religion," and have therefore implied a connection between the attitude expressed in such a document as the Apostles' Creed and the attitude of the modern scientist, historian, or reformer. But I do not wish to make it a matter of words, and if "religion" cannot be so used, some other term may be found. The essential truth remains: we have today an enthusiasm for civilized intellect-

ual life in the individual and a better arrangement of society, and we have also a view of the universe very different from that of the authors of the creeds or the Bible. One cannot separate the elements of any attitude, for the complex should be judged as one whole; and therefore we may compare the modern intellectual attitude as a whole with the intellectual attitude of the thirteenth or the third century. The emotional results of these attitudes differ, and so we may compare the enthusiasm of the thirteenth century with its modern representative, and this modern enthusiasm we call by the old name.

For just as enthusiasm for social reform and individual civilization has taken the place of resignation and the desire for heaven, just as doing one's work well has taken the place of ritual, so also the insight of the philosopher, the scientist, the historian, or the reformer has taken the place of that theological sentiment which used to be called mysticism. Whether we should call this new insight "mystic" or not is another question which I do not intend to discuss; for I mean to use the word in this new sense, just as I use "religion" to express the attitude of the reformer.

The continuity of language is hardly ever a coherence of meaning. The content of a word is sometimes deliberately changed, sometimes vaguely modified; and sometimes, when the experience has changed completely, the old words are used because they are flexible and adaptable, whereas new words are hard and not easily made current. Thus we have now in use such words as "economics," the meaning of which would astonish Xenophon; "tragedy," "sacrifice," and "vote" are all used with meanings which would astonish the thirteenth century. And so I extend the meaning of the word "mysticism."

It now becomes necessary to observe, at least in a summary fashion, the psychological nature of that experience which I have called religion. It differs from the aesthetic or the purely intellectual experience of the artist or of the scientist. It is an enthusiasm for an ideal life depending upon an emotional but at the same time intellectual view of the nature of the world.

In the first place, the moods of every man vary, and with them probably his view of what is most worth doing. No man pursues with a continual enthusiasm any one definite purpose. There

are many ends, most of them good, which are pursued by every individual; for at one time he thinks of the supply of food and clothing which he needs, at another of the companionship he must maintain or increase, at another of music or painting, and at another of the retirement and rest which should follow labor. Among such moods one may be called religious; for the religious man, even in the simplest meaning of the word, does not always feel the enthusiasm which he would call religious; and the attempt to keep any mood artificially prominent produces morbidity. Among all these moods, however, unless there is a mere confusion or an entire absence of thought, there are acknowledged differences of value. Most men will admit that, however it may be in abstract philosophy, the supply of food and clothing is of less importance than the opportunity for hearing music; and one purpose may have to be sacrificed for another, or one may be regarded as means and the other as end. So that there is some sort of connection between these different purposes other than that bare connection which is implied when we say that they are the purposes of the same individual; and it may be possible, within limits, to suppose that one purpose so dominates others that it may become the ruling passion of a life. As with the purposes for which a man works, so with the moods through which he passes, one tends to dominate the others and to form the *temperament* of the man.

Now if absolutism reduces all the variety of life to mere appearance and therefore explains away life itself, the new realism, as far as I understand it, makes of this variety only a monotonous succession of disconnected facts. Against realism we must urge the differences in value in different experiences; and against absolutism, the reality of every experience, however transient, and by reality I mean that such experiences are irreducible and not to be smoothed out into a flux or a system.

It seems that we can go farther than realism generally does in relating our experiences to one another, and we cannot go so far as absolutism generally does. That there are hints, half-meanings, and implications in every sentence seems to be true, and therefore the exactness of realism misrepresents life; but on the other hand we cannot make these hints and implications, as absolut-

ism does, the ground for erasing the distinction between true and false. So that in the end we accept as a description of the modern man an account of various moods, one not destroyed by the other, and of various purposes, one not destroyed by the other. The connection of such moods is organic, and therefore the acceptance of an intellectual statement such as that of evolution changes all the other beliefs of the man. The complex whole which results may be called the modern mind; and it is impossible to suppose that the emotion flowing from modern views is in any sense the *same* as that which came from theological beliefs. Absolutism should not extinguish the variety of intellectual statements in a mere flux of feeling. The emotional view resulting from science is not the same in value as the emotional view coming from mediaeval philosophy. One creed is not as good as another. One mythology is not as good as another.

But what of this modern emotion?

At certain moments there comes an insight which transforms the world and reinterprets the individual life. Whether we say that then new facts come under observation or that then we are momentarily capable of observing more exactly, the result is the same. These moments of insight are used for guidance in the more normal episodes of life. And so in the midst of historical research or of scientific investigation an occasional moment seems to transform the world, just as to the old theologians of the middle ages there seemed to come a sudden divine illumination. For if we read in St. Bonaventura or St. Thomas of the moment at which intellectual labor seems to pass into divine vision and then turn to read in Darwin or in Creighton of the transformation in the scientist or the historian, we seem to perceive a like process ending in a like emotion.

Again, as, in the individual, life varies in value through its different moments, so in the race one individual varies from another. In questions of art one man has insight and another has not. In science one man may learn by rote all the details of fact and yet preserve untouched an antiquated view of the world, while another will see the whole aspect of things in a new light when he has appreciated scientific truth. Again, whether new visions of fact come into existence or certain men are more capable than

others of seeing fact, does not at present concern us: the result is the same. There is a difference of value in the visions of reality among different men. And, once again, this is what we read in the old literature of religious experience of the distinction between the mystic and the unilluminated. So that we are compelled to recognize in modern terms, as successors to the old visionaries, not the worshippers of cabalistic signs and symbolic phrases, but the scientist and the historian. But since in reference to religious experience there is prevalent a very great amount of nonsense, something must now be said as to the claims of visionaries. Mysticism is a dangerous word, because it is sometimes used to hide an entire absence of intelligence. Claims to special insight are made by men ignorant of science, history, or philosophy, and often as deaf to real music and blind to real painting as it is possible to be. Their claims are made on the ground that religious experience is their special province,—that, ignorant as they may be, blind and deaf to every art, yet they have an enthusiasm which may be justly called religious.

Now we have admitted the distinction between religious and other experience. We shall also admit that there may be religious genius, as there may be scientific or artistic genius. Even if "religious" means only moral or only political, still there is a distinct region of fact to which this word refers. But in the first place having religious experience does not entitle a man to respect as an authority on historical or scientific questions. If you have an enthusiasm for an ideal of life, it does not follow that those statements are true which you say are necessary for the maintenance of that enthusiasm. The Christian preacher may be virtuous and he may produce virtue in others, and yet he may be quite wrong both as to the fact that Christ was born of a virgin and as to the fact that virtue even in himself depends on such a belief. To be believed on the former point he should be a trained historian, and on the second point he should be a psychologist. The man who says that his finest enthusiasm "depends upon" a theological creed may be wrong: the enthusiasm even in him may depend upon modern views of the world which he breathes in during his every-day life and of which he is almost unconscious. And, again, religious enthusiasm is of varying degrees; or we may



put it that religion has various stages of development. It may be that the religious enthusiasm is of the primitive kind: that enthusiasm may be directed, let us say, only to the life of the soul. The gospel of resignation may be preached, so that the starving man is told to be content and virtuous and to live a worthy life, even though his body is dying. Religion may be directed to the production of such an attitude. But that would be a very primitive form of religious enthusiasm, because it is childish to suppose that the soul of a man can progress if his body is dying by inches. The fallacies of inadequate thought on this subject are countless, and most of them are due either to the approval of a whole because the part is good or to the calling a less evil good because there is a greater evil.

Now my present point is that a primitive religious enthusiasm may have connected with it a special insight, but that insight cannot be regarded as more valuable than the insight of a more developed mind. It is easier to imagine and perhaps to experience the insight of a simple form of enthusiasm than it is to understand or feel the insight of a greater knowledge. Therefore "real" insight is often confounded with its most primitive form. But it is reasonable to suppose that the mind grows as a whole; and therefore there is every reason to suppose that the finer intelligence may have also the finer religious experience. All forms of intuitional philosophy either involve the mistake of setting back the clock or are used as excuses for maintaining a primitive experience. Bergson seems to set us back for the obtaining of truth to a mere awareness of the flux of life. At least his interpreters often set aside the insight of the scientist in favor of the bare perception of the common man. Intuition, if contrasted with intellect, is misleading. And in the same way Eucken seems to seek some very restricted way and not the plain road of intelligence in order to reach the vision of the divine. The life of the spirit is divided from that of nature; and again the clock is set back. We are supposed to find the finer religious experience only in unscientific or non-historical minds. The insight of the barbarian is contrasted with the learning by rote of a civilized man: the learning by rote is then called science or history, and the conclusion is evident that such science and history are not so

valuable for the understanding of life. But no one ever supposed that learning by rote was science or history except for the purpose of avoiding labor or excusing ignorance. If the science or history, not of school-boys but of constructive and critical minds, is contrasted with the finest insight of the barbarian, it will be seen how much more of religious enthusiasm there is in the more developed mind. We cannot complain against science and history as barren unless we understand the passion that made them. The appreciation of a feeling of general flux which may arise when all the detail of science and history is blotted out is no better understanding of the nature of life. It may be better than a learning of formulae: it is not better than an appreciation of detailed scientific knowledge.

Now if we suppose that there is no sacred and special way towards knowledge of fact, but that insight is as much to be experienced in abstract science and detailed history as in the vaguer and more primitive philosophy of the creeds and the Bible, then it follows that the insight of a man of science and historian is more valuable than that of the ignorant in proportion as the civilized life is more valuable than the barbaric. Nor is it possible to suppose *a priori* that "religious" insight is higher when scientific knowledge is more primitive; although it may seem that such is the case. The evidence must be reviewed. We must compare the religious insight of the present with that of the past. The evidence shows that one past age excels in painting and another in architecture; but we cannot, unless we are mere *laudatores temporis acti*, say *a priori* that any age of the past excels the present in *any* sphere. And the evidence at present seems to show an enthusiasm arising out of modern knowledge which transforms life as much as the older creeds did.

I am inclined to believe that the facts which appear, or the life which seems good, at exceptional moments in the average man's life is the same as that which appears normally to the exceptional man. When death draws the curtain for the average man, he sees the same fact which is seen more continuously by the philosopher. The resulting emotion may be called mystic, but it is very different in quality from the emotion that follows upon appreciation of an orthodox creed. I do not now compare the

two. I state simply the existence of a transforming emotion derived from an appreciation of the modern view of the world. That is the mysticism of the modernist. That, and not the sentimentalism due to hearing a creed recited or seeing a ritual, is the true mysticism. For the associations of an old creed and ritual certainly produce in the mind an emotion; it is the emotion of memory. Mysticism is the emotion of hope. It looks forward and not back. It builds anew, it does not simply reinstate the old.

This is the point of growth in modern religion. It is here, where the normal touches the exceptional, that the advance is being made which preserves the genuine life of religion. For whereas the modernist has to explain to the orthodox that he values the tradition of the past, he must keep clear in his own mind the appreciation of the future. More Catholic than the pope, he allows not merely for the past but for the revelation which is to come. And what sort of world appears when we use exceptional moments of our own or the continued insight of exceptional men in order to make our philosophy?

To begin with the more practical issue as to the ideal life, it is clear that the individual life is not to be valued with reference only to success and failure. For, not knowing the effects in the far future, we cannot judge of success and failure. And yet we can say that certain efforts are worth making, as for instance Mazzini's, and certain efforts apparently more effective, as for instance Napoleon's, are not so much worth making. It seems to me also that we can say that the issues of good and evil in life are not all to be rendered in the terms of temporal consequences. From all such statements arises an emotional enthusiasm which is the true mysticism.

As to the life of the race in which our own individual life is lived, it seems clear that the idea of progress is mistaken. Progress within a certain limited time there certainly is.

"We build like corals, grave by grave,  
That have a pathway sunward."

But the worlds of life which have now disappeared seem to prove that the present system of life will eventually decay. Whether

a better or more "spiritual" will take its place or not, most of what we now hold valuable will disappear. "The old proud pageant of man" will conclude with a jest or a tragedy, and, whether the gods laugh or weep, the play will be over. But our statement of all this results in lifting us high above the mere succession of things.

As to the scene upon which life appears, that too changes its appearance when it is seen at exceptional moments. High up above the blue which bounds our normal sight is the open space of other stars and skies. Deep down within the normal appearance of our daily life are the vast facts of destroying passion and inevitable death, but also of transforming joy and the disdain of death.

If I end now with no clear statement of any transforming vision, it is not because such a vision is impossible or even at present non-existent. My hesitation is due not to the weakness of my own conviction but to my respect for the convictions of others. It seems as though we had come to the summit from which we look out upon a new and unexplored ocean, as those first Spaniards looked out over the Pacific. Most men come to such a point at some moments in life, and exceptional men live more continuously close to the summit. But the world which all see is the same.

*THE FUTURE OF RELIGION*

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No one who has studied the history of the last century can fail to be struck by the great changes which have taken place in human thought, affecting the whole outlook of man in his relation to the world both within and without and constituting a revolution in the intellectual life of our times. The most permanent forces in human life have been brought face to face with new facts, new conditions, and new ideas, and nowhere do we find the evidences of this change in outlook greater than in the sphere of religion, where the old problems and the old controversies are passed or passing. One of the great questions of today is, as a recent writer has said, "whether Christianity can come to terms with the awakening self-consciousness of modern civilization, equipped with a vast mass of new scientific knowledge and animated for the first time by ideals which are not borrowed from classical or Hebrew antiquity."<sup>1</sup> But Christianity itself has already been deeply influenced by some of the changes which have taken place. The great forces of history press steadily upon all the institutions of society and the form or expression of the religious life is profoundly affected by the movements of thought or changes in sentiment which take place in human society.

A favorite illustration has long been to liken the Church to the Ark in which are gathered those who are to be carried safely across the stormy sea of Time to the haven where they would be. The figure has other suggestions, however, than the old ecclesiastical one. The church may be a ship floating upon the stream of time: the controversies, disputes, differences, agreements, and opinions are all of interest, but meanwhile the stream is bearing the ship onward, and quite as interesting a matter, and a more important one, is the question, Where is the stream taking it, and what doing to it? The cross-currents and eddies which dis-

<sup>1</sup> R. W. Inge, *Faith and its Psychology*, p. vi.

turb the surface of a river often blind us to the real fact that these whirlpools which seem to endanger the vessel are themselves swept steadily forward by an invisible current which constitutes the real force of the stream. If one can get the direction of this current and calculate the forces which are sweeping it on, one gets a clearer view of the meaning of things than if he considers a narrower group of phenomena.

What, then, are the most vital forces in our present history? What ones have acted most effectively during the last hundred years? Though civilization is an organic growth, and history an unbroken chain, we can still characterize each age by the way in which certain elements of its life have taken the lead in shaping the mind and the mood of the world. It is not an exaggeration to say that no other two ideas or forces have had such influence in the last hundred years as Democracy and Science. Whether one likes or dislikes them,—and there are many whose dislike is most unfeigned,—it cannot be disputed that, as shaping forces in the life of the world today, no other ideas have had such a vital influence as these.

The warning cry which Goethe uttered against "the Anglo-saxon contagion" was at bottom a protest against rising democracy, and in the next generation, Renan, the most accomplished critic in Europe could see in the growing power and influence of the people only the huge, half-human form of Caliban. Yet the political institutions of Europe have been transformed by the democratic spirit, and those countries which have done the most for civilization and are now the most powerful, are, at least in theory and law, the most democratic. One of the most thoughtful students of the great forces of history today has said: "It is no mere platitude that we have reached the threshold of a new age. Democracy, Nationality, Socialism, the constitution of the modern State, the standing of the churches—all have come within the attraction of forces hitherto unknown."<sup>2</sup> Every social disturbance, every national movement, every theoretical discussion of the great problems of history and civilization, is influenced by this full and vital idea of democracy. Its growth is one of the mysteries of history, and its definition defies all categories. It is not political

<sup>2</sup> John Morley, *Critical Essays*, vol. iv, p. 281.

equality, civil rights, representative institutions alone. It is all these and much more,—a new spirit in the world, which looks out on life from a new point of view, a burning consciousness of personality bound up with the sense of wide and universal relations. This it is which makes democracy the most powerful social force of the modern world. When it has been resisted, revolution has invariably followed. It has inspired the passion for national independence which changed the map of Europe during the last century. When it has been opposed or suppressed by authority, it has gone to extremes and formulated theories of socialism and anarchy which are not its natural evolution. It is the most dissolving force ever brought to bear upon old institutions and the ancient organization of society and the most penetrating spirit which has touched the mind of the modern man. It seems to work with the relentlessness of a physical law. For more than a hundred years it has been moving steadily forward through the civilization of the western world, and now, strangest sight of all, this most revolutionary and fiery force of modern history is disturbing and inspiring the immobility of the East.

To political institutions and political theorists it is the greatest portent in history. To some it is the hag at the foot of the guillotine, counting the heads of the aristocrats as they fall into the basket; to others it is the young goddess upon the mountain top, with the Phrygian cap upon her head and something of the Phrygian madness in her eye. It has no traditions and cherishes few memories, is devoid of reverence or respect for the past and has about it something of the ruthlessness of the glacier. All anachronisms, all unreality, are swept away by the slow-moving torrent.

On the side of social and political privilege democracy has been brought into conflict with religion or religious institutions, and it has again and again been called irreligious and atheistic because of its attitude towards these institutions. When we look at history frankly, without personal or party prejudice, we see that the vast mass of Christian institutions have been anti-democratic in their origin; that is, they rest upon privilege. All religious institutions and organizations follow the type presented by the social development and constitution of the age in which they

arise. In the reconstruction of society after the fall of the Roman Empire and before the consolidation of the modern states, while the mass of the population was still heathen, Christianity was the religion of the governing classes, with the cities as its centres, and when the villagers or pagans were christianized, they became members of a church already based upon aristocratic principles. As a result, when any political disturbance has seemed to trench upon the hereditary powers, the great rallying cries have always been "Throne and Altar" or "Church and King." There is nothing discreditable to religion in this attitude; it is simply the struggle between the past and the future; and whatever the abuses and tyrannies of the past have been, democracy is now the spirit which holds the future in its hands.

As a consequence of the century of struggle, we find that the church, as a privileged institution and a legal establishment, has been steadily losing ground. The oldest political institution in Europe, the papacy, is shorn of all its temporalities, and as the nations one by one advance in culture and intellectual progress, the church is everywhere being displaced from its position of privilege. One need not say, as its opponents often do, that the church is in spirit essentially and necessarily anti-democratic; the contrary might be affirmed without much question; but as an historical institution it has seemed for many centuries to be on the anti-democratic side of human affairs, and with the rise of the new social order the disestablishment of every church in Europe seems inevitable. So high a representative of the existing order as the late Lord Coleridge, chief justice of England, felt the difficulty of reconciling an established church with the democratic spirit.

Not only as an institution has the church felt the influence of democracy; it has also been affected in its interior life. Democracy knows nothing and cares nothing for historical precedents; what it demands is efficiency. The doctrine of efficiency may seem to some to be overworked in the present day, but in opposition to the historic platitudes which are continually brought forth by ecclesiastics and theologians, it has vitality, for it represents the working convictions of a huge mass of sincere and upright, though unlearned, men. Tell such as these of the great



antiquity of certain institutions and of their unquestioned right to demand the acquiescence and obedience of men; this has to them much the air of political party appeals, and democracy is cold, feeling that the age of an institution is rather proof that it needs to be overhauled and adapted to the needs of the modern situation. No doubt in many if not most instances this is totally wrong in theory and springs out of an intelligence exceedingly crude and sadly disrespectful to history. But the great democratic mass goes on serenely, neither caring for criticism nor heeding complaints. Accomplished facts are what make to it the most convincing appeal.

To be a prevailing force, religion must recognize the essentially religious nature of each individual and recognize that the only strong appeal is that of actual life and not of historical or philosophical theory. Nothing is more striking than the diffusion of the democratic spirit in the churches of our own land. Those which represent this instinct of the masses are far more extended and far greater in numbers than the purely historic churches; for the membership of the Roman Catholic church is to a great extent of comparatively recent immigration. Even this church, with all its anti-modern tendencies, has to reckon with the democratic spirit. When a representative of the people which has traditionally been most loyal and submissive to the Holy See says, "We will take our religion from Rome, but not our politics," we see that a new spirit is abroad and that the union of submission and freedom will soon break, on one side or the other. In our own land at least, a church which does not recognize that to succeed or fail with the plain people is to succeed or fail as a religious institution, is in a bad way. It was told of a thoughtful English scholar that when an attempt was made to excite his alarm against the church of Rome by quoting the number of aristocratic families or parts of families which had been converted to that church, he replied: "Show me where the grocer and the workingman is turning to the Church of Rome and then I shall begin to feel uneasy about the Church of England." The real problem is not to win over the rich or the fashionable, but to get hold of the common people. So the church which will make itself most effective, and will have the largest influence in shaping

the social life and moral growth of the nation, is the one which recognizes the full meaning of the democratic spirit.

In addition to the expressed or unexpressed desire for efficiency, first, last, and always, there is a deep, inarticulate wish, springing out of the heart of democracy, for simplicity. And by simplicity is meant something real, effective, connected directly with the moral and spiritual life, and necessarily something which can be stated so clearly and plainly that the wayfaring man will not misunderstand. A noble English missionary bishop once said, "There is nothing essential to the gospel of Jesus Christ which cannot be made plain to the dullest savage in five minutes." If this be not true, the universality of the gospel is at once destroyed. If it be true, there is much in the way in which the gospel is presented to men that needs to be corrected. Such a process of simplification would indeed make terrible work with theology, but it would help men to get hold of what is vital, and that would be an immense advance over the incredible abstractions which have been and are still set forth to men as the things by which they shall live. The attitude of the democratic spirit towards all these subtleties of theology is one of indifference as well as ignorance. It does not understand them nor does it pretend to understand, and, with all respect, it does not care to understand.

What shall be done with this recalcitrant mass which cries out for simplicity? We know too well what is done,—the plausible theories, the so-called "truths of the gospel," the barbarous and vulgar inventions which are set forth in the name of simplicity. The cry of the Roman proletariat, "panem et circenses," has found its echo in many of the efforts which the necessities of the case have developed in this modern world, with its burden of ignorance, poverty, and seething unrest, and, as a result, much is done under the name of Christian charity which sacrifices true manhood and nobleness of character. This however seems to be unavoidable. The problem of presenting religion to a large, free, and to a great extent unintelligent democracy has never before been attempted by the Christian church, and it was to be expected that many blunders and mistakes should be made before the energy could find its proper expression and exert its full power.

Simplicity does not mean crudeness or vulgarity, though these are often mistaken for it. A real faith in democracy involves the highest appeals and the noblest response, or at least the possibility of these; but the process of readjustment to new conditions must be slow, with many halting steps and many backward glances to the old paths on which past ages moved. Though circumstances change, though social conditions are profoundly modified, though new economic and moral questions present a different front to the anxious eye, the underlying facts of human nature and the eagerness and restlessness of the human soul are still the same, and they are groping for and dumbly craving the old eternal satisfactions. The absolute freedom of democracy in the field of the spirit brings to light new and morbid excesses and strange, even grotesque, expressions of the religious instinct. Probably few more unscientific, unphilosophical, and unreasonable religious movements have spread so widely and so rapidly as those we find in our own so-called enlightened democracy of today. It is these things which rouse contempt and fear for the uncertain ends of a democratic age. Yet these same things reveal the real ineffectiveness of the general religious attitude towards the broad movements of our social life. If truth is intended for men, if they have a natural appetite and capacity for it, then it is possible to present every truth, even the most abstract and subtle, the most profound and spiritual, to every man. One of the great reasons why Phillips Brooks exercised such a wide and noble influence was that this was one of the deepest convictions of his own soul, and he applied it always with fearless confidence. "The people will get the heart out of the most thorough and thoughtful sermon, if only it really is a sermon. Even subtlety of thought, the tracing of intricate relations of ideas, it is remarkable how men of no subtle thought will follow it, if it is really preached."<sup>3</sup>

As one looks over the tumult of our modern democratic society, it often seems to be entirely without idealism of any high and inspiring character; all its ends are material, all its convictions utilitarian. Yet the paean of "Triumphant Democracy" which was chanted in rather strident tones a generation ago, has already

<sup>3</sup> Lectures on Preaching, p. 113.

lost something of its force and is less and less assertive, as moral unrest and spiritual hunger disturb its self-confidence. It is beginning to be understood that the denial of idealism has brought the cheapening of life, the vulgarizing of the human soul and the repudiation of those "high instincts" which make the worth of life, and that the vindication of the reality of man's spiritual nature is the first step towards a sure appeal to the multitude. Religion is idealism, and in the directness and simplicity of its appeal lies its moral efficiency. The prime necessity of a democracy is character, for character is the foundation of national life. A thoughtful English historian says, "The essential qualities of national greatness are moral not material."<sup>4</sup> To strengthen this conviction and build upon it will widen the power of religion and bring the spiritual significance of life before men as the most impressive and important of realities.

To say, however, that democracy as we now understand it is to be the ultimate form of human society is to deny the law of social evolution, which is progress; to define the outcome of that progress is at once to set the bounds and end the movement of our social life; but for the present and the immediate future, democracy is the great factor in the political evolution of the most modern and progressive nations.

Far removed from the turbulent life of the crowd, the noise of success and defeat, the strife of parties and the struggle of politics, exists another movement quite as significant, yet to the vast mass comparatively unknown and unintelligible,—that is, the progress of science. Its economic and material effects are part of the means by which our modern industrial and democratic society has been able to establish itself. These, however, are but the outward application of conceptions which have profoundly changed the whole order of human thought. For the real meaning and worth of science to the student of history is the change in the world of thought, the new horizon and the new methods. Since the time when the Copernican system swept away the cosmology that had ruled the world from the Babylonian days, the new knowledge and the new conceptions have been creating a new world and a new mind in that world.

<sup>4</sup> Lecky, *History of England*, vol. i, p. 490.

In its broadest aspect, science is the organized expression of that passion for truth which has always been the distinguishing feature of man's history, but in its more technical sense it means that body of laws and truths which are most specifically the result of the application of the inductive method to the field of human investigations. To many, science, on account of its revolutionary character, has seemed to be but another name for atheism and destruction, and its progress only wider devastation. This feeling no doubt has some ground in what has been said and written on both sides of the question, but much of it is due to a confusion of terms and a misunderstanding of the real problem. "The controversy between science and religion," as it was once called, is now seldom heard except among those vociferous orators who always seek an audience and find the warmest welcome where there is the least intelligence. But the much-discussed controversy was in fact misstated. There never was any controversy between science and religion. The battle was between science and theology and often between scientists and theologians, in both of which cases the problem is entirely different. Theology is simply the thoughts, theories, and reflections of men upon problems which are forever with us and upon which we may always expect more light. That any conclusions should be infallible to any degree, if there are degrees in infallibility, depends entirely upon the knowledge and power of the individual mind. To take these conclusions, no matter how carefully drawn or from whatever sources of knowledge, and then affirm their undying truth, their unchanging form and their everlasting authority, is simply to affirm that progress in knowledge has finally ended. Nowhere has such an assumption been more conclusively denied than in theology itself. Science therefore is but the living continuation of the same conviction in a new field and with new methods. How it has altered, when it has not destroyed, many of the theological theories of the past can be seen by contrasting with them any of the most elementary handbooks on geology, astronomy, or biology, to go no farther afield. But religion, or the religious instinct, has not been destroyed and is no longer denied. Rather it is affirmed with unfaltering conviction by the most severely scientific students and thinkers of our own day.

The three primary factors in all our thinking, God, the universe, and man, and the two elements of religion, man and God, have been entirely changed in their relation to each other, and new conceptions have sprung out of the new knowledge. God is no longer the mechanician, standing outside of and apart from a universe which he has constructed and which requires his constant care and attention lest it get out of order, as was thought by Paley and the deists; but he is the living energy which moves forever:

"A motion and a spirit, that impels  
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,  
And rolls through all things."

The universe is a vast organism in which the divine life finds its manifestation. Mind and will, thought and cause, play in endless expression through the changing evolution of the visible. The bright glare which revealed the outlines of a stiff and rigid mechanism is veiled in mystery through which the energy of a vital will is forever throbbing. Man, his own greatest mystery, stands no longer as a fallen angel whose degradation fills life with an unspeakable melancholy after the supreme moment when heaven lay about him in his infancy. But in the midst of vast cosmic forces which through endless time have slowly evolved the conditions of his existence, he stands at last and looks back to the darkness out of which he came, to the depths from which he rose.

The moral value of the difference in point of view is enormous. The new standpoint checks the rashness of the dogmatist and the audacity of the anarchist. Civilization is seen to be not the degradation of a lost race or the contrivance of a selfish despotism. It is the result of a long travail which stretches back beyond the rim of history and rests upon the movement of the stars. At its roots lie the prayers and struggles which through the long ages of the life of humanity have followed the sun round a sorrowing world. The scientific interpretation of the universe has given a new meaning and a new worth to civilization. We see that the difference between barbarism and civilization does not lie in material achievements or intellectual conquests but in the ethical values which have come after fierce struggle, awful waste, and

mighty conflicts between striving ideals. So the solution of history lies not in physical conquests or material success, but in moral growth, and that means time and suffering.

It is the method of science rather than its results, the conceptions upon which it rests rather than the conclusions which it has reached, that are most significant for theology and religion. It is but little more than fifty years since Darwin placed before the world the first results of his great investigations. His tone was so modest and the significance of his work so little apparent that some years passed before the full meaning of his vast generalization was recognized. There are those now living who can remember the cry of fear and horror which then rose upon the air. Many careful constructions of theologians and philosophers which had been built up so painfully through the ages were swept away. The skilful theories which had sought to interpret the divine mind were shattered as they stood. God, man, the universe, religion, all the tender and noble memories and instincts of the race, seemed thrown down in one wide and universal ruin, while a blind and mysterious force in unknown ways moulded unconscious matter into the things which are. Many of these passionate champions of orthodoxy would rub their eyes if they were to enter into the inner life of the world's best and most inspiring thought today. The fundamental conception of the scientist has become the heart of the world's most vigorous thinking. The theory of evolution is the working hypothesis of every great and progressive science which occupies the mind of man.

In its sweep and operation the scientific spirit has many resemblances to the democratic, and works unconsciously for the same ends. Science is as jealous of prerogative and privilege as democracy. It recognizes no sacred preserves and has invaded the territory hitherto so jealously guarded by the ecclesiastic and the theologian. It refuses to believe that any class of men are endowed with the power to work a daily miracle or speak authoritatively the mind of God. Religion itself has become the study not of the theologian alone, but of the psychologist, philosopher, and scientist. Philology too, working on the strictest scientific principles, has opened up new fields of knowledge, and the theory of evolution is the power by which are called forth

the secrets of archaeology, the history of man, and the primitive institutions of society. In the field of church history, including the history of doctrine as well as of institutions, the play of universal laws is recognized and the development and growth of all ideas and institutions is seen to conform to the principles which prevail in the whole order of things. The foundations of Christian doctrine are uncovered and shown to rest, not as was once supposed, entirely in the Christian consciousness, but largely in historical conditions and metaphysical theories. Everywhere the story is the same. There are no sacred regions, no closed territory where science cannot venture and evolution must be excluded in the interests of theological or historical systems and theories.

Like democracy, science asks for reality, and the only reality it recognizes is that which is demonstrated in the facts of life and character. So though it touches religion with no partial eye or tender hand, it grasps the problem with a wider conception than lay behind much of the theological interpretations of the past. It assumes the validity of all forms of religion and recognizes their truthfulness as expressions of the essentially religious nature of man, while it differentiates them not on the basis of race, history, or theology, but on ethical and spiritual grounds. The revelation of the divine in the world is from everlasting to everlasting, but the highest revelation, the truest religion, comes through the struggle for existence, and stands as the highest because it survives and proves through life and history its working value and its spiritual worth. This scientific point of view is often shocking to sensitive and reverent minds, but it has this great merit at least, that it is founded on reality and so satisfies one of the requirements of democracy.

When we compare these two forces of our modern world and penetrate into their inner constitution and meaning, we find that they have many resemblances and are working in the same direction though not on the same plane. In its general view of society, science asks for laws and facts scientifically understood instead of theories based upon ignorance, prejudice, or selfishness. Science like democracy is a striking illustration of what may be called the economy of the universe. A single force once set in motion



may and does produce a variety of effects as it moves in different fields of activity and operation. To enumerate all the modifications and influences which have sprung from this creative idea would involve a view of all the activities of human thought. It not only suggests unknown results in the future, but it throws an illuminating light upon the past. The theory of evolution enables us to understand, as no other theory does, the story of the past of man as an organic development of partial truths and imperfectly apprehended ideas working out to a completer and fuller expression through the infinite vicissitudes of life. When we regard this new theory from the point of view of co-operation with the great forces of democracy, we see that the effectiveness which the latter calls for is embodied in the working of principles and laws which lie behind the origin of society itself and antedate the beginnings of man's history. It declares also that these laws, or laws working by this method, will rule through all the ages yet to come. Man's achievements are not left to the passion or pride of his own will but rest upon that sublime obedience which is the glory of the stars and the moral splendor of the saint. The simplicity in religion which democracy demands is asserted as the divine method by the fundamental conceptions of science, and for the wilful choices of men it substitutes a uniform system of laws, thus strengthening and re-enforcing the affirmation of the theologian that the law of the Spirit never varies in its operation or changes in its results.

To the eyes of many the whole course and tendency of these great forces seems ominous and burdened with disaster. They are "the two-handed engine at the door" which "strikes once and strikes no more." Sacred traditions, venerable institutions, long-established theories, and time-honored convictions seem falling into one huge ruin. The actual achievements seem but a poor and inadequate compensation for so much that is vanishing and soon to pass away. The red spectre of anarchy lurks in the shadow of the ruins of our social and political institutions: the golden glow of a vivid faith which made life radiant to so many beautiful souls in the ages gone by fades away in the cheerless gloom which gross desires and austere conceptions seem to create. The whole movement and process seems critical, nega-

tive, and destructive. No preserving power for the high sanctities and the inner life of the soul seems to issue from these forces which are sweeping society into new fortunes and new faiths. But, "though much is taken, much abides." A period of great change in history always means advance and progress when it is the result of a vigorous and energetic movement in the world's life, and surely no century since the sixteenth has had so splendid a story as the one we have just passed through, turbulent and revolutionary as it has been.

Let us glance at some of the things which abide and which stand today with new meaning, new values, and new power. With reference to the stability and permanence of civilization both the forces we have named are of immense significance. The broad basis of a democratic self-consciousness is a firmer foundation for social order than the narrow support of the most intelligent aristocracy. In the one case the strength is inherent in the whole organism, in the latter it belongs only to a part of that organism even if it be the better part. In the case of science we not only find a new and strengthening element in the conceptions of history which tends to deepen the meaning of the social fabric, but there is also added to the life of the community a great class of thoughtful and cultivated minds who divide with the old leaders many of the duties and all the responsibilities which belong to civilization.

When we consider the spiritual elements which are at the basis of the new type of character begotten by both these great forces, we see the emphasis laid primarily upon the idea of freedom. Both science and democracy assume the necessity of freedom. Now liberty is not, as many think and have thought in the past, a means to an end. It has always been the attitude of authority and privilege to make this confusion, or at least to accept it and to puzzle the instinct which was working for liberty, by making reforms in society and feeding the passion of the soul with the things of the body. Freedom is not a mere privilege or opportunity for truth, but a supreme spiritual truth itself. It is not the right to think this or that particular thing, but the atmosphere of the soul itself, the very necessity which impels to all the highest realizations of life and character. For the man of science,

freedom is the breath of life. Without it he may attain results, but he does not achieve that nobleness of mind which is the finest expression of truth. The only inconsistency which freedom will not forgive is the inconsistency of not being free. For truth is not truth to the soul unless it is voluntarily and gladly, yes, passionately, sought and obeyed. Freedom is as necessary as truth itself, for it is necessary to truth. Often in its energy and activity it seems radical, eccentric, and revolutionary, but it is the fundamental condition of life in this new world which has grown out of the old, and is the underlying power of both democracy and science.

As a creative element in the growing life of the soul, freedom has sharpened and emphasized the consciousness of personality until at times man feels alone and unfed by human hands. The man of science is an individualist by virtue of his purpose and his freedom. He cannot be otherwise. The democratic passion for liberty has fired the heart of the martyr, and the martyr is the most perfect individualist the world knows. For individualism is only the expression of the belief in the supreme worth of each soul, which has its origin and inspiration in the heart of the gospel. The ecclesiastic, with his reverence for the authority of the past, and the socialist, with his contempt for it, join hands in denouncing the "exaggerated individualism" which is the child of the freedom they both fear. These exaggerations are necessary stages in the process of evolution and are in time corrected by the workings of experience. For individualism in the true sense of the word, the deep appreciation of the essential elements of personality as primary in the growth of life, strengthens the social instinct and accepts as holy the law which guards the social organism. The strength of a vital and stable as well as progressive society lies not in the mere aggregation and coherence of its parts, but in the elevation and development of the social units.

Christianity itself has not escaped the influence of this vast scientific movement, and one of the most significant results of this last century of its history lies in a field which seems purely technical and remote from the living interests of the ordinary man. For more than a century the New Testament has been the storm centre of one of the most active controversies which

have ever taken place in the history of the Christian church. The various results which have been attained need not and could not be here stated, but one which is of supreme interest to the world is the new conception of the character and person of Christ. The forms of expression have not so much altered as the sense of his life and person which are of the greatest spiritual significance. Never before has he been seen as he is now seen, even in the apostolic age. The theories which have been identified with him, and to which he has too often been subordinated, have fallen away as the shadows that darken the fountain to which men come to drink are banished by the light. He stands out now more clearly, in the simplicity of his moral and spiritual power, than he has ever before been seen. Those who first knew him and loved him most, did not and could not see all that he was and all that he would be and would do for man and in man. It is the historical reality of this personal influence through races and ages, through the infinite variety and conflict of different forces and stages in civilization, which makes him the profoundest fact in our modern life. As a spiritual force he is related to men in their highest endeavors and most lasting achievements everywhere. He is the Universal Man, the Son of Man, the Divine Democrat, "the purest of the mighty, the mightiest of the pure, who with His pierced hands lifted a world." His message comes clear and straight, answering to the deepest needs of man's deepest nature. He stands before the soul that is swathed in the grave-clothes of selfishness, sin, and death, bound hand and foot by the fetters of custom, tradition, and ignorance, and the clear voice, in calm and conquering tones, utters the command: "Loose him and let him go."

*CHRISTIANITY AND MINISTERIAL ORDINATION*<sup>1</sup>

AMBROSE WHITE VERNON

BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS

The Dudleys occupy an honorable place in the history of Harvard University. The first American Dudley was Thomas, second governor of the Massachusetts colony. It was he who signed the original charter of the University in 1642 and the revised charter in 1650. His son Joseph also became governor of the colony, and of him President Josiah Quincy said, "Of all the statesmen who have been instrumental in promoting the interests of Harvard College, Joseph Dudley was most influential in giving its constitution a permanent character." Joseph's son Paul was the founder of this lectureship. He had a judicial career of forty-nine years, for the last six of which he was chief justice of the supreme judicial court. Believing, as he evidently did, that religion was the primary fountain of justice, he chose to show his interest in his college by providing her with funds so that four subjects of great moment to him should be discussed publicly, one every year. There is small wonder that the Validity of Non-episcopal Ordination, which is the subject set for our consideration tonight, should have interested him. While he was a student in college, this question which had hitherto been regarded as settled in Massachusetts colony, at least, was violently reopened. Sir Edmund Andros, the new governor sent by

<sup>1</sup> The Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, April 29, 1913, on the following subject, prescribed by the founder, Paul Dudley, in 1750:

"The fourth and last Lecture I would have for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion, as the same hath been practised in New England from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day. Not that I would any ways invalidate Episcopal Ordination as it is commonly called and practised in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among the Dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, scriptural, and valid; and that the great Head of the church, by his blessed Spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them accordingly and will continue so to do to the end of the world. Amen."

James II, had determined to introduce the Church of England into the colony that owed its existence to a conscientious flight from its jurisdiction and to support that church by public taxation. One of the governor's friends, the licenser of the press, wrote to the Bishop of London: "I press for able and sober ministers and we will contribute largely to their maintenance; but one thing will mainly help, when no marriages shall hereafter be allowed lawful but such as are made by the ministers of the Church of England." The sequestration of the property of "factionists" was threatened; at a public funeral there was an open rebellion when the episcopal minister attempted to read the committal service; and it looked as if the war against episcopal pretension and arrogance must once more be fought through. Had Judge Dudley witnessed the expulsion of two colonists for sedition fifty years earlier merely because they insisted upon worshipping according to the rites of the Church of England, his feeling about ecclesiastical arrogance might have been quite different. As it was, however, he retained the sense of the universal horror at the threatened loss of simple and spiritual worship which had clouded the days of his youth until he came to make his last testament. Therein he ordered that at the college which had stood so sturdily for the simple polity of the colonists, there should be delivered once every four years a lecture "for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion, as the same hath been practised in New England from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day." And the curious fact is that even today it is not altogether unnecessary to defend the liberty of prophesying.

Now not only my immediate predecessors in this lectureship, but a number of other scholars of the highest rank, not only in the mother-country, not only among non-conformists, but among bishops of the Church of England, have made it clear that the ordination-ceremonies in the early church were certainly not those of the Church of England against which Judge Dudley was protesting in the formation of this lectureship, and that the idea of apostolic succession did not arise until the apostles' bodies

had lain in their obscure graves for fully fifty years. But it is by no means so clear that ordination, even of the simple sort of our New England fathers or of that more stereotyped method of the Congregational churches of today, existed in the churches that were founded by the apostles and were governed by the Holy Spirit. The question that should concern us today, I feel, is not so much the validity of non-episcopal ordination as the validity of ordination itself. That episcopal ordination is contrary to the usages of the early and apostolic church seems to me thoroughly established; the question I should like to raise is rather this: Is any sort of ordination contrary to the customs of the early church or inimical to the spirit of Jesus? Underlying even this seemingly fundamental question is, of course, the question regarding the nature and validity of the church,—a question which we shall not be able entirely to evade.

In answering this question concerning the nature and validity of ministerial ordination, so far as light is thrown upon it from the study of the New Testament, we must take our stand upon that wide consensus of New Testament scholarship of our time that differs perceptibly from the consensus of Judge Dudley's time. In his time the court of last resort regarding the validity of any ecclesiastical custom was the New Testament. In our time this is no longer true. Helped largely by the interest in this very question that Judge Dudley lays before us tonight, the scholarship of today appeals for two reasons from that ancient court of last resort. In the first place, it has been shown that the New Testament is not a single book of uniform credibility and authority but a library covering a period of from fifty to a hundred years, and that certain portions of the New Testament are to be preferred to others as witnesses to the practices of the primitive church. And in the second place, we have discovered that the early churches were no more infallible or impeccable than the churches of today, that to find out the custom even of the primitive church is not to find out the right custom, that each age has access to the Spirit of Christ, the final authority of the modern Christian man, and that where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. I shall therefore ask you in the first place to consider with me whether in the utterances of our Lord, or in the

earliest documents of the church, we find any clew to the nature of ministerial ordination, and in the second place to consider its significance and value for to-day.

The earliest entire documents in the New Testament are the early epistles of Paul but those portions at least of the Synoptic gospels probably antedate them which are contained in the Gospel of Mark and in the Logia—that collection of the sayings of our Lord which underlies the present Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The situation reflected in the Pauline letters will be clearer if we consider the place the church occupied in the mind of Jesus, as that mind is revealed by the Synoptic gospels. And we immediately find that Jesus is recorded as speaking of the church only twice. But neither of his utterances about the church comes from either of the two primitive sources of the Synoptics. The sayings are both of them found in the Gospel of Matthew alone, and the authenticity of each is, to say the least, questionable. One of them is almost clearly of later date than Jesus and of a different spirit. Jesus is thereby represented as saying to his disciples: "If thy brother sin against thee, go show him his fault alone or take with thee witnesses that every word may be certified." "And if he refuse to hear them," we suddenly read, "tell it unto the church: and if he refuse to hear the church also, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican. Verily I say unto you, What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." "Let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican"; but the parable of the pharisee and the publican and Jesus' treatment of Zacchaeus remind us how foreign to Jesus' spirit it is to make a publican synonymous with an outcast. One of the most frequent taunts cast at Jesus was that he ate and drank with publicans and sinners. It is therefore scarcely conceivable that in laying down an ecclesiastical rule he should have spoken of them in the accents of a pharisee. Moreover, when he spoke these words, there was no church of any kind which could refuse to hear anybody. There were disciples who went about the lanes of Galilee at the side of Jesus, and who went with him into the synagogue to worship, just as there were disciples of many a Jewish rabbi. The word church comes into



the narrative quite unheralded and unmotivated. The passage at many a point bears earmarks of its late origin, and because it does, it makes us suspicious of the only other passage in which Jesus is represented as even mentioning the word church. This is the famous passage in which he declares that Simon is Peter, and upon that rock will he build his church, and that the gates of hell will not prevail against it. Here indeed the church may be considered as still in the future, and therefore the passage may not necessarily be charged with being an anachronism. Yet there are two reasons which tend to confirm our suspicion of the authenticity of these words. In the first place, they fail in the earlier account of Mark, which has evidently served as the skeleton of this. Moreover, just those words fail, and only those which emphasize the supernatural dignity of the church, a most fatally familiar conception of later times. And in the second place, we are amazed to discover almost precisely the same words which in our former passage were addressed to the disciples in general now addressed to Peter alone. For we read, "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." This sentence, in anything like an honest interpretation of it, is so completely foreign to the spirit of him who said, "Suffer the little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," that we cannot seriously reckon with it as a word of the Lord. These two passages, against whose authenticity both external and internal evidence witness, are the only ones in which our Synoptic evangelists represent Jesus as mentioning the church. Both the Gospel of Mark—the earliest gospel—and the Gospel of Luke went out to confirm the certainty of the things wherein Christians had been instructed with no single word from the Lord about his church. It is quite clear, I think, that we cannot regard Jesus as the Founder of the church in any literal sense of that term. The conception seemed foreign to him. He was careless not only about its rites and ordinances but even about it. The Kingdom of God filled his heart; the church is utterly unessential to his discipleship; if it be Christian at all, it is so only because it is a convenient means of establishing the Kingdom of God on earth.

We are confirmed in our conviction that these sayings of Jesus about the church are apocryphal by observing that, according to the early records incorporated in the Acts of the Apostles, the disciples never thought of segregating themselves for worship until the Jews drove them to do so. They worshipped God in the synagogue until that worship was forbidden them and until the development of their hope made it evident that they were completely shut up to another spiritual fellowship. But it is well-nigh inconceivable that this course could have been taken if Christ had really insisted upon the founding of a church.

This omission of direction of Jesus to his disciples about the gathering and ruling of a church explains the situation which meets us in the undoubted letters of Paul, to which we must now briefly turn. In the unquestioned words of the Lord we find no clew whatever to ministerial ordination; there seems to have been nothing to be ordained to: how shall we fare with the earliest datable documents in Christian history, preceding by decades the Gospel of Matthew as it now lies in our hands?

In the early letters of Paul there is absolutely no mention of any kind of ordination. One may read the entire epistles to the Thessalonians and the Galatians and the Corinthians and the Romans and find no mention of any office concerning which the question of the validity of ordination has arisen. Twice the apostle gives a list of the individual activities and services of church-members, but in neither list is a bishop or an elder or a deacon so much as mentioned. To the Romans he writes: "Having gifts differing according to the grace that was given to us, whether prophecy let us prophesy according to the proportion of our faith; or ministry, let us give ourselves to our ministry; or he that teacheth, to his teaching; or he that exhorteth, to his exhorting; he that giveth, let him do it with liberality; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that sheweth mercy, with cheerfulness." In this catalogue the only possible categories under which bishops and deacons could be subsumed are "ministry" and "ruling." If it be "ministry," the word would mock pretensions of lordship; if it be "ruling," it is to be noted that the apostle ranks that particular gift rather low. And it is most likely that under neither rubric did the apostle think of the future lords of the

church. The position of "ruling" between "giving" and "shewing mercy" is quite a clear indication that all three designate private activities of Christians. "Ruling" probably refers to the function of a parent in the home or of a master among his slaves. The catalogue the apostle addressed to the Corinthians is even fuller, but the ordained officers of today have an even poorer chance. The gifts of the Spirit which the apostle mentions are the word of wisdom, the word of knowledge, faith, gifts of healings, workings of miracles, prophecy, discernings of spirits, tongues, and interpretation of tongues, and the Christian occupations are enumerated as follows: "God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues." Here, again, only "helps" and "governments" suggest deacons and bishops respectively. "Governments," however, may be translated "wise counsels," and of how little vital importance these two gifts were in the eyes of the church Paul betrays by immediately exhorting the envious Corinthians in these words: "Are all apostles? are all teachers? are all workers of miracles? have all gifts of healings? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?" It is evident that whatever the somewhat obscure "helps" and "governments" may have been, they were not sufficiently important to be coveted. Indeed, the entire conception of office and officers seems to have been utterly undeveloped. This is noticeable in these very catalogues, where the gifts and those who exercised them are jumbled unceremoniously together, as though the gift were the important thing and as though it might be a transferable grace. When Paul tells the Galatians of his unfortunate introduction to those who were of repute in Jerusalem, he not only declares, "Whatsoever they were, it maketh no matter to me," but proceeds, "God accepteth not man's person," the idea of respecting an office apparently not having dawned upon him.

It is, however, only just to say a word about the possible ordination of the Christian functionaries who are mentioned first in the Corinthian catalogue, namely, the apostles. For while it is at once evident that their office is not that either of the bishop or deacon or pastor of today, it is quite possible to regard them

as holding an office to which ordination is essential. The word "apostle" at once suggests a messenger, and the only earthly body of which an apostle could be a messenger is a Christian gathering. But how much of an official commission an apostle had, or how this commission was bestowed, is now quite obscure. We are certain, however, of three things in connection with the office. First, we know that the word "apostle" did not signify a member of a self-perpetuating board of supernaturally endowed directors of the Christian church. It was not confined to any original twelve. In the Epistle to the Corinthians and in the closing chapter of the Epistle to the Romans there are indications that Paul had no thought of the twelve when he spoke of apostles. The same usage prevails in the Book of Revelation. Even in the Acts, Barnabas as well as Paul is spoken of as an apostle, and in so late a document as the Didache we find a large number of persons spoken of by that term. Secondly, we cannot find that any apostle possessed any official standing in the community by which he may have been commissioned: the word rather suggests that he was qualified as a messenger to other communities, so that if there were any ordination to the apostleship, ordination could not have been regarded as bestowing any authority in the community which ordained. And, thirdly, Paul was most earnest in asseverating, when his apostleship was called in question, that he was an apostle neither from men nor through man but through Jesus Christ. While this asseveration indicates that apostles were at times commissioned by churches or by Christians, it also indicates clearly and unmistakably that Paul did not regard himself as so commissioned, and so did not regard any such commission or putative ordination as essential even to the apostolate. Indeed, the word apostle is used in the Didache interchangeably with the word "prophet," an officer whose ordination can least be assumed. The origins of the function and the nature and source of its possible commission are too obscure for us to say more. But however commissioned customarily, their rights are meagre. It appears that the churches were bound to support them as long as they labored among them, but even this right Paul found of doubtful expediency. He was not able to persuade Apollos to follow his advice, and even Titus simply "accepted his exhorta-

tion." He does speak of setting the practices of the church in Corinth in order when he comes, but it is fair to suppose that he might as well be thinking of the influence that would accrue to the founder of the confused church as of any divine authority. Indeed, he expressly declares to these very Corinthians that he has no lordship over their faith. "We preach not ourselves but Christ Jesus as Lord, and ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake."

As for other officers and their rights, in all the exhortations of these long letters there are only two expressions that hint at them. The Corinthians are urged to be "in subjection unto" the house of Stephanas, the first-fruits of Achaia that "have set themselves to minister unto the saints," but before we have time to wonder at the expression, "be in subjection," the apostle takes the edge off his injunction by adding, "and to every one that helpeth in the work and laboreth." We are further enlightened as to the meaning of the apostle by remembering an injunction in the letter to the Ephesians: "Subjecting yourselves one to another in the fear of Christ." This is not the sort of subjection which could uphold the hierarchical idea. Consequently we are left to wrestle with a single sentence in the first letter to the Thessalonians: "We beseech you to know them that labor among you and are over you in the Lord and admonish you, and to esteem them exceeding highly in love for their work's sake." If this sentence stood alone, we might indeed infer the presence of a hierarchy thus early in the life of the church. But as we have seen reason to suppose that all those who were endowed with any kind of spiritual gifts would be considered by the apostle to be "over" the church in those particular functions and services, it seems unnecessary to build so portentous an edifice as an ecclesiastical hierarchy on so unsteady a stone. Moreover, in the very next sentence the apostle turns from these supposed dignitaries to the rank and file of the church to which the letter is addressed, with these words: "And we exhort you, brethren, admonish the disorderly, encourage the fainthearted, support the weak, be longsuffering toward all." Over against this single utterance we may well place the entire spirit of all these letters. It is not in personalities nor in officers nor in ordination nor in churchman-

ship that the apostle puts his mighty trust, but in the gospel that he proclaims. "Though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema." "What, then, is Apollos? and what is Paul? Ministers through whom ye believed." Indeed, the very foundation of Paul's joy lay in his belief that a Christian had escaped from all dominion of men and had entered upon the freedom of the world of the Spirit. "Ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you." And Paul was in no doubt as to the manner in which the Spirit of God took possession of a man. The magical or sacramental method never entered into his mind. To him there were only two conceivable ways of salvation. These he mentions to the Galatians in his self-answering question: "This only would I learn from you, Received ye the Spirit by the works of the law or by the hearing of faith?" Or again, "Christ redeemed us . . . that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." Any man who had received that Spirit by a simple act of faith was removed from the world where the judgments or customs of men counted, or where their authorities could be recognized. To every Christian—bishop (if there were a bishop), prophet, apostle, miracle-worker—his question reached: "Thou, why dost thou judge thy brother?" And to every Christian also reached that other more daring question: "Know ye not that the saints"—those who have received the Spirit of God—"shall judge the world?" How could there have been authoritative ordination in churches ruled by conceptions like these?

And when we come down the century a little further and take up the group of the captivity-epistles of Paul, the result is but little different. Here, again, there is no mention whatever of ordination. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of the ordination of a prophet or of a man possessed by the gift of tongues. "The lion hath roared, who can but tremble with fear? The Lord Jehovah hath spoken, who can but utter his message?"—that conviction is of the very essence of prophecy. These gifts of the Spirit which were the most widely coveted shut out the idea of ordination; it was, I suppose, as a guard against them that in later times the bishops and deacons were ordained to direct the

churches in their stead. And here in the letter to the Philippians we have the first datable mention of bishops and deacons. Paul addresses perhaps the most unecclesiastical of all his letters to "the church at Philippi with the bishops and deacons." That both words are used in the plural when designating officers of a single local church leads us to premise that the first officer mentioned is rather the present elder than the present bishop. But it is noteworthy that here they emerge from the realm of supposition into the realm of history. It has been cleverly guessed that the reason why Paul sent the letter in part to them and to the deacons was that it was through these officers that the gift was gathered and brought to him for which the letter to the Philippians returns thanks. However that may be, they are not again mentioned in the letter nor in the more churchly letters to the Colossians and to the Ephesians. But even in them the same free atmosphere is about us. The Holy Spirit is given upon faith, no officer is permitted to discipline a brother. No man is to judge another "in meat or in drink or in respect of a feast day or a new moon or a sabbath day." Here the catalogue of functionaries includes only apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers. The bishops and deacons are not mentioned, though the pastors appear, and the more primitive gifts of the spirit—miracles and tongues and interpretation of tongues—have disappeared. There are also two sentences in the Epistle to the Ephesians which strike us as a departure from the full freedom of the more undisputed letters of Paul. Instead of the old straightforward declaration, "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ," we read, "Ye are . . . of the household of God, being built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone." But a more dangerous departure from the spirit of him who said, "Why callest thou me good? none is good save one, even God," is the phrase in the letter to the Ephesians, "holy apostles and prophets." It is only fair, however, to add that in the same letter we read that "each several building groweth into a holy temple in the Lord," and that at a later period we find in one of the Pastoral letters the injunction that the men everywhere "lift up holy hands" in prayer. We cannot therefore say that there is

any insistence in these letters of the captivity upon ordination, least of all upon that ordination which takes a man out of the ranks of his fellows or bestows any special grace or holiness upon him.

When, however, we come down the century still further and touch perhaps the confines of the next, the atmosphere is different. In the Acts of the Apostles and in the Pastoral epistles we seem far away from the vigor and freedom of the early letters of Paul. In the Acts of the Apostles we are dealing with ancient authorities and an editor. We cannot always separate one from the other, and it may be on this ground that we find traces both of the old freedom and also of a more systematized life in the churches, or—perhaps we should say—of church government. Baptism becomes prominent. Prophets retreat behind elders and far behind apostles. The nomenclature indeed is not yet fixed. The elders are once called bishops, and an apostle is said to have not an apostleship but a bishopric. At times the Holy Spirit falls on people in the good old way, but at times it seems to be transmitted through the laying on of the apostles' hands. Not even here is the Holy Ghost confined to the good offices of an apostle, to say nothing of a bishop, but there are some startling accounts. Not only did some Ephesians who were baptized into John's baptism and had never heard of the Holy Spirit receive the same when Paul, happening that way, laid his hand upon them, but men who had believed Philip and had been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus, received the Holy Spirit only after Peter and John had prayed for them and laid their hands upon them. Even Paul did not receive the Holy Ghost until Ananias, to whom curiously Paul never alludes, lays his hands upon him. This transmission of the Holy Spirit through the hands of good men as well as through their words may not, of course, necessarily imply any sacerdotal powers. But it is to be noted that just at this time also we begin to have records of ordination. We are told that in the earliest days of the church the apostles laid their hands upon seven men elected by the church and thus set them apart for the service of tables. We are fortunately told, however, that one of the men on whom these hands were laid was full of the Holy Ghost before the sacred ceremony. Barnabas



and Paul too, though both already full of the Holy Ghost, were separated by certain prophets and teachers for an apostleship to certain regions near, by a revelation and by the laying on of hands. Church government begins to have at least the first hint of authority. Paul and Barnabas "appoint elders for every church," and Paul delivers to the churches "the decrees which had been ordained of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem,"—decrees, by the way, which Paul, speaking to the Galatians of the same conference, never mentions. But, ecclesiastical as is the atmosphere in the Acts, it is, I think, still more marked in the Pastoral letters, which modern scholarship is more and more widely denying to Paul. Here the catalogue of functionaries in the churches is quite different from those in the letters to the Romans and Corinthians and Ephesians. We hear no word of a prophet. Bishops and deacons and widows bulk large instead. Their qualifications, harmless and Christian enough, are given in great detail. Titus is bidden to reprove with authority and to appoint elders in every city. We hear for the first time of the "washing of regeneration," afterward so emphasized in John. But, most noteworthy of all, "Paul" writes to Timothy about his ordination in most dubious language. He seems to refer to it five times. Once he speaks of "prophecies which led the way to thee," as though some prophet had chosen him for his office of evangelist by a free word of the Lord. Again he bids Timothy: "Neglect not the gift that is in thee which was given thee by prophecy and by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." Even here, however, the free word of prophecy has its part to play in the ordination. But at still another time "Paul" does not scruple to charge Timothy to "stir up the gift of God that is in thee through the laying on of my hands." Here certainly an unprejudiced rendering of the words would seem to imply that spiritual gifts were dependent upon apostolic ordination. It is true that all these three passages seem to refer to the same event, and that, after a prophet had selected Timothy by revelation for the work of an evangelist, the elders and "Paul" laid their hands upon him and ordained him to that office, but it is a fact that this last expression is contained in a different letter from the others and seems to convey a different theory of the event. It may indeed

be a shift of the apostle's memory, but whatever it is, it would appear as if, at the time the second letter to Timothy was written in its present form, the sacerdotal conception was no longer an impossibility. The letter is full of offices and of induction into those offices of which the earliest Christian documents betray no knowledge. The emphasis has certainly changed, and in spiritual things a change of emphasis betokens a change of living and of believing.

These are facts, and are far surer than any explanation of them. And yet it does not seem difficult to guess the reason for this shifting of emphasis from the freedom of the spirit to the orderliness and statutoriness of ordination and systematic church government. It was already necessary at the earliest time to warn the Thessalonians, who were themselves expecting the coming of the Lord, not to despise prophesying, and it was a hard matter to straighten out the tangles in which the freedom of prophecy had involved the Corinthians. As it seemed so impossible to keep the spirits of the prophets and the ecstasies subject to them, the churches began to desire them to be subject to more ordinary men. And as prophecy sank in favor, the atmosphere in which it thrived disappeared. Gradually churches found themselves without prophets, and the bishops (elders, as we would call them) and deacons performed their tasks. In the early *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* we find it enjoined to give the first-fruits to the prophets, "but if ye have no prophet, give them to the poor." And a few sentences farther on we read: "Appoint for yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord; for they too render you the service of the prophets and teachers. Despise them not therefore." It is interesting to observe that the Greek word *χειροτονέω*, which here seems to have its earlier meaning of "appoint," is the very word which later was employed in the signification of "ordain." Thus upon these bishops and deacons, the parts of the body of Christ which were thought to be less honorable, upon them was soon bestowed the "more abundant honor" of ordination. As the financial questions, moreover, grew more important, and as the eucharist became the central service of the church, these less conspicuously spiritual offices became the most necessary of all. An elder or

bishop could preside at the Lord's Supper as worthily as a prophet, and could administer the church funds with greater acceptance. It is not surprising if eventually the apparent spiritual defect of these offices was made good by the service of ordination, to which an increasingly sacerdotal significance became attached for purposes of honor and discipline.

To sum up the historical facts regarding ordination. Our Lord founded no church and commissioned no church-officers. The one command savoring of church-problems which he gave those nearest him was: "Be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your teacher, and all ye are brethren. And call no man your father on the earth; for one is your Father, the heavenly."<sup>2</sup> The earliest Christian documents contain no allusion to ordination, nor to those officers who afterward claimed divine powers on its account. Not until the second century do we assuredly come upon a contemporaneous witness to the ceremony of ordination, and even then its sacerdotal quality is but little emphasized. Surely the question is in place, Is any ordination valid in the Christian church?

As this, however, is a question not of history but of spiritual predilection and temperament, brief suggestions rather than a closely knit argument are in place. We ask, therefore, whether ordination fits those Christian officers who are customarily ordained today for the functions now expected of them. We expect them to marry men and women; but even Christians recognize as lawful marriages which are performed by the state. We expect them to bury the dead; but what church would forbid any of its members from reading a committal service? Must a captain at sea be ordained for that purpose? We expect them to preach the gospel; but how often is the gospel preached as effectively by laymen! To ordain a man as a necessary qualification for preaching would be to outlaw both the Old and the New Testament prophets and many a successful evangelist. We expect them to baptize; but even the Roman Catholics allow this to be done in necessitous circumstances by lay Christians. We

<sup>2</sup> This cannot, however, be absolutely relied upon as a genuine word of our Lord. While far more primitive in its phrasing than the sayings of our Lord upon the church, which we have already considered, it comes to us from the Gospel of Matthew alone.

expect them to pray; but they certainly have no exclusive rights in prayer. The only service which is still widely withheld from laymen is the conduct of the Lord's Supper. But certainly that service is no more sacred than baptism or prayer. The presiding person at the feast seemed of such little importance to the apostle Paul, or even to the writer of the Acts, that it is impossible to say who it was. Only those who see some kind of pharmacological significance in the Lord's Supper can logically demand a specifically ordained person to distribute it. But to see such significance is to depart from the truth as it is in Jesus.

No one can believe in the freedom of the Spirit as Jesus and Paul believed in it and believe in a peculiar and saving sacramental grace. If the Spirit is supplied by the hearing of faith, if a child can repose on the love of God before it has ever sat at the Lord's table, if the teaching of Jesus is still regarded as a sufficient standard of faith, then sacramentalism is false. And any ordination that is supposed to convey a peculiar grace or an exclusive right to preside at the table of the Lord is a delusion, and is dangerously near being an enemy of the gospel. Much more in accord with the earliest practice of the church, and at first sight at least more conducive to the rule of the Spirit, would it be to do away completely with ordination of Christian ministers, as we have happily done away with ordination of Christian deacons. But is it necessary for us to follow the example of the Quakers and of the Separatists and do away with ordination altogether? We should, if we regard the act of ordination as conferring necessary grace; if we would define it with the Century Dictionary as the rite of investing with ministerial or sacerdotal power and authority. We need not, if we regard the act of ordination as a public recognition of grace. The service of ordination does in the church precisely what a degree does in a college. It testifies to the church at large that in the opinion of the representatives of a group of churches a certain man understands and reveres the gospel and the Lord sufficiently to preach them. It is a certificate of standing. And so it aids the churches in securing Christian men to perform functions for which Christian men are necessary. But such ordination should no more prevent other Christians from performing those same Christian

functions in churches where they are personally known than the absence of a college diploma should prohibit a scholar from writing and teaching. In my own opinion the Christianity of our churches would be considerably purified and deepened if the churches should choose from their own number an unordained and earnest Christian to preside at the sacred service of the Lord's Supper, a service no more sacred, however, than any reverent service of prayer.

For, after all, the church is an institution in a realm where institutions are bound to be inadequate. Only as every church recognizes its fundamental inadequacy can it do its work with the least fatal consequences. The church represents order in a realm where order seems utterly presumptuous. The very immensity of its task should keep it reverently fearful of everything systematic and stereotyped. The church is committed to a task which can never be committed to it. The moment it presumes to confine the Spirit of God in the bounds of its ceremonies, that moment the Spirit of God departs from it. For the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. High walls can keep out the Spirit of God, but they cannot hold the Spirit in. So long as the church held a semi-pagan view of redemption, so long could it consistently demand a pagan order of priests to perform it. For centuries the church identified redemption with everlasting life. This life was to be ingrafted upon our mortality by drugging our flesh with infusions of the body of Christ. This body was obtainable only through the sacraments of the church. And the sacraments were dependent for their efficacy upon the special grace bestowed upon the administrators of the same in the sacred service of ordination. But ordination, as a requisite for the performance of ministerial functions, stands or falls with this ancient semi-pagan theory of redemption. *When a man comes to believe that redemption consists in taking the filial attitude toward God and the brotherly attitude toward men, then ordination as an indispensable qualification for any Christian service becomes an impertinence.* By whom was Christ ordained? And whom did He ordain? When a man, through reverent trust in Jesus, makes His attitude to God and man his own, he has become a king and priest to God. No

ordination can give him more than an opportunity for the exercise of that priesthood that his faith has already bestowed upon him. The higher and more spiritual is our conception of redemption, the higher and more spiritual will be our conception of the task of the church. For the task of the church is nothing else than to spread the good news of redemption and to maintain in the world a fellowship founded on the glad experience of redemption. But when we define redemption as Jesus revealed it, that moment the church becomes simply one of God's agents in preparing the way for that supreme spiritual act which is consummated between God and each individual soul. All orders fall away, save as matters of convenience. There is but one order, as but one reward, in the Christian church. Whether a man comes to it at the first or at the eleventh hour, whether he works in it as Sunday-school teacher, or bishop, or reverent worshipper and obscure disciple, he receives the one order and the one reward; he comes into conscious spiritual communion with the Most High God, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. "So then neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase." "There can be neither Jew nor Greek," neither ordained nor unordained, "there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female: for ye all are one in Christ Jesus."

## RECENT BOOKS ON PREACHING AND PREACHERS

EDWARD HALE

CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS

The books that have been written on the preparation and delivery of sermons are usually more helpful to ministers of some experience than to the students in divinity schools for whose instruction they were first of all intended. The man who is already a preacher, and who is also open-minded and willing to learn, sifts out from the detail of the numerous divisions and subdivisions of such books much that is suggestive and stimulating; his own experience interprets the precepts and warnings that are given, confirms their wisdom, and brings home their application. To the average student, on the other hand, the elaborate analysis easily becomes confusing; the sermon is made to appear a thing highly technical, if not artificial, and, in spite of any protest to the contrary which the book may contain, an end in itself instead of the means to an end. Learning to preach is like learning to do anything else. The rules for the beginner must be few and simple, and refinement and enrichment of method must come as part of the preacher's general growth, and with the gain in confidence and freedom which should naturally result from the continued practice of his calling. Many students would find it easier to begin to preach, and many preachers would be more effective, if they could understand from the first that the rules which govern the method of the sermon differ in no way from those of any other form of persuasive public speech.

Dr. Breed's *Preparing to Preach*<sup>1</sup> illustrates both the defects and the merits of these books. There is much that is wholesome throughout, the chapters on extemporaneous preaching are exceptionally definite in analysis and helpful in advice, and nothing could be better of its kind than the frank, pithy counsel of the chapter on pulpit manners. But one wishes that the four hundred and fifty pages had been condensed at least one-third, that

<sup>1</sup> *Preparing to Preach*, by David R. Breed, D.D., Professor of Homiletics in Western Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pa. George H. Doran Company, 1911.

the preparation for the delivery of the sermon had been treated on broader lines, and that the writer had abstained from any part in perpetuating the artificial classification of sermons as "narrative," "doctrinal," "expository," and the rest.

Professor Hoyt also lends his authority to this kind of classification in his book on *The Preacher*.<sup>2</sup> But there is a quality in this book, as in Professor Hoyt's earlier book on preaching,<sup>3</sup> which disarms criticism of such formalism as he retains. Both books so overflow with the new wine of a warm, earnest personality, seeking and calling forth all that is most personal and living in those to whom the writer addresses himself, that the old bottles which are made to do duty become comparatively unimportant. "Christianity is a life; it can only be propagated by personal influence"; the "homiletic habit" is "the power to see and use truth for public speech"; "you must preach to yourself before you can preach to others": these sentences, taken almost at random from the earlier book, are characteristic of the spirit in which both books are written. They can hardly fail to accomplish the avowed purpose, "to help the preacher speak with authority, touch the conscience and form the moral habits of the age, and make his work educative of the abundant life."

Dr. Dykes also writes on the preparation of the sermon, though more concisely, in the third part of *The Christian Minister and his Duties*.<sup>4</sup> The style of the book is dry, and the treatment of the conduct of worship is so largely historical and descriptive that those who turn to it for practical suggestion may be disappointed. But, in what is said of the call to the ministry, those who are doubting whether they should or should not be ministers will find clear-cut answers to many of their questions; and the chapters on the minister's devotional life, his character, and his citizenship, contain much that is at once searching and stimulating.

<sup>2</sup> *The Preacher, his Person, Message, and Method. A Book for the Classroom and Study.* By Arthur S. Hoyt, Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in the Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909.

<sup>3</sup> *The Work of Preaching.* The Macmillan Company, 1905.

<sup>4</sup> *The Christian Minister and his Duties,* by J. Oswald Dykes, M.A., D.D., Principal Emeritus of Westminster College, Cambridge. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909.



Nearly every teacher of homiletics advises students to inform themselves in regard to the lives and methods of great preachers. The advice is good if the student is not led into formal imitation, but reads to catch the spirit of the preacher. As a rule one's own direct resort to original sources is more satisfying, in such study, than any knowledge at second hand, in which one must depend on the judgment of another for selection and criticism. But the competent summary or review has its value in so far as it invites to a first acquaintance which might not be had otherwise. The collection of such summaries which Professor Brastow published in 1904<sup>5</sup> needs no word of appreciation at this late day for its just and sympathetic estimate of the life and work of the eight or nine spiritual leaders whom it describes. The same catholicity and discernment characterize Professor Brastow's later book, *The Modern Pulpit*,<sup>6</sup> and have made it especially instructive to those who wish to compare the preaching of the different Protestant denominations, and their work in general, and to see just what contribution each is making toward the larger and deeper spiritual life of the present time. The book must already have helped much toward a fuller mutual understanding and a more intelligent and sympathetic toleration among the denominations. The form of both volumes is attractive, but any future edition of *Representative Modern Preachers* would be more convenient for reference if the running titles of the chapters were to include the name of the preacher who is the subject of the essay.

There is a class of books the aim of which is not so much to instruct the minister as to quicken his spiritual life, or to reassure him in the face of the difficulties which the student foresees and which the settled minister has experienced. Professor Robertson has undertaken to do this in *The Glory of the Ministry*,<sup>7</sup> a study

<sup>5</sup> *Representative Modern Preachers*, by Lewis O. Brastow, D.D., Professor of Practical Theology in Yale University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904.

<sup>6</sup> *The Modern Pulpit. A Study of Homiletic Sources and Characteristics*. The Macmillan Company, 1906.

<sup>7</sup> *The Glory of the Ministry. Paul's Exultation in Preaching*, by A. T. Robertson, M.A., D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.

of Paul's triumph over the discouragements which met him as a preacher. The friendly candor of Dr. Robertson's preface makes one reluctant to criticise, but it is to be regretted that he did not allow himself more freedom from the exegetical method of the class-room. The very numerous references in the page and in the foot-notes make the book helpful as a commentary, but they make still more difficult the attempt to follow a sequence of thought, already far too much broken in the slow progress of the exegesis. *The Minister and the Spiritual Life*,<sup>8</sup> as indicated by its title, is another of the books intended to stimulate rather than to instruct. All who know anything of Dr. Gunsaulus will realize how much these Yale lectures of 1911 must have gained from his personality in the actual delivery. In print the uniform richness of illustration and figure which characterizes the style becomes burdensome, and the reader longs for an occasional thought more simply expressed. The main thesis, however, the need of spiritual vision in the church and of spiritual life in its leaders, is presented with sufficient clearness and force, and there is much that is stirring in the study of the various channels through which the spiritual life either is enriched or makes itself effective. At times, as in the discussion of the subliminal and subconscious in personal salvation, one feels on rather uncertain ground, and the sense in which Dr. Gunsaulus uses the term "orthodoxy" seems strained. But the vigor with which he declares that a great society becomes possible only as the individuals who compose it are worthy, is most timely in view of the readiness with which the opposite theory now often finds acceptance. In reading *The Theology of a Preacher*<sup>9</sup> one does not have to agree with Mr. Hough in his belief, or even in his point of view, in order to feel the contagion of his sincerity and enthusiasm. It is from the revelations of the spiritual in the material, the divine in the human, that the preacher is to construct his theology, and these he finds as he goes about his work and comes into daily contact with men. His belief in God, the special form which this belief is to take, the corollaries which

<sup>8</sup> *The Minister and the Spiritual Life*, by Frank W. Gunsaulus, D.D., LL.D., Minister of Central Church, Chicago. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.

<sup>9</sup> *The Theology of a Preacher*, by Lynn Harold Hough. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1912.

result from it, all become clear and assured as he responds with real consecration to the demands made upon him by the duties of his calling. Mr. Hough's theory is new only in the sense that he has discovered it for himself, but the ardor with which he makes, as it were, the confession of his own experience, and seeks to give to others the key to the satisfaction which he has found, is most quickening. The very human and at the same time very spiritual quality of the book will constitute for most readers its chief value, but from time to time there is some especially suggestive thought, as in the brief passage on free will. The chapter on the place of Jesus in the theology of the preacher probably will be helpful to many, but some will find a broader and at the same time deeper interpretation in what Dr. Gunsaulus says on the same subject, an interpretation which Mr. Hough himself presents indirectly in his chapter on "The Great Companionship."

To student and settled minister alike, and perhaps most of all to the man who is hesitating whether to enter the ministry, nothing is more helpful than a reasonable assurance that there is not only a place, but a demand for what the minister can do for the interpretation and development of men's lives under present conditions. In *The Church of To-Day* and *The Church of Tomorrow*<sup>10</sup> Dr. Crooker reviews these conditions frankly, with full recognition of the difficulties which they present; while in his conviction that the church must be the chief source and instrument of those forces which are to meet the difficulties, and preserve to both present and future all that makes life really worth living, he makes very plain the opportunity which the ministry offers for the exercise of a man's best powers. Of the two books, *The Church of Tomorrow* is the more critical in tone, and to some extent the more theoretical. Partly on this account and partly because of a certain repetition in the discussion, which Dr. Crooker himself recognizes, it is not likely to make so strong an appeal as the earlier book.

The little volume entitled *Scientific Management in the Churches*<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *The Church of To-Day. A Plea*, by Joseph Henry Crooker. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1908. *The Church of Tomorrow*. The Pilgrim Press, 1911.

<sup>11</sup> *Scientific Management in the Churches*, by Shailer Mathews, Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1912.

gives more permanent form to a paper read by Professor Mathews at the Sagamore Sociological Conference of 1911, in which the principles of scientific management that make for greater efficiency in business are applied to the activities of the Church. In so far as the author calls attention to the superficial character of what passes for organization in many churches and to the resulting inefficiency, he renders a real service, and all must be grateful to him both for his analysis of existing conditions and for the remedies he proposes, by which the church is to become a "coöperating group of spiritual workmen." His conception should also help to make the calling of the ministry more inviting to those to whom administration, and concrete, measurable forms of service, especially appeal. It is unfortunate, however, that Professor Mathews is not wholly clear or consistent in the distinction which he makes between the minister and his education as they are assumed to be, and the education and the minister as he would have them. For example, every one will agree that ministers should be trained to become "leaders of men rather than merely exhorters of men," and that schools of divinity should send out men "trained in efficiency rather than merely informed as to orthodoxy." But when it is said that the "fundamental conception of the minister's education must be changed from that of a man with a message to that of a leader of a social group with a definitely religious and moral function," one is not so sure. The "man with a message" is very apt to become a leader of men, whether an exhorter or not, and whatever his orthodoxy or heterodoxy. In *The Educational Ideal in the Ministry*<sup>12</sup> President Faunce develops a conception of the minister which is as essential as it is timely. For in its fundamental idea, as he says, the church has anticipated in various ways the emphasis which our age lays on education as its "characteristic activity." But the chief educational work of the church, Dr. Faunce holds, can be done, not as it reaches a few "through formal schools and curricula," but only "in and through its regular services and functions." "If the aim of education is 'preparation for complete living,'

<sup>12</sup> *The Educational Ideal in the Ministry. The Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale University in the Year 1908*, by William Herbert Perry Faunce, President of Brown University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908.

and the aim of the church is 'that the man of God may be thoroughly furnished unto all good works,' then the church is fundamentally an educational institution, and the minister is in essence a teacher of his generation." Dr. Faunce discusses the questions suggested by this thesis, and the conclusions which follow, with characteristic insight, breadth, and judgment, and with the authority of an experience, both as parish minister and as educator, which has been peculiarly rich in opportunity for observation. The eight chapters or lectures are all full of suggestion and encouragement for the minister who is in earnest in his desire to justify his calling; but the concluding chapter, "The Education of the Minister by his Task," is peculiarly valuable in that it makes plain the challenge to intellectual and spiritual growth and to the development of originality in its best sense, which the ministry gives beyond any other calling. Incidentally the long pastorate is shown to be necessary, not only that the minister may attain the full strengthening and ripening of his powers, but also that the relation in which he stands to the church and the community may be assured "time for growth as well as for appeal."

It is suggestive that these books, representing various sympathies and methods, have one characteristic in common. All emphasize the personality of the preacher and the quality of that personality. The minister is to be first and always a man among men, and he is to be a spiritually-minded man. It is a good omen for the continued and increasing usefulness of the Christian ministry when those who enter it are thus reminded that, although changing times bring changed conditions, the one great essential of their calling is still the same, and that they are to come as their Master came, that men "may have life, and may have it abundantly."

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- THE MAN AMONG THE MYRTLES: A STUDY IN ZECHARIAH'S VISIONS.** *By John Adams.* (The Short Course Series.) pp. 8+142. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 60 cents net.
- THE MESSAGE OF THE DISCIPLES FOR THE UNION OF THE CHURCH, INCLUDING THEIR ORIGIN AND HISTORY.** *By Peter Ainslie.* (Lectures delivered before the Yale Divinity School, New Haven.) pp. 212. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. cop. 1913. \$1.00 net.
- THE FUNDAMENTAL CHRISTIAN FAITH; THE ORIGIN, HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE APOSTLES' AND NICENE CREEDS.** *By Charles Augustus Briggs.* pp. 12+332. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. \$1.50 net.
- THE BOOK WITHOUT A NAME, CHIEFLY ON NATURISM, OR THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.** *Compiled in Dixieland by Oran Catellaw.* pp. 15+173. London: C. W. Daniel. 1913.
- THE BOOK OF WISDOM, WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.** *Edited by the Rev. A. T. S. Goodrick.* (The Oxford Church Bible Commentary.) pp. 12+437. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. \$2.00 net.
- A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT.** *By George Buchanan Gray.* pp. 11+253. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 75 cents net.
- COMPARATIVE RELIGION.** *By F. B. Jevons.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 7+154. Cambridge: University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 40 cents net.
- ANCIENT BABYLONIA.** *By C. H. W. Johns.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 7+148. Cambridge: University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 40 cents net.
- THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON.** *By Édouard Le Roy.* Translated from the French by Vincent Benson. pp. 10+235. New York, etc.: Henry Holt & Company. 1913. \$1.25 net.
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- EVOLUTION AND THE NEED OF ATONEMENT. *By Stewart A. McDowall.* pp. 16+155. Cambridge: University Press. 1912. 3 shillings net.
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**SOCIALISM, IDEALISM, AND THE CHANGING THEOLOGY; A STUDY OF THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.** *By Gerald Birney Smith.* (The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures for 1912 delivered before the Yale Divinity School.) pp. 26+251. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. \$1.25 net.

**THE BOOK OF JOB. THE POETIC PORTION VERSIFIED, WITH DUE REGARD TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE AUTHORIZED VERSION.** *By Homer B. Sprague.* pp. 6+243. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1913. \$1.25 net.

**THE BOOK OF JOB INTERPRETED.** *By James Strahan.* pp. 12+356. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1913. Seven shillings and sixpence net.

**STUDIES IN JEWISH LITERATURE ISSUED IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR KAUFMANN KOHLER, PH.D., PRESIDENT HEBREW UNION COLLEGE, CINCINNATI, OHIO, ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY, MAY THE TENTH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTEEN.** pp. 7+301. Berlin: George Reimer, Publisher and Printer. 1913.

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**THE MODERN CALL OF MISSIONS: STUDIES IN SOME OF THE LARGER ASPECTS OF A GREAT ENTERPRISE.** *By James S. Dennis.* pp. 341. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. cop. 1913. \$1.50 net.

**NOTES ON THE HEBREW TEXT AND THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BOOKS OF SAMUEL, WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON HEBREW PALAEOGRAPHY AND THE ANCIENT VERSIONS AND FACSIMILES OF INSCRIPTIONS AND MAPS.** *By the Rev. S. R. Driver. Second edition, revised and enlarged.* pp. 20+96+390. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1913. 12 shillings net.

**HOMELY THOUGHTS ON THE PARABLES OF THE TREE OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE LIGHT OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.** *By John Coutts.* pp. 64. London: G. Lyl. 1913. Twopence net.





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For the year 1913 Harold M. Wiener, Esq., will continue his masterly defense of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, Professor A. A. Berle will furnish a series of articles on "The Christian Church as a Social Instrument," and Dr. H. W. Magoun will give three papers on "A Layman's View of the Critical Theory."

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# THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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The Review aims to include discussions in the various fields of theological study and also in the history of religions, ethics, education, economics, and sociology, in their theological and religious aspects. It is designed to serve the needs not only of clergymen and scholars, but of all who are interested in religious thought and in the place and function of religion in modern life.

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## *A STUDY OF THE RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND CHURCHES OF THE UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>*

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UNIVERSITY OF MARBURG, GERMANY

The following memorial, which I publish with the approval of the Prussian Minister of Worship and Education, is to inform the public at large of the establishment of an American Library of Theology at the University of Marburg. The scientific aims of this Library have the full approval not only of the Prussian government, but also of the theological Faculty of the University, of which I am a member. Thanks to a well-wisher, a German living in America, whose generosity made possible the founding of the Library, the Prussian government was in a position at the beginning of this year to call it actually into being, and to establish it at the University of Marburg as an official institution.

Established in connection with one of the seminars at the University, it has as yet, because of its modest resources, not been able to make any great claims, and must rely upon the active support of the Prussian government, and, above all, upon the help of friends and well-wishers in America. When, as head of the Library, I made public the document which brought unexpected fulfilment to a thought that occurred to me during my trip in America, it was not with the claim of wishing to make a scientific contribution to a religious understanding between Germany and America. It was much more my wish to give renewed expression to the deep convictions with which, under the fresh

<sup>1</sup> The translation has been made by Rev. W. H. Anthony (University of Pennsylvania '09) and Rev. J. M. Groton (Harvard '09), students at Marburg, winter semester 1912-13.

impression of the religion of a new land, I came to grasp the possibilities of a mutual theological understanding.

The conviction of the great value of an international religious understanding through the interchange of scientific ideas has not since left me; in fact, it deepens to its first glow as often as I discuss this subject or take pen to write of it. The work itself, however, will be done quietly, with no attempt to exaggerate either its significance or its possible results. Within half a year's time, I think, all vague enthusiasm following the establishment of the Library will have vanished, and the service to be rendered by it will be seen to be not only scientific but personal. For, no matter how religion may be viewed, it is always personal, and no scientific consideration can conceal this glowing personal element. It is for this reason that I regard the task of the American Library of Theology as that of rendering personal service as well as service in the realm of pure ideas.

Above all else, I consider of greatest value a collection of books from which may be gathered scientific information on the theological, ecclesiastical, and religious development and present-day conditions of North America. On account of the size of the field to be covered and the expense, only the most important works may be procured. Besides dogmatics, literature dealing with the psychology and the social aspects of religion is the most interesting which America just now has to offer us. These branches of the Library will be developed first, and brought into practical use by means of seminars, special courses, and lectures. Further, the Library offers free access to current scientific, religious, ecclesiastical, and political periodicals, which are important for a study of the continuous development of the religious life of America. In this way the Library will be of value to American students—to those who are willing to help us in our comparative studies of German and American forms of piety, and to those who, through American journals which elsewhere in Germany are not to be found, wish to keep in touch with the course of events at home. It may well grow into a common meeting-ground where German and American students of theology may learn to know one another. It should surely be the aim of both teacher and pupil to comprehend the international character of

religion in its widest sense, and to extend their examination to the religion of all civilized peoples, without in any way neglecting the sharply emphasized individual and national characteristics of the religious life. An impartial and intelligent introduction for foreign students to German religion would be a secondary aim, and could be realized in so far as we, as Germans, take pains to understand scientifically their own religious peculiarities and achievements. The publication of yearly reports, of papers in the Institute's special department, reviews, information on pertinent literature, these should go a long way toward completing our work, and above all should win for it in America the friends which it needs.

This small but fortunate beginning has its root in two lands. No land by itself can bring about a common understanding in matters of religion; the other must co-operate. The essence of all religion is its foundation in personality. The growth of this new institution may well symbolize the fact that only in the mutually unselfish undertaking of a common task and in mutual confidence is the progress of religious culture in the world to be sought. With firm confidence in the religious future of America the following memorial has its origin. It should lead the way for the work of coming years.

I should like to submit herewith the memorial, in which I made a report to the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship and Education in the fall of 1911 concerning my visit to America. In making this report I have in mind the suggestion to establish, in the department of the theological Faculty of one of the Prussian universities, a seminar for the study of religious conditions in the United States. I was so much impressed by the churches and their organizations in the East and Middle West that I feel I must not lose this opportunity to record my observations. As a result of my visit, I am more and more convinced of the importance of a thorough religious understanding between Germans and Americans. For these two peoples have doubtless a very important part to play in the future of Christianity and in the general development of culture. The task of bringing about this mutual understanding must, in my mind, devolve upon the university, and proceed along intellectual lines. It must nat-



urally have to do with the departments of (1) theology, (2) the churches, (3) the religious life. The work of such a seminar as I am suggesting will fall easily into these three main divisions.

*Theology.*—In the first place this seminar must have a library of distinctly theological works. The systematic theological branches should receive first consideration, since these express the most characteristic features of the religious development. I feel that a well-chosen collection of such books in English would be more valuable than the German translations of individual authors, which at best could give no more than a fragmentary survey. After all, how little do we really know of the theological literature of America! One looks for it in vain on the shelves of our university libraries. The leading theological periodicals ought also to be included. To supplement the use of this material, classes should be held with discussions, or now and then a lecture, on some such topic as the psychology of religion.

*Church Organization.*—In the second place and perhaps of greater importance, we should possess material relating to the history, teaching, organization, and present-day life of the different denominations, their leading periodicals, characteristic sermons, and books of instruction. There is much of such material available, as, for example, *The Congregationalist*, *The Churchman*, and many other periodicals, with the aid of which lectures on the creeds, history, *et cætera*, could be made of real and lively interest. Since those different denominations have a real and vital existence, their polity, forms of expression, and other externals acquire for us an ever-increasing interest and importance. A study of the organization and history of these denominations should prove of equal value with that of their theology and doctrine. The development of the church life and the fitness of the different forms of government must be of the greatest interest to our theologians, and even, may we not suppose, to students of law. For there is no doubt that we have suffered through our ignorance in this particular field. Therefore in some German university there should be easy access to abundant material for the study of such questions. This need our seminar could supply.

*The Religious Life.*—In the third place and finally, the general religious life in America must be studied. If we are to be

thorough, we must have the leading works of philosophy and ethics, politics and missions. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that a grasp of American philosophy and mental attitude is the only starting-point for bringing about such a mutual understanding as we propose. To this end I already held, in the winter semester of 1911-12, a seminar on the religion and philosophy of America, which I hope to continue. The scope of this seminar must be so wide as to include a study of the social and political periodicals, for example, *The Survey* and *The Outlook*. Of no less importance are books dealing with the social question, and the social work of the leading denominations, and reports of the Young Men's Christian Association. As the American government offers its *Statistics on Religious Bodies* (1906) to all interested, I have no doubt much of this material would gladly be placed at our disposal. Further, we must not overlook a study of politics, aesthetics, and *belles lettres*,—to mention only such writers as Whittier and Hawthorne. In short, it is here a question of so broadening the horizon that we may have a clear view of the development of the great underlying characteristics of American Protestantism, and at the same time come to understand the reason for the many religious divisions and their consequences.<sup>1</sup> Only in this way is a complete understanding of American Protestantism and a corresponding intercourse with it possible; the significance of which for the intellectual advancement of humanity and for the world's peace I assert in the strongest terms.

Indications point today to an international understanding of the sciences. For some time the interchange of the results of science and philosophy has been productive of much good. Political differences have been modified and a better understanding of the life of the nations brought about. Science, because of its objectivity and universality, forms a connecting link between nations; for the conclusions of logic are everywhere the same, and no one may disregard their scientific exactness. Hence may not science be a bond of peace between nations? The question must now be asked, should we content ourselves merely with this

<sup>1</sup>W. Müller's new book, *Das religiöse Leben in Amerika* (Jena, Diederichs, 1911), represents the beginning of such a collection in German. It could well have been more thorough and scientific.

interchange of abstractions? In every people we find a spiritual power which much more fully expresses its real being, namely, the power of religion. This, which reveals the very soul of a people, is individual, inimitable; nevertheless, it should play a unique part in international relationships.

The interchange of religious ideals is in itself a specific task. We realize that theology in many of its branches lacks that objectivity which is a common bond among the sciences. Religion, however, is not imparted by purely intellectual means. It is important to note that not only within the realm of the Christian religion generally, but even in a particular denomination whose members are made up of different nationalities, fundamental differences prevail in the forms and expressions of religion, which cannot occur in case of the sciences. The observations and impressions which I express here are based only upon the scanty material which I collected during my short stay in America in the spring and summer of 1911. As this has given me but a mere glimpse of the country, my effort will be limited to pointing out the necessity of religious intercourse between two peoples bound together not only by political and economic ties but, because of their pronounced Protestantism, by a common task in religion.

I must, in passing, strongly emphasize the fact that America has much to learn from Germany in theology and religion. But America has always followed with interest the course of German theology. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century her students have come to Germany, and in fact it is now quite the rule that the majority of those who receive foreign scholarships come to us to study theology at its source. We, however, have not been so ready to learn from them the condition of religion in their own country, but have contented ourselves with being willing hosts and disinterested teachers. The result has been that German influence is recognized more readily and with less prejudice in the universities and theological seminaries than anywhere else in America. Here the results of German theology exercise an undeniable influence.

But the time has come when we Germans must change our attitude. Friendships between peoples, as between individuals,

must be reciprocal, and such reciprocity must extend into the sphere of religion. The peculiar way in which America has developed and applied that which she has learnt from us makes it impossible for us to disregard her religious conditions. And we must be careful not to limit ourselves to the realm of pure theology, which is today so ably represented through the visits of German professors to America. For present-day relations call for greater depth and more soul; and these can only come from a thorough understanding of the whole religious life of America. Thus our attention is directed: 1. To American theology; 2. Church organizations; 3. religious ideals.

## I.

After this general characterization it will not surprise us to find that Germany has little to learn from American theology. For we must remember that the theology of America is scarcely more than 150 years old, and it is only recently that it has shaken off the fetters of denominationalism. In fact, the fight for complete intellectual freedom is still going on. A few leading theological institutions, as, e.g., Union Theological Seminary of New York, the Harvard Divinity School of Cambridge, and some others, have acquired an interdenominational character and offer instruction to students of every creed. Only through this expansion has the complete freedom of professors of theology become an established fact; though they are of course benefited through friendly intercourse with affiliated universities. So broad has the teaching become that, in the more conservative denominations, some of their students have difficulty in gaining ordination. It is to be hoped, however, that these churches will, sooner or later, recognize the value of this radicalism, and through their own theologians and clergymen aid in this work of broader scholarship. A frequent combination of theory and practice in the seminaries—to point out the disadvantages of which is in itself a specific task and is here out of place—helps to develop this liberal movement.

My chief interest is in the theological seminaries, and of these only the more prominent are to be included in our study. We

must, however, mention the fact that the philosophical Faculties of different universities include men who have done excellent work in the field of religion. It should not be supposed for a moment, however, that all such professors are ultra-radical and dangerous to the Church. In fact, some of them occupy conservative positions and a few of the more radical ones have pastorates in orthodox denominations. That is indeed a good sign of tolerance.

*Institutions and Scholars of Special Interest.*—Among institutions which one would do well to visit I would mention the following: Union Theological Seminary in New York; The Harvard Divinity School, Andover Theological Seminary, and The Episcopal Theological School, in Cambridge, Mass.; The Yale Divinity School; The Divinity School of the University of Chicago; and others not affiliated with universities, such as Hartford Theological Seminary in Connecticut; Bangor Theological Seminary in Maine; and the Baptist Theological Seminary in Rochester, N.Y. I must also include the philosophical, psychological, pedagogical, and sociological departments of such universities as Columbia, in New York; Harvard, in Cambridge; Yale, in New Haven; University of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia, and others. Finally, I must mention, in psychology, the names of Stanley Hall of Clark University, Worcester, Mass.; J. Leuba of Bryn Mawr, Penn.; Edward S. Ames of Chicago; Irving King of Iowa; Geo. A. Coe of Union Theological Seminary in New York: in philosophy, J. B. Pratt of Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.; G. H. Howison of California: in sociology, Edward T. Devine and J. E. Russell of Columbia, New York, and others.

Now it is significant that the generally peaceful relationship between theology and church in America rests upon a more or less imperfect grasp of the former. I leave out of consideration the mass of traditional theology which, though unable to meet the demands of modern thought, is nevertheless very successful in practical work and still taught in many of the seminaries. Among its exponents one cannot fail to observe a lack of philosophical interest in religion,—a fact which is also true of many of the students. Even where German theology seems to wield a deep influence, the result is a superficiality and inability to comprehend

religion in its largest aspects. The scientific method, which is alone the result of time and careful study, is generally lacking in the treatment of American critical theology. With the disappearance, however, of Biblical authority and the introduction of radical criticism, the interest in scientific scholarship has grown. Along with this, history seems to have become frequently merely the object of negative criticism;<sup>3</sup> and hence, the many singular attempts to grasp the modern situation apart from its historical setting. It is not to be wondered at that only a few of the leading minds of America have recognized the importance of revising the conceptions of historical tradition; for, as a matter of fact, America has very few great traditions, and those which it has have been almost entirely disregarded. On the contrary, one meets occasionally with thinkers who hold that only in the complete breaking away from tradition and in the dream of a new religion can true progress be realized. In studying this religious radicalism we must recognize that the lack of a scientific theology is partly compensated by a belief in the power of religion and by an enthusiasm for Christian progress.

*Biblical Theology and Church History.*—Here I must observe that this criticism is limited strictly to that department which we must regard as of paramount importance, viz., systematic theology. To this field I have principally directed my attention, together with the allied sciences of psychology, history of religion, and philosophy. Only in these departments am I able to form anything like a correct estimate of American theology. In the departments of the Old and New Testaments there are in English philological and historical works which Germany has always readily recognized and used. Work in Church history in America has, until recently, confined itself almost entirely to the English Church; though H. M. Baird's book on the Huguenots and H. C. Lea's on the Inquisition are noteworthy exceptions.

*Dogmatics.*—The study of general church history, however, in which Harnack and his works are the standard guides, has not

<sup>3</sup> An extreme example of this is Thompson's article on the alleged persecution of the Christians at Lyons in 177 A.D., in *The American Journal of Theology* (July, 1912, pp. 358-384), and the withering criticism of the article by A. Harnack in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, Nov. 3, 1913, p. 74 ff.

been without valuable results. If we leave out of consideration the field of practical theology, which is not at all scientific and which is always stamped with denominationalism, there remains systematic theology taken in its widest sense. And if from this we extract its essence, viz., its dogma, we find little profitable to the German theologian. Many of the principal American works on dogma have been derived from England and Germany. One can still detect, for example, Hegel's influence. Many of the latest works, influenced partly by Ritschlian theology and partly by modern empirical interests, have no clearly scientific character. Nevertheless, the works of leading theologians, such as William Adams Brown of Union Theological Seminary, and Edward C. Moore<sup>4</sup> of The Harvard Divinity School, repay a careful study.

*Ethics.*—Much more original work has been done in the field of Christian ethics, which, combined with certain social ideas, plays an important part in religious education. Social ethics is studied in most of the seminaries. Especially to be mentioned in this connection is F. G. Peabody's seminar in Harvard, which is attended by a great many students. W. Rauschenbusch of Rochester, N.Y., represents a progressive type of this social Christianity. His book, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, has found a wide circle of readers and has been translated into German. Although as a whole American social work is far behind that of Germany, yet the latter must come to deal with these social questions in the scientific and progressive way which is characteristic of the Americans, and in many practical details must be willing to learn from them. It is very interesting to notice how American theology concerns itself with these present-day problems, although means for their solution may not always be at hand.

*Philosophy of Religion.*—The philosophy of religion affords a less satisfactory outlook. In this field, as in one of pure science, American theology has not felt very much at home, and has, for

<sup>4</sup>See E. C. Moore's recent book, *An Outline of the History of Christian Thought since Kant*. Prof. D. C. Macintosh has given an account of this book in *The Yale Divinity Quarterly*, January, 1913, p. 103 f. I do not think that his opinion about the future of Kantianism is in any way correct. Prof. Macintosh does not know sufficiently the modern philosophical development in Germany, which is as a whole founded on Kant.

the most part, taken over Höffding's empiricism or Pfleiderer's Hegelianism. James's original attempt to construct a philosophy of religion cannot, in its purely empirical aspect, be supported. Indeed, James himself and his followers admit its inconsistency and logical defects. These men have made use of previous works which were by no means sufficiently developed for a treatment of the philosophy of religion, but which, however, were recognized as rich in influence for a future religious philosophy—the psychology of religion. Nevertheless, I would strongly urge a study of James's philosophy, although scientifically it is fragmentary and inconsistent. No one has expressed more genuinely and popularly the real character of American thought.<sup>5</sup>

*Psychology of Religion.*—Of greater importance for us are James's religious convictions, which he has formulated in his psychology of religion. We must unhesitatingly admit that America has created and paved the way for the development of a religious psychology, as of modern empirical psychology generally. On the other hand, it is true that the religious psychology of America is in a period of such undue popularity and overestimation that the book-market is flooded with a mass of hastily drawn conclusions and pseudo-scientific works. It also suffers from the fact that it has too early acquired publicity and become little more than a means of public entertainment. Nevertheless, it has value in so far as it is employed in religious pedagogy. Both orthodoxy and liberalism make use of the unestablished results of an empirical psychology to support their own dogmatic tenets. This religious psychology has failed to adjust itself to the history of religion and of dogma. Rather the history of religion has been little more than the laboratory of psychology. It is to be hoped that the above-mentioned sensationalism, since it has no value for religion, will soon spend itself, and the psychology of religion will find its proper place in the sphere of religion generally.

No matter how foreign this whole movement of the psychology of religion may seem to us, it is nevertheless a reproach to German theology that it has, in the face of these extravagances, held itself

<sup>5</sup> See on James, Prof. Troeltsch's article in *The Harvard Theological Review*, Oct., 1912, "Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion," and articles by the present writer in *Die Christliche Welt*, 1910, No. 34, and 1913, No. 6.



too much in reserve. For it devolves, in the last analysis, on German theology to bring out, where others have failed, the results of this empirical science of religion. But German theology cannot accomplish this task until it has first collected and analyzed all previous results which others and especially America have furnished. Is not the time already ripe for such a collection, in order to sift materials, to criticise methods, and to effect, not only pastoral and practical ends, but a scientific embodiment of the psychology of religion in religious philosophy and dogma? In bringing this about, the work of such men as Troeltsch and Wobbermin must find more general acceptance; especially as that type of religious psychology which is represented by Vorbrodt and Runze, and which is but a copy of the American, promises no success. At any rate, German theology must realize that the psychology of religion, even if it cannot claim the definite position which the inventive genius of the American has given to it, must form the basis of theological study. We have here, in any case, a definite opportunity to learn from American criticism.

*Comparative Religion.*—The department in which we are most of all indebted to American theology is that of comparative religion. The painstaking collection of sources and the study of primitive religion are among the most valuable contributions in the science of history. The work of such a scholar as G. F. Moore of Harvard is enough to prove that this invaluable material has received in America thorough and careful treatment. German theology should not lose sight of this American movement but profit by it, even where it seems to lose itself in philological discussion and secular history. For the task is ultimately that of making the spirit of religious history effective for present-day needs, or, in other words, to develop it into a philosophy of historical religion. In this respect it becomes most important for German theology, since it forms an introduction to the study of dogma.

This rough sketch shows that the study and appraisement of American theology would not be without its value, quite apart from the great advantage we should have through a better understanding of the scholarly world of America.

## II.

If it is possible in some cases only to point to the necessity of a study of American religion, it is, on the other hand, easier and simpler to bring home to German study the need of a fuller knowledge of American church history. The development of the American denominations, each in its own special way and independent of the others, and largely under the influence of peculiar historical and political conditions, has given to them, in form and administration, the appearance of new organizations, and is therefore of great interest for our investigation. Unfortunately, our knowledge of American church conditions is so limited that we have come to have, in some measure, the grotesque conception in regard to them of ecclesiastical anarchy. Exactly the contrary is true. The ecclesiastical life of the great denominations expresses itself in a systematic way, in which the individual members play a personal part, so that one may almost speak of a genuine church democracy. One cannot fail to note, however, that these denominations more and more assume forms of organization in which the direction is placed in the hands of smaller bodies of men chosen by the congregation. Thus the church gradually loses sight of the democratic ideal, according to which every member has a voice in all questions. Simultaneously there has taken place an enrichment of the forms of worship which would have been intolerable to the earlier Puritan. A type of church life has therefore been developed which, for example, makes the Presbyterian form of government approximate the Congregational, and in which elements of the worship of the Episcopal Church creep into the liturgies of other Churches. This is not the place to discuss these matters in detail, but it is important to note that in the great denominations we have a process of development which aids the German student in understanding them and makes a knowledge of them important for German Protestantism.

*Church Unity.*—Another evidence of this form of development is the effort which is being made to bring about a union of the principal Churches, which will at least draw together their social

forces in united action. This effort towards unity includes mainly the Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists, who through their joint decisions would direct the course of American Protestantism. Such a unity would mean not only a great conservation of energy, but also, notwithstanding the inherent differences of church organization, the possibility of acquiring very great influence, religious, moral, and educational. Rightly enough, American idealists see in the joint decisions of these denominations the genesis of an American Protestant *Volkskirche*, which, unhampered by any connection with the State, might play a very great part in the life of the people. Such a result can come only through Christianity and through Protestantism. The German Reformation has created this ideal; the American Church Union may be the first to realize it. It could not be a matter of indifference to German Protestantism if in America a church were formed which should represent the chief Protestant bodies of the world. Rather it would be our duty to have a share, in so far as we are able, in the realization of this unity, and to maintain a friendly relation with these denominations, which would make possible a universal bond of Protestantism. We dare not, in this day and age, live in ecclesiastical isolation, and we should only deceive ourselves if we concluded from present indications that either the church in general, or German Protestantism in particular, had finished its work. Who knows whether the German mind may not undergo a change, and, passing above individualism and intellectualism, fulfil the great obligation in regard to religion which it owes to our own people and to humanity! And so the church will be the means through which religious convictions find their practical expression. No religion without this social bond of the church is possible in modern life.

*Church Life and Tolerance.*—That the church in its social and religious activities can exercise an unlimited influence is proved in the case of America. It is incorrect to speak of the American Churches as having no influence. Equally true is it that German advocates of a separation between church and State are wrong when they point to America as a country where the church does not influence the government. The question of mere organization is absolutely irrelevant, when the spirit of the institution

begins to permeate the life of the people. One can hardly conceive that the representatives of the American people at Washington are there only as American citizens, and not also as Catholics and Protestants. Such a false idea would be dispelled through better knowledge. As well say that one Church can copy another.

German theology and the German Church, in considering the American denominations, are not to imitate them, but to learn what powerful religious and moral forces are at work in them, how these forces are nourished and made productive, what in our Church is essential and what accidental. Is it not astonishing that the Baptists, who used to consider all who practised infant baptism as pagans and would have no communion with them, today are uniting with all such "pagans"—Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and others? This means the renunciation of an earlier *conditio sine qua non*, a fundamental dogma of like importance with the verbal inspiration of the Bible. And this in a conservative Church, which in its orthodoxy is incomparably more fixed and well defined than any in Germany! The vision of practical Christianity is today in America so real that the fetters of dogma are being more and more loosened. Indeed, the thought of religious brotherhood is so potent in the Protestant Churches that men of different creeds gladly work together for the common cause of Christianity. The Evangelical Alliance already in the preceding century tried to bring about such an understanding between America, England, and Germany; but the dividing lines could not be done away with, and so the task remains. In Church and religion work unites, dogma divides. This fact Germany needs to learn from America.

*German Lutheranism in America.*—In this connection it must be mentioned that, unfortunately, the Lutherans in America have not been able to adapt themselves to this modern friendly feeling of the American denominations and to subordinate dogmatic differences. We must not overlook the fact, of course, that the Lutheran Church is made up of so many different kinds and classes of people that we cannot think of it as a unit. Connected with the Missouri Synod are the Synods of Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois, all of which form the Conference of

North America, and represent, especially Missouri, an inflexible creed. There is next the General Synod, which includes the Eastern States and contains many strictly American elements. Lastly we have the Evangelical Synod, which is the outgrowth of an effort for union. This Synod has a more liberal creed than the others, but is in fact conservative and dogmatically inflexible. Because of this a number of German Free Churches have separated from it and formed the German Evangelical Protestant Preachers' Union and Conference. As a result of their free thinking they find no support from the Germans, and because of their small numbers they are being gradually absorbed by the American denominations, especially the Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Unitarian. It is no injustice to designate the German Lutherans as irreconcilably positive and dogmatic.

This exclusiveness in orthodox theology has produced many disadvantages for German Lutherans in America, and it is high time for the Lutheran Church to enter progressively the paths of thought and action. Also for the German mother Church the connection with the German Church in America will thus be made easier. Theological work in German universities ought to help in bringing about a better understanding of church life in America and the future of German religion there.

It is only through a full understanding of American church conditions that we shall be able to use our strong influence in keeping the German Church in America in the line of religious progress. The important part which the church is to play in the future of America makes it necessary for us to know and understand the American denominations.

*Value of American Denominations.*—Such a task necessitates first of all a study of the history, tenets, and organization of all the American religious bodies. It is self-evident that we ought not to pick out merely the leading ones; it is rather a question of studying the whole extent of American religious life. After this we should consider the denominations individually, their forms and historical modifications, their educational institutions, their schools and seminaries, their doctrinal development to the present day, their ideals of government and how they are realized. Only after such a comprehensive study can we legitimately draw

our conclusions. Much will undoubtedly appear to be superficial, and of little value, and at times bordering on the sensational and ludicrous. However, far-reaching indications of a deep religious spirit and an unusually practical method of organization become all the clearer in the leading denominations. While this organization is the guardian of American piety, which devotes itself to practical, effective, and progressive work, it is, on the other hand, little fitted to nourish the inner religious life. All the more conspicuous is the social significance which these Churches increasingly acquire, their sense of obligation to the people, and their practical work for the public welfare. A study of the creeds of the American denominations enables us to judge directly to what extent they inspire morally and influence religiously the life of the people, and realize, in a new way and with new powers, the imperishable ideals of Christianity.

### III.

The next point of importance is a study, from the point of view of religion, of American life generally, with special reference to the way in which its Christian life has developed. While this development in America is still in its beginning, and is so broad and unorganized as to admit of no detailed study, a careful and thorough investigation might result in a truer estimate than the American himself would be likely to make. For doubtless the foreign observer views the religious and social development more as a unit than the Americans, with their many divisions, are capable of doing. The material of special significance for this study may be classified according to the following divisions: 1. Academic; 2. Commercial; 3. Industrial.

1. *The Academic*: It is very interesting to the German who pays a visit to any of the leading American endowed universities of the East, such as Princeton, Pennsylvania, Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Williams College, to see what an important part Protestantism plays in them all. Everywhere he finds chapel services, at which Professors of the different Faculties make brief religious addresses, and, in institutions where attendance is not compulsory, he finds students of all kinds gladly and voluntarily

attending these exercises. How uplifting is the influence of the morning devotions in Harvard, for example, which some of the leading preachers and men of America conduct for one or two weeks at a time, while having opportunity in free hours for personal discussion with the students on every vital question! How helpful also for the young university preacher, near to the students in age and experience, preaching to them on Sundays and coming into social touch with them during the week by means of open evenings, visits, conferences, and small groups for discussion of religious questions! The presence, for example, of such a man as Columbia University has, is of the utmost significance, and forms just that bond between Professors and students which in Germany we lack. The intellectual unripeness and lack of independence of the American student encourages, perhaps, such religious relationships. And it is surprising that these can exist in a university even in such a giant city as New York. The result of this is a tendency to draw the denominations together.

*Y. M. C. A.*—Significant also in the life of the student is the way in which he is directed in the practical realization of his religious ideals. I have especially in mind the Young Men's Christian Association, which exists in every university and college and breathes a spirit of personal religion. The methods of its work in the University of Pennsylvania, for example, are astonishingly effective, and exemplary. The *Y. M. C. A.* in the Middle West, where I attended a very interesting student conference, is intellectually much less developed than in the East, where it numbers among its members some of the finest and most capable young men, who may rank with the best German students. All this tends to create in every university a fellowship of a high moral character which is at the same time a source of great help to the morally weak. The moral life of the student is further developed through practical work, which makes him realize his obligations to others. Both university settlements and Churches seek the help of the students in their institutional work. Students of theology are in this way often too heavily burdened and diverted from their studies. This is not true, however, with students of other departments. Rather this practical religious work in which they are often engaged makes them realize as per-

haps nothing else could the work of religion and the seriousness of their studies. The work of Charles Stelzle in New York City, which attracts many students of Union Theological Seminary, is a notable illustration of this student-activity.

*Interest in Foreign Missions.*—Still another indication of the religious spirit among the students is their interest in Foreign Missions, a work in which one recognizes the enthusiasm of the students combined with the maturer conception of religion on the part of their leaders. The way in which every university provides for its own mission-work and the willingness with which students contribute their own money, are most commendable. Some of the best-trained theological graduates gladly volunteer as missionaries. This interest in missions gives also a world-wide aspect to Christianity. Missionary work is being more and more carried on not only by the theological student but also by the engineer, teacher, chemist, and doctor, who through their Christian environment in the university have received, along with their scientific training, a simple enthusiasm and inspiration for the cause of Christianity throughout the world. This comes from a strong, unreflecting conviction rather than from a clear knowledge of the situation. With this enthusiasm is bound up a dream of world-conquest, which is perhaps only natural in a people so young and prosperous.

It seems to me that the United States can bring its influence to bear upon Japan and China through its missionary work much more quickly than through any political measures. Such a conception of world-conquest implies a genuinely modern belief in the universal mission of Christianity. The accomplishment of this task will help considerably the position and greatness of that people which has unselfishly recognized and undertaken it. The fact that the American people with its ingenuousness and intellectual vagueness is far-seeing enough to realize the great political significance of Christianity and to undertake without delay, although at first with ineffectual methods, the tasks involved, stamps them, it seems to me, more than do any commercial and technical accomplishments, as a people and nation with a future. This far-sighted national policy, the extension of Christianity, finds its origin in the university; and is not, as in our case, the



result of a traditional and child-like piety. How absolutely different from this modern world-wide conception is our whole traditional view of Christianity as a means of maintaining for the State and people, through the dissemination of National and Christian culture, prestige in the world! It is for the German universities to realize the importance of this matter.

It must be observed, however, that the idealism and unselfishness which are characteristic of all German missionary work, are in America, consciously and unconsciously, attended with national motives. Practical considerations urge the American to great accomplishment. But these considerations are able to demand from him as much personal self-sacrifice and devotion as foreign missionary work usually requires. It is a striking fact that America, in her missionary work, has singled out principally those countries which are important to her own political interests, and through their culture to the future of civilization, viz., Japan, China, and India. But it is only natural that missionary work should follow in the course of new international relationships with the Far East. And perhaps it is not irrelevant to ask if, with our present-day lack of idealism, such practical motives would not actuate our own people in mission-work to a deeper conception of religion and Christianity.

*The Theory of Pragmatism in Religion.*—It is interesting to note, in connection with this practical side of American religious life and its desire for conquest, how it has been influenced by the philosophy of pragmatism. This philosophy, with a true understanding of the American spirit, has drawn religion into the field of its speculations and has developed its metaphysics into a philosophy of religion. It is, in its theoretical contradictions and impossibilities and in its practical utility and popularity, a typical product of Americanism. More an attitude toward life than a philosophy, it has won for itself recognition in educational circles; it is supreme at such universities as Columbia and Chicago; it exercises the strongest influence upon morality and religion, since it directs popular idealism into thoroughly utilitarian channels. Through this philosophy, which has woven itself into American religion and has won for itself a place of prominence, American logic, ethics, and aesthetics are being more

and more subjected to religious pragmatic influences. In the field of logic it means an interpretation of truth in terms of faith; in the field of ethics it is shown in the practical application of all possible means for the attainment of religious ideals; in the field of aesthetics it has, up to the present, been of uncertain value, but will doubtless make its influence felt here as well; as evidenced by the drama of Miss Josephine Preston Peabody (Mrs. Marks), *The Piper*, and the popular religious shows. So in pragmatism we find the philosophical explanation of the practical spirit of America which has directed it to a higher Christian development. The philosophy of James and his school can, however, be regarded from our scientific standpoint only as the hybrid product of a period of transition. But it is the key to the understanding of the religious life of the universities, and its study is therefore necessary for all those who would understand fully the practical expressions of American religion.

2. *The Commercial*: In the business-world of America, which is ruled by commercial interests, religious influence is not so strong as in some of the more advanced academic circles. It is always to be borne in mind that the influence of the universities, especially as they assume a utilitarian character, which is in accordance with the practical bent of the American mind, becomes constantly stronger and of greater significance in industrial and commercial life. This is especially true of the State Universities of the West. Further, the influence, which countless graduates of universities now in business carry from their college days into practical life, is constantly becoming greater. As a result, settlements, Y. M. C. A.s, missions (alluded to under 1), are actively supported by business-men, who realize the practical work of religion. The interest of business-men in the Y. M. C. A., for example, is accompanied by the pragmatic principle that their employees, well cared for and religiously influenced, can be of greater service to business. It may often happen (unfortunately) that a leading merchant prefers to contribute largely to the Y. M. C. A. rather than to increase the wages of his employees. Railroads and States are concerned with the moral education of youth; the Y. M. C. A. makes special provision for railroad-employees and for the men in the navy. Ex-President Taft has

stated that only the religious influence of the Y. M. C. A. could improve the demoralized conditions in the navy; and this it actually does.

*Men and Religion Forward Movement.*—This religious interest among the laity has crystallized in a striking manner in the "Men and Religion Forward Movement," which, in regularly planned campaigns in the great cities of the United States, aroused religious interest among the men. If this work of the laity is more a piece of external organization than a religious deepening, it is nevertheless important to observe how strongly these laymen feel their obligations to their fellows and seek to fulfil these obligations. And since the Churches have taken a deep interest in the movement, the result may be, in spite of sensational and advertising methods, a great improvement in American religious and moral conditions.

*Social Christianity.*—With all this it is not to be forgotten that social work in America, for which the State does not hold itself responsible, falls in a very great degree to the individual citizen, and that the further prosecution of this has to be left to the conscience of the ruling classes. The pulpit exercises an obvious influence on business-men in bringing them to a realization of their moral obligations. In the last analysis social work is ever the result of the religious impulse. This is shown in the fight against intemperance, in which religion has been the great champion of prohibition; in the problem of child-labor, to which is opposed every fine instinct of the people; and in the case of the work and wages of women. When once the deadened conscience of the people is awakened, it is remarkable how quickly moral unscrupulousness gives way before it, how a new public opinion is created which is hostile to monopolies that trample on the rights or disregard the interests of others, and how promptly this sentiment makes itself effective by legislation and judicial decision, as in the case of the notorious Standard Oil Company. Further, new norms of business principles are established which, in their purely secular character, evince nothing of the religious motive which gave them being. How great is the influence, politically and ethically, which preachers such as Lyman Abbott and Parkhurst, in New York, have exercised, and a publication like *The Outlook*!

In the same way the religious social conscience extends, slowly but surely, to other fields. Since so much of the social work is left to the individual which is, in Germany, the work of the State, it is no wonder that America is still very far behind in the attainment of social and religious ideals. Both in academic and business-circles the "Social Gospel" is the watch-word, and the social worth of Christian teaching, the ethics of the Gospels, is so strongly emphasized that the importance of the inner life of the Christian is almost lost sight of. The program of preachers in New York, Chicago, and other large cities is Christianity in its social aspects; Christianity in the great cities is to become awakened through its social conscience. Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis* is not without good reason one of the most widely read books, and its sequel, *The Christianizing of the Social Order*, expresses in the title the practical direction which Christianity in America takes. In this same way we must explain the general disposition of the people, which in the United States has given rise to the peace movement. In the enthusiasm for world-peace, which must be regarded not so much from a political as from a purely religious point of view, there vibrate both religious and social chords. In general it might be said that it is not the social work, but the religious impulses prompting it which are of importance for us. For a task is involved here which with us has been neglected, viz., that of bringing religion into the life of the people.

3. *The Industrial*: Here we find certain conditions similar to those already mentioned in connection with the academic and commercial groups. These are settlements, wages, child-labor and woman-labor. In addition to these there are certain problems which are too often passed over—housing, the supply of food and water, and the religious education of children. The attempt to solve these problems may be designated as an effort to Christianize the whole life of America. Apart from the social work carried on by the individual denominations, in which, owing to the many divisions, much energy is wasted, and apart from the excellent work of the Y. M. C. A., the religious sense of obligation to the working classes has raised two problems: the immigrant-problem, and that of the people's amusements.

*Religion and Immigration.*—The immigrant-problem is becoming more and more the most difficult question for the American government. The great influx of Poles, Greeks, and Irish means a growth of Catholicism which is incompatible with the Puritan spirit. More serious is the accompanying influx of peoples either without religion or hostile to it, who recruit the ranks of the social democrats. The religious conscience is now so far awakened that obligation to the immigrant is not regarded as being discharged merely with the inculcation of the democratic spirit. In addition, the necessity is realized of instilling, by means of religion, a deeper sense of duty towards the community. The gross individualism which prevailed among the earlier immigrants must be socially and religiously modified and made to share in the general communal life. This care of the immigrant is rightly emphasized by the religious bodies. It is interesting to note how here also the Americans, who believe in religious equality, cannot dispense with religion for the attainment of its national aims. And may not religion itself, as it renders this service, in turn be greatly enriched?

*Religion and People's Amusements.*—The next problem is the supervision of the people's amusements. American individualism has produced in the past conditions of inconceivable coarseness. One has only to think of the Fourth of July, when every year hundreds are killed by fire-works. It is commendable, however, that in the last two years this celebration has been reformed, and milder forms of entertainment, such as parades, park-amusements, etc., substituted. Secular and religious institutions have worked together in this cause. As characteristic is the movement to provide a "People's Sunday Evening." Since the saloon is closed, other places of entertainment must be provided, and reading-rooms and church services do not suffice. Religious societies therefore endeavor to supply this need by lectures and instruction, and by an effort to arouse among the masses a real interest for religion, which with many has been quite lost. Such is the aim of Charles Stelzle in his Labor Temple in New York. His position as leader of the social work of the Presbyterian Church is illuminative. In all such work the American laborer is a congenial person to deal with, as he is not biassed by any

false philosophy of life. Nor is he a stranger to the ideals of religion. How otherwise would it have been possible for a social leader such as the Secretary of the Labor Union in America, Mr. R. Robins, during the strike among the miners of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1911, to gather the strikers together for a Sunday morning service, after having counselled and advised them the preceding evening in their fight against the company! Thus does religion assist the laborer in his social battles. It is also for him a real help in his daily needs. The Churches take advantage of these opportunities to guard jealously this religious disposition. Hence the zeal with which Christian communities take part in this work, and, being carried on in the name of social Christianity, it means a most telling extension of the Christian spirit throughout the nation.

If with such a large country and so young a people very little aid is at hand for the dissemination of Christian culture, yet it seems to me that great ideals are at work, which we perhaps can recognize better than the Americans themselves. If to the profit which we have gained from a study of the religious development of America and its meaning for us both ecclesiastically and religiously, we could add the possibility of helping in an intellectual way this kindred people, it would be but one further reason why we should investigate the religion, the theology, and the Church, of America.

In concluding, I should like to express the hope that a systematic study of the above-mentioned facts might be not without profit for our students of theology, for other students of our universities who take an interest in such questions, and finally to American Protestantism, which will gladly encourage such scrutiny. It must be left to the future whether, as a result of this scientific study of the development of a modern people, the practical spirit may not influence our own religious life—a spirit which we should make our own, and which would not bear the foreign stamp which we, in our intercourse with England and America, too often recognize in our people. On the other hand, only those results, which through the German scientific method can be thoroughly Germanized, are capable of being incorporated into German religious life and used as a means of teaching and helping the German

people. And if through a gradual filtration foreign religious elements are to be brought into our own life, where else than in our universities can this thorough work of adjustment be accomplished? These practical aims, however, must receive a secondary consideration. This does not prevent us from considering their realization. But the principal task is to make Protestant theology and the Church more intimately acquainted with American Protestantism, and in this way to insure the friendliest feeling between these two kindred peoples.

*THE CHURCHES AND THE PREVAILING SOCIAL  
SENTIMENT*

CHARLES WILLIAM ELIOT

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Churches in the great religions have been allies of all ancient governments and most modern ones. The Emperor of Japan was believed to have, and in the popular mind still has, intimate relations with the heavenly powers. He used to be held in a seclusion suitable for this peculiar relationship to Deity. The Emperor of China for thousands of years under various dynasties was a high priest, whose offerings and prayers were peculiarly acceptable to Deity, and frequently procured for his people good seedtimes and good harvests, although he sometimes failed to avert pestilences, droughts, floods, and famines. The Indian castes are family clans and trades-unions with strong religious sanctions. The Koran contains the foundations of civil law as well as of ecclesiastical, and the Sultan claims succession to the religious as well as to the civil authority of the Caliphs. Under the feudal system there was a chaplain in every great noble's house, and the king ruled "by the grace of God," and by the same grace transmitted his office to his son. Both Napoleon the Great and Napoleon the Little claimed as Emperor the support of the Church; but Napoleon the Third never seemed to see the extraordinary pathos in the formula he used so much, "By the grace of God and the national will Emperor of the French." The French Revolution tried to divorce civil government from religion, but failed to do so. National established churches supported by the state exist all over Europe, although their tenure is frail in several European countries. The American Republic has carried into practice complete religious toleration and complete separation of church and state; but every now and then some one proposes to bridge the gap between church and state by a phrase such as "Vox populi, vox Dei," or to "recognize" the Divine Immanence by inserting the word God in the Constitution.



With the general increase of liberty which has taken place during the last hundred years both church and state have undergone profound modifications. The church, in some measure set apart from government, is thrown back on its original functions of cultivating virtue, promoting sympathy and good-will, conducting worship, administering sacraments, and energizing the motive power of love. The state, on the other hand, becomes more and more a business agency for getting the public work well done; and the public work is more and more the application of the new sciences to the promotion of the public welfare, the abatement of nuisances and injuries, the protection of the whole people from physical and moral contagions, the provision of the conveniences and securities which urban life imperatively needs, and the preservation of order and peace. The Constitution of the United States has promoted and encouraged the safe development of a form of government for the people which trusts everything ultimately to the intelligence, good judgment, and quick conscience of a majority of the people. It has developed a democracy which is the most complete representative in the modern world of the principles of the Protestant Reformation, with religious toleration added. The Reformation stood for the right of private judgment with individual responsibility. It transferred religious authority from an ecclesiastical institution to a book, the Bible, and hence made universal education a necessity. The free, responsible individual must be able to read, else not only the individual but society might go wrong. Cromwell built not only his army but his Commonwealth on the Congregationalists and Independents; and he was the "Protector" of liberty at home and abroad. Religion was paramount in the minds of both the Pilgrims and the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, and for a hundred and fifty years the ministers of religion were the ruling class on New England soil, sharing their power, however, with the magistrates and ship-masters.

By the time the American Republic was fifty years old its fundamental principles of freedom, brotherhood, and equal justice had begun to develop a new kind of social state, and therewith a new relation of the numerous and diversified churches to the community as a whole; and by the time the Republic

was a hundred years old there had arisen in this new society a new kind of social sentiment which was really an adaptation and modification of the Christian sense of human brotherhood. Two forces in the industrial world hastened the development of this social sentiment—the corporation with limited liability, and the liberty of association of like-thinking or like-hoping people for the accomplishment of public objects which seemed to them good. Incorporation with limited liability has proved to be a powerful promoter of industrial efficiency and of co-operation by small or large groups of persons in industrial production, and also in carrying on private works of education, religion, and charity. Both the right to incorporate and the right to associate have proved to be invaluable aids and supporters of free institutions.

The new social sentiments developed in the last half of the nineteenth century are, however, by no means peculiar to the democratic society of the United States. Indeed, they have been more rapidly developed and carried to a greater extreme in European countries, where despotic or aristocratic government still lingers, than in the United States. Although they are modifications and applications of the Christian doctrine of human brotherhood, they did not originate in the Christian churches. In fact, many of the most vigorous exponents of the social sentiments have been men and women who had but slight connection with any of the churches, or who even thought of the churches as anti-social. The Greek Church, the Roman Church, and the great majority of the Protestant churches have not shown much active sympathy with the new social sentiment; and a considerable proportion of the men and women devoted to the social propaganda have been persons who maintain no connection with any church. The social sentiment has found active expression in efforts to improve by legislation the condition of the poorest and most laborious classes, to contend against the evils of alcoholism, gambling, and prostitution, to raise wages, shorten hours, improve lodgings, and to provide the crowded city populations with the means of innocent and wholesome enjoyment. Some of these objects have long been striven for by the trades-unions, and these unions have therefore been active in building up the

new social sentiments, although their own leading sentiment is an exclusive class feeling. New agencies have also been created to give practical expression to these sentiments, such as the "settlements" in poor quarters of cities, the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, and the numerous clubs of boys and girls, young men and young women, which undertake to supply guidance to satisfactory work and to good play, and to maintain in their members ideal standards of conduct. Some of these agencies may fairly be called religious; but many of them say little about religious topics, and take pains to avoid religious teaching which could possibly be called denominational.

Since the twentieth century opened, the churches have begun to take account of the social position thus created and to inquire into their own duties in connection therewith. They find that social service offers a new field for church activities; that it is something very different from the old forms of kindly relief for special cases of distress or disease; that the new social service deals with common conditions under which their livelihood is earned by thousands of persons, families grow up, and successive generations thrive or deteriorate. These conditions have in many cases been created by the factory system and by the transfer of millions of people from country life to city life. They have also been caused by the new liberties which the population as a whole now enjoy, and by the comparatively new reluctance to take life by judicial process, to imprison, or to exercise any physical repression on the ruder and more vicious elements of the population. Social service is no longer alms-giving, the providing of hospitals to die in, or poor-houses in which to prolong an unproductive and miserable existence. Modern social service means curing, remedying, finding employment, enabling a distressed family to resume self-support, defending the weak or defective against cruelty and oppression, catching and reforming the deserter from family responsibilities, resisting natural catastrophes, and repairing the damages they occasion. Almost all social service nowadays requires something more than sympathy and compassion. It requires knowledge of economics and applied science, and careful discrimination between those measures which break down diligence, frugality, foresight, self-reliance, and

family affection, and those which foster such virtues. The churches should all exert an active moral force. They should be fountains of religious emotion, but also steady sources of moral action on the part both of individuals and of society. They therefore should never support social undertakings which have a degrading effect on individual character, and should always be careful to discriminate between the good and the bad effects of philanthropic undertakings which clearly produce mixed effects, some good, some bad. Moreover, the churches should always insist that ample inquiry and discussion precede every effort at reform by or through legislation and the executive action of public officials.

The evangelical churches in the United States have lately manifested some disposition to unite in good works, prompted by the newly developed social sentiment. Having had ample experience of the impossibility of uniting on creeds, liturgies, and ecclesiastical politics, they cannot help hoping that they have found a basis of unity in their common purpose to render social service; that is, to engage in co-operative good works. Hence, federations, federal councils, and comprehensive commissions. Here, however, new dangers may be encountered. Seeing the dangers of exciting religious emotions which cannot be transformed on the instant into loving action, and feeling keenly the loss of influence which churches in general have lately suffered, individual ministers in charge of churches and other leaders may urge young people to take up some form of social service without adequate preparation and without competent direction or guidance, the ministers themselves having had no practice in the kind of work to which they urge their young parishioners, and possessing no trained judgment as to the probable results of the young people's labors.

I find a good example of rash and ill-considered action on the part of churches in the Principles adopted at Chicago, December 9, 1912, by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, which declare that the churches must stand for sixteen separate propositions, some of which are axiomatic but vague; some so lacking in precision of definiteness that they suggest no specific action; some grossly exaggerated, though of good tendency; and some positively mischievous, because they sug-

gest forms of collective action which are distinctly demoralizing to individual workers. It is of no use for the churches to declare that they stand for "proper" regulation of marriage, "proper" housing, and "proper" education and recreation for every child; for the real questions are, what *proper* regulation of marriage is, what *proper* housing is, and what *kind* of education and recreation every child should have.

One of these Principles is that the churches must stand for the abolition of "child labor." By child labor is probably meant precocious labor in unwholesome factories. It can hardly be intended that the churches should stand for the abolition of child labor on the farm and in the household, labor which is wholesome in moderation and altogether desirable for the bringing up of children and the safe and happy development of the family as a whole.

Another of these Principles implies that the physical and moral health of the community can be protected by the regulation of the conditions of toil for women. Now, legislation can improve the conditions under which women labor in factories and shops, and protect married women from overwork before and after confinement; but this kind of legislation will not "safeguard the physical and moral health of the community." That health can only be adequately protected by the development of sound character in the members of the community, both men and women.

This Declaration as to what the churches must stand for exhibits a strong tendency to attribute the moral evils in the community to poverty. One reads frequently in the public prints that the cause of prostitution is the failure of employers to pay young women what is called a "living wage." Must the churches stand for that doctrine? It seems to me a demoralizing and degrading doctrine in itself and in all its implications. To my thinking, poverty is a far safer moral condition than inordinate wealth.

Another of the Principles for which these churches must stand calls for the protection of the individual and society from the social, economic, and moral waste of the liquor traffic. The liquor traffic is a waste; but that fact is not the principal reason for

opposing it, and the churches ought not to put that motive forward as the principal one. The burning question about the liquor traffic is how to restrict it most wisely. Is prohibition the best policy, or local option? If local option, how shall the transportation of liquor by public carrier be regulated? The Principle for which the churches must stand, according to this proclamation, gives the voter no clear indication how he should use his vote, and dodges the real questions.

The Declaration says vaguely that the churches must stand for the conservation of public health; but what action shall the churches advocate for diminishing the ravages of the venereal diseases, and for suppressing the profitable commerce carried on publicly by both men and women to gratify the lustful propensities of men? These are practical and very difficult questions, calling for decision in action. A just conservation of the public health raises many questions concerning the use of the collective force and the collective resources of the community, in restriction of individual liberty, but in promotion of both public and private safety. Shall the churches support the public authorities in compelling vaccination and making free distribution of diphtheria antitoxin, or shall they resist these methods of conserving the public health? Shall the churches advocate the expenditure of public money for playgrounds, and the provision at public expense of illustrated lectures, dance halls, public concerts, and other means of popular recreation?

This Declaration of Principles by the Federal Council speaks of the "right of all men to the opportunity for self-maintenance," and of "encroachments" on that right. Who gave men that right? Against whom is it to be enforced, and by what means? Who are they who encroach upon that right, and how is the church to deal with them, if discovered? The sentence throughout suggests the existence of social wrongs, but does not specify them or indicate any clear line of action for remedying them. This is an injurious kind of incitement to unjust opinions about the existing industrial organization.

The churches must also stand, according to this Declaration, for suitable provision for the old age of workers and for those incapacitated by injury. Does this recommendation mean that

all old people are to be provided for at the expense of the public? Does it mean that the churches must stand for the demoralizing and enfeebling, non-contributory, old-age pension legislation? Does it mean that the churches are to become responsible for the neglect of children to take care of their old parents, or for that lack of industry, frugality, and self-control which brings people to old age without any provision for comfort in declining years?

The Principles adopted by the Federal Council include the following remarkable statement: "For the gradual and reasonable reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, and for that degree of leisure for all which is a condition of the highest human life." One would suppose from these phrases that labor was always a curse and leisure a blessing, and that the progress of civilization depended on reduction of the first and increase of the second. The facts are just the other way. The progress of civilization depends on the steady, productive labor of the entire community. The hours of labor might be so far reduced as to diminish disastrously the total product of the community below the amount necessary to maintain the life of the community as it is and to provide for improvement and progress. Leisure in the sense of loafing, idleness, or inactivity is not necessary to the highest human life. What is necessary, or at least expedient, is variety in productive and pleasurable activities. The notions that labor is a curse and leisure the indispensable condition of contentment are both thoroughly mischievous, and if carried into practice would destroy civilization and make real happiness impossible.

There is also in this Declaration of Principles an apparent endorsement of the uniform, or minimum, wage, which is one of the most deplorable doctrines and practices of trades-unions, demoralizing to the competent workmen and cruel to the weak, the unskilful, and the old.

The final Declaration of the Federal Council, "For the most equitable division of the product of industry that can ultimately be devised," is one that the communist, the collectivist, the socialist, the individualist, and the nihilist might all think themselves entitled to subscribe to, so vague and elusive is it. Churches

which are invited to co-operate in social service ought to have at least similar aims and well-defined plans for the common work. It is doubtless desirable to secure the co-operation of many of the religious and philanthropic institutions called churches in common, helpful, social activities or good works; but that co-operation ought to be based on clear and specific propositions.

In regard to the directing of the young people connected with churches into the various activities called social service, the dangers of that policy may be avoided and its benefits reaped by either of two methods, both of which are already in use. The young workers may be given in college or in schools for social workers an adequate training for the special line of work they propose to follow before they assume any serious responsibility, or they may be put as probationers or apprentices under the direction of experienced paid workers, who will employ them as recorders and cataloguers, let them witness some of the daily work, and soon ascertain whether they possess the insight, tact, and vigor necessary for permanent service.

Before the churches can safely enlist for the new kinds of social service, the ministers who lead the churches ought to have devoted a considerable part of their professional study to subjects adapted to prepare them for social service, such as economics, government, and the inductive method of finding truth. They should have been specially trained to avoid broad generalizations from few particulars, and unlimited inferences from limited groups of facts. The traditional training of the minister in all churches of all religions has been chiefly deductive, speculative, philosophical, historical, literary, and emotional. There is the most urgent need of making a considerable part of it inductive, observational, and economic. Every minister and every philanthropist needs practice in scientific experimentation, in the selection of the promising experiment, and in the elimination from his selected experiment, if possible, of all irrelevant or uninstructional variables. It is in this way that the scientific investigator demonstrates his capacity and wins his success.

Such additions to the traditional training for the ministry will not make the ministers of the future any less spiritual, enthusiastic, devoted, or altruistic than the ministers of the past. The



strongest evidence existing today of the attuning of the human mind to the Intelligence which created and upholds the universe is the process by which the scientific investigator projects his imagination beyond the present limits of knowledge, and conceives an hypothesis which guides him safely to new truth. The hypothesis is not always verified; but the fact that it is not seldom verified by subsequent experimentation suggested by the hypothesis is the superb demonstration which the inductive method has supplied, that man's finite thinking and loving is akin to God's infinite thinking and loving.

It is imperative that the minister who is to practise social service himself, or to exhort others to it, should have obtained in his own person and through his own experience a thorough knowledge of the inductive philosophy and of its applications in the promotion of human welfare and of progressive civilization. The churches and all other philanthropic institutions must learn how new truth about human society is to be acquired, little by little, step by step, through thorough and candid inquiry into the existing facts, and then through careful study, first, of the causes of existing conditions, and finally, of the most promising remedies. For such work the churches are not yet well organized, and the ministers are not yet well educated. In the mean time, the churches may best give active support to the well-organized agencies which employ experts in social service and in scientific, social, economic, and medical research. There are many such agencies which are employing men of good will, sound judgment, and practised skill. Let the churches support them with sympathy, comprehension, praise, and money. Gradually they will learn how to employ experts themselves, and to co-operate with each other in so doing. The medical work of foreign missions illustrates the gains that will come to the churches through the exercises of these new powers. There will be no abridgement of the churches' ancient and imperishable function of teaching men faith, hope, and love.

*LUTHER'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF  
JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY*

PRESERVED SMITH

AMHERST, MASS.

One of the best-known stories about Luther relates that while at Rome in December, 1510, he began climbing on his knees, for the indulgence to be thus acquired, the Scala Santa, but that, before he reached the top he remembered the text, "The just shall live by faith," and he desisted. If authentic, this anecdote proves that he had thus early attained to the fundamental doctrine of the Reformation. The source of the story is a reminiscence of Luther's son Paul, who says that he heard it from his father when he was eleven years old but did not write it down until thirty-eight years later. Such testimony to any fact is necessarily unreliable at least in details, and now that the same story has been found, in a very different form, in one of Luther's own sermons, Paul's version of it must be abandoned. In 1545 the Reformer relates that, while at Rome, he ascended the Holy Stairs with the purpose of getting the soul of an ancestor out of purgatory, but that when he arrived at the top he thought, "Who knows whether this prayer avails?" As this is assuredly no proof that he had by this time arrived at the *sola fides*, the only decisive reason for placing his acquisition of that doctrine prior to 1510 disappears, and we are thrown back on the earlier, contemporary sources, which in any case are more trustworthy, to trace the gradual development of that important dogma in his mind.

The road he travelled towards his ultimate goal was that of the contemporary scholastic theology. The old controversy between realists and nominalists, one of the deepest that has ever agitated human thought, and one which shows vitality in certain quarters even today, had given place, with the victory of the latter party, to a new alignment, of the "ancient" *versus* the "modern" school; the former supporting Albertus, Thomas, and Scotus, the latter Biel and Occam. The substance of the controversy was no longer, properly speaking, speculative but rather

literary, a hair-splitting and sophistical wrangling over the propriety of terms and even of syntax. "The flippancy and unreality of the later schoolmen were sins unto death which brought the inevitable penalty of the overthrow of scholasticism itself."<sup>1</sup> A little later Luther joined the humanists in decrying these "hog-doctors," but at first he drank deeply of their teaching, and, much as he revolted from them, the disciples of Occam left lasting marks on his mind. This master gave him his first taste of any kind of philosophy. At times he felt such pleasure in speculations on obscure points, such as that of Christ's divinity, that he seemed to be "among choirs of angels," but a sharp reaction always told him that he was rather "among devils." Again, rumination on the mysteries of predestination led him to so black a pit of horror and despair that ten years later he could hardly bear to speak of it. Even these thoughts seem to have had the morbid coloring of the young monk's neurotic diathesis.<sup>1a</sup> It is no longer fashionable to extol Luther as the apostle of free thought. In his own early experiences was founded his horror of the purely human reason as an arbiter of divine matters; as such, it was for him the *omni studio fugienda sapientia carnis*.

He was most interested, however, not in points of abstract divinity, but in what the doctors had to say on the concrete and vital question, What shall I do to be saved? The answer given was precisely the opposite of that which he later attained for himself. The theologians he studied told him that a man must win redemption by his own works. Brother Martin was in the main perfectly right when he asserted that the doctors believed that God would infallibly give grace to one who did the best that was in him. It is true that the almost miraculous learning of Father Denifle<sup>2</sup> can quote more than two hundred mediaeval

<sup>1</sup> Workman: *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, 1911, 242f. A good example of this is Eck's statement at the Leipsic debate that a good work was due to God "totum" but not "totaliter." O. Seitz: *Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation*, 54.

<sup>1a</sup> This statement, and several others in the present study, will be elucidated by reference to my essay on "Luther's Development in the Light of Psycho-analysis" in *The American Journal of Psychology*, 1913, xxiv, pp. 360-377.

<sup>2</sup> H. P. Denifle: *Luther und Lutherthum. Ergänzungsband. Die abendländische Schriftausleger bis Luther über Justitia Dei*. 1905.

theologians, all of whom, save one, Abelard, certainly not known to Luther, interpreted the famous verse, Romans i. 17, "The just shall live by faith," much as did the Reformer. It is true that Father Grisar<sup>3</sup> can cite some of Luther's immediate predecessors, Biel and Proles, for example, as witnesses that the importance of faith was never entirely lost sight of. But against the theory of the Church, holding a delicate balance between faith and works, must be put her practice, and, in this case as in others, actions spoke louder than words. It is an undeniable, an obtrusive fact that, whatever was the doctrine of the Church, at this time her practice had reduced the economy of individual redemption to an almost purely mechanical process of debit and credit for evil and good works. Dr. A. V. Müller<sup>4</sup> has collected a large number of quotations from thirty-seven manuscript prayer-books in circulation between 1450 and 1550, all of them assuredly promising to the worshipper who would repeat such and such prayers or do certain pious acts, sundry temporal or spiritual blessings, the latter including indulgence and salvation. But the main proof of the thesis is found in facts so widely known as to need no verification by specific quotation from sources. The whole system of indulgences, for example, offered not only immunity from the pains of purgatory but all other spiritual favors, including forgiveness of sins<sup>5</sup> and the grace of God, in return for the performance of a good work or the payment of money.<sup>6</sup> The monastic system also encouraged men to believe that celibacy, fasting, privation and self-torture of all kinds, together with the appointed offices, were meritorious and practically certain to win salvation. Luther so believed, and acted on the belief in the best faith, hoping "to get to heaven by his monkery." Indeed, by these means he won the reputation of a saint, without attaining the least inward satisfaction or peace. In after-life he

<sup>3</sup> H. Grisar: *Luther*, ii, 470.

<sup>4</sup> A. V. Müller: *Luthers theologische Quellen*, 1912, 235 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Though contrary to the now accepted theory of the Church, indulgences were often represented as forgiving "culpa" as well as "poena." So the indulgence at Einsiedel quoted by S. M. Jackson: *Zwingli*, 99.

<sup>6</sup> See the sources published in B. J. Kidd: *Documents of the Continental Reformation*, nos. 1-10.

often stated the theory on which he acted while a monk, as for example: "They lead people from Christ to their own works, telling them to go into a cloister, or make a pilgrimage to Rome or Compostella, and live a severe, hard life, and choose the Virgin Mary or some saint as intercessor, that you may be saved." <sup>7</sup> And this theory, which he was afterwards so passionately to combat, was deduced correctly and logically from the general practice of the Church. Not that he was repelled by the duties and privations of the monastic career as such; rather his letters and other references to his daily life show that he found in it the joy of work well done. What he did *not* find was salvation.<sup>8</sup>

His extant writings for the years preceding 1513 are very scant, being confined to three letters, a receipt, and some marginal notes to works of Lombard and Augustine, but they are sufficient to show that he was still at the antipodes of his final conclusions—the bondage of the will, salvation by faith, and certainty of election. From notes to Augustine of 1509 it is clear that Brother Martin still held to the freedom of the will; from others of about the same time, to Lombard, we infer that, though even at this early date he had begun to consider the problem, he was yet far from the *sola fides*.

He was led to reverse his position by a variety of influences, partly practical, partly academic. One of these was a long and rather heated quarrel with that faction of the Order which laid most stress on the punctilio of the cloister. The German Augustinians were divided into two parties; the "Observants," of a stricter rule imposed by their Vicar Proles in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, and the "Conventuals," who had refused to adopt this reform. When John von Staupitz became Vicar of the German Province in 1503, he did his best to reunite the two congregations, and after long effort finally obtained a bull granting him the necessary power, the document being dated June 26, 1510, and published by him on the following September 30 at Wittenberg. This aroused a protest from the Observants them-

<sup>7</sup> Werke, Weimar, xlv, 8.

<sup>8</sup> Luther's teacher, Dr. Usingen, testifies that in 1511 Luther was satisfied with his profession. Paulus: Usingen, 17. Other passages in his letters and in the Commentary on Romans show that this was true in 1515 and 1516. Römerbrief, Scholien, 318.

selves, the reason thereof being inferentially their unwillingness to have anything to do with the brothers whose practice was looser than their own. In October, 1510, two of the chapters, Nuremberg and Erfurt, sent an embassy to Rome to appeal from the action of their Vicar, the representative of Erfurt being Martin Luther.<sup>9</sup> The mission came to nothing, probably because while at Rome Luther became convinced that Staupitz was in the right, and therefore went over to his side. His action was naturally resented at Erfurt, which within a few months became too hot to hold him and his friend Lang, who also sided with Staupitz, and both of them were consequently transferred, in the summer of 1511,<sup>10</sup> to Wittenberg. This did not help matters, for Erfurt was jealous of the growth, largely at her expense, of the new university. The controversy was blown up afresh at a general chapter held at Cologne in May, 1512, at which Luther was present and at which Staupitz endeavored to carry out his plans for union. The Erfurters, indeed, were so incensed against their former brother that their leader, Dr. Nathin, represented his departure as a breach of faith and of oath to his *alma mater*; for at that time, when degrees were little more than licenses to teach, a man was required to lecture, for a time at least, at the academy at which he had prepared.<sup>11</sup> All this opposition came from men so

<sup>9</sup> The date of the journey to Rome is given as one year later in Köstlin-Kawerau: Martin Luther (1903), i. 89, and this is followed by McGiffert: Martin Luther, 37 ff. and by W. Köhler: s.v. "Luther" in Scheel's Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. But Professor Kawerau has now become convinced of the greater probability of the earlier date (Lutherkalender, 1910) which is also given in Grisar: Luther, i. 21 ff., and in my Life and Letters of Martin Luther, 16. Its correctness is now settled by the recent discovery of a note of the Vicar General, Aegidius of Viterbo, dated January, 1511. Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, xxxii, 604.

<sup>10</sup> In August, 1511, Lang matriculated at Wittenberg. Paulus: Usingen, 16. That Luther's transfer took place at about the same time may be inferred partly from this, partly from the fact that he lectured three semesters at Erfurt, beginning November, 1509.

<sup>11</sup> Kampschulte: Die Universität Erfurt, ii, 8, note 1, says that according to the custom of the time Luther should have continued lecturing at Erfurt. The degrees he took there were "baccalaureus ad biblia" and "sententiarius"; the doctorate at Wittenberg, October, 1512, was another grievance. An oath to lecture at the university where a man had taken his degree, or had prepared for it, was administered at Paris until 1452. H. Rashdall: Universities of Europe, i. 455 f. See further, my translation of Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters, 1913, pp. 30 f.

strictly Observant that they abhorred fellowship with those living under a looser rule. They appeared to Luther like Pharisees straining at gnats. His anger against these "little saints," as he called them, found vent in a rousing sermon, almost a tirade, delivered at the general chapter held at Gotha, May, 1515, when he was elected District Vicar. Some hostility to him was also found at Wittenberg, for his lectures contain occasional sarcasms against those "Judaizers" who trusted in their Order, their saints, and their ceremonies. The controversy necessarily increased his sense of the futility of the works practised by men with so little inward rectitude.

His reading supplemented this impression. From the first days in the cloister he had heard Augustine read, and in 1508 he had acquired and annotated some of his works. This profoundest of all Christian philosophers had won from Paul, *via* the Neo-Platonists and Victorinus, the doctrine of justification by faith, which, as a living conviction, he had made his own, holding it in neither exactly the Pauline nor in exactly the Lutheran sense. From the Bishop of Hippo the Wittenberg student received a higher conception of God than he had hitherto held, for the essence of St. Augustine's genius is his feeling that God was the be-all and end-all of his life. From him, too, came the doctrine of the depravity of the human will, and a new realization of the nature of sin and of grace. What Luther did not and could not get from his master was the answer to what was for him the kernel of the whole problem; for, "with all his horror of sin, St. Augustine had not experienced the horror of uncertainty of salvation,"<sup>12</sup> and, though he held the election to grace irresistible, he thought that no one could be sure of possessing that grace.

Augustine's most valuable element, his doctrine of grace and faith, was practically suppressed until the Sixteenth Century, but at that time there were several authors who began to take it up before Luther. Of these one certainly influenced him, the brilliant French humanist, Lefèvre d'Étaples, whose editions of the Psalms and of the Pauline Epistles Luther used in his university lectures. His copy, with notes in his own hand, of the Frenchman's *Quintuplex Psalterium* has survived, and the more

<sup>12</sup> Harnack: *History of Dogma* (English), v, 210, note.

closely it is studied the more nearly does the Saxon professor seem to have adopted his forerunner's doctrine. From this, for example, he borrowed his extremely complex method of interpreting Scripture in several senses, half of them literal and half of them spiritual. But he was far more deeply impressed by Lefèvre's *S. Pauli Epistolae XIV*, published in 1512. — Luther did not get it until two or three years later, when it became the basis of his lectures on Romans. From it he obtained what linguistic material he used, until in March, 1516, the Greek New Testament of Erasmus appeared, when for the moment he deserted the older for the more recent authority. But the ascendancy of the Dutch humanist was short-lived. A year later Luther stated that the more he read him the less he liked him, "because I fear he does not sufficiently promote the cause of Christ and the grace of God, in which he is much more ignorant than Lefèvre." The French scholar, indeed, was peculiarly congenial to him, anticipating several of his later doctrines, including that of the supreme authority of the Bible. Justification by faith only was also pointed out by him in the clearest terms. There are two ways of righteousness, "that of the law and that of faith, the one of works, the other of grace, the one human, the other divine."<sup>13</sup> Again: "It is almost profane to talk of the merit of works, especially before God. For a merit does not seem to ask for grace but to exact what is due; to attribute merit to works is to have the opinion of those who think that we can be justified by works, an error for which the Jews were particularly condemned. Therefore let us not speak of the merit of our works, which is little or none, but let us celebrate the grace of God, which is everything."<sup>14</sup> This doctrine was most clearly expressed in the *Commentary on Romans*, the Epistle on which Luther, too, first lectured: "Do you ask whether there was ever anyone justified without the works of the law, written or natural? There have been such, even very many. Who knows not that the penitent thief was justified by faith

<sup>13</sup> Romans iii, *S. Pauli Epistolae*, fol. 74, quoted by A. Humbert: *Les origines de la théologie moderne*, 283.

<sup>14</sup> 1 Cor. viii, fol. 118b, quoted by E. Doumergue: *Jean Calvin*, 1899, i, 82.



only?"<sup>15</sup> Finally: "By works without faith it is impossible to be justified; on the contrary, by faith without works it is possible."<sup>16</sup>

Such passages make it certain that Luther took his most famous doctrine bodily from Lefèvre. By "doctrine" I mean here the formula into which his theology was cast, for it must be noted and emphasized that it was but the form that was Lefèvre's; the personal experience which led the German friar to adopt this dogma and which gave it a new and deepened meaning were his own. On this more will be said presently; but the fact must here be underscored that what was borrowed from the Frenchman was but a marvellously apt formula to express the essence of a personal experience which the Reformer would have had in any case.

The formula indeed was so far from original with Luther that other men in his circle were grasping at the same thought. Stau-pitz and Carlstadt, for example, were not far from the *sola fides*, even before it was established by their greater friend. The essence of the thought is one of the oldest in Christianity, so that it is not hard to assert and to prove that in this respect Luther "was not an innovator but a renovator," that "all the opinions objected to by Denifle as specifically Lutheran were no intellectual discovery of the Reformer, but were known long before Luther, and found, during his life-time, both in and out of his Order, Catholic defenders."<sup>17</sup> Are ideas, indeed, ever originated or invented by great men? Do they not rather arise by a necessary evolution in the minds of a generation, being thought about, hinted at, half enunciated by many, until some one of masterful insight focusses the scattered rays and thus founds a new school of thought?

Luther's second call to Wittenberg in 1511, which gave so much offence to his brethren, was for the purpose of enabling him to take the chair of Biblical exegesis, hitherto occupied by Stau-pitz. He therefore took the degree of "doctor of the Holy Script-

<sup>15</sup> Romans iv, *ibid.* fol. 77a, quoted *ibid.* 83.

<sup>16</sup> Romans iii, *ibid.* fol. 75a, quoted *ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> A. V. Müller: *Luthers theologische Quellen*, Einleitung and *passim*. Something on the same subject in an article "A German View of the *Sola Fides*," by F. Loofs, in the *Constructive Quarterly*, no. 1, 1913.

ure" on October 18, 1512. The date marks the beginning of his real study of the Bible, which from this time on was undoubtedly the most potent purely intellectual formative influence in his evolution. It is true that he knew the work before, for at his entrance into the cloister the monks had given him a Bible bound in red, and moreover the Constitution of Staupitz, adopted by the Order in 1504, prescribed diligent perusal of the Scriptures.<sup>18</sup> But it was not until he became a doctor, sworn to defend and bound to teach God's Word, that he really applied himself to it and assimilated a portion of its contents.

Luther's exegesis is a subject that well might fill a volume, and yet a few words, inadequate as they must be, are necessary to explain it, for what a man gets out of the Bible always depends on his avenue of approach. Even in the sixteenth century it was noticed that this was the book in which everyone sought, and everyone found, his own dogmas.<sup>19</sup> The work of the Wittenberg professor has been much studied but little clarified. Certainly, the unqualified depreciation meted out to it by scholars blinded by the far greater achievements of modern research does not seem to me just. No one, I should think, can read Luther's criticisms of the Epistle of James or that to the Hebrews, or of some of the historical parts of the Old Testament, without feeling that he had on occasion insight and acumen superior to any of his contemporaries, even Erasmus. His translation, too, is really remarkable, not only as a masterpiece of style, but as a scientific philological achievement. On the other hand, a very superficial acquaintance with Luther's method is sufficient to show that his spirit was anything but scientific; that he was far less objective and open-minded than was Erasmus.

Few works of Biblical scholarship show a more hopeless lack of historical feeling and a greater waste of effort on a totally fruitless method than the first lectures on the Psalms, presently to be described. The subject is too large to be treated here as it deserves, but the key to this strange puzzle, this odd mixture

<sup>18</sup> T. Kolde: *Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation*, 22. This provision was later repealed, probably as a consequence of Luther's example.

<sup>19</sup> *Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque, Invenit inque illo dogmata quisque sua.*

of fine work and labyrinthine bewilderment, must at least be offered. The answer to the problem is found in the professor's dogma. The supreme interest with him was the establishment, or elucidation, of a preconceived body of ideas, the doctrine of the Church which he adopted so strictly, and which, even in his later days of rebellion against the hierarchy, he did so little to change. This interest was with him decisive. Any exegesis, no matter how far-fetched, any treatment of the text, no matter how violent, which harmonized with and supported the dogmatic system, was considered preferable to any alternative, however natural or reasonable, which seemed to contradict these ideas. This is why the method of Erasmus, in whom the dogmatic interest is at a minimum, and the impartial, critical attitude adopted, so promptly and decisively repelled him. But on the other hand, when his system allowed it, Luther was capable of achievement surpassing that of the humanists. In respect of his limitations it hardly becomes us to judge him too severely; the most famous Biblical scholars of the present show precisely similar tendencies. Not that either Luther or his successors consciously propose to themselves an apologetic method; rather they approach the Bible with the sincere wish to find out exactly what it has to say. It is only according to the psychological law of apperception that they see in the Bible that which they are told is there. The mind can only assimilate that for which it is in some degree prepared. It must be acknowledged, however, that Luther carried his dogma into his exegesis more boldly than do most scholars. He had the courage of his convictions. Thus he altered a text<sup>20</sup> in translating, to make it agree more nearly with the idea which he was convinced, on independent grounds, must be there. Thus also he rejected the Epistle of James because it contradicted his favorite idea of justification by faith; this, however, was much later than the period we are discussing. At that time he felt it incumbent on him to harmonize James and Paul, much as his followers have done since.

Luther's first lectures were on the Psalms; he then took up the Epistles to the Romans, Hebrews, and Galatians. It is significant that his so individual spirit was attracted to those por-

<sup>20</sup> Romans iii, 28. On this, my Luther, 267.

tions of the Bible which are, in either Testament, the supreme expression of personal religion. The dirges and paeans of the Psalmist, the temptations and fightings of the Apostle, struck in his troubled heart a chord deeper than that sounded by the Gospels; for the hero of the Gospels was on such a plane of God-like impeccability that he seemed unable perfectly to sympathize with frail humanity. Luther sought Christ in the Scriptures; indeed he sought him alone, but it was Paul's Christ, the Crucified, whose death and resurrection, rather than whose life, made reconciliation of man and God. All the Scriptures, he thought, spoke of Christ, and he therefore made them speak of him by allegory, if they did not do so directly. His later opinion, that he at first allegorized too much, will certainly be shared by most of his modern readers. Turning over his lectures on the Psalms (1513-16) we see that he found in almost every one some prophecy of Jesus, his birth or life or passion, including specific references to Pilate and Judas. From the modern standpoint it is impossible to imagine a worse method than his. He not only adopted from Lyra the fourfold interpretation of every text, historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical, but he improved on it by multiplying it by two; each of the said interpretations being understood in a double sense, the literal and the spiritual. The latter, which dealt with Christ or the Church, was the truer sense, the meaning which gives life while the letter killeth; the sense, in short, which made the true theologian. Anything can be deduced from any text by this method. It is of course hopeless to look for light on the original from Luther's lucubrations on the Psalms. The work on Romans (1515-16) is better, simply because it suited the professor's ideas to take Paul more literally. The Apostle really did speak of Christ, and there is therefore some hope of getting an objective inquiry into his exact meaning. But even here Luther did not at this time get very far; he really read his own ideas into Paul. Having learned from Erasmus and Lefèvre the trick of linguistic criticism, he seemed to make a sincere effort to get the original meaning of the words, but his research seldom went deeper into the context. Every sentence was treated as a premise, from which was deduced, by rigid Aristotelian syllogism, some truth of practical bearing on the question of salvation.

For our present purpose this subjectivity is an advantage; the less of the Psalmist and of Paul, the more of Luther. Read with this only in mind, the first lectures give a pretty accurate account of the road travelled by the Reformer during the years 1513-16. One of the most striking things in them is Luther's large and growing interest in public affairs—the evils in the Church, the tyranny of the princes, the disorders in the monasteries, the faults in the universities. These passages serve to remind us that their writer was rising to a responsible position in the university and in the Order, and that he was already a reformer; but as they have no direct bearing on our particular subject, which is the evolution of the doctrine of justification by faith, they may be safely disregarded for the present.

In the first lectures (1513-15) he has already arrived at a fairly advanced position. He no longer lays the whole emphasis upon works, as he apparently did in the first monastic years, but on the other hand he has not yet arrived at the *sola fides*. Faith without works is dead; a little later, faith is shown by works. The will is still considered free, though largely dependent on grace, but God is thought to give grace infallibly to one who did the best in his power. Indeed, God wants us to co-operate with him in working out our own salvation. Good works are therefore not to be disparaged, for they inevitably proceed from one who has been made just (justified).<sup>21</sup> In pondering the question of his own salvation, Luther is also wavering; he neither despairs of it, as previously, nor postulates it, as later. He relies only on God's mercy, which is our only righteousness;<sup>22</sup> he appreciates God's pity because he knows that he deserves nothing but evil;<sup>23</sup> he shuns blasphemy more than hell, striving to glorify the God who damns him.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, he even takes comfort in the thought that it is a sign of goodness to believe that one is reprobate, for none but those who know that they are most perfect can be free from this dread.<sup>25</sup>

These passages point to the ultimate predestinarian and solifidian doctrines of the lecturer, but they do not actually formulate

<sup>21</sup> Werke, Weimar, iv, 113 (1515).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 343 (1513-14), 496 (1514).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. iv, 131 (1515).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. iii, 73 (1513-14).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. i, 41. Sermon of December 27, 1514 or 1515?

them. Faith, he saw, was needed, but how was it to be got, and what was it? How, in short,—for this was the secret thought hardly acknowledged to himself,—could a man have faith in a God who still seemed to him unjust? The answer was suggested by the German mystics, Tauler and one of his school, the so-called Frankforter, whose anonymous manuscript Luther himself first printed under the title *A German Theology*. Just as he was beginning to lecture on Romans, thus becoming more deeply involved than ever in the awful mysteries of predestination and redemption, these men came into his life to tell him, what they felt as few men have ever felt, that the essence of religion is the union of the soul with God, and that this is achieved only by complete abandonment to his will. With the glow of intense conviction Tauler urges the need of ever greater self-denial and of ever completer surrender, until, without the interposition of any external institution, the soul eventually finds herself at one with her bridegroom.<sup>26</sup> So little emphasis is put on the usual ecclesiastical works, that Tauler esteemed the holiest man he ever saw one who had never heard five sermons in his life. He tells of a woman ready to be damned for the glory of God.<sup>27</sup> “And if such a person were dragged into the bottom of hell, there would be the kingdom of God and eternal bliss in hell.” In like manner the *German Theology* preached, “Put off thine own will, and there will be no hell.”

The bearing of this on faith came to Luther as the answer to the problem he had been meditating day and night for many years. It came to him suddenly, with apparent casualness, as the answer to so many questions comes to us all; the attention hovering around a desiderated thought and dwelling on all known associations with it, until, as it were spontaneously, the new idea, so long wanted, surges up into consciousness. The subconscious self is regarded by William James as the particular seat of the religious impulses, in which a concept may be long maturing, until, sometimes at the end of a protracted struggle, it comes into the stream of consciousness. Now, as we have seen, Luther had

<sup>26</sup> This simile made a particularly strong impression on Staupitz, who worked it out in his *Libellus de executione eternae predestinationis* (1515) with a realism revolting to modern taste. See Staupitzens Werke, ed. Knaake, i, 137 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Luther was doubtless thinking of this in his *Ninety-five Theses*, nos. 29, 40.

almost arrived at the conception of redemption by faith when he began to lecture on Romans, in May, 1515. It was apparently soon after this time<sup>28</sup> that the fully formulated idea (with certain corollaries presently to be discussed) dawned upon him with such force that it seemed a direct revelation of the Holy Ghost, opening the door to paradise. It is strange, and yet certain, that this revelation was vouchsafed to him in the privy of the Black Cloister, situated in the little tower overlooking the town walls. One is tempted to connect this fact with the monk's neurosis, referring to parallel cases of obsession driving people to go through certain ceremonies at stated times, often ceremonies of a quasi-religious nature at times least natural for them. It is simpler, however, to recollect only that Luther was a busy man, with little leisure for private meditation, and that the rule enjoined spiritual reflection at these times.<sup>29</sup> In telling the story of the monk who prayed while sitting on the stool, and had a controversy with the devil about the propriety of so doing,<sup>30</sup> Luther probably referred to his own practice. It must naturally have seemed odd to him at the time, however, that such a revelation should come on such an occasion, and thinking over the reason, he symbolized it:<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Luther's references to it are so frequent and specific that it is impossible to believe that there was really no crisis at all, as is apparently the opinion of McGiffert, who does not speak of it in his *Luther*. The dating is more difficult, and is placed in various years from 1508 to 1519 by H. Böhmer, O. Scheel, G. Kawerau, Loofs (*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1911, 461 ff.), and H. Grisar. I place it in 1515 or early in 1516 chiefly because the thought seems to me lacking in the writings of or earlier than 1515, but fully developed in the letters of 1516 (Enders, i, 28 ff. et saepe), and in other writings of this year, e.g. the *Quaestio de viribus* (*Werke*, Weimar, i, 142). Luther himself places it between his two courses on Psalms (1516-18, Scheel: *Dokumente*, 17), and says that it came to him while lecturing on Romans. *Tischreden*, Weimar, i, 335. Further he says the crisis came when he was "over thirty." *Werke*, Erlangen, xlv, 78.

<sup>29</sup> A. V. Müller: *Luthers theologische Quellen*, 221.

<sup>30</sup> *Colloquia*, ed. Bindseil, i, 434.

<sup>31</sup> *Werke*, Weimar, iv, 448. In 1516. My dating of the lectures is based on a system of interpolation; the lectures on Psalms being assumed to have lasted from November, 1513, to October, 1516; those on Romans from May, 1515, to October, 1516. The dating, which I have worked out in great detail, is remarkably supported by parallels, but, even if not quite accurate, it is obvious that when the limits of a course are known, the first lectures must fall near the beginning, the last near the end of the term.

the greatest triumphs of the spirit are in the vile substance of the flesh, which is regarded by the spiritual man, and is stated literally to be, in a manner, a *latrina* and *cloaca*. Conversely, therefore, the *cloaca* might stand for the flesh, in which the message of the spirit was revealed.

Analyzing the content of this experience, we find that it was not, "The just shall live by faith," or any such words. No; this was but the later formulation of an idea totally different when felt. Here, as so often, theology or philosophy but furnished the formula into which a great experience was forced, and thereby cramped and distorted; for words are still so large a part of thought that when once a certain set of them is adopted, it modifies and alters the original conception. What relation does the definition of the word "love" in the dictionary have to the wild heart-throb of passion? But the dogmatic shell of the *sola fides* was, if possible, even farther from the empirical concept which gave it rise, for it did not even approach that experience as closely as language allows; it was not, in short, the primary form in which Luther described his message. The antithesis, faith *versus* works, has become so natural to most students of the Reformation that they forget there is absolutely nothing necessary about it. The natural opposite of "work" is "do nothing," and *this* was the whole essence of Luther's message. Pure passivity on the part of man is the only way to court the grace of God. The strong man, who was never weary of the battle and of striving, was weary of defeat. He had been trying, trying, trying to work out his own salvation—for he had believed this possible—by ridding himself of sin and lust, but all to no avail. He gave it up as a bad job, cried, "Lord, damn or save!" and found peace. The sudden relaxation of the over-tense mind is in itself enough to bring it rest. The battle is not to the strong but to him who can yield himself most perfectly into God's hands.

The lectures on Romans are full of this idea; they grow eloquent to the point of passion when they treat of the mastering thesis. Paul's purpose in the whole letter, according to his exegete, is to destroy all one's own righteousness and wisdom, to show man his sins and folly and his deep need of Christ as his justification.



In fact, the more we seek salvation, the more God gives damnation. What, then, can we do to be saved? All we can do is to yield ourselves up with perfect resignation into God's hands, holding the soul as passive as a woman at conception,<sup>32</sup> who by no effort of her own is impregnated with the grace of her bridegroom. To express his idea, he invented the phrase "passive righteousness of God," meaning thereby the righteousness of God which he puts in or imputes to man without any merit or even effort of the latter. The word has naturally puzzled many scholars, even the thorough Köstlin, who knew it only in the Reformer's later reminiscence. According to this, the crux of the whole matter was to fathom the mystery of how God's righteousness could justify man, for by righteousness of God (*justitia Dei*)

- Luther had always understood "the formal or active justice of God, by which he is just and punishes sinners"; but in the revelation he is describing it came to him that by it the Apostle
- rather meant "the passive justice of God, by which he mercifully justifies us through faith." These words are indeed obscure as they stand, but they are amply elucidated by reference to the *Commentary on Romans*. There we read that the passivity is to be understood of man, who thus and only thus acquires God's grace. Another image to bring this truth home is that of the axe in the hands of the woodman and of the rod in the hand of a man chastising a dog. Neither the axe nor the rod can do aught of itself, but only the master. Now this "passive and active justification" is the same as believing in God, and the power to do even this is also his special gift. Again faith is defined as not merely believing in him—the writer's former position—but believing him to be just, for it is only his justice that makes us just. Consequently, "faith is justifying grace," and faith in Christ takes away the consciousness of sin.

The corollaries of this passivity, which, because it was so hard, was interpreted as the highest mark of faith, were drawn with strict logic. "Where now is our righteousness? Where are good works? Where are the freedom of the will and chance?" The will has no power to justification, but only to sin. Where God

<sup>32</sup> Römerbrief, Scholien, 206. This comparison of the soul to the bride of Christ was not of course original with Luther. It was the favorite simile of the monks.

does everything, man can do nothing; therefore his will is in bondage. This dogma, in fact, is but the reverse of the medal of which the doctrine of faith only is the obverse. That it makes God the cause of man's sin and damnation is frankly recognized, though it is stated that, as all belongs to him, he has a right to do as he will with his own. The doctrine is put very strongly, for God is conceived as dealing out redemption and reprobation with total disregard of the merits and demerits of individuals. As this idea, to our notions so irrational and mean, became widely prevalent among Protestants, it must be assumed to have had in it something suited to the mental constitution of the time. What this was, however, is hard to say. It can certainly not be explained on the overworked maxim that man makes God in his own image, for a capricious and tyrannical God was repugnant to the natural feelings of the Reformer. It was only by a supreme effort of faith that he could persuade himself that a Deity apparently so cruel and iniquitous could be merciful and just. The thesis of this article is that Luther's beliefs were deduced from his experiences, and yet it must be recognized that this key is too simple to fit all locks. Some of his beliefs were apparently but the logical deductions of others, although the corollaries occasionally ran counter to the emotions which prompted the primary propositions.

Another deduction from the main premise, and one which he was obliged to modify in practice, was the total worthlessness of good deeds, even those of ordinary morality. This in fact was the antinomianism with which the *sola fides* is often charged, and which, in fact, it often produced. The position he held in 1516 is more cautious than it occasionally was later, but it is sufficiently pronounced. Venial sins are thought not to prevent a man inheriting eternal life, and good works do not help him to it. Good works without grace are like the actions of a monkey imitating a man, but unable thereby to make himself one. Grace, and grace alone, is necessary. The negative side of the same teaching is cast into the form of caustic sarcasms against the "*justitiiarii*" who rely on their own endeavors. Their righteousness is no righteousness, for man has none save that which is imputed to him by God. A man may be perfectly good (*rectus*)

without being in the least justified (*justus*). In short, the heroic virtues of Fabricius and Regulus no more savor of redemption than do sorb-apples of figs.<sup>23</sup>

The final corollary of the great message was: Certainty of salvation. "*The elect are saved not contingently but necessarily.*"<sup>24</sup> These words, thus underlined by Luther, indicate the last stage in the development of his system, for they brought him the assurance of comfort and hope. He dwells on the concept at length and frequently. He never forgets that the new hope came to him through despair, that to win heaven a man must be resigned to hell.

This great experience was the beginning of the career of the Reformer. It was the corner-stone of his life and doctrine. The effect was almost instantaneous. "It is mine," said he, with superb self-confidence, shortly after, "to point out whatever I may see that is not right, even in high places." It was this feeling which made him thoroughly purge his university of the dross of Aristotelian ethics. It was this hatred of good works that necessitated the momentous protest against indulgences, and it was the comfort brought by the idea of faith and salvation that nerved its champion in the hard battle until the victory was won.

Once enunciated, the doctrine spread rapidly; faith as a grain of mustard-seed waxed a great tree; the morsel of yeast leavened the whole lump. In the secular twentieth century it requires a slight effort of the imagination to realize what enthusiasm a purely religious idea might arouse in the sixteenth. That it did so is certain; undoubtedly because multitudes were sick of the holiness of works offered them by the Church, and longed for a more spiritual religion. Admitting that the antithesis has often been exaggerated and stated, both by Luther and his followers,

<sup>23</sup> Enders, i, 64. October 19, 1516. This is of course from Augustine, recalling the saying attributed to him, that the virtues of the heathen were but splendid vices. Cf. also Römerbrief, Scholien, 323.

<sup>24</sup> Römerbrief, Scholien, 208. It may be of interest to note that at the Council of Trent, twenty-one theologians were for "*certitudo gratiae*," fourteen against it, and two silent. A. V. Müller, *op. cit.*, 219. But the doctrine was rejected. Pastor: History of the Popes, xii, 345.

with gross unfairness,<sup>36</sup> nevertheless the popular idea remains roughly right, that the Reformation meant a movement from a mechanical to an individual and subjective conception of religion. It was the same need of doing away with externals and seeking an immediate relation to God that moved the mystics of the fourteenth century; but Europe was not then ripe for the idea. The explanation of Luther's success where Tauler failed is partly found in the timely elements with which he combined his original thought. His own experience was but the nucleus around which was gathered all that was most vital in the thought of the age—the return to the Bible, to Augustine and to mysticism, the protest against the sophistries of the schoolmen and against the corruption of the Church, and a simpler, more individual relation of the soul to God. Above all, Martin Luther was fitted to be the prophet of his age because he had the most searching experience in what that age imperiously demanded, personal religion.

<sup>36</sup> Luther says that the papists believed "*Der Munch-Dreck besser quam fides.*" *Werke*, Weimar, xlvii, 296.

*THE TEACHING OF ERNST TROELTSCH OF  
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In these days of world-wide intercommunication, the hope of unity and demand for it among men are very strong, so strong that the optimistically inclined often think they already see the rosy hues of a dawn heralding the day of universal harmony. Perhaps these good people are right; but in no respect do modifying considerations appear more clearly than in matters of religion and religious thought. In these things racial as well as individual differences exist; and even between nations so near akin as Germany and the United States mutual understanding seems hard to attain. No doubt the average religious man in America looks upon Germany as a hot-bed of religious radicalism, opposed to all those principles of piety which good men wish to see preserved. There is ground for this opinion, in that German theologians have led the way in the application of the critical method to the facts of religion, and it is often still true, though far less than a few decades ago, that the theories advanced contain poison for the springs of pure religion. But this is not the whole of the picture. Besides the forces of stanch conservatism, which are as strong and as active in Germany as elsewhere, there exists also there at present a vigorous and increasing body of men, as much interested in religion as any conservatives, who are attempting to mediate the great truths of religion to the modern man, whose views are no longer in agreement with orthodoxy. To some these teachers may seem radical, but to those who realize that the great crux is the religious life itself and not this or that particular formulation of it, they convey a distinct impression of constructive renewal—renewal, because they reckon with the knowledge and forces of the new day; constructive, because they build upon and further the knowledge which the past has bequeathed and the forces to which man has ever turned for help and strength.

Such a man is Ernst Troeltsch of Heidelberg, too little known on this side of the Atlantic, but a man to be reckoned with in the future here, as he already is in his own land. That a new school will form itself about him is unlikely; his teaching is too individualistic for that. But many a student is attracted by his powerful reasoning, fearlessly critical of all the prevailing tendencies—orthodox, Ritschlian, Hegelian, pragmatic—and gets from him a deeper hold on the realities of the spiritual life and a stronger faith in Christianity as the permanent expression of that life. It is this broad aspect of Troeltsch's teaching which will interest us here rather than his views concerning the history of Protestant Christianity, which is his special field.<sup>1</sup>

The Hegelian school of evolutionary idealism<sup>2</sup> has sought to reduce religion to the "idea" which it postulates as the germ existing in primitive religions and developed gradually by evolution into its absolute manifestation in Christianity. Great as this conception is, and satisfying as it is to many, it is weak in every part. We do not know and probably never shall know enough about the real conceptions of primitive man to discover in them, in all cases, the germ out of which later developments have come; nor are we able to identify historical Christianity with the philosophic Absolute in the manner intended. Also, valuable and legitimate as the theory of evolution is, it will not stand the test when face to face with the great religious movements of the world. They defy the attempts to explain them by any theory of continuous development, for such explanations ignore the underivable, creative, and sovereign elements manifest in the great personalities which alone have given birth to the durable religions of mankind. Thus Troeltsch opposes such thinkers as Hegel, Schelling, Pfeiderer, and the Cairds, who

<sup>1</sup> The following presentation of Troeltsch's views is made from carefully taken notes of lectures and books, and undoubtedly many passages approximate closely to his actual words; but because of the uncertainty as to an exact verbal correspondence, the writer has deemed it wiser not to use quotation-marks, even in referring to specific books and lectures.

<sup>2</sup> (a) Lectures on "Religionsphilosophie" delivered in Heidelberg in 1912; (b) "Die Selbständigkeit der Religion" in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1895; (c) *Das Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft*. See *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I: 4: pp. 460-489.

would make religion subsidiary to philosophy. Philosophy is right and necessary; but it can reach only a logically postulated unity without content. To reduce religion to that would make it no religion at all, and complete knowledge of it would mean its end.

The same result ensues with those who would reduce religion to mere aesthetics, as is done by Feuerbach and similar thinkers. According to these religion is a practical human creation, the poetic deification of human needs; the wish is father to the thought; and comforting and helpful as the thought may be, it is still an illusion. Illusory also is aesthetic pantheism, which reduces religion to art and makes of it merely a sense of the harmonious and the beautiful in nature. All such systems presuppose an illusion as an objective reality. But do the facts of religion support such a theory of illusion? If the wish were father to the thought, then fear and anxiety would be the only feelings brought into play; but as a matter of fact friendly communion is quite as prominent an element in all known religions as propitiatory expiation. The powerful religions always contain a mixture of the gentle and the terrible, which is far better explained as responsive to objective reality than as an artificial creation. The frequent absorption of independent cultural values by the religious life is not an idealizing process, for religion is not an idealization of culture. On the contrary, religion has often, as in the case of Israel and in Greece, tended to separate from set cultural forms, and the view constantly recurs that culture is the enemy of religion. For religion sets its eye on the beyond. The touch of the Absolute is upon it, an experience of something higher, that creates needs by establishing a gap between the ideal and the actual. To reduce religion, therefore, to poetic fantasy, which creates nothing new but only reshapes what is, would be the reduction of its fundamental sense of the Absolute to pure illusion; and this would mean robbing the world of all worth.

More common and convincing today is the derivation of religion from morality, or at least the conception of religion as a mere hand-maid of right action. Religion is thought of as morality colored by the Absolute, or, as Matthew Arnold described it, "morality touched with emotion." It is no wonder that the

attempt at such an identification should be made in a time when so much emphasis is being laid upon the ethical side of all questions, and indeed the two fields lie very near each other. Kant maintained that a moral law-giver was the necessary inference from the moral law. That is, religion is not a process of clothing the moral law with authoritative supernatural garments, but is the necessary and logical result of the categorical imperative, a result of morality and derived from it. Others hold that religion is a fanciful creation of human weakness in its effort to attain morality, which is the main thing, but which the average man finds it hard to follow for its own sake. That is, God is introduced to drive or inspire us to the great moral task of life, which in itself has not compelling power sufficient for the case.

Is either of these derivations justifiable? Thirty or forty years ago the usual answer was yes, but historical investigation has enabled us to know and judge the facts better. Not even in the great religions, where the moral and the religious elements are closest together, is such a derivation or identification possible. In them the first commandment is not ethical efficiency or righteousness but union with God. The other commandment may be "like unto it" but is not the same. Religion is ever independent, and does not spring from morality nor exist for the sake of sanctioning it. The salvation of the Buddhist is in the beyond, in a remoulding of the soul, and not in ethics; while the neo-Platonic communion with God is independent of good or bad action. In all the higher religions there lies this contrast, often an opposition, between the religious element, looking at "the things which are not seen and eternal," and the moral element, looking at "the things that are seen," temporal, practical, worldly. Over against the natural appeal to the moral effect of their faith by defenders of religion must be placed many instances of strong religious feeling coupled with great lack of morality, fanaticism indulging in extremest acts of immorality. This is lack of development, of course, but not hypocrisy, and it is conclusive proof that the two, religion and morality, are not identical or derived one from the other, but are independent. Morality grows out of social life in all its varied forms. Religion springs out of experience with the superhuman, and originally was morally indifferent.



The only method of their union would be through a fusion of ethics and religion. This, Wundt holds, has been historically accomplished, and the object of religion therefore is now really the moral law. Such a fusion has of course taken place, though it has never become absolute, and if it were so, it would not prove the origin of religion in ethics any more than the converse. Furthermore, that the distinction has always remained along with the fusion is shown by the periodical outbreak of one or the other against its companion element. Through ethics indeed there has come a deepening and purification of religion; yet, as shown so clearly by Nietzsche in the case of Christianity, all universal religions have a double ethics, one eye toward the world and the other toward heaven, a worldly morality and a religious morality. Thus even here the two elements exist side by side and remain different from each other. So, Troeltsch contends, religion is not to be identified with or derived from morality, any more than morality is to be identified with or derived from religion.

Briefly put, Troeltsch's course of reasoning is this: All thought must start with an analysis of the facts of the human consciousness—a psychological investigation pure and simple. The mechanical-naturalistic and association theories are not without value, but they do not explain the facts of the mind. It is the structural theory which best solves the problem. The mind has its several capacities, mutually related to be sure, but each independent and sovereign in its own domain. The logical, aesthetic, and moral elements of consciousness are sovereign within their own spheres, each operating according to its own principles and judged by its own standards. But the facts of human experience demand the admission of the religious consciousness also into this hierarchy of equals, in that it too constitutes an independent element of human thought.

The peculiar characteristic of this religious faculty is its sense of the Absolute, generated primarily in the great religious leaders of the world, and from them reproduced by various means among the mass of men in whom such original productive powers are lacking. The question of the correctness of this belief lies beyond the realm of psychology, in that of the theory of knowledge. Is

the sense of the Absolute, which is the characteristic mark of the religious experience, valid? Does it correspond to an external reality which gives it rise? Is it, in other words, knowledge and in correspondence with truth?

Troeltsch's answer has already been indicated. The religious sense of the Absolute is grounded in and arises from an absolute objective reality, which manifests itself in human consciousness, and especially in those great leaders of mankind whom we may call religious geniuses or prophets. Troeltsch is emphatically a theist, and a thorough-going personal idealist. Theodor Kaftan, in his misleading brochure on Troeltsch,<sup>3</sup> accuses him of being a pantheist. This is undoubtedly due to the latter's insistence on "inclusive" supernaturalism against the "exclusive" supernaturalism of the orthodox view. But, as a matter of fact, Troeltsch is as far from pantheism as he is from positivism or pragmatism, or from materialism, to which, according to him, these systems all more or less readily lend themselves. His conception of God is not unlike the "*force créatrice*" of Bergson, whom he is wont to mention sympathetically—a great, inexplicable Power who has done much in the world that is beyond our understanding and who cannot be reduced to the measure of the expected; inscrutable, yet revealed in human history, especially in its loftiest personalities; a Being who, when we consider the age of the world, the possibility of other inhabited worlds, and the numberless human beings who have lived on this earth beyond the horizon of known history, cannot be thought of as limiting his self-revelation to any one place or time. He must be thought of in personal terms, even though he cannot actually be compassed by the mind of man; separate from the world and yet immanent in it, separate from man and yet coming into communion with him. This is theism through and through. In it the voluntaristic and apparently non-rational elements in God's nature are so emphasized that Troeltsch feels himself in greater sympathy with the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination than many Calvinists themselves. He has indeed put himself on record as believing that this doctrine is today unduly minimized and underestimated. It is undoubtedly this element in Calvinism together with its

<sup>3</sup> Ernst Troeltsch, 1912.

capability for modern social tasks, that leads Troeltsch to count it superior to the Lutheran Church, to which he belongs and by whose stanch adherents he is in consequence not wholly liked.

All this means that the religious consciousness has as much right and capacity to supply valid knowledge to man as any other phase of his mental life. We have been for years too much under the domination of those who have insisted on the legitimacy of the logical faculty alone. The result has been a dogmatism on the part of the mechanical-naturalistic or equally mechanical intellectualistic theorists, who will not see the facts which testify to the presence in the world of a creative spirit whose acts cannot all be forecast or reduced to known rules of reason. Logic has its method of procedure, its laws, and its validity. So has the moral consciousness, by which the validity of the categorical imperative is established; so also the aesthetic sense in matters concerning the beautiful.

In like manner the religious sense of the Absolute may be deemed valid. Through long experience and consideration of the facts of life one may reach the intellectual conviction that religious faith is justified; that a spiritual interpretation of the universe is the right one; that "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world." But this conviction is not proof and cannot be used to prove the proposition to others, though as a supplementary confirmation of faith it is not to be disregarded. The religious object can be apprehended only through the religious consciousness itself; and it is only by means of entrance into the religious experience, by coming into direct soul-contact with God himself, that certainty can be set up and proof established. In other words, we are here in the realm of the most highly personal of all experiences, one for which other experiences of a different sort may give the occasion or confirmation but which remains distinct from them, unique, compelling, and self-evidencing; valid just as our sense of logical unity, of goodness and right, of beauty and harmony, is valid. No one may substitute even this theory of religious knowledge for the knowledge itself. All must enter in by the same narrow door, which involves conversion, not in the way prescribed by traditional theology, but in a broad

sense none the less deep; a new birth, a turning from the lower to the higher life, from material, temporal, and earthly things to "the things that are above, eternal in the heavens"; a personal communion with the Father of Spirits, which conveys to the believer that sense of reality without which religion is no religion at all.

Thus we come to one of Troeltsch's fundamental emphases, in many respects the most fundamental—namely, the essential subjectivity of the religious process. This element brings him into close touch with the mystics of all ages, for whom he naturally expresses great regard; with Schleiermacher, whose teaching as a whole he more nearly follows than that of any other man; with the Pietists, in spite of his condemnation of their Biblical literalism and anti-social tendencies; and finally with Ritschl, through whom largely, I suspect, in the contacts of student days, this trait was developed in him. Even at that time, however, his many points of disagreement with the Ritschlian school began to show themselves. Like all his past and present subjectivistic *confrères*, Troeltsch has at this point been forced to run the gauntlet of otherwise opposed but here united foes—the dogmatists and systematics of every kind, theological and philosophical, conservative and radical,—who hate nothing so much as a sovereign individual.

These critics Troeltsch meets by bringing out the essential relation existing between individual faith and the facts of history. While the mystic hovers in the immediacy of the eternal, oblivious of mundane actualities, Troeltsch maintains that theism must be based on the whole phenomenon of religion and its evolution in history. That he is himself unusually well equipped historically and has carefully considered what has been thought and felt in the realm of religion, even a superficial reader of his writings can see. In his article "*Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums'?*"<sup>4</sup> he rejects the three main solutions which have hitherto been offered of the relation of history to norms—the rationalistic, according to which all history is but a blurred expression of a human ideal; the supernaturalistic, which employs authority guaranteed by miracle; and that of evolutionary idealism, which

<sup>4</sup> In *Die Christliche Welt*, 1903, nos. 19, 21, 23, 25, 28.

is the absolute realization of the Idea in history. All these, he says, have been disproved by the criticism of the last century; and he concludes, "The only other solution is that of the purely factual and irrational connection of a Reality, recognized as necessary and true, with historic tradition and experience." Every new thought and experience bears witness to that connection, flowing out of preceding thoughts and experiences but not being comprehended in them. Therefore there will always be devotion to the past, new creation of the future, and personal appropriation. The historic object never lies ready merely to be appropriated, but is always newly created, maintaining its continuity in a mixture of the historical with conscious, personal expansion and modification. This is not mere unbridled subjectivism, but a conscientious historical subjectivism.

Several of Troeltsch's outstanding convictions may for convenience' sake be grouped here, convictions which touch directly and vitally this question of the relation of the subjective and the objective, of norms and their historical embodiment. Like most Germans, Troeltsch is very apt to shift the scene from facts to presuppositions; and he does not hesitate to admit the legitimacy, nay to demand the necessity, of a presupposition in estimating history. The only question is of the range and accuracy of the experience of which the presupposition is born and then of its ability to stand the repeated assault of the facts. He holds that we have a right to presuppose not only the possibility but also the probability of the existence of original, spiritual values in history, values which cannot be explained by the purely naturalistic hypothesis; furthermore, thinkers of the naturalistic class are quite as open as the idealists to the charge of being unduly *a priori* in their methods. His rule for passing judgment on religious history is this: "We must consider that religion to be the highest in which the religious *a priori* value comes to clearest expression," that is, that religion in which the sense of the Absolute is most satisfyingly embodied.<sup>5</sup> The goal for which Troeltsch here strives is, as he says, the same goal for which Hegel strove, an efficient unity and a norm; but the method is different in substituting a teleological law of evolution for the Hegelian dialectic.

<sup>5</sup> Das Wesen der Religion.

But, according to Troeltsch, the religious *a priori*, the sense of the Absolute, is a matter of great religious personalities; for all durable religions have had their origin in the "revelation" imparted to individuals. Hence his great emphasis upon the religious heroes of the race, the prophets of Israel—Jesus, Augustine, St. Francis, Luther, Buddha, Mohammed. One of his issues with the Ritschlians, however, is at this very point. In spite of this emphasis on the creative religious individual, which Ritschl makes the exclusive basis of his system, Troeltsch insists on the necessity of estimating a religion not by its founder alone but by the whole course of its development. In estimating Christianity, for example, it is not the teaching and the person of Christ that constitute the sole test, central and controlling as they may be. It is the whole course of that organic religious development which began with the Hebrew prophets, culminated in Jesus, was mediated and extended through Paul, the Catholic church, and the Protestant movements, and is still with us, a living, growing, creative force. Thus we necessarily reach the conception of a progressive revelation;<sup>6</sup> according to which the Bible may be considered central and yet allowance be made for a present-day revelation as well, a revelation which progresses, but is sufficiently close to the old lines to unite with tradition and to be called Christian. In many modern forces Troeltsch sees just such a Christian progress. He sees it in the emphasis on immanence and humanitarianism; in the recognition of the unknown elements in God's nature, with the fact of the immense size of the universe; in the objection to miracles, and in the consequent removal of the gap between the Christian and non-Christian worlds. He recognizes Christian kinship also in the modern belief in a dynamic rather than a mechanical revelation, and the resulting opposition to all sacramental ideas; in the rejection of the idea of a lost world, given over by its Creator, which should busy itself only with sin and its removal; in the abandonment of the demand for comprehensive, systematic formulations of absolute truth considered as final; and lastly, in the opening up of Christianity toward the world and toward the idea that all of life is to be controlled by the spirit, that "religious experience" means a

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Lectures on "Glaubenslehre," delivered in Heidelberg in 1912.

valuation and personal appropriation of all the elements of life. All these modern ideas should be looked upon as a real revelation of God himself in present-day life, the latest phases of God's self-manifestation to man.

Troeltsch recognizes the fact that most men in the world accept more or less willingly the authoritativeness of those views into which they have been born, but that for the increasing number to whom education is bringing independent judgment, religion is presenting an acute problem. With the outcry over the possibility of a new religion different from all that have gone before, or of a gradual disappearance of all religion, Troeltsch has little sympathy. The question for an educated man in doubt is not that of a new religion, nor of an intellectual sublimation of the religious experience, which would then be displaced by philosophy; nor yet again of a syncretism of various existing religious systems. The problem is rather one of estimating and choosing between the systems already before us in the world; not in the exclusive way of the Ritschlians and of many orthodox thinkers, who will allow no good outside of Christianity, but a choice, nevertheless, involving gradations and personal devotion to the religion of one's choice. The necessity of entering personally into the spirit of a religion in order to judge it and really to choose it is absolute. Troeltsch does not underestimate the difficulty of this task, but insists upon it and tries honestly to perform it himself. The historical judgment involved in this is something more than a judgment of facts, and something more personal and vital than a calm, unprejudiced, intellectual decision. It is contact of life on life, spirit on spirit; and the choice is an inevitable response of the whole man to the appeal of the vital force, the spirit, which is in the religion. This does not mean reading one's own ideas or ideals into the religion. It means rather judging each by its own standards, bearing in mind Ranke's famous sentence which Troeltsch is very fond of quoting, "Every age is direct to God."

This famous statement is all the more necessary because all religions and all prophets have been historically conditioned. All in history is relative. Both the universal and our idea of it find limitations and conditions in their historical manifestation.

An absolute is not to be found anywhere in history. So strongly does Troeltsch insist on this point that one is almost led to think he cannot find his way back to any norm, not to say the Absolute. But while he goes with Kant in emphasis on the relativity of history, he goes with him also in the method of establishing the religious norm, and still more with Schleiermacher in the necessity of overcoming this relativity by ontological, historical speculation. The norm lies beyond history, but it exists; and its existence, suggested by history, can also be traced in history. So Troeltsch says with Schleiermacher, "The spirit in mankind is not different from that which the Holy Spirit is also. We thus have in combination what appears to be both natural and supernatural."

Thus far we have been engaged chiefly with Troeltsch's historical method. It is time to call attention to his results,—to his own concrete judgments upon the course of religious history.<sup>7</sup> In this, as in most matters, his voice is clear and strong. Men's lives are really governed by a very few thoughts, and hence in religious history we have only to decide among a few great manifestations. The decision among religions is the more necessary, because of the increased significance of personally grounded religions and the decreased significance of individual production, which lessens the possibility of creating anything really new. The norm will have to be found in the strongest and best religion, appropriating only the best elements of the others. This means that we must root ourselves, if at all, in a historical religion, giving it at the same time the new emphasis necessitated by our new knowledge. We have to set up an end which can be seen in all the progress of history and to judge the different revelations by their depth, greatness, and power of drawing men to God. The norm, he repeats, is always subjective, a matter of personal conviction; but it springs out of a careful historical examination, conducted without prejudice, sympathetically and conscientiously. A final decision must come through personal conviction; knowledge must be bound up with earnest morality and piety. If the norm results from a comparison of religions, it implies a common relation

<sup>7</sup> Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte; Tübingen und Leipzig, 2<sup>te</sup> Auflage, 1912.



of all to a universally valid, immanent element; not to an abstract universal idea, but rather a goal or ideal—a transcendental goal recognizable in its main outlines but whose full meaning transcends knowledge, an ideal manifesting itself in history only in individual, limited forms. Our search in history then is not for the absolute religion, but for the clearest embodiment of the highest valid religious truth. Is this a task so difficult as to cause despair? Consider the simplicity and unchangeableness of pure religion as contrasted with the changes in cultural ideals, bound up as they are with nature; yet the content of culture is, in its main points, simple and constant. If we think we can discern a fundamental culture in the past and base practical action on its principles, why may we not in the same way determine the principles of religion and consider it valid to win in like manner connection and unity for the spiritual life? In other words, why may we not hold that in the greatest human religion we see the victory of the purest and deepest thoughts of God?

The question now arises, "Is Christianity the greatest human religion?" This is a matter of personal conviction arising from a broad, historical comparison and not from an isolated consideration of Christianity or from an assumption of its absoluteness. The latter methods may give to some men satisfaction, but they will not satisfy most modern minds. On the other hand, such a conviction is a confession of faith; which is always a matter of jest to strict and narrow scientists. But these have no monopoly of science, and their own peculiar views of reality are not unsailable. Hence the main thing is a faith based on an inner appropriation of the great spiritual movements of the world. Troeltsch does not hesitate to affirm that such a faith, based on such an appropriation, will confess Christianity as the greatest human religion, the highest manifestation in history of valid religious truth. We must, however, consider Christianity in its entire historical manifestation; as an organic union of Hebrew prophetism, the teaching and person of Jesus, Pauline mysticism, Stoic and Platonic idealism, the Catholic fusion of European culture and religion in the Middle Ages, the individuality of Luther, and the moral earnestness and activity of Protestantism. This has indeed been the main line of progress and may easily be defended as the historic ground of our norm.

The primitive forms of religion are comparatively unimportant because it is a psychological error to seek to derive the higher religions from the lower through an analysis of the latter. It is only the great universal religions which can come into consideration, and among these the legal religions, Judaism and Islam, are less strong than others. It is among the religions of salvation that the real contest lies, religions which make a clear break with actuality and then return to it again with God-given power; and indeed among these religions, between two main types: that represented by inclusive Christianity on the one hand, and on the other by Brahmanism and Buddhism, which in some respects resemble the neo-Platonic and Gnostic systems. In Christianity, God and the soul are freed from the world, in that they are personalities overcoming nature; eternal worth breaks out of the depths to overcome what is. In the Indian type, God is pure being and the world is evil; salvation is the end of the world-process and means absorption of personality in the being of God. In Brahmanism, God is the abstraction of being, and salvation is self-salvation through contemplation and asceticism. In Buddhism, God is at once the world-order and world-fate, and salvation is self-salvation through breaking the will and right knowledge. Christianity, on the other hand, is the strongest possible manifestation of religious personality. It means a complete break between the higher and the lower world. It changes and does away the lower, through souls in the world which are made strong through the love of God. In a sense, it denies the world, and yet it affirms it as from God; and the combination of affirmation and denial results in the greatest strength that has yet been seen in the world. The choice therefore lies between salvation through thought directed to super-being or no-being, and salvation through trustful faith, by which we share in the personality of God, the ground of all life and worth. All the great interests of religion, centring about the conceptions of God, the world, the soul, and eternal life, are more independently and vigorously conserved in Christianity than in the competing group. Here the idea of God tends always toward unity, spirit, morality, and distinction from both the world and the soul. The conceptions of the world and the soul tend to distinguish

them both from each other and from God; a separation which overcomes contradictions and makes possible salvation through a higher life beyond the sense-life. Outside of Christianity all of these tendencies are bound down by the primitive view of God as an essence or force of nature, and of men as being and not becoming. The legal religions give the law of God, but leave men to work it out. The non-Christian, self-salvation religions merge the world and man in God's substance, but lose thereby all content and positive meaning for the essence of God. Only Christianity has overcome the persistent naturalism in religion, and revealed a living God who is doing and willing, as opposed to merely being; who unites the soul with himself in order that, saved, comforted, and purified from guilt and pride, it may work in the world toward the upbuilding of the Kingdom of God which is the kingdom of pure personal worth.

Hence Christianity is the high point of convergence of all religious evolution and opens a new kind of life. It is not to be identified with the absolute, since it is historically conditioned and limited in every form, and so we are not able to prove that it will always be the highest religion, i.e. that it will never be surpassed. But its supremacy over all previous religions and the fact that all real progress since its inception has been upon its basis, may give us good ground for believing in its permanent supremacy. Thus we may consider it the plane on which all further spiritual life will move, and yet withhold our consent from the proposition that it is, historically, the absolute truth. Troeltsch contends that this position is not only demanded by the canons of historic thought but is also implied in one of the most central ideas of Christianity itself, namely, its emphasis on the future judgment of God as bringing absolute truth. In other words, according to Christianity itself, absolute truth lies beyond this world. We must consider of course the possibility of the downfall of modern Christian civilization and the rise of other historical forms not related to Jesus of Nazareth; but even in such an extreme case we may believe that the history of Christianity would only be re-enacted. Hence Christianity represents not only the highest that has been, but also the future, insuperable religion, the militant, triumphant Kingdom of God himself. Yet we can

employ the term "absolute" in connection with it only in a perverted sense, signifying highest worth and the certainty of being on the way toward complete truth. This is all we mortals can achieve, but it is also all we need.

The estimate of Christianity just given is of Christianity as a totality, including, as we have said, not only the teaching and person of Jesus, but also the antecedent forces of Hebrew prophetism and the subsequent developments within Christianity itself—its apostolic, Catholic, and Protestant forms.<sup>8</sup> In this respect also Troeltsch breaks with Ritschlianism and its exclusive emphasis on Jesus alone. But at the same time he values in his own way the founder of Christianity quite as highly, and with certain limitations is in close agreement with Ritschl in a common emphasis on the necessity of a personal appropriation of the spirit of Christ. Jesus is for him the central force of Christianity but not the sole element in it; for the picture we have of the Master is mediated to us through his followers, and hence we must consider subsequent events and hold steadily before us the wide, historic, Christian stream.

This mediation through Christian disciples, even in our very earliest sources, has created wide-spread historic doubt. What can we really know about the historic Jesus? Does not our modern idea of individual freedom make us disdain to build upon external authority, or to stake our all on the possibility of demonstrating a sole historic event? Does not faith look up and not back, fixing its gaze upon a present or future goal, eternal and timeless, and not on an event of the past? We must certainly admit that in all history we are dealing with probabilities, and that the chance of error is large, especially in such documents as those which constitute our Bible, for they sprang out of uncritical faith. Thus it is not strange that we find many conflicting views within the Christian church itself concerning the essence of Christianity. A common conception is hard to find, but the great common impulse is easy to see; and this stream of impulse is easily traced back to its source in the founder, Jesus of Nazareth. Here is our historic connection, and it cannot be excluded from faith. If it were excluded, no cult and no religious organization would be

<sup>8</sup> "Glaubenslehre," *ut supra*.

possible, and there would be no impulse toward practical activity in the world, only a mystic, religious individualism without any concrete, continuous, ethical content. This is what happens at the break-up of every great historic religion; and if this individualistic mysticism is to be the religion of the future, it means the end of Christianity and the end of religion, a powerless humanity.

The centre of a great religion is always a person, its founder; and the essential element in any organization of this kind is the attitude toward this founder. All else is secondary. The cult, dogmas, and creeds are only expressions of this relation; but they are necessary as a vehicle of the common conception of the founder, for we can have organization only by means of some acceptances in common. This historic connection is not contradicted by the fact of religious autonomy. As in the other fields of human activity—law, ethics, politics—so it is here. We cannot create everything ourselves but are dependent on the past, unless we choose to be barbarians. Autonomy means only our own way of appropriating what is not our own production, the progressive continuation of that which is already given. This implies not subjection to the mere historic fact but subjection to the ideal which is clearly incorporated in the fact; for we cannot make a purely temporal, historic event the object of our faith, but only the meaning of the event, the timeless element incorporated in the historical sequence but not identical with it.

We are obliged then to separate our historical investigation from the religious valuation of its results. We must decide independently what are historic facts and then independently estimate them. Thus in a measure faith is dependent upon history, though history can never tell us what we must believe. It can only tell us what we can or cannot believe; for the very facts which exclude certain beliefs always leave room for a variety of other beliefs. Thus we are forced to consider first the historic facts of Jesus' life before we can talk of faith. It is not the details that we need secure but the main points of his preaching and of his personality. Is the tradition good or is it unreliable? Faith cannot answer the question. Here, as everywhere, faith is dependent upon the scientific establishment of fact, and, as not every one can investigate these problems for himself, most men

abide by the authority of their leaders. Still, the Jesus of history makes a clear impression upon simple instinct and common sense that is sufficiently in accord with the facts. For highly educated and scientifically trained classes, however, an individual historic examination is essential.

How then does the case stand with the Gospel tradition? This is no longer a matter of details but a great fundamental question. Are the representations of Jesus, to be found on the one hand in the ethical, rabbinical Synoptists, and on the other in the more ecclesiastical, mystical writings of the Pauline-Johannine school—are these of different origin? In other words, how are the teaching and personality of Jesus, with their prophetic affiliations, related to the cult of Jesus which sprang up so early in the history of the Christian community? Was the cult of Jesus an inner Christian development out of this teaching and personality, or was it due to a non-Christian cult attaching itself to Jesus? Troeltsch holds that the latter explanation is unjustified except in its emphasis upon the hiatus and the distinction. Of just such a mystery-cult we have no knowledge. Cults of this sort are known, but none of a kind of quality to explain the Christian cult. The gap and the changes in it do not necessitate such a theory and at no point in the apostolic history do we find any point of union. The theory is improbable in itself also from the analogies of other religions and other religious leaders. Mohammed was made almost divine without the help of any such outside influence, and the histories of the Buddha and of St. Francis show how easily deification can arise among religious followers. We have here therefore an internal Christian or Jewish-Christian development, against which no inherent impossibility can be urged; for it is clear that Jesus was an extraordinary personality and a teacher of the highest originality, who strongly opposed the ordinary view of life. Consider the combined effect of his teaching and personality, his own lofty self-consciousness, his striking death and the resurrection visions.<sup>9</sup> Out of all these things it is easy to explain the rise of the cult of Christ in which Jesus of Nazareth was worshipped, not

<sup>9</sup> Troeltsch considers these visions to have been psychological results of the memory of Jesus' personality; though the possibility of a real intercourse with the spirit of Jesus is not excluded.

as God, for this was not the original idea, but as Messiah and revealer of God, the complete revelation of Jahve, the fulfilment of the prophets, the revelation of the Father. Here Christianity reached its self-consciousness as a religion distinct from Judaism.

Many important historic problems still remain and will remain unsolved, such as the question how far the picture of Christ in the Gospels is colored by the faith of the early community; what Messianic words should be ascribed to Jesus; the precise manner in which the Christian faith and cult of the first community arose; the origin of the Lord's Supper. Here we have results and can only guess at the processes. But in spite of all the uncertainty, we can be sure of the main trend of Jesus' teaching and of the nature of his self-consciousness. He shows us God the Father, gathering his children to himself through his messenger, preparing them by counsels of love and devotion of will for the speedy coming of that Kingdom in which the divine life was to be made completely manifest; a lofty world-indifference for the sake of ethical and spiritual values, and yet a marked emphasis on and a continuation of the old Hebrew faith in a God-given world; a high Messianic consciousness directed toward a positive, present, spiritual end, the like of which has never been seen in the world before or since. Out of this teaching and out of this self-consciousness arose the Christ-cult, a faith in Christ not as a new God but as the saving revelation of God the Father.

Briefly put, these are the facts. What is their significance for our faith today? Primarily, the recognition of the permanent value of the ethical and religious personality of Jesus as bringing about in us a change of inward life and imparting confidence and strength against pain and evil. If we wish to bring this religious significance under definite categories, we may distinguish three distinct elements—Jesus as the revealer, not of a law or of a dogma, but of a life, the divine life and spirit of God, which can be described only in general terms, but is clearly felt and recognized by the appropriator; Jesus as the opener of the possibility of salvation, by whom the way to God is made clear, and by whom we are led in that way through trust, simple and direct, as of children to a father; in other words, Jesus, the divine guide; finally, Jesus as

the head of the community into which believers are gathered, the "*caput mysticum*," the vine whose branches we are or may be, the leader and Lord who does not prescribe dogmas but is the source of the life of the community.

Troeltsch considers the old ecclesiastical terms for these three functions very apt, though he of course uses them with a different connotation; namely, Prophet, Priest, and King, for the revealing, mediating, and leading functions respectively. In all this he is undoubtedly indebted to Ritschl, who used these three terms in much the same sense. There is further agreement between the two in their common emphasis on the kingly element, the element of will or end. Troeltsch also treasures the title "Saviour," recognizing it in the phrase, "the opener of the possibility of salvation." While strongly emphasizing the fact of sin and the necessity of its removal, he is more interested in the positive phase of salvation, which he pictures as a new birth and a turning from a lower to a higher life. He is particularly out of sympathy with the whole scheme of redemptive theology which the Church has built up on the basis of a mythical fall of man and its equally unreal preceding state of perfection. There is evil enough in the world, but the world is not under any such curse as our orthodox theologians would have us believe. Hence the whole Pauline and post-Pauline over-emphasis on the single fact of the death of Christ, and especially the later emphasis on this fact as the death of the God-man, working a change in God—all this to Troeltsch is outworn and untrue. God is ever the same, seeking to draw us to himself. Not only has Jesus shown us this most clearly, but the power of his life and death constitutes, through many channels, a compelling power to enable us to turn from the lower self to God and the life of God. This is salvation, and Jesus therefore is the Saviour.

Out of this arises a need that goes beyond the mere historico-psychological effect of Christ, namely, the search for a metaphysical ground, for an answer to the questions "How" and "Why." The modern emphasis has been as much on the historico-psychological side as the earlier emphasis was upon the metaphysical. Schleiermacher felt and responded to this metaphysical need and assigned to Jesus a peculiar, essential relation



to God; that is, a unique relation of essential being. Ritschl used the term "Deity" in describing this relation. According to Troeltsch, the presupposition is the permanent, central place of the historic Jesus in human history. Therefore, just as the ancients, thinking in their own thought-forms, conceived of Jesus as "the first-born of all creatures" or as "the means of creation," so we, thinking in our modern thought-forms, can look upon him as the central man, the Absolute Man.

The early Christians had to think of God through Christ; but to them Jesus was not a new God, but the Messiah, the Son, the Mediator, the Prophet that was to come, who was, in spite of all connections, distinct from Judaism. This was the apostolic idea and the basis of all later developments—God the Father in heaven, in close connection with his historic revelation in Christ, a duality of Father and Son but with the Son subordinate to the Father. The influence of the demand for monotheism brought out the doctrine of "Homoöusianism"—oneness in essence with God. This was an Athanasian emphasis against the half-way monotheism that lurked in the idea of successive strata of divinity from God through the Logos to the human Christ. All this was in the interests of monotheism, and the result was a homoöusian duality. Then arose differences of opinion with regard to the unity of essence between the Spirit and God. The final answer to this question was the trinitarian formula.

In the apostolic age the "Spirit" denoted the "spirit of Christ," and in Paul's Epistles we have three passages in which the "formula of three" occurs—"Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." This is not a trinitarian formula in the accepted use of that term, any more than are the declarations of the Apostles' Creed in the same sense trinitarian. The position held in the apostolic age may be described as that of the "formula of three," or of an economic trinity; that is, a short description of the rule of God in the world and not by any means a hard-and-fast metaphysical formula. But through the medium of this "formula of three," on the basis of the homoöusian teaching of the duality of Father and Son, there arose the trinitarian formula. Here we have an immanent trinity. It is not a working formula, but a declaration concerning the eternal, essential, and substantial

reality within the mysterious nature of God. The historical emphasis of the apostolic age on Jesus and the Spirit is dropped, and a metaphysical emphasis replaces it. But though we may not ourselves adopt this way of thinking, we must not lightly reject its grounds or its justifiability for the age in which it arose. Notwithstanding the apparent cutting loose from history, we have, even in this highly abstract metaphysical statement, a legitimate connection with it through Christ as the revelation of God's love and through the Spirit as the spirit of the Christian community. So even in this immanent and most abstract trinitarianism, the historic foundation of Christianity is included and emphasized. The whole evolution is the result of an effort to unite religion and history.

But for us today the question is not whether this solution was justifiable for the early Church, but whether it really solves the problem for us. To this we must reply unhesitatingly, No. Such a cosmological solution cannot suffice today. The trinitarian formula stands or falls with the theory of Incarnation, and the latter is no longer a problem for us, for we base our faith not on an Incarnation but on a revelation bringing salvation. The only solution for us is to go back to the apostolic teaching, not because it is apostolic but because it is most satisfying to us as modern men—satisfying historically and satisfying religiously; back to the "formula of three," the economic trinity, a working formula of the rule of God in the world. "I believe in God the Father, in Jesus Christ, His Son, and in the Holy Spirit." This may be our final statement of historical religion. We need no special theories as to why it is so. In fact, we do not know.

A few words should be added concerning Troeltsch's views of the Bible and of dogma.<sup>10</sup> Since he considers Christianity as a great historic totality whose centre is Jesus of Nazareth, the historic source of that spiritual stream through which the world's greatest progress has come and will come, it is easy to understand his attitude toward the Bible. The Bible is the literary expression of the classical period of Christianity, and therefore is itself classic, central, unsurpassable, unless Christianity itself can be surpassed. Besides being the classic literary norm, the Bible is

<sup>10</sup> "Glaubenslehre," *ut supra*.

also a most important means of propagating the Christian life through the power of the personal elements in it. It is the personal element which really makes our modern Bible, for we now recognize authority and revelation chiefly through the personalities of men. In this way the Bible as a whole is significant, and a personal relation to it is far better than an intimate knowledge of critical theories. On the other hand, this does not mean any elaborate theory of literal inspiration. Look at this book with "*rein gewaschenen Augen*." Catch the spirit of its prophets and apostles, and, above all, of its Lord. We need no further theory.

Troeltsch's break with the orthodox conception is very manifest in his idea of dogma and creed. We have seen how strongly he emphasizes the necessity of a historic ground for our faith, lest we float away into powerless, individualistic mysticism, which would mean eventually the death of religion. He is just as clear and strong in his recognition of the place of cult and creed in the life of a religion. Christianity could not have become a world-religion had it not evolved its own peculiar cult, and cult means dogma. In fact, there can be no cohesive organization without cult and creed, no perpetuation and no progress. The only question is, how are we going to estimate and judge our dogmas? Are they truth absolute, eternal, unchangeable? If not, what are they? This raises the whole question of the relation of faith to knowledge, of the much-discussed problem of the relation of religion to science and philosophy. We may be weary of the discussion; but as long as the problem remains so acute as it admittedly is, both for individuals and for organizations, just so long will discussion be necessary and so long should it be welcomed, especially when a solution is offered as clear-cut as that of Troeltsch. No dogma is, has been, or ever will be, the absolute truth, for the absolute lies ever beyond the confines of human history. Man's nearest approach to it is in his religious experience, in which God reveals Himself. But this experience, this revelation, especially in our great religious leaders, is not and cannot be the direct object of our faith. Faith ever seeks something more tangible and fastens itself upon the historic deposit of that inner, mysterious life. The essential characteristics of this faith are

presented by dogma in what are really symbolic terms, thus establishing a platform upon which the members of the organization may stand. We have here therefore the symbolic theory of dogma already made so familiar to us through Auguste Sabatier's *Philosophy of Religion*.

Dogma then is not a scientific product set up by the logical faculty through a process of mere reasoning. It is primarily a religious product, symbolically formulated for practical purposes. It is not, however, absolutely independent of all our other knowledge, for it has to do with a general world-view into which our other knowledge must enter. In particular must we reckon with the results of the individual sciences of astronomy and physics, as well as geology, biology, anthropology, and universal history. Here, in spite of many disagreements and uncertainties, we find a growing body of accepted fact which no theologian may ignore—the Copernican view of the universe, the size and age of the world, and the like. These facts do not tell us what we must believe, but they do tell us what we cannot believe. Our dogmatic symbols must be made to harmonize with all this knowledge, or else they will lose the very practical influence and hold they were created to exercise.

The influence of philosophy is far less than that of the individual sciences just mentioned. It attempts a general unification of all science, and so is less secure than the sciences and cannot be so insistent in its claims. One may ignore philosophy altogether without seriously invalidating his dogmatic beliefs, but one cannot so ignore the results of science. Nevertheless, there is a relation between theology and philosophy which is real and important. There are certain philosophies with which religion can fraternize, and others with which it must be at eternal enmity for its very life's sake. Among the latter are pessimism, materialism, and parallel pantheism, together with those pragmatic-positivistic schools which deny the possibility of metaphysics though themselves metaphysical. On the other hand, religion can work in harmony with any philosophy of the idealistic and teleological type, whether it have the critical, personal, or more speculative emphasis.

So, while our dogmas are necessarily more or less poetic symbols, formulations springing out of the independent religious consciousness of man, they must, in order to accomplish their purpose, continually take account of the results of science and the tendencies in philosophy; and the religious life, remaining fundamentally unchanged, must receive new symbols, or be pictured by old symbols with new meanings, as the changes in our non-religious knowledge oblige us to readjust our view of the universe.

This presentation has been limited to Troeltsch's general views of religion and Christianity. Even this phase of his thought and work has not been entirely exhausted, but enough has been given to bring out something of the faith, courage, virility, and originality of the man. His chief efforts hitherto have been directed to work more strictly historical, as in his *Die sozial Lehre der Kirche* and *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*. The same breadth of view, scholarship, originality, and warm practical interest that we have already noted, manifest themselves in all his historical writing, making it vivid, interesting, and modern. We see that the sum of his thought is the personal appropriation of the great spiritual values of the outstanding religious personalities of the world, especially those of the Christian organism, and supremely Jesus Christ, Prophet, Priest, and King. While such men as Ernst Troeltsch live and work in Germany, religion will not die out, and just so long will seekers after truth from other lands be drawn thither, to return, not merely with a clearer vision, but with a warmer heart and stronger purpose.

*THE PERIL OF A SAFE THEOLOGY*

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The multiplication of safety appliances for the protection of human life is a marked characteristic of our age. No humane ministry to society is more consistently and forcefully urged than the providing of automatic safety-devices to supplant the older method of reliance upon personal attention and intelligence. "Such accidents will happen until we eliminate the whole human element by means of automatic provisions," observed a railroad operator after a recent disaster. He followed the statement with an informing discussion concerning the installing of safety-appliances on his own line of road, in response to the demands of the public conscience. There is always a position and a premium for the inventive genius who can substitute for fallible human attention an automatic response that works infallibly. The disabled switchman, the drunken watchman, the recreant employee, can be more and more dispensed with as his services are supplied by the mechanical device which never sleeps nor drinks whiskey, and whose integrity does not call for any subjective processes. Lives of employees and of patrons by the thousands are thus guarded and saved every year. And the principle is so humane and sound that we do not propose to halt while inventive skill is unexhausted or the reluctant employer remains unpunished.

Our object here is not to question the beneficence of these things; we are concerned rather with a by-product. What are the moral consequences of safety devices—their effect upon character? and what are the limitations of mechanical safety in the complex and responsible activities of human achievement? Does the elevator man become a more or a less responsible person when he feels that not his own skill and attention, but an automatic device, stands between his passengers and disaster? Do railway employees, when relieved of personal responsibility, develop the types of character that under the old system fitted them to advance as conductors, engineers, and managing officers? What is the effect

upon a board of directors of knowing that they have provided "every device for the safety and comfort of their patrons"? In short, does the movement contribute to responsible character or does it not?

These questions are not asked from a wholly academic point of view. I would not curtail practical efforts to reduce risks by safety appliances, but I am apprehensive of the results of safety produced at the cost of all human sentiment, and I raise the question whether in the long run it is not possible for the impersonal and the practical to defeat its own ends and suffer a practical revenge. For in the end the control of automatism is in the hands of personality, and real safety is secured for us only through the sentiment which is developed in the life of the men who own and control automatic devices.

The question is of course only a special aspect of the problem which the ideals of mechanism always create when they invade the realm of the personal. Wherever automatism carries its ideals too far, something very precious and fundamental in human life is threatened. In the boy set to watch the primitive steam-engine, who discovered that he could so attach the levers that they would operate the steam-valves mechanically and thus dispense with his attention to them, we have the symbol of a racial experience quite as fateful in its potential influence upon human kind as the experience symbolized by the venerable tradition of the forbidden fruit and its resultant catastrophe.

As the aim of this discussion is to investigate and not to dogmatize, we shall content ourselves with indicating certain points where the demand for automatic safety threatens to obscure or defeat some of the finer issues of life.

In a thoughtful piece of literature, "The Preliminaries," contributed by Miss Comer to the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1910, we have a convincing illustration, in terms of life, of the universal demand for automatic safety, and its intrinsic weakness. The story deals with the fortunes of two lovers who are held back from the consummation of their hearts' desire by prudential considerations urged on both sides. Fond parents, admitting the obvious fitness of the marriage, at the same time poison the atmosphere of the romance as well as the peace of their own lives by dread

apprehensions of possible miscarriage of plans or fatal taint or weakness of character. The objections raised are not definite and positive, but are only formulations of the general lack of certainty involved in all dealing with the future. They tacitly demand guaranteed insurance against all possible evil before life can be sanctioned and accepted as blessed. The apprehensions are aggravated by a grim tragedy of justice that has overtaken the head of one family and embittered life. The natural consequence is that all concerned are living on the verge of nervous prostration. All see life's problems through morbid eyes and with fretful spirits. All save one. The father of the woman, a convict behind prison walls, has learned in suffering and meditation the true philosophy of life—the philosophy of life's inevitable risks. He reverses the nervous prudential counsel of the others, with their nameless fear for the future. The highest point of the dramatic movement of the story is his counsel addressed to the youth, who visits him in prison on the delicate mission of asking for the hand of his daughter:

They haven't the point of view. It is life that is the great adventure. Not love, not marriage, not business. They are just chapters in the book. The main thing is to take the road fearlessly,—to have courage to live one's life. . . . That is the great word. Don't you see what ails your father's point of view, and my wife's? One wants absolute security in one way for Ruth; the other wants absolute security in another way for you. And security—why it's just the one thing a human being cannot have, the thing that's the damnation of him if he gets it! The reason it is so hard for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven is that he has that false sense of security. To demand it just disintegrates a man. I don't know why,—it does. . . . The mastery of life comes with the knowledge of our power to endure. That's it. You are safe only when you can stand everything that can happen to you. Thus and thus only! Endurance is the measure of the man. . . . Courage is security. There is no other kind.

Very like in kind is the philosophy uttered in a "Sketch of Life on the Road" by a wandering philosopher:<sup>1</sup>

How can any man look for true adventure in life if he always knows to a certainty where his next meal is coming from? In a

<sup>1</sup> David Grayson, in the *American Magazine* for November, 1912, page 6.



world so completely dominated by goods, by things, by possessions, and smothered by security, what fine adventure is left to a man of spirit save the adventure of poverty?

Now I am not an apologist for the convict, nor for the picturesque, ecclesiastical, mendicant saint; nor yet for the less picturesque and unecclesiastical mendicant sinner. But the point of view of life as an adventure points to a principle of faith—faith and strength and insight born of the needs of the moment—which seems to me a neglected factor in many of our closed and rigid systems of interpretation of life. For every specific spiritual situation as it arises there is a new insight born of the new experience. No standardized interpretation expresses the whole truth of such an hour. Like the manna of the wilderness, if we try to preserve our spiritual truth for days ahead, it spoils on our hands. Faith is the only mental attitude that overcomes the world—not security! The voluntary acceptance of life seems somehow to precede and condition our proofs and certainties. We have in the citations given, if I mistake not, recognition of the subtle evil involved in an excessive demand to surround life with safety devices. Security, whether purchased by riches or rank or rationalism or other automatic means of safety, tends to create a sense of ease which is the menace of the soul. We must work out our salvation in any realm, if we want the distinctive reward of that realm. Certain personal capacities and creative moral insights and sympathies shrink and shrivel when they are over-subsidized by external securities.

One effect of the demand for automatic safety is seen in the history of the mightiest and most precious impulse of life, the religious nature. The larger half of Christendom is organized on the principle that we need an infallible guidance for life; that religion, with its issues of eternal life and death, is too fateful a matter to be trusted to the limitations of our hard-won wisdom; that here at least we must know before we act. We are all familiar with the mechanical logic by which J. H. Newman satisfied his soul that there must be somewhere an automatic safety-device for religious hearts longing for certainty. That logic led Newman into the only ecclesiastical fellowship which guaranteed infallible guidance. The guarantee of safety first, life and trust

afterward—millions of people nominally allege this principle as fundamental and inevitable in life's deepest concerns. Of course, history alone can vindicate or disprove its merits, and the history is open to us all.

On the other hand, the Protestant wing of Christendom is in nominal revolt against external religious guarantees, and avows its purpose to rest life upon faith, which shall win its own certainties. But alas for the logic of Protestantism, there is an unformulated dialectic in human nature which leads straight back to the safety-device. A hundred years or so after the Protestant movement had challenged the automatic safety of the Catholic church in the name of "salvation by faith," the Bible appeared in the light of "an infallible rule of faith and practice"; and either avowedly or nominally that is the rôle which the Christian Scriptures play in the religious life of the multitude today. We will have a safety contrivance to guard personal life in its deepest issues. We will have Authority as the highest court of appeal. Either Holy Church or Holy Bible must furnish a principle of infallible security. The consequences for Protestant theology of thus dealing with the Bible as a "divinely given revelation"—an authoritative text-book—and not as a transcript of the realities of human experience in its religious development have been immense. Surely the theologies of the future will trust the revelations of God that come to the moral heroes of old, even though we test their knowledge of spiritual things by the same psychological and epistemological canons that we bring to our own religious experiences.

We have protested against the flaunting of guaranteed salvation announced over church doors: "*Plena indulgentia quotidie.*" That smacks of commercialism and legalism. But many who shudder at the principle thus brazenly published, offer to furnish the same brand of safety in subscriptions to various orthodoxies, and thus to bring into life a sense of peace and security. For our constituency demand both security and large returns before they will invest. This is the underlying philosophy of every "safe" orthodoxy.

Again, in the very citadel of faith, where religion professes to achieve the personal assurance of unseen realities, this demand

for independent, safeguarding principles haunts us. With curious infidelity to the personal confidence in a supreme living Spirit which is the essence of the best religion, the church has yet cherished the intellectual "proof" of God as a buttress and bulwark of her faith, and we have felt secure only when the burden of our certainty was seen to rest not upon faith but upon an independent and universal basis. The "direct and fundamental proofs" have thus tended to supplant the faith upon which we once felt that true religion should rest. The moral consequences of theistic proofs have not been more salutary than those of the safety of infallible guidance, whether supplied by a church or a book. Thus one keen critic says:<sup>2</sup>

It has grown clear to all thinkers, first, that the God and soul of religion cannot be proved with proofs that compel the assent of the intellect, and secondly, that by such proofs there is, in a serious degree, the destruction of the values which are sought to be demonstrated.

Now faith does not come at the suggestion of distrust, but of trust. A safety-device here seems an affront both to reason and to faith. The intellect must indeed offer its fortifying reasons, but the prior and deeper reason of faith takes precedence of all specific reasons. In living contact with spiritual reality the soul finds the irrefutable argument for God, and any proof which absolves the soul from this original vision of God weakens the case which it seeks to establish. No rationalism can take the place of the Moral Venture.

This study of the effect of a principle might be carried into nearly every department of life, for religion is not alone in this error. The field of education is likewise infested with the fallacy of orthodox methods, mechanical devices to guarantee that every child shall be pedagogically "saved." The "system" sometimes stimulates and sometimes paralyzes the individual response of the "Child." In the field of law, too, justice is often defeated rather than established by professional orthodoxies; while in politics machine methods are widely employed to relieve the individual of personal attention and responsibility,—to the demoralization

<sup>2</sup> Professor George Burman Foster, *The Function of Religion*, page 85.

of the citizen. These all illustrate the tendency to apply mechanical standards to life, to secure automatic safety, and to this extent to imperil and defeat the higher spiritual achievements of the race. The best condition of such achievement is the absence of these very safeguards and certainties, which are in no way wrung out of the deep experiences of life; for the law of the spiritual is faith. No absolutions or indulgences are known to the moral law. The paradoxical truth is that every man must bear his own burden, even though he must also bear the burdens of others. The certainties of spiritual reality do not rest upon independent ground, but are conditioned by our own moral response to life, and the highest spiritual discernment is not merely imitative: it is creative.<sup>3</sup> The interpreter of religion, of law, or of pedagogy must be something more than a copyist. Even a lawyer ought to be a prophet; but a theologian or a teacher must be one.

Now when in our preaching and teaching we so far disregard this principle of faith and freedom that we tacitly standardize our theology, we do so in response to the demand for an automatic safety-device. This substitution of a mechanical theology for a spiritual is based upon a fallacious theory of knowledge, and it works harm. It is founded upon a bad philosophy and a shallow analysis of the whole problem of knowledge. For when our interpretation of spiritual truth is conditioned upon all sides by theories of sacred history, inspiration, infallible sources, divine tokens, revealed truth, and safe standards of doctrine, we virtually so subsidize our thinking about spiritual reality that a healthy spirituality and a stalwart theology are hardly possible. A really safe theology, like a safe chemistry, is one which faces the facts of life and their laws, and gives the profoundest account of them of which the mind is capable. It recognizes that the law of life is growth, and asks no other guarantee than that of faithful living and faithful thinking.

We have thus far dealt chiefly with the intrinsic fallacy of the safety method in religious interpretation. But it would not be hard to show, on the practical side, that a mechanical ideal in

<sup>3</sup> Professor Bergson's characteristic and fruitful emphasis has to do with the essentially creative nature of the ethical.

place of a spiritual ideal of religious interpretation is a menace to religious effectiveness. We may here simply enumerate two or three points at which a "safe theology" imperils the interests of "the Gospel which is committed to our trust."

The christianizing of the Orient in this missionary age requires a recognition of types of mind and types of meaning which a rigid theological method does not recognize. If Jesus Christ and his message of God's love is to dominate and save Eastern civilizations with their millions of needy people, they must be allowed to reinterpret our blessed gospel in forms of life and thought which our orthodoxies do not know, and we must recognize the heterodox ways in which God is already manifesting himself in the hearts of these people. We imperil a world message by parochial thinking. "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all." Does this not mean that the God who works in Islam and in Buddhism is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? It may well be that the truth of God and his Son will come back to us from the East with new depths of insight which our formulations never perceived. No rigid orthodoxy can deal sympathetically with this racial problem.

Again, a formal and safe theology is ineffective in dealing with the marvellous developments of ethical, social, economic, and industrial life about us. Christianity and the church are, measurably at least, losing the most splendid opportunity that history has offered to spiritualize life and bring to it the vision and the power of God in Christ, because we insist that the profound modern movements must conform to our orthodox interpretation of Christianity, formulated under the influence of other social ideals. Thank God for prophetic men in the ministry who get their vision of God and the spiritual meaning of Christ in the life of today; whose measure of the divine revelation and redemption is not a safe orthodoxy, but the whole range of human need, the whole development of human life. Thank God for ministers of Christ who see that the social life of today is as much God's as the social life of the past; who believe that God speaks to us and leads us as directly and authoritatively in our thought and life as he has spoken in the thought which we have inherited

from the past, so inspiringly set forth in our Bibles. When we face this truth squarely, we shall no longer raise such issues as "Christianity or socialism," and "Christianity or economic reform," but our Christianity will be seen to include all these problems and the principles for their solution as well. Christ will still be seen as our spiritual Leader and Inspirer.

There is also a peril to the highest life of the church in measuring its spiritual possibilities in terms of an orthodox theology. I will not speak of the formalism which so easily besets ecclesiastical organizations, but rather of the danger to creative spiritual leadership. In a conception of spiritual truth and of theology which absolves the minister from profound religious thinking upon the deepest concerns of life there is an intellectual menace which must affect also the preacher's spiritual vision and the character of his message. One cannot enter the deep original vision of the meaning of spiritual things without first thinking things through in terms of fundamental principles. We do not require mere dispensers of second-hand visions. We do not need preachers who can demonstrate that God was in the thought and life of the past so much as we need those who can reveal a living God in the thought and life of today. These fundamental things are matters of present insight, personally achieved. Theology needs to be moralized along the whole line of her doctrines, but at no point is the need so critical as in this matter of her angle of approach—the intellectual method—which shall control the religious interpreter.

There is a mysterious but very precious doctrine of our Christian faith which sets forth in a positive way the very truth of which we have been speaking; that is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. "He will guide you into all truth." Theology must rely upon personal guidance, not mechanical control. Living guidance for living men, by the Spirit of the living God! The sin against the Holy Ghost is the great sin in the Christian list. *It is the distrust of present guidance that throws a man back upon theological safety-devices.* Real security in spiritual interpretation comes only from the present, free operation of the Spirit of Truth. Living guidance for thought and life can never harden into a code or orthodoxy. The only orthodoxy that is safe is this

same Holy Spirit, eternally at work in the interpretations of men, eternally deepening our vision of God and the meaning of life. The truth of the Holy Spirit, effectually studied and practised, would render unnecessary this earnest protest against a safe theology. But, alas, the tendency has been to measure and standardize the very doctrine itself, in forgetfulness of the truth that God "giveth not the Spirit by measure."

In conclusion, if there is a peril in a safe theology, what is the theological method which will best serve the church and its Lord? It is the method which speaks out of a rich and profound spiritual experience, which has a sympathetic and intelligent understanding of the spiritual history of the past and of the spiritual life of today, and which trusts the accepted methods of sound thinking to guide its rational interpretations of spiritual reality. Christian theology is the type of theology which makes Christ's spirit the supreme test and dominating principle in setting a value on the facts of history and of life, as well as in interpreting their spiritual significance. In the frank employment of this method, the standardizing method of a "safe theology" would have no place; and without the method of rational and spiritual freedom, no orthodoxy is safe.

*AN INTRODUCTORY WORD ON NIETZSCHE*<sup>1</sup>

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According to Professor Riehl of Berlin, the most widely read of serious writers in Germany today is Nietzsche.<sup>2</sup> German ideas require time to cross the Channel and still more time to reach America; but already translations of Nietzsche's numerous works are appearing in England, and within three or four years three books have been devoted to him in this country. Probably ere-long the thoughtful among us will have to attend to him, as we have had to attend to other German writers in the past. As yet very confused ideas are current about him; his disciples are more or less confused themselves. Nietzsche once half-humorously remarked that the first disciples of a doctrine really prove nothing against it.

Moreover, Nietzsche was a lonely, markedly individual thinker, caring more to express himself than to be comprehended by the ordinary reader, soliloquizing much; and he said many things that, unless we carefully, patiently attend, may mislead, have misled. I could easily quote passages from him that would offend you, as they did me when I first came upon them. No one needs to be studied more before he is judged. No one lends himself less to impressionist treatment, which is all he ordinarily gets from non-Continental writers.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, I sometimes think that Nietzsche is a philosopher for philosophers and a moralist for moralists rather than for the common run of us, so subtle is his thinking, such an acquaintance with the history and refinements of philosophical and ethical speculation does he presuppose.

Accordingly, it may be most useful, as well as most conformable to my abilities, to cover a quite limited field this morning; and

<sup>1</sup> An address to the Harvard Divinity Alumni Association, 19 June, 1912.

<sup>2</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *der Künstler und der Denker* (4th ed.), p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Some of the exceptions are the late William Wallace, Professor Pringle-Pattison, Mr. A. W. Benn, Havelock Ellis, our own Dr. Everett, Professor Thilly, and, *mirabile dictu*, two women, Dr. Grace N. Dolson and Miss Emily S. Hamblen.



I shall content myself, after giving a few facts about his life and a very general characterization of him, to portray somewhat in detail his state of mind during one—the first—period of his career. What I say may thus serve as a kind of introduction to the subject; and happy shall I be if I interest any one sufficiently to take it up on his own account.

Nietzsche was the son of a Protestant pastor (indeed he came from a line of them), and was born in 1844 in Röcken, a small Prussian village. He had the best and strictest of school training at Naumburg and Schulpforta; at Schulpforta beginning a lifelong friendship with Paul Deussen, since well known as an authority on Hindu philosophy, a disciple of Schopenhauer, and now professor at Kiel. At twenty he entered the University of Bonn, removing later, with his "great" teacher, the philologist Ritschl, to Leipzig. His university studies were only interrupted by a period of military service. At twenty-four (in 1868) he was made professor of classical philology at Basel, becoming Ordinarius two years later. He also undertook work in the Pädagogium, or higher Gymnasium, of the city. Eight years later he was obliged on account of ill-health to relinquish his duties at the Pädagogium, and two years after, in 1878, he resigned, for the same reason, his university position as well. To his sister, who saw him in the spring following, he was hardly recognizable, "*ein gebrochener, müder, geülterter Mann.*" He was then thirty-five. His subsequent life was more or less spent in search of health; summers ordinarily in the Upper Engadine, winters on the Riviera. He lasted for ten years, when he had a stroke of paralysis, which affected his brain. His natural bodily vigor kept him alive for eleven years more, progressive paralysis ending in death in 1900.

Perhaps a special word should be said of Nietzsche's insanity. It came suddenly, with the paralytic stroke I have mentioned. There are no real evidences of it before. A commentary on the state of American criticism with relation to Nietzsche is furnished by the fact that two of our books are prefaced with likenesses of him after he was hopelessly deranged. All his work—**sixteen** volumes in the octavo edition—was done before insanity came on. That there are traces or warnings of it in any of these volumes is

at best a subjective opinion; in fact, it is a position that tends to be abandoned more and more.<sup>4</sup> Highly wrought Nietzsche often was, particularly in his latest writings; he said extravagant things and uttered violent judgments. So did Carlyle; so have many earnest, lonely men, struggling unequally with their time; but insanity is another matter.

The causes of his break-down were manifold. In attempting to mount a restive horse, when serving his time in the Prussian artillery, he suffered a serious rupture and was incapacitated for further service. Later he attached himself to the ambulance-corps of his country during the Franco-Prussian War (he could not be a soldier, as he was then living, and had become naturalized, in Switzerland), and had dangerous attacks of cholera and diphtheria, which were treated with strong medicines that deranged his stomach. Eye-troubles (he was always near-sighted) still further complicated the situation. Sick-headaches and insomnia became more or less chronic. His sleeplessness drove him to the use of drugs, and more and more powerful ones. All the time he was living the intensest intellectual life. This state of high tension, along with the other causes, seems sufficient to account for the final collapse.

By nature he was of vigorous constitution. He had been fond as a boy of swimming and skating, and at the university, until his disablement, he was an active horseback-rider. At Bonn he was described as a "picture of health and strength, broad-shouldered, brown, with rather fair thick hair, and exactly the same height as Goethe."<sup>5</sup> He was clean both in person and in thought. At school the boys called him "the little parson," instinctively repressing coarse language in his presence. He had a brief taste of dissipation at the university, but seemed to sicken of it. The delights of beer-drinking and duelling palled on him; and his openly expressed dissatisfaction with the "beer-materialism" (as he called it) and the strained relations with his fellow-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Karl Joël, *Nietzsche und die Romantik*, p. 328; H. Liestinberger, *La Philosophie de Nietzsche*, pp. 83 ff.; R. Richter, *Friedrich Nietzsche* (2d ed.), pp. 91 ff.; H. Vaihinger, *Nietzsche als Philosoph*, p. 16; Ernst Horneffer, *Nietzsches letztes Schaffen*, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Havelock Ellis, *Affirmations*, p. 11, quotes this.

students that ensued, appear to have had something to do with his leaving Bonn for Leipzig. Once he allowed himself to be taken to a house of questionable character, but was soon speechless before what he saw there. For a moment he turned to the piano, and then left.<sup>6</sup> Deussen says of him, "*mulierem nunquam attigit*"; and though this may be too absolute a claim,<sup>7</sup> it shows the impression that was left on one of his most intimate friends. He was never married. He had, however, intimate relations with gifted women, like Frau Cosima Wagner and Malwida von Meysenberg, and his family-affections were strong and tender; so tender toward his mother that he strove to keep his writings from her for fear of giving her pain. He had a nature at bottom sympathetic. No attentive reader can fail to feel this. If he warned against pity, it was as much because he had felt the excess of it as for lack of it. In personal intercourse he showed marked politeness, and, it is said, an almost feminine mildness. All his life he was practically a poor man. He called it his happiness that he owned no house, saying "*Wer besitzt wird besetzt*"; liked to wait on himself; despised the dinners of the rich; and loved solitude, aside from a few friends and the common people. The sight of the latter, he said, was as necessary to him as that of strong and healthy vegetation; and some of them in the later days of his illness and comparative emaciation in Geneva spoke endearingly of him as "*il piccolo santo*." He had remarkable strength of will. Once, as a school-boy, when the story of Mucius Scaevola was being discussed, he lighted a number of matches on his hand and held out his arm without wincing. He asserted himself against his later illnesses and depression in extraordinary fashion; and when he became mentally and spiritually disillusioned, he wrested strength from his very deprivations.<sup>8</sup> In general, there was an unusual firmness in his moral texture. He despised meanness, untruthfulness, cowardice, cunning; he liked straight speaking and straight thinking. He did not have one philosophy for the closet and another for life, as Schopenhauer

<sup>6</sup> It is Nietzsche's own story, as narrated by P. Deussen, *Erinnerungen an F. Nietzsche*, p. 24.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Möbius, *Nietzsche*, p. 50.

<sup>8</sup> Also *Sprach Zarathustra*, p. 163.

more or less did, but his thoughts were motives, rules. In his thinking itself we seem to catch the pulse-beats of his virile will.<sup>9</sup> Noble in spirit he was, too. One of his sayings is, "A sufferer has no right to pessimism";<sup>10</sup> the thought being, of course, that such an one is too likely to be biassed by the personal point of view. Nor is he always dogmatic. At the close of the first book of his second or sceptical period, he asks his youthful readers not to take his doctrines at once as a guide of life, but rather as theses to be weighed; he throws the responsibility on them, urging them to be true to themselves even against him. Elsewhere he says:

"It lureth thee, my mode and speech?  
Thou followest me, to hear me teach?  
Nay! Guide thyself—honest and fair—  
And follow me, with care! with care!"<sup>11</sup>

Well aware that his doctrine was a kind of adventure, he tells us, "This is my way, what is yours? *The* way there is not." "It belongs to the humanity of a teacher," he declares, "to warn his pupils against himself"; yes, a pupil badly recompenses his teacher, when he is always pupil and nothing more.<sup>12</sup> His ideal for the thinker as such appears in these lines:

"Destined, O star, for radiant path,  
No claim on thee the darkness hath!  
Roll on in bliss through this our age!  
Its trouble ne'er shall thee engage!  
In furthest worlds thy beams shall glow:  
Pity, as sin, thou must not know!  
Be pure: that duty's all you owe."<sup>13</sup>

Yes, Nietzsche was aware that the thinker might contradict himself, as he himself did more or less in the successive periods of his mental evolution. "This thinker," he once says, evidently alluding to himself, "needs no one to confute him; he suffices to that end himself." Nor did he wish to be kept from following his own

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Riehl, op. cit., p. 161.

<sup>10</sup> *Vermischte Meinungen u. s. w.*, (Vorrede, p. 5).

<sup>11</sup> *Werke* (Pock. ed.), VI, p. 42, (tr. by Thomas Common).

<sup>12</sup> *Zarathustra*, p. 114.

<sup>13</sup> *Werke* (Pock. ed.), VI, p. 56, (tr. by Thomas Common).

path by friendly defence or adulation. One must needs, he said, not only love one's enemies, but be able to hate one's friends. In short, there was a kind of unworldliness about him. Vanity he had little of; reputation, save among the selectest few, he cared little for; personal resentments, such as Schopenhauer cherished, he was incapable of. I do not mean that his language is not severe at times, even unwarrantably so; but he tells us almost pathetically in one place that we must not underscore these passages, and that the severity and presumption come partly from his isolation. A lonely thinker, who finds no sympathy or echo for his ideas, involuntarily raises his pitch, he says, and easily falls into irritated speech.<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps I should add that the aphoristic form of much of his later writing has partly a physical explanation. He was able to write only at intervals, putting down his thoughts at auspicious moments, oftenest when he was out on his walks or climbing. One year he had, he tells us, two hundred sick days. Such ill fortune was extreme, but he was more or less incapacitated every year.

Yet, despite the fragmentary nature of his work, Nietzsche was, one feels, a genuine thinker. He cannot of course be put into the same class with Aristotle or Kant; he is not systematic enough; his ideas, save in instances, are not sufficiently reasoned out. And yet he is more of a thinker (I mean more analytically and critically so) than writers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Carlyle, or Emerson. He has reasoned and deep-going opinions on almost the whole range of human interests, including metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, art, religion, politics. It was the tendency at first to take Nietzsche as an artist, a man of letters, a "stylist" (to use a barbarous word imported from the German). Now he is often spoken of as a prophet. He once betrayed what he thought of style, when he said that the only way to improve it is to improve the thought. And as to prophecy, he was too remorselessly critical, too much concerned with ideas as such, to come exclusively under that category. The fact is, he was thinker *par eminence*; and had he known better how to work and

<sup>14</sup> I borrow here from Riehl, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

how not to work, or even had he lived ten years longer, he might have justified the title of systematic thinker, for he was engaged at the time of his collapse on a work, *Der Wille zur Macht*, that was to present in elaborate scientific form his total view of things. There are, as it is, fragments enough of this work to fill a stout volume and a half.

And now, before attempting a partial portrait of the initial stage of his mental evolution, let me note the fact that his determination when a lad was to be a pastor, like his father and his grandfather, and that when he matriculated at Bonn, it was as student of philosophy and theology. It was only as his doubts increased or came to a head that he abandoned the study of theology, and something of the temper of religion remained with him always. His mind was essentially reverential. And here is the explanation of his craving for men beyond the men we know, higher men, superman (whatever the phrase is), something to satisfy, however inadequately, the instinct for the great and divine.

I have spoken of his mental "evolution"; and it is one of the most characteristic things about Nietzsche that he was a changing, evolutionary being, as contrasted with his master Schopenhauer, whose views crystallized when he was still young and never materially altered. First he was under the spell of Schopenhauer and of Wagner (Schopenhauer on the philosophical side, Wagner on the artistic), and, I might add, of the anti-Socratic Greek view of life, as he understood it. Later he became disillusioned about Wagner, more or less turned against Schopenhauer, was appreciative of Socrates and his rationalism, admired Voltaire and English positive science. It was his analytical, rationalistic, positivistic, many would say sober period, in which he dissected most of all his own earlier ideals, or, to use a phrase of his, laid them on ice. Last of all came a fresh idealism, sobered indeed and relieved of some of its early features, but none the less real and with magnificent forecasts. Nietzsche may be more interesting on account of this vivid life-history, but he is also more difficult of comprehension; we cannot always say, so Nietzsche thought, but so he thought at a certain time. And yet the later periods cannot be understood without an acquaint-

ance with the earlier, and I must doubt whether one can understand him at all without an acquaintance with his masters, Schopenhauer before all.

And now let me endeavor to bring before you in some measure Nietzsche's initial state of mind. He is professor at Basel. He is kindly treated by his colleagues. Particularly is he happy in the friendship of Jacob Burckhardt, authority on Greek culture and on the Renaissance. Happy is he also in a friendship with Wagner, with whom and Frau Cosima he often spends delightful week-ends at their villa above Lake Lucerne. His lectures are strictly professional. He had specialized, I should perhaps have said, in Greek philology, and only the few devoted to philological study attend his lectures.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time his interests are wide and he has an ideal beyond the training of capable philologists.<sup>16</sup> Occasionally he gives a public lecture, and now and then a little book or pamphlet appears from him. In these we find his ideas and ideals in general. A new note is struck, a fresh stream of thought seems to be forming itself, even his interpretation of Greek life is more or less novel; feeling, passion, strong preferences and aversions, make themselves heard and felt. He sees in Socrates the beginning of the rationalistic spirit that killed Greek tragedy. He writes about *David Strauss und Andere Philister*; and this polemic from a new point of view against an honored name makes a veritable stir in the intellectual world. *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* appears, and "On the Use and Harm of History for Life," and "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." "*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*" he calls them, i.e. considerations not in harmony

<sup>15</sup> Burckhardt said of him at the time that Basel had never before had a teacher like him (Lon Andreas-Salomé, Friedrich Nietzsche, in seinen Werken, p. 8).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Werke (Pock. ed.), I, xxviii. Nietzsche had an early antipathy to those who dissolve themselves into "reine Wissenschaft" (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 3). The "historische Sinn," so extensively cultivated in Germany at the time, struck him as almost a "Krankheit" (Werke, Pock. ed., II, xli). He reflects at length (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 3) on the "Selbstsucht der Wissenschaft," i.e. of the learned class, as one of the forces, "von denen zwar die Cultur gefördert wird, ohne dass man doch ihr Ziel, die Erzeugung des Genius, anerkennt." He even says, "Ein Gelehrter kann nie ein Philosoph werden" (he means by this "not merely a great thinker but an actual man." Cf. what is said of Kant, Ibid., p. 7).

with the spirit of the time. It is a young fiery spirit that expresses itself, Professor Riehl remarks. A friend who visited him in Basel in 1872 says he appeared "fiery, elastic, self-conscious, like a young lion."

As I have said, he is a disciple of Schopenhauer. As a student at Leipzig he had chanced on his works. After he read one page, he knew he must read the whole, he felt Schopenhauer's full charm. It is interesting to see that Schopenhauer did not depress him. As against the scepticism and despair which Kant had bred in a man like Heinrich von Kleist,<sup>17</sup> Schopenhauer was to him a leader who took one up to the heights of the tragic view, with the heavens and infinite stars overhead. He gave him, he says, a view of the world as a whole, opened up to him the meaning of life, and made him feel the true consolation for one's individual limitations and sorrows, namely, in renouncing self and giving one's self up to noble aims, above all to justice and pity.<sup>18</sup> He echoed the words of Schopenhauer: "A happy life is impossible. The highest to which man can attain is a heroic course of life." This was to him a kind of battle-note. In seeking for happiness, he says, we do not go beyond the animal; yes, all our restless moving to and fro on the earth, our building of cities and states, our waging of wars, our restless accumulating and spending, our running amuck at people, our copying them,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the *Quarterly Review* (Oct., 1896, p. 310): "Reason, made suddenly aware of its own impotence, so Nietzsche felt, would drive thoughtful men towards the wilderness in which, for example, Heinrich von Kleist had done himself to death." Kant, it must be remembered, reached the conclusion that we know nothing of things as they exist in themselves, our mind putting its shaping hand on every object; so that the world as we conceive it and the world as it really exists are separated by an impassable barrier. [Cf. the summary statement of O. Külpe, "Outer experience is bound up with space, inner experience with time, and they can be thought only in and through categories (space, time, and the categories being alike subjective, according to Kant). And so all realities of the several sciences, nature as well as soul, become phenomena. The knowing mind places on every object its stamp" (*Philosophical Review*, Jan., 1912, p. 8).]

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 3. Cf. the description of his feelings after first reading *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*: "Here there met me the full, unselfish, sunlit gaze of art; here I saw sickness and healing, exits and a haven of refuge, hell and heaven" (Professor Pringle-Pattison's translation from the *Leben*, in "Man's Place in the Cosmos," 2d ed., p. 259).



our outwitting one another and trampling on one another, our cries in need and our shouts of joy in victory—all this, he says, is only continuation of our animality. It is, in a way, a picture of nine tenths of the content of human history; not only of the barbaric world, but of the world as it has now been going on for some two thousand years since the birth of Christ, yes, as it is going on at the present moment. Nietzsche at this time sees chiefly pain in it—pain, illusion, disappointment; he discovers little sense in it. The will plunges aimlessly forward, and does not know itself or the higher aims for which it exists. The world—this greater part of the world, that is—is to him full of gloom and contradiction. At bottom there is something terrible about it and something absurd. The terrible thing is that we live on one another; that forgetting our essential unity, imagining we are separate individuals, we prey on one another. Our human world is like the world outside. Animals prey on plants, we prey on animals; yes, animals prey on one another, and we men prey on one another. It seems to be a part of the order of things, the price of individual existence. A certain violence and wrong cleaves to life. This is the foundation of Nietzsche's tragic view of the world, as it was of Schopenhauer's. It is a mistake to think of Nietzsche originally, as of Schopenhauer, as having only the wish to put a slight thereby on morality. Both (Schopenhauer always and Nietzsche at the beginning) take their stand with morality, and it is life, not morality, that is put in the wrong. As Nietzsche afterward put it, "Before the court of morals (particularly Christian, i.e. absolute morals) *must* life forever and unavoidably be in the wrong, since life is essentially something unmoral."<sup>19</sup> It is this fact, that morality and right are violated in life, that makes the world to him enigmatic and terrible. It is the fight for existence and the necessities it imposes that are the terrible things. Only a sensitive, a profoundly moral nature would feel in this way. Hegel did not feel so; Bismarck did not; our masters in political economy (till recently) have not; nine tenths of the world do not. Commonly, men see nothing more immoral in fighting for existence, whether with animals or with one another, than the

<sup>19</sup> Versuch einer Selbstkritik, p. 5, prefixed to a 2d ed. of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*.

South saw in subjecting slaves to their masters, or than the ancient Greeks in making slaves of those they conquered.

Yet Nietzsche says (and here his view grows more tragic still), not only do we prey on one another, but we must; must, not merely for selfish ends, but to attain the things that make life worth while. By implication he asserts that the very means by which we rise above the sphere of animality, just described, are immoral means. For what are the things that make life worth while? Nietzsche answers, with Schopenhauer, philosophic contemplation, aesthetic appreciation, creation, the vision of truth and beauty; in short, philosophy and art. And how are these things reached? He answers, again with Schopenhauer, only by means of leisure. And how is leisure possible, since man lives by the sweat of his brow? Only as some men produce more than they need, thereby freeing others from the necessity of labor. That is, leisure is the fruit of surplus labor (Nietzsche uses Marx's term, "*Mehr-Arbeit*").<sup>20</sup> And as men are not apt to render this labor willingly, as they naturally want all they produce, some kind of necessity or force must be used upon them. Whether this be force of law, or of competition among themselves for the chance to work, is immaterial. In either case the men are without choice, i.e. are slaves.<sup>21</sup> Nietzsche knows that the slavery of the "free laborer" of today is just as real as that of the legal slaves in the ancient world. On this shameful foundation, then, does the higher culture, philosophy, art, arise. Nietzsche says it in so many words: "Culture and art rest on a terrible foundation. In order that a wide, deep and fruitful soil may exist for their development, the vast majority must be in the service of a minority, must labor beyond the measure of their individual needs, be slaves of poverty. At their expense,

<sup>20</sup> Der Griechische Staat in Werke (Pock. ed.), I, 210; cf. 211, "Das Elend der mühsam lebenden Menschen muss noch gestiegen werden, um einer geringen Anzahl olympischer Menschen die Produktion der Kunstwelt zu ermöglichen," and Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 18, "die alexandrinische [i.e. Socratic, theoretical] Cultur brauchte einen Sklavenstand, um auf die Dauer existiren zu können."

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Nietzsche's express language later: "Sklave (wie wir vielleicht jeden geistigen und körperlichen Lohnarbeiter bezeichnen müssen)", Werke (Pock. ed.), V, xviii; also Professor Simmel's language quoted, xxiii, and Morgenröthe, p. 206.

by means of their surplus labor, must the few rise to freedom."<sup>22</sup> It was so in ancient Greece (students of political science and political economy would do well to read his little paper on "The Greek State"). "To the nature of a higher culture slavery belongs;" and Nietzsche unflinchingly makes the statement, not at all because he favors slavery or fails to be outraged by it, but simply because he sees, or thinks he sees, the fact. Indeed, about the absolute worth of a scheme of things in which slavery can be necessary, there cannot in his estimation be two opinions. This world is not a divine world, and he praises Schopenhauer for squarely saying so.<sup>23</sup>

And yet there is no way out for mankind save through philosophy and art. The many must toil and suffer, and only incidentally for their personal good. They must live in relative darkness that a few may reach the light, though this will ultimately be of universal benefit. In other words, tragedy is inseparable from life at present; even those to whom the joy of life does come, the philosophers and artists, must live for ends beyond their personal selves, live to pass on their light and the beauty they create. And the highest man of all (for philosophy and art are at best preparatory), the saint, the hero-saint—he dies to himself absolutely, makes himself one with all, with their pain and suffering as well, marks out some great path for the good of all, and follows it unflinchingly and with firm-set face, like the knight in Dürer's picture, riding along his frightful way with Death and the Devil for companions, to the bitter end. For, it should be distinctly said, Nietzsche in this period puts the saint or hero above the philosophers and artists; and no one, he holds,

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Werke, XII (8vo. ed.), 206 (p. 439), "Aber haltet immer fest, dass diese ungeheure Bemühung [of Fürsten, Kaufleute, Beamten, Ackerbauer, Soldaten], dieser Schweiss, Staub u. Arbeitslärm der Civilisation für die da ist, die dies alles zu benutzen wissen, ohne mitzuarbeiten: dass es *Ueberschüssige* geben muss, welche mit der allgemeinen Ueberarbeit erhalten werden, u. dass die Ueberschüssigen der Sinn u. die Apologie des ganzen Treibens sind!"

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the admiration he later expresses, but no doubt early felt, for Schopenhauer's repudiation of theism or pantheism: "The un-divinity of existence was recognized by him as something given, tangible, indiscussable" (Fröhliche Wissenschaft, p. 359). Cf. "Der Atheismus war Das, was mich zu Schopenhauer führte" (Ecce Homo, "Die Unzeitgemässen," p. 2).

makes such sacrifices, accepts such obligations,<sup>24</sup> so absolutely parts with all self-seeking, as he. He once formally compares three ideal types of men: the Rousseau ideal man, easily a blind revolutionist, the Goethe ideal man, who too easily accepts the world as it is, simply glorifying it by philosophy and art,<sup>25</sup> and the Schopenhauer ideal type, the hero and saint; and he puts the Schopenhauer ideal man on top. He praises Schopenhauer for making the saint the final arbiter and judge of existence. He says, not victory in this world, but tragic death may be the highest thing; as we actually feel when we listen to old Greek drama and are lifted to the thought of being other than we know of here.<sup>26</sup> Yes, in the saint he sees the consummation toward which all nature presses and strives; for the saint is he in whom and through whom nature, the blind egoistic will working everywhere, is redeemed from itself. He is the solver of the riddle of the world. With him indeed we all have affinities and ties. He is *in actu* what we are *in potentia*. He points to the redemption toward which we all may strive.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> From the start Nietzsche speaks of "Verpflichtungen" and "Pflichten" in a very different way from Schopenhauer (cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 8), though the difference may be more in language than in essential conception. Schopenhauer reacted against Kant's categorical imperative by going to an absurd opposite extreme.

<sup>25</sup> Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 7: he had said of the philosopher, "Denn das ist die eigenthümliche Arbeit aller grossen Denker gewesen, Gesetzgeber für Maass, Münze und Gewicht der Dinge zu sein" (*Ibid.*, p. 8); but above the philosopher he puts the saint.

<sup>26</sup> Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 21; cf. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 5, cf. II, 264-265, I, 155, 148 ("Wir glauben an das ewige Leben," so ruft die Tragödie"). Geburt der Tragödie, p. 16 ("Wir glauben an das ewige Leben," so ruft die Tragödie"); p. 17 ("am reinsten Tone vielleicht im Oedipus auf Kolonos der versöhnende Klang aus einer anderen Welt.").

<sup>27</sup> Cf. his recognition of Christianity: "Das Christenthum ist gewiss eine der reinsten Offenbarungen jenes Dranges nach Cultur und gerade nach der immer erneuten Erzeugung des Heiligen" (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 6). In Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 11, he shows appreciation of the deeper side of Christianity, as contrasted with the lightness and surface cheerfulness of the later Greek spirit, so different from the serious and almost sombre views of the sixth century B.C., quite in the manner of Schopenhauer. Cf. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 2, where he speaks of Christianity as surpassing in the elevation of its ideal the ancient moral systems "und die in allen gleichmässig waltende Natürlichkeit"; though he admits at the same time that Christianity went so far that it produced a reaction, and hence the vacillation of the modern mind. It was in the midst of his own perplexity over ultimate problems that he came on Schopenhauer (in 1865), and found relief (*Ibid.*, p. 2).

Things being so, the whole aim at happiness is delusion. The final aim of our life is not in anything we can ourselves attain to, any passing success or satisfaction, but beyond us, above us, in producing or helping to produce those philosophers, artists, and saints through whom nature and man are redeemed; or, if we may, in producing the philosopher, artist, or saint in ourselves. "Humanity should continuously work to this end, to produce single great men; and this and nothing else is its task"—so Schopenhauer had said and so now Nietzsche after him. For such an end we are to strive; for it we are to make sacrifices. What accords with it is right; what clashes with it, wrong. Hence for every man to seek happiness, each in his own individual way, seems to Nietzsche folly. We do not exist for ourselves. The life of most of us has not significance enough to make it worth striving for as an end in itself. The purpose of our life is to serve higher life. In this way the lower gets a significance that it has not in itself.

Taken abstractly, a view like this may not offend us; but Nietzsche is in earnest with it. The slave class of ancient Greece did not exist for itself. How meaningless was their toil and drudgery, save as thereby Greek genius was set free! Suppose the slaves had risen and asserted their own individual rights to happiness, the "rights of man," as we say. Where would the age of Pericles have been? No more do the corresponding class, the working-class of today, exist for themselves; and Nietzsche comments on the unfortunate consequences in modern times of the general-happiness philosophy, that is, the idea that all may attain happiness on the earth, for culture, now as always, requires a class of virtual slaves as its foundation,<sup>28</sup> and if they rise, considering themselves wronged, culture will be destroyed.

<sup>28</sup> His sister says in summing up his views: "Man muss ohne Heuchelei zugeben, dass Sklaverei, oder wie man es nennen will, die schmachvolle und betrübliche Kehrseite *jeder* Civilisation ist! Man kann sie mildern, sie weniger schmerzhaft machen; man kann dem Knechte die Annahme seines Loses erleichtern—das Mittelalter mit seinen Feudal-System steht in dieser Hinsicht über der Neuzeit;—aber so lange es eine Gesellschaft giebt, wird es auch Mächtige und Privilegirte geben, deren Glück auf der Mühsal u. schweren Arbeit einer unterdrückten und zu ihren Gunsten ausgebeuteten Masse beruhen wird. Das sind harte Wahrheiten, welcher nur der tragische Mensch in aller Unerschrockenheit in's Auge zu sehen wagt" (Werke, Pock. ed., II, xxxi-xxxii).

"There is nothing more fearful," he declares, "than a barbaric slave-class that has come to consider its manner of existence a wrong, and sets about taking revenge not only for itself but for all generations." From the start, he had little sympathy with the spirit of the French Revolution or with present socialism: "*Der gute Urmensch will seine Rechte: welche paradiesischen Aussichten!*" he ironically exclaims. Let Nietzsche not be misunderstood. The business-classes do not exist for themselves, either. They think they do, indeed, and there is just the trouble, for they are on top now and do pretty much as they like. The economic doctrine of *laissez-faire* which these classes virtually inspire, works injuriously, Nietzsche holds, on the morality of whole peoples today. The egoism of these classes, particularly since the period of the Reformation (for before that time the church had been a more or less restraining force), has become one of the determining factors in modern life. It, along with the egoism of the military class, is to be reckoned among the coarsest and most evil influences that work upon us. The selfishness of the new industrial wealth perverts the aims of culture itself, looking on it as a means to its own gain and happiness. It opposes culture that has no industrial value. It thinks man has a right to happiness on earth, and needs education for this end, but only so far. Nietzsche speaks with scorn of the gold-aristocracy, the banking lords of our day without country or home, who use the State for their own ends, and so oppose war and even favor the masses against monarchs—patrons of peace and the people, forsooth! He questions the notion that wealth of itself prepares the way for culture. He satirizes the Germans after the Franco-Prussian War, who said, "Now let us become rich and self-conscious, and we shall have culture." Their wealth and surface-polish have been rather the foe of culture. Some kind of a surplus there must be, of course, but not, Nietzsche holds, the kind that is being piled up in modern communities. No, the business-classes, like the working-classes, have worth and dignity, in Nietzsche's view, as they serve ends beyond themselves, as they consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, are the helpmeets of genius, as they too contribute to the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint. If he recognizes the necessity

of slavery for the workingman, it is not as the business-man or the economist might do so. He is ever a son of the muses, not a Philistine.

Undoubtedly, a certain hardness and severity come to the fore here. It is the beginning of the characteristic Nietzschean note. Life is a difficult business, and there is no easy way out. If we take a great aim into ourselves, we must be hard to all that opposes it.<sup>29</sup> Softness, weakness, become folly and worse. Even cruelty may be necessary. Might, rule, says Nietzsche, is always ruthless. Something of cruelty lies in the nature (i.e., at the basis) of all culture. The state which made slavery law and continuous was cruel. Nietzsche speaks of the shameful origin of the state. Indeed here, in this first period, Nietzsche begins his revision of moral notions. We cannot, he says, aim at the happiness of others, singly or collectively, any more than at our own. The good of the greatest number, as we now find them, is not the ideal. The development of great communities and states is not the ideal. Why should the many be more valuable than one? he in effect asks, quite in the spirit of Heraclitus, who said that one man was in his eyes equal to ten thousand, if he was the best. The aim of life, according to Nietzsche, is, I repeat, to produce those perfect specimens of the race, who by philosophy and art and heroic self-transcendence will redeem the race; and the aim of society at any given moment is to find out and establish those conditions that are favorable to the emergence of this higher breed of men. This is the end, and there should be iron-hardness in seeking it. We may have sympathy with men; we must;<sup>30</sup> but not to the extent of interfering with the conditions and arrangements that are necessary to the attainment of the higher end. To attempt to make the working-class or the business-class happy

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, 2d ed., p. 975: "Objektiv, hart, fest, streng bleiben im Durchsetzen eines Gedankens—das bringen die Künstler noch am besten zu Stande; wenn einer aber Menschen dazu nöthig hat (wie Lehrer, Staatsmänner u. s. w.), da geht die Ruhe und Kälte u. Härte schnell davon. Man kann bei Naturen wie Cäsar u. Napoleon etwas ahnen von einem 'interesselosen' Arbeiten an ihrem Marmor, mag dabei von Menschen geopfert werden, was nur möglich. Auf dieser Bahn liegt die Zukunft der höchsten Menschen, die *größte Verantwortlichkeit* tragen und *nicht* daran *zerbrechen*."

<sup>30</sup> "Die Weisheit wendet sich dem Gesamtbilde der Welt zu und sucht in diesem das ewige Leiden mit sympathischer Liebesempfindung zu ergreifen."

in the way each would like to be, to relieve the one of surplus labor and allow the other to get and to spend as they choose, is against the evolutionary law. They must endure, and we must endure. The condition of things makes this necessary, the nature of the world, where good is won by pain, and Prometheus, the fire-bringer, the friend of man, suffers. Relief is only in freely accepting the tragic view, willingly making sacrifice (if we don't willingly, we may have to unwillingly), and feeling beyond us and above us the heavens and infinite stars, a super-earthly and super-human order of things.

In the tribute to Schopenhauer which I have so often quoted—Schopenhauer, who with all his melancholy was to Nietzsche a good and brave fighter—Nietzsche imagines a disciple of culture saying, "I see something higher and more human above me than I myself am; help me all to attain it, as I will help every one who feels and suffers as I; in order that at last the man may arise who is full and measureless in knowledge and love and vision and power, and who with his whole being cleaves to nature and takes his place in nature as judge and valuer of things."<sup>1</sup> Plainly, it is a self-confession. It lets us into the inner nature and soul of the man. He changed in many ways; but from this central aspiration or prayer, if I may call it so, he never wavered.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Werke, II, 267. The translation of the latter part of this quotation is not literal; the German is: "Damit endlich wieder der Mensch entstehe, welcher sich voll und unendlich fühlt im Erkennen und Lieben, im Schauen und Können, und mit aller seiner Ganzheit an und in der Natur hängt, als Richter und Werthmesser der Dinge."

Cf. "Ich habe von Kindesbeinen an über die Existenzbedingungen des Weisen nachgedacht" (X, 183, p. 987).

<sup>2</sup> "Meine 'Unzeitgemässen' bedeuten für meine *Versprechungen*; was sie für Andere sind, weiss ich nicht. Man glaube mir, dass ich längst nicht mehr leben würde, wenn ich diesen Versprechungen nur um Einen Schritt breit ausgewichen wäre! Vielleicht kommt noch ein Mensch, der entdeckt, dass von 'Mensch. allgem.' an ich nichts gethan habe, als mein Versprechen erfüllen" (XIV, 8vo ed., 381-382, p. 265).



*THE BOOK OF ISAIAH: CRITICAL PROBLEMS AND  
A NEW COMMENTARY*<sup>1</sup>

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Professor Gray's commentary on Numbers (1903) not only filled a vacant place in English exegetical literature, but had to do with a book that has usually been perfunctorily treated by serial commentators; and this made an intrinsically valuable work doubly welcome. Isaiah, on the contrary, competes with the Psalms for the distinction of being the subject of more commentaries than any other book in the Old Testament, and of some of the best. The inevitable question therefore is, Wherein does the volume before us mark an advance beyond its predecessors? To answer this question it will be necessary to indicate the problems with which the critical study of Isaiah is at present chiefly concerned, and to show what progress has been made toward a solution of them.

There are three clearly marked periods in the criticism of Isaiah: from 1778 to about 1820; from 1820 to 1880; and from 1880 to the present time.

The first period begins with Bishop Lowth's translation of Isaiah (1778). Lowth was interested primarily in the aesthetic appreciation of the prophet. It was the glory of Hebrew poetry which he wished to see revealed. This glory was often obscured by the corruption of the text. Hence much attention was given to the establishment of a better text, often by brilliant conjectural emendations which have become a part of subsequent exegetical tradition. Lowth's work was translated into German in 1779-81 by Richerz, and supplied with notes by Koppe. In these notes Koppe for the first time directs attention to the critical problems of the book. Are the connections between its various sections original and organic, or are they artificial and com-

<sup>1</sup> A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Isaiah, I-XXXIX. By George Buchanan Gray. Vol. I, Introduction, and Commentary on I-XXVII. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912.

pilatory? Koppe maintained the latter view. Again, are the historical backgrounds of the prophecies in all cases the real backgrounds, or are they sometimes assumed backgrounds? This question was most urgent in connection with what may be called the Babylonian elements in Isaiah.<sup>2</sup> The usual theory had been that Isaiah, projecting himself by inspiration into the future, had taken the point of view of the Babylonian exile, or even of later times. Koppe suggested that what was supposed to be only an assumed background was after all the real background. Koppe's hints were taken up and elaborated by several scholars at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, of whom Eichhorn was the most influential. In *Die hebraischen Propheten* (1816) Eichhorn resolved Isaiah into some eighty-five fragments, dating from various periods in the history of Judah, and in his *Einleitung*, the fourth edition of which (1823-24) may be considered to close the first period of criticism, he summed up in precise form the arguments against the genuineness of the expressly Babylonian elements in Isaiah. By this time chapters 24-27 and chapters 34 and 35, out of the first part of Isaiah, had also been drawn into the critical stream and carried off to the exilic or post-exilic period. In the criticism of these chapters, especially in the case of chapters 24-27, not only the probable historical backgrounds had been used as arguments against their genuineness, but also their peculiar religious ideas; for example, the doctrine of the resurrection in chapters 24-27.

The second period in the critical Isaiah-analysis lasted above sixty years, say, from 1820 to 1880. In it fall the works of three great commentators: Gesenius, whose commentary appeared in 1821, Hitzig (1833), and Ewald (1840-41; last edition, 1867-68). Upon the philological, exegetical, and critical foundations laid by these scholars most of the other work in this period was based, either by way of strengthening and continuing their work or in the attempt to check further building operations on the lines they had laid out. Both Gesenius and Ewald represent a distinct reaction from the disintegrating tendency of Koppe and Eichhorn, while Hitzig carried on the work of the earlier critics,

<sup>2</sup> Primarily, 44-66; 13 1-14 23; 21 1-10.

though in a more tempered form. But the great authority of Gesenius and Ewald prevailed, and at the end of this second period there was general agreement among critics only in the elimination of the prophecies already mentioned,<sup>3</sup> though a feeling of insecurity was often expressed as to certain other chapters also.<sup>4</sup>

But with the removal of Isa. 40-66, or Second Isaiah, to the exile, a large part of the consolatory prophecies in the book had been taken away from Isaiah. Of the rejected parts of Isa. 1-39, chapters 24-27 and 34-35, also, were consolatory. The elimination of so many of the consolatory prophecies could not fail to react on the conception of Isaiah's outlook upon the future. A new problem thus emerged, namely, to determine what at different stages of his career the prophet Isaiah expected the future to bring forth, in distinction from the expectations of other men and other times which are embodied in the Book of Isaiah. This was to prove the central problem in the criticism of the book, into which all others finally lead. But until the end of the second period little had been done toward disengaging this problem from the multitude of critical and exegetical questions which had arisen in the progress of investigation.

The merit of having first grasped and formulated the problem of Isaiah's eschatology on the basis of the critical results generally accepted in the middle decades of the nineteenth century may fairly be given to Bernhard Duhm in his *Theologie der Propheten* (1875). Robertson Smith's *Prophets of Israel*, which has the same critical premises with the *Theologie*, did not appear till seven years later (1882). It is perhaps not so original as Duhm's essay; yet it has exerted an equally profound influence upon subsequent investigation, and still remains the most brilliant exposition of Isaiah's religious significance which we possess in English. At crucial points these two essays are in the sharpest antithesis, and the differences mark the lines of division in the subsequent criticism and interpretation of Isaiah.

<sup>3</sup> Isaiah 40-66; 13 1-14 23; 21 1-10; 24-27; 34 and 35.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Ewald harbored doubts as to the genuineness of chapters 12 and 33. Hitzig's vigorous attack upon 19 16-25, in which he followed the lead of Koppe, had also made some impression.

If chapters 1-39 are closely examined, four great prophetic doctrines are found in them: The doctrine of the Day of the Lord; the doctrine of the Remnant; the doctrine of the Messianic King; and the doctrine of the impregnability of Zion, which last may be considered the obverse of the prophecies which foretell the destruction of Assyria. Of these doctrines Duhm lays the main emphasis upon the Day of the Lord, Smith makes the Remnant central. The difference between the two writers at this point had interesting consequences. The conception of the Day of the Lord, according to Duhm, approximates to the Christian conception of the Last Judgment. It is primarily a day of wrath (see ch. 2). At first Isaiah thinks of it as impending over Israel and Judah only, but later he comes to realize that all nations will be involved in the catastrophe. The present order of the world is to be changed. The future is in no sense a continuation of the present or an evolution out of the present, but the direct opposite of the present. The present must be totally destroyed in order to prepare the way for the future. The transition to the future is to be supernaturally effected, and the character of the future itself is supernatural. It is marked by a miraculous change in nature and the charism of the spirit (see chapters 11 and 32). Duhm's interpretation is based partly upon the implications of what may be called the anti-Assyrian prophecies,<sup>5</sup> partly upon the sudden, unmediated transitions from threat to promise, as seen particularly in chapters 28-33.<sup>6</sup> In all these prophecies the transition to the future era seems to be attributed to the direct intervention of God. Thus, if Duhm's interpretation be accepted, Isaiah's eschatology<sup>7</sup> in its most characteristic features is apocalyptic. And in proportion as it is apocalyptic, the historical and moral interest is absent. Duhm

<sup>5</sup> The most typical of these are chapters 10 and 18; but compare also the briefer prophecies, more or less fragmentary in character, 8 9 f.; 14 24-27; 17 12-14; 29 6-8; 30 27-33; 33; 37 22 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Compare 28 1-4 with verses 5 f.; 29 1-4 with verses 6-8; 29 9-15 with verses 16-25; 30 1-17 with verses 18-26 and 27-33; 31 1-4 with verses 5-9.

<sup>7</sup> The reader should be apprised that here and throughout this article the word "eschatology" is used, after the example of some recent German authors, for the prophet's expectations or predictions about the future of his people, without implying that these expectations were "eschatological" in the etymological sense or in the established English meaning of the word.—Ed.

himself is quite aware of this. He deliberately exalts what he calls the religious element in Isaiah's eschatology, by which he means the supernatural and apocalyptic element, at the expense of the ethical and historical. This involves him in difficulties, however, with the doctrines of the Remnant and the inviolability of Zion. If there is a Remnant, if Zion is not to perish in the final catastrophe, there would seem, after all, to be left something out of the present which passes over into the future. Even the figure of the Messianic king, who is a Davidic king, and so has historical connections, is not quite congruous with Duhm's apocalyptic interpretation of the future; and it is interesting to observe how little prominence Duhm gives to this conception. In particular the Messianic significance of Immanuel (7 14 and 8 8) is denied.

In contrast to Duhm, Smith lays the emphasis upon the ethical and historical. This is because he makes the idea of the Remnant central in Isaiah's teaching. For Duhm the Remnant is a future ideal; for Smith it is "a practical principle" in the present. The Remnant, accordingly, takes concrete shape: it is nothing else than the prophetic party which Isaiah developed out of a small group of his disciples<sup>8</sup> into an effective organization. This Remnant is to be the basis of the ideal kingdom of the future. It is the connecting link between the present and the future, and through it the transition from the one to the other is to be morally achieved. The future is not a wholly new creation, as Duhm would have us believe, due to the sudden irruption of the divine into history; the future is the purified, idealized present. There is continuity in Jahweh's work. The doctrine of the Remnant is in turn connected with the doctrines of the inviolability of Zion and of the Messianic King. "Because the community of Jehovah [the Remnant] is indestructible, the state of Judah and the kingdom of the house of David cannot be utterly overthrown. . . . The capital and the court appeared to him as the natural centre of the true remnant." But how does all this rhyme with the doctrine of the Day of the Lord in which Judah and Israel are to be destroyed? In general, Smith seeks to supply moral connections between the threats and the promises. The

<sup>8</sup> See 8 16-18, a passage hardly noticed by Duhm.

threats are recalled if, or when, king and people repent. But the difficulty is precisely that the ethical transitions have to be supplied by the reader. In the present form of the prophecies both judgments and consolations are expressed unconditionally. They are placed side by side, without any hint of an organic connection between them (see especially chapters 28-33, and note 6 above).

We begin to see our problem defining itself more sharply. How are we to reconcile those prophecies which unqualifiedly foretell the doom of the nation in the Day of the Lord with the predictions of a brighter future—the prophecies of the Remnant, the inviolability of Zion, and the Messianic King?<sup>9</sup> It is the problem created by the conflicting representations of the national future in Isaiah 1-39, a problem illustrated by the divergent expositions of Duhm and Smith, which has given rise to the new development that characterizes the third period in the recent criticism of Isaiah. Investigation and discussion in this stage have centred about the problem of Isaiah's eschatology.<sup>10</sup>

This period, which may be said to run from about 1880 to the present time, may itself be divided into three stages: the stage of critical disintegration, from 1881 to 1892; the stage of critical reconstruction, from 1892 to 1905; and the stage of critical reaction, from 1905 to the present time.

The first of these stages is represented by the work of Stade, Soerensen, Guthe, Giesebrecht, and Duhm. With the exception of Duhm, these scholars have dealt only with particular problems in Isaiah.<sup>11</sup> I shall not attempt at this time to give a detailed statement in chronological order of the various contributions which these scholars have made to our subject. I must

<sup>9</sup> Since the doctrine of the Remnant implies some sort of a judgment from which the Remnant escapes, this doctrine is not in such sharp contrast with the eschatology of doom as are the doctrines of the invulnerability of Zion and the Messianic King.

<sup>10</sup> See especially chs. 2, 10, 18.

<sup>11</sup> See the series of articles by Stade in the *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1881-84), supplemented by his *Geschichte des Volkes Israel* (Vol. I, 1881-85); A. Soerensen, *Judah und die assyrische Weltmacht* (1885); Guthe, *Das Zukunftsbild des Jesaja*; Giesebrecht's article, *Die Immanuel-Weissagung*, in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1888), and his monograph *Beiträge zur Jesaiakritik* (1890); Duhm, *Das Buch Jesaja* (1892, 2d ed. 1902).

content myself with setting forth the logical relations of the questions which they have discussed, as these bear upon the criticism and interpretation of Isaiah.

In Isaiah 1-39 (after the elimination of 13 1-14 23; 21 1-10; 24-27, and 34-35), there are four main critical problems which overshadow all others in interest and importance: *first*, The genuineness and date of the anti-Assyrian group of prophecies; *second*, The historical credibility of the narrative section, chapters 36-38; *third*, The unity, genuineness, and date of the remarkable section, chapters 28-33, with which chapter 22 is also to be associated; *fourth*, The interpretation and date of the prophecies of the Messianic King, namely, the Immanuel prophecies, chapters 6-8, and 9 1-7; 11 1 ff.; 32 1-8.

Stade's criticism was concerned mainly with the first two of these problems, though important hints were also dropped with respect to the last two. The immediate subject of Stade's first studies was not Isaiah, but Zechariah and Micah. The genuineness of Zech. 9-14 and Mic. 4-7 was denied, and these important sections were ascribed to a period after the time of Ezekiel. The argument turned mainly, though not exclusively, on the agreement between these sections and Ezek. 38 and 39. In all three passages there is a conception of a great duel between Jehovah and the nations, in which Jehovah was to triumph, and thus vindicate his absolute supremacy as a universal God. Stade argued that in Ezekiel this idea is worked out in an organic and intelligible way, whereas in the disputed portions of Zechariah and Micah it is not worked out at all, but is presented in an allusive fashion which implied that the idea was already well-known and a part of prophetic tradition. Hence it was inferred that Zech. 9-14 and Mic. 4-7 probably followed Ezekiel. But it thereupon became evident that the assignment of these sections to post-exilic times put in question the genuineness of several of the anti-Assyrian prophecies of Isaiah in which substantially the same idea of a conflict between Jehovah and the world power, or powers, was expressed. Stade was thus led ultimately to reject, in addition to Zech. 9-14 and Mic. 4-7, the anti-Assyrian prophecies, Isa. 8 9 f.; 14 24-27; 17 12-14; 29 7; 33; 37 22 ff. It will be remembered that these prophecies teach by implication the doc-

trine of the inviolability of Zion. Stade's criticism is thus seen to make a large inroad upon those prophecies in which this doctrine is expressed or implied. Yet Stade still held to the genuineness of Isa. 10; 18; 30 27-33; and 31 5-9; and so long as this was done, the rejection of the other anti-Assyrian prophecies did not in principle affect the eschatology of Isaiah.<sup>12</sup>

In the rejection of 37 22 ff. the trustworthiness of the surrounding narrative section, chapters 36-38, in which the campaign of Sennacherib in 701 B.C. is narrated, became involved. Stade showed that, instead of one narrative of this campaign, chapters 36 and 37 contain two accounts of the same campaign, which differed in various ways and gave evidence of legendary accretion. Now critics had referred most of the anti-Assyrian prophecies, particularly chapters 10 and 18, to the time of Hezekiah's revolt and Sennacherib's invasion of Judah (705-701 B.C.), associating them chronologically with the campaign in which they were conspicuously fulfilled. But what would be the result when, on the one hand, the genuineness of the anti-Assyrian prophecies as a group began to be impugned, and, on the other, the credibility of the historical narrative was thrown into doubt? This question did not present itself to Stade, inasmuch as he accepted the most characteristic anti-Assyrian prophecies and also the truth of the central fact in Isa. 36 f., namely, the deliverance of Jerusalem. But it is evident that others who followed him so far might not stop where he did.

Stade's rejection of chapter 33, also, had far-reaching consequences. The close connection between chapters 32 and 33 was obvious, and this led Stade to include both in the same judgment. Now chapters 32 and 33 have two important characteristics. In content they are thoroughly eschatological, doom and deliverance alternating in unmediated juxtaposition, and the eschatology of hope predominating. In literary connection they had always been associated with chapters 28-31, as a kind of appendix. When they were abandoned, therefore, a considerable

<sup>12</sup> Stade sought to justify his retention of a part of the anti-Assyrian prophecies, while rejecting the rest, by pointing out that in the accepted group Isaiah was dealing with the one historical nation, Assyria; whereas the rejected prophecies dealt vaguely with many nations. The accepted prophecies were thus construed historically, while the rejected prophecies were vaguely eschatological.



body of eschatological material was further subtracted from Isaiah, and a breach was made in the integrity of the section, Isa. 28-33. This attack was advanced by Giesebrecht in a very thorough discussion of the opening chapter of the section. He undertook to show that the present sequence of the several prophecies in this chapter (Isa. 28 1-4, 5 f., 7-22, 23-29) cannot possibly be an original and organic sequence, and attempted to account for the present order as due to successive revisions by Isaiah himself at different periods of his life. To support this view he sought evidence of revision elsewhere in the book, and contended that 8 9 f. and 17 12-14 (prophecies against Assyria which had been rejected by Stade) were, indeed, incongruous in their contexts, but could be explained as later revisions by Isaiah himself of the earlier and gloomier prophecies that preceded.

The question whether Giesebrecht's theory of revisions by Isaiah himself or Stade's theory of later additions and interpolations by other writers is the more probable explanation in such cases of incongruous contexts, confronts us again when we turn to the main body of chapters 28-33. Here we find the most abrupt transitions from threat to promise (see above, note 6). These transitions are all the more inexplicable when the prophecies in which they occur are properly dated. As long as the integrity of Isa. 28 was maintained, it was common to let 28 1-4, which must belong to a time before the fall of Samaria (722), determine the age of the whole. But when the unity of chapter 28 was given up, it was easy for Giesebrecht to show that at least 28 7-22 was intimately connected with chapters 29-31, and the latter chapters, which are directed against an Egyptian alliance, were most naturally placed between 705 and 701 B.C., when it is known that Judah was negotiating with Egypt against Assyria. The alliance with Egypt was, however, in direct opposition to the advice of the prophet in chapters 28-31. We should therefore expect in these chapters, as Giesebrecht himself points out, threats, not promises; and this expectation is justified by 22 1-14, which very clearly reflects the situation in 701, and contains only denunciations. Thus, both from the point of view of their literary connections—or, rather, lack of connections—and from the point of view of the historical situation, the position

of the hopeful prophecies in Isa. 28-31 is seen to be increasingly difficult; and it is not surprising to find Soerensen denying that these prophecies belong in their present connections at all. His observations, however, were casual, and made little impression at the time.

It is more important for the present to note the effect which Giesebrecht's criticism and his dating of Isa. 28-31 has upon the anti-Assyrian prophecies. When it has been shown that a group of prophecies predominantly threatening in tone belong to the time of Sennacherib, and that it is menacing prophecies which are to be expected in the circumstances, what is to be judged about the anti-Assyrian prophecies, which are all unqualifiedly consolatory and encouraging? Giesebrecht accepts the genuineness of these prophecies, but removes them all (with the exception of 37 22 ff. and the two oracles, 30 27-33 and 31 5-9, which lie within chapters 28-31) to an earlier period in Isaiah's life (711). By this proceeding the prophecies of hope in chapters 28-31 are left in a still more isolated and unaccountable position. It is evident that, when once chapters 28-31 are included in the discussion, the problem of Isaiah's previsions of the future in the days of Sennacherib becomes increasingly perplexing. Are the anti-Assyrian prophecies genuine? If so, are they to be assigned to the time of Sennacherib? What is their relation to chapters 28-31? What is the relation of the threats in chapters 28-31 to the promises? These are the questions which press for a solution.

Stade's rejection of chapters 32 and 33, which began the work of disintegrating Isa. 28-31, also initiated the criticism of the Messianic prophecies. Isaiah 32, in which the Messianic prophecy, 32 1-8, occurs, had usually been placed in the later years of Isaiah's career. Chapter 11 was supposed to be organically connected with 10 through the contrast between the felled forest of Assyria (10 33 ff.) and the revived sprout of the stump of Jesse (11 1). Hence 11 1 ff. was also assigned to Isaiah's latest period. Guthe rejected chapter 32, with Stade; but he went a step farther and denied that the connection between chapters 10 and 11 was original: it was, as he had no difficulty in showing, compilatory and not organic. With the separation of chapter 11 from 10,

the Messianic prophecy in chapter 11 became chronologically homeless. Guthe found shelter for it by associating it with the closely kindred prophecy, 9 1-7. The latter was apparently organically connected with chapters 7 and 8, which were securely anchored in the period of the invasion of Judah by the allies, Syria and Israel (734). The effect of denying the genuineness of 32 1-8 and of shifting 11 1 ff. to a place beside 9 1-7 was that all the prophecies of the Messianic King, including the Immanuel prophecies in 7 14 and 8 8, which Guthe interpreted messianically, fell in an early period of Isaiah's ministry, whereas the figure of the Messianic King disappears altogether from the later prophecies. In the latter the doctrines of the Remnant and the inviolability of Zion take its place. Guthe's reconstruction of Isaiah's eschatology may thus be regarded as a kind of synthesis of the theories of Duhm and Smith. In the early period Isaiah is supposed to have entertained a more supernaturalistic conception of the future, which centres about the ideas of the Day of the Lord and of the Messianic King, who, according to Guthe, belongs to the new order, after the old things have passed away. In the later period of his life Isaiah's view of the future is shaped by his doctrine of the Remnant and the invulnerability of Zion, and is consequently more historical and ethical than his earlier conception. Guthe's labored attempt to account for these changes in Isaiah's anticipations of the future need not detain us; for no sooner had this theory been built up than it was undermined, though unawares, by Giesebrecht. Giesebrecht also rejected chapter 32, with Stade, and, with Guthe, severed 11 from its connection with 10, ascribing it to the same age with 9 1-7; but he followed Duhm in denying the Messianic import of Immanuel in 7 14, and by textual criticism eliminated Immanuel from 8 8. Now, the strongest link by which 9 1-7 is united with chapters 7 and 8 is the supposed identification of the Messianic child in 9 1-7 with Immanuel (interpreted messianically) in 7 14 and 8 8.

If Immanuel is not the Messiah, this link is broken, and only one slender filament connects 9 1-7 with chapters 7 and 8, namely, the verse 9 1 compared with 2 Kings 15 29. The latter describes the devastation of Gilead and Galilee by the Assyrians in 734,

and the reference to the same events in Isa. 9 1 might seem to fix the date of the following prophecy in the same period. If this connection with chapters 7 and 8 were broken, the Messianic prophecies in 9 2-7 and 11 1 ff. would be set chronologically adrift. On what unknown shores would they finally land?

The disintegrating work of the scholars mentioned above reached its climax in the commentary on Isaiah by Bernhard Duhm (1892). This commentary makes an epoch in the criticism and interpretation of the prophet. In the influence it has exerted it ranks with the commentaries of Gesenius, Hitzig, and Ewald. Yet I have ventured to assign Duhm's commentary to the era of disintegration rather than to the era of reconstruction. As a matter of fact, the theory of the significance of Isaiah advanced in the commentary differs in no essential particular from that presented in the *Theologie der Propheten*. But Duhm perceived clearly and applied consistently the great critical principles of which previous investigators had only caught glimpses, or which they had been able to apply only in isolated instances. In so doing he brought all previous criticism to a head, and prepared the way for an entirely new conception of the significance of Isaiah's teachings.

Three things distinguish this commentary from its predecessors. *First*, Duhm attacked the literary sequences in the Book of Isaiah in a more determined way than had ever been done before. The book was analyzed into a large number of unrelated sections. This was in effect a return to the fragmentary hypothesis of Koppe and Eichhorn. But, as would be expected after nearly a century of study, Duhm's analysis was much more systematic and discriminating than that of the earlier critics. *Secondly*, in separating the fragments from one another, the principles of Hebrew poetry were employed. It was shown how changes in rhythm often concurred with a change of subject. The fragments stood out formally distinct from each other. A great gain! At this point Duhm revitalized the work of Lowth as he had revitalized the work of Eichhorn and Koppe. The great commentaries of the nineteenth century had given too little attention to the poetic structure of Isaiah's oracles. But Duhm saw, as his predecessors had not seen, the great importance of this criterion

for textual and even for historical criticism. The result of Duhm's analysis was to demonstrate more forcibly than had ever before been done that the Book of Isaiah is the product of centuries of compilers and editors. This had, of course, long been acknowledged to a certain extent, especially since the time of Stade, but it had commonly been supposed that Isaiah had a considerable share in the work. It had been tacitly assumed that Isaiah was an author; in Duhm's view Isaiah was a preaching prophet rather than a writing prophet, and took little pains to preserve his utterances.<sup>12</sup> It follows that the more or less fragmentary oracles that have been preserved to us are not ordinarily to be interpreted by the contexts in which they now stand; the order and connection are secondary and artificial. Each fragment must be interpreted by itself. This principle is not stated by Duhm in so many words, but it underlies all his exegesis. *Thirdly*, closely connected with this more purely literary criticism is Duhm's historico-religious criticism. He supposes that the final redaction of the book was made largely in the interest of eschatological dogmas which prevailed among the Jews in the last two centuries before Christ. The eschatological problem which, though not always recognized, gave direction to the criticism of Isaiah, is now brought to the front with full consciousness of its central importance. In these three particulars—the adoption of the fragmentary hypothesis, the employment of the principles of Hebrew poetic form to support it, and the emphasis upon the eschatological problem—Duhm's commentary lays the foundation for the further development of criticism. It is beside our present purpose to exhibit all the results at which, in the employment of this method, Duhm arrives. We must confine our attention to those which bear directly upon the questions we have been considering.

If we turn to Duhm's criticism of chapters 28–33, we find that the unity of this section, which had been attacked at its end (chapters 32–33) and its beginning (chapter 28) by Stade and Giesebrecht, is now thoroughly shattered. The transitions from threats to promises in these chapters are recognized to be impossible,

<sup>12</sup> Only chapters 6–8 and 28–31 (in their original form) are allowed to have been composed by Isaiah.

and the genuineness of many of the promissory passages is denied.<sup>14</sup> They are held to represent a later eschatology than Isaiah's. The threatening nucleus of chapters 28-31 is placed in the time of Sennacherib (705-701), with Giesebrecht. On the other hand, most of the great anti-Assyrian prophecies are retained, and ascribed to the same period. The difficulty which Giesebrecht sought to avoid by assigning the anti-Assyrian predictions to an earlier period, Duhm attempts to dispose of in another way. He thinks that the threats in chapters 28-31 are directed publicly to the people, whereas the promises in these chapters whose genuineness he defends, and the promises in the anti-Assyrian group, are given privately to the Remnant. But there is no hint in these consolatory prophecies that they are addressed exclusively to an inner circle. Further, Duhm does not tell us how both the threats and the promises can be realized at the same time. If Zion is to be destroyed on account of the sinners, how is the righteous Remnant to be saved? If it is to be preserved for the sake of the Remnant, how are the sinners to be destroyed? Could not the ungodly also find refuge in Zion? As criticism advances, the contradiction between the eschatology of hope and the eschatology of doom becomes more and more apparent, and it would seem as if a choice between them must be made.

Again, Duhm takes the step in the criticism of the specifically Messianic prophecies for which Guthe and Giesebrecht had prepared the way. He treats 9 1 as a gloss, and thus breaks the one remaining link between the Messianic prophecy, 9 2-7, and chapters 7 and 8. This leaves 9 2-7 and its companion piece, 11 1 ff., without chronological anchorage. Duhm combines these two prophecies with 32 1-5, which he accepts as genuine, and 2 2-4, which is similar in form and feeling though not in subject-matter, and thinks that they were uttered toward the close of Isaiah's life; 9 2-7 is assigned to the time of Sennacherib's campaign; the other prophecies are placed vaguely in Isaiah's old age and regarded as "swan songs." Duhm's arguments for these dates are very inconclusive, and the real reason for attributing them to the

<sup>14</sup> Among these are 28 5-6 (a gloss upon verses 1-4); 29 16-25; 30 18-26; 31 5-9, in its present form; chap. 33. On the other hand, 23 23-29; 29 5-8 (substantially); 30 27-33; and all of chap. 32 are accepted.

latest years of Isaiah's career would seem to be that Duhm is unable to find a convenient place for them anywhere else. This is not at all reassuring. If we can find a place for these prophecies, 9 2-7 excepted, only by locating them in a period of Isaiah's life about which nothing is known, the question inevitably arises, Are they prophecies of Isaiah at all? Thus in the criticism of the prophecies assigned to the time of Sennacherib and in the criticism of the Messianic prophecies, Duhm's positions cannot be regarded as final. They raise problems which they do not solve. In another respect Duhm leaves the student in doubt. His criterion for distinguishing between early and late eschatology is often vague. He holds that Isaiah was the creator of the eschatology of hope, and in consequence his eschatology is usually fluid in character, whereas the eschatology of the later writers is allusive, implying fixed dogmatic ideas. This criterion is interesting, but often fails to carry conviction. For example, it is difficult to see how Duhm can accept 32 15-20 or 30 27-33 but reject 30 18-26; or how he can accept the nucleus of 31 5-9 but reject 10 33 f. It would appear as if the passages which he accepts and those he rejects were often too similar in character to warrant such different treatment; and the question presses whether the disintegrating process which culminates in Duhm's commentary should be brought to a stop, and the passages which he rejects be defended on the basis of the passages which he accepts, or whether criticism should push still further and, on the basis of the passages which Duhm rejects, abandon many passages which he still accepts. The latter is the course which criticism actually took in the next stage of its development. The result was a new positive construction of the religious significance of Isaiah.<sup>15</sup>

It was Hackmann who laid the foundations for the new construction. His work was carried on by Cheyne, Brückner, and Volz. The capstone was placed upon it by Marti.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> In the criticism of chapters 36-37, the other main problem of Isa. 1-39, Duhm accepted Stade's results.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Hackmann, *Zukunftserwartungen des Jesaia* (1893); Cheyne, *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah* (1895); Brückner, *Die Composition des Buches Jesaia*, 28-33 (1897); Volz, *Die Vorexilische Jahwehprophetie und der Messias* (1897); Marti, *Das Buch Jesaia* (1900).

In his literary criticism Hackmann agrees in general with Duhm though he arrived at his conclusions for the most part independently of Duhm. The methodical principle of his historical construction is that all investigation of Isaiah's eschatology, and for that matter of every problem connected with the book, must start from the prophecies which can be dated with tolerable certainty. The datable prophecies gather around the two great political crises in Isaiah's lifetime, the Syro-Ephraimite war in 735-734, and the revolt from Assyria and the campaign of Sennacherib in 705-701. It is to be assumed that in these crises the profoundest convictions of Isaiah would find classic expression. In chapters 6-8 are found the views of Isaiah, as developed in 735-734. In consequence of the refusal of Ahaz and the people to follow the prophet's counsels, his message at that time became a message of doom for both Israel and Judah. The only hopes which he cherished were concentrated upon his own immediate followers (8 16-18), who constitute the Remnant. With Duhm and Giesebrecht, Hackmann denied the Messianic character of Immanuel, and, with Duhm, he separated 9 2-7 from the preceding Syro-Ephraimite prophecies. Thus the eschatological outlook in 735-734 was, so far as the nation was concerned, pessimistic in the extreme.

The situation in 705-701 was analogous to the situation in 735-734. The people refused to follow Isaiah's warnings not to rely on Egypt, and again the prophet announced doom. The prophecies which most accurately reflect Isaiah's views at this time are found in chapters 28-33 (for the date, see Giesebrecht and Duhm). Hackmann completes the work of Duhm, and denies the genuineness of all the hopeful predictions in these chapters except 28 23-29 and 32 15-20 (!), these two passages being ascribed to other periods of Isaiah's life. What is left of chapters 28-33 is thus a series of denunciations and predictions of doom. But contrary to Isaiah's expectations—here Hackmann introduces an important variation—Jerusalem was delivered (*cf.* Stade and Duhm). The prophet interpreted this as a special dispensation of Jehovah, who thus sought to give a respite to his people that they might repent. But the people, whose heads were turned by the unexpected deliverance, far from amendment,



plunged into mad revelry, which drew from Isaiah his direst oracle (22 1-4), foretelling the utter destruction of the nation.<sup>17</sup> The two groups, chapters 6-8, and 28-31 with 22, are thus the two foci from which Isaiah's eschatology is to be described.

Hackmann finds no period within the known lifetime of Isaiah in which the Messianic prophecies (9 2-7; 11 1 ff.; 32 1-5; 2 2-4) can be placed. Duhm had removed them to the last years of Isaiah's life; Hackmann finds this unsatisfactory, and pushes them beyond the prophet's horizon altogether. The argument against the genuineness of these prophecies is strengthened by several new and important considerations drawn from their character. The great anti-Assyrian prophecies, with their messages of encouragement, are either rejected or ignored, with the exception of chapters 10 and 18. These two chapters are placed between 705 and 701, but 18 is interpreted as a conditional promise (!), and the usual interpretation of 10, which infers from its denunciation of Assyria a deliverance for Jerusalem, is denied. Hackmann thus arrives at a consistent theory of Isaiah's eschatology. Beginning with some hope of a better future beyond the coming judgment, such as is expressed in 1 21-26 and 32 15-20 (!), Isaiah is convinced by the obstinacy of Ahaz that this expectation is vain, and the only hope he now allows himself is that expressed in 8 16-18, which concerns his immediate followers exclusively, and has nothing to do with the nation. The conviction of coming national disaster which was gained in 735-734 was intensified as time went on, till it reaches its climax in chapters 28-31 (expurgated of their consolatory sections) and 22. Instead of a prophet of eschatological hope, Isaiah has become in Hackmann's interpretation "a prophet of faith," who sets righteousness above patriotism, and, clinging to faith beyond the forms of faith, is ready to surrender his hope for the nation, and for Zion itself, with which the religion of Judah was so closely bound up. Thus, in the alternative, defined above, between the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope, Hackmann decides for the former. Of the four great eschatological doctrines in Isa. 1-39, the doctrines of the Day of the Lord and the Remnant are ac-

<sup>17</sup> In dating 22 1-14 after the withdrawal of Sennacherib, Hackmann followed a suggestion of Soerensen.

cepted, and the doctrines of the invulnerability of Zion and the Messianic King are rejected. And it is interesting to note that the criticism which has led to this result leads also to a renewal of the emphasis upon the ethical and historical in Isaiah's teaching upon which Robertson Smith insisted, as against the supernatural and apocalyptic elements which Duhm had stressed.

Cheyne's *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah* (1895) followed closely along the lines of criticism marked out by Duhm and Hackmann, but with a preference at important points—for example, in the rejection of the Messianic prophecies—for Hackmann's results. The *Introduction* has the adventitious importance of being the first comprehensive work in English on the advanced criticism of Isaiah; but it was perhaps unfortunate that the task of introducing the newer criticism to English-speaking students should have devolved upon Professor Cheyne. His great learning is cordially recognized by all Old Testament scholars. He is the possessor of a literary style which lends charm to all that he writes. He has in an unusual degree the gift of exegetical divination—a divination which, unfortunately, in his "Jerahmeel" period borders on the mantic; but his logical faculty is deficient. He lacks the ability to present his evidence in a convincing way, and his readiness to assume the thing to be proved is almost unlimited. In the *Introduction* he adopts the plan of criticising the chapters of the book *seriatim*. The student is accordingly plunged in *medias res*, since the first chapter happens to present some of the most delicate problems of the book; and one who is not thoroughly familiar with previous criticism is likely to become bewildered. Phenomena whose critical significance would be readily understood if they were presented in their proper setting make no impression when viewed in the isolated way in which they must be considered when the present order of chapters is followed.

It might be thought that Cheyne's method is a proper application of the principle of induction, and adapted to clear his results from the suspicion of bias in favor of any particular theory of Isaiah's eschatology.<sup>18</sup> But all fruitful induction starts from

<sup>18</sup> This seems to be the author's own view of his work; see *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 2184.

facts which are in themselves well ascertained, and whose significance can be fairly well understood, and, with the principles derived from these facts as a starting-point, the more complicated phenomena can be studied. This is the method of Hackmann, whose criticism thus takes on the form of a closely knit inductive argument, and in spite of incidental weaknesses proceeds with cumulative power. Not so in the case of Cheyne's *Introduction*. It is hardly more than a vast collection of more or less detached observations and suggestions, whose value is consequently obscured for those who are not already familiar with the criticism of the Book of Isaiah. In two respects, however, Cheyne goes beyond anything attempted by Duhm or Hackmann, namely, in the development of the linguistic argument against suspected passages, and in the almost exhaustive collection of parallels in the later literature to the content of these passages. In the accumulation of linguistic evidence, Cheyne has expended his strength on a kind of proof the value of which is not estimated as highly as it used to be; but by his collection of parallels he has earned the gratitude of all subsequent investigators.

The scholars who carried on Hackmann's work in the most effective way were Brückner, Volz, and Marti. Brückner devoted himself to strengthening and refining Hackmann's criticism of Isa. 28-33, but his work does not compare with that of Volz in importance. Volz particularly assailed the genuineness of the Messianic passages, setting himself to prove that the idea of a Messianic king was alien not only to Isaiah's profoundest convictions, but to the most characteristic teachings of pre-exilic prophecy generally. If this can be demonstrated, the burden of proof rests upon those who defend the genuineness of the Messianic prophecies, and not upon those who reject them. There is a weakness in Volz's position, however, just at this point. He himself admits the presence of the Messianic idea, or at least of nearly related conceptions, in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, though, upon his thesis, these ideas agree with the ruling convictions of those prophets as little as the Messianic prophecies in Isaiah with his; and he tries to account for this by alleging that in the age of Jeremiah and Ezekiel the Messianic eschatology was in the air, and that the prophets were unconsciously influenced by

it. But, if so, may it not have been already in the air in Isaiah's day, and cannot Isaiah have been influenced by it in the same way? Volz gives no adequate consideration to this possibility, and until the question is settled his theory must be regarded as exposed to attack at a vulnerable point.

Marti, finally, sought to complete the criticism, begun by Stade, of the anti-Assyrian group of prophecies. He rejects all of them except chapters 10 and 18. By questionable criticism and exegesis he attempts to show that, in their original form, neither of these prophecies predicts the overthrow of Assyria, and hence that they do not imply the deliverance of Jerusalem; they give no support, therefore, to the opinion that, at one time in his life, Isaiah entertained a hopeful view of the future of Judah.

But the importance of Marti's commentary does not lie merely in its criticism of the anti-Assyrian prophecies. In it the criticism which we have been following since the time of Stade, and especially since Hackmann, reaches its logical conclusion. The commentary cannot be called an original work. It sets forth no new principles for the interpretation of Isaiah. In fertilizing power it is in marked contrast with Duhm's commentary. Marti's talent is for lucid exposition and orderly arrangement. He does not scintillate new ideas; he presents accepted ideas in clear and definite form. This estimate is not intended to depreciate the excellences of his commentary. Marti's special gifts of both analysis and synthesis are admirably displayed in it, and the volume is perhaps the best Baedeker which the student could have to the criticism of the past generation. The skill shown in handling the mass of matter accumulated by preceding scholars cannot be too highly praised. It is all analyzed with the greatest care, and the important things are brought out and disposed in a way that concentrates attention upon them. The eschatological problem, which we have seen to be the chief problem of the book, occupies the central place in the exposition. In the selection and arrangement of the material, and especially in the perfecting of the exegetical basis for the newer criticism, there is abundant opportunity for independence of judgment, if not for originality of conception, and independence of this kind the commentary unquestionably has.

Two fundamental propositions underlie Marti's work. The first is adopted from Hackmann: Isaiah "is not the prophet of eschatology, but the prophet of faith." By eschatology is here meant not the eschatology of doom, but the eschatology of hope, expressed most concretely in the two doctrines of the inviolability of Zion and the Messianic King. The second thesis, also, had been advanced by some of his predecessors, but the thoroughness with which it is applied is characteristic of Marti's commentary. This proposition is that down to the exile Isaiah's prophecies were preserved with but little change, except for accidental corruptions, but that in and after the exile extensive additions and interpolations were made to the collections of his oracles, in the spirit of the times, so that almost every prediction of doom now has its pendant of glowing promise. The reason for this can be readily understood. In the exilic and post-exilic periods, owing to the completely changed historical conditions the sense for the real meaning of pre-exilic prophecy was lost. The message of doom which was the heart, or, perhaps better, the conscience, of the earlier prophecy was no longer understood. What the people longed for, what they needed, under the foreign rule to which they were subject for centuries was a word of hope and courage. Now the interest of the scribes who collected and preserved the remains of the ancient literature that survived the catastrophe of the exile was not an antiquarian or historical interest; it was a religious interest. And to make pre-exilic prophecy religiously edifying to their contemporaries, the scribes used the predictions of national ruin, which had been fulfilled in the exile, as a dark background, against which the golden age to come shone out more glorious. Marti has endeavored to separate these two elements more consistently and completely than his predecessors, and this is one of the chief merits of his commentary. The following analysis, based on Marti, will enable the reader to see at a glance the results of criticism in this stage:—

## I. ISAIAH I-XII

<i>Chapter</i>		<i>Chapter</i>
i	Judgment offset by ii, 2-4 (5)	Eschatological Hope <sup>19</sup>
ii, 6-iv, 1	" " "	iv, 2-6 " "
v, 1-29	" " "	v, 30 " "
vi, 1-viii, 18 (19-21)	" " "	ix, 1-7 " "
ix, 8-x, 4	" " "	x, 5-xii, 6 " "
i-ix, as a whole, culminating in	x-xii	" "

## II. ISAIAH XIII-XXVII

xiii-xxiii, Judgments on the nations, culminating in xxiv-xxvii, Eschatological Judgment of the World.<sup>21</sup>

## III. ISAIAH XXVIII-XXXV

xxviii, 1-4	Judgment offset by xxviii, 5-6	Eschatological Hope
xxviii, 7-22	" " " xxviii, 23-29	" "
xxix, 1-4 (6)	" " " xxix, 5, 7-8	" "
xxix, 9-15	" " " xxix, 16-24	" "
xxx, 1-17	" " " xxx, 18-26, 27-33	" "
xxxi, 1-4	" " " xxxi, 5-9	" "
xxviii-xxxi, as a whole, culminating in xxxii-xxxiii,	Eschatological Appendix I	
	xxxiv-xxxv, Eschatological Appendix II	

## IV. ISAIAH XXXVI-XXXIX

## Narrative Section Eschatologized

It must not be supposed that the only work done on Isaiah in the twenty years from Stade to Marti was done by the school of advanced criticism whose history we have been following, but it can fairly be said that they have done nearly all the fruitful work, for it is they who have really grasped the problems of Isaiah

<sup>19</sup> In attaching ii, 2-4 to chapter i, Marti follows Lagarde; i, 27 f., also, is an eschatological gloss.

<sup>20</sup> Isa. vi, 13b and vii, 15 are eschatological glosses, and viii, 8b-19 is an eschatological fragment offsetting viii, 5-8a.

<sup>21</sup> Within chapters xiii-xxiii are various eschatological fragments or glosses, notably xiv, 24-27; xiv, 28-32 (especially verse 32); xvii, 12-14; and cf. xvii, 7 f.; xviii, 3, 5, 7.

and tried methodically to solve them. The hypothesis, more or less clearly defined, which has guided their investigation is that the present Book of Isaiah is the product of a long process of compilation, accretion, and redaction, and that even with the earliest collections of his oracles Isaiah had very little to do. When it is recognized that the present connections of the various oracles or groups of oracles are not original, the book falls apart into conflicting prophecies of threat and consolation, between which no sufficient transitions can be discovered. The next step is plain, namely, to deny the genuineness of the chief prophecies of consolation, for which no adequate occasion can be found in the historical situation in Isaiah's day, and which contradict the mission given to the prophet in his inaugural vision (Isa. 6).

If the position is to be successfully attacked, it must be in one or more of three ways: *First*, The attempt may be made to prove that the prophecies stand in the connections in which the prophet himself put them; and a hypothesis may be framed to explain the unmediated juxtaposition of doom and deliverance. *Secondly*, the question may be raised whether the eschatology of hope which recent critics ascribe to the post-exilic period accords in fact with the known eschatology of that period. If not, can the various elements in it be wrought into an organic unity with Isaiah's known eschatology of doom? *Finally*, if this cannot be done, is it possible to show that there was in Isaiah's day a popular eschatology, which Isaiah inherited, but did not succeed in fusing with his own ruling ideas? In that case the eschatology of hope found in the present form of Isaiah's prophecies might conceivably be genuine, even though not brought into organic relation with his other teachings. Isaiah would then be like Luther, whose original ideas radically conflicted with many of his inherited beliefs, though he himself was often unaware of the contradiction.

Most of the commentaries and introductions that appeared between 1880 and 1900, and even down to the present time, have either ignored the problems raised by recent criticism or have been contented with animadverting upon points of detail, without a thorough discussion of its fundamental principles. For this reason these works are, for the most part, of subordinate interest,

and a detailed criticism of them in this article is unnecessary.<sup>22</sup> But before proceeding to the next definite stage something should be said about some important monographs and essays upon the narrative section of Isaiah (chapters 36–38) and upon the anti-Assyrian prophecies.<sup>23</sup> Winckler adopted Stade's analysis of the narrative chapters (Isa. 36–39) with some modifications, but advanced the theory that there were two campaigns of Sennacherib against Judah, a successful one in 701, to which 2 Kings

<sup>22</sup> The following representative commentaries and introductions cited by the names of their authors may be mentioned. Cheyne (1880, 5th ed. 1890), suggestive of what was to come, but now largely antiquated; Bredenkamp (1886–87) and Orelli (1887, 3d ed. 1904), representatives of the strict conservative position; Delitzsch (4th ed. 1889), because of the piety and learning of its author, exerted an important influence in recommending the older criticism to timid students, but shows little apprehension of the fundamental problems of the book, which are too often glossed over by means of a somewhat sentimentalizing exegesis; Dillmann (5th ed. 1890), a lineal descendant of Ewald, and the best representative of the older critical position, characterized by solid learning, a thesaurus of the history of criticism and exegesis, but with a strong tendency toward harmonizing exegesis; the sixth edition (1908), edited by Kittel, has all the merits of the fifth, with important concessions to recent criticism, a work of permanent value; G. A. Smith (*Expositor's Bible*, 1889), a work of great originality and inspiration, which has perhaps done more to interest the lay reader and the preacher in Isaiah than any other work, but the glowing imagination which has accomplished this tends to fuse many sections of Isaiah into a false unity, and thus obscures the real problems of the book; Skinner (*Cambridge Bible*, 1896) and Whitehouse (*Century Bible*, 1905), two works whose value is not to be judged by their limited scope, both representing the principles of the older criticism; Skinner's introduction, an admirable exposition of Isaiah's religious significance on the basis of these principles; Whitehouse, to be especially commended for its wealth of archaeological illustration; Box (1908), an excellent translation in metrical form, with brief but illuminating introductions, and notes to the several prophecies, embodying the principles of Duhm and Cheyne; a handbook of results, not of processes; McFadyen (*Bible for Home and School*), elementary; Wade (*Westminster Commentaries*, 1911), a fair commentary of the reproductive kind, showing incidental traces of Duhm's exegesis, but making no very positive contribution to the subject; Kuenen's Introduction (*Onderzoek*, 1889), an admirable, condensed exposition of the older critical views of Isaiah, regarding many of Stade's positions as hypercriticism; Driver (*Literature of the Old Testament*, 1891) maintains the older critical positions; in the revised edition (6th ed. 1897) he describes many of the results of recent criticism, but occupies a very reserved attitude toward them; Cornill's Introduction (*English trans.*, 1907) may be said, in general, to occupy Duhm's standpoint, but the discussions are not at all exhaustive.

<sup>23</sup> Winckler, *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen* (1892); Meinhold, *Die Jesaiaerzählungen*, Jes. 36–39 (1898); Nagel, *Der Zug des Sanherib gegen Jerusalem* (1902); Prásek, *Sanheribs Feldzüge gegen Juda* (1903); to which I venture to



18 13-16 refers, and a second, which ended in a great disaster, after 691. This theory is defended by Prášek and in my own essay. Meinhold and Nagel reject this theory, but differ in their judgments on the narratives. Meinhold, on the ground of 2 Kings 18 13-16 and Sennacherib's own inscriptions, denies the historical credibility of the accounts, while Nagel defends it. The importance of the subject lies in its bearing upon the group of anti-Assyrian prophecies. If Isa. 36 and 37 relate to the campaign of 701 and are substantially trustworthy—that is, if there was a signal deliverance of Jerusalem at that time—and if Isaiah's threats and promises at that time are both accepted as genuine, then the promises were confirmed by the event, and the threats were not. If the signal deliverance in 701 is admitted, and the genuineness of the promises in 701 is denied, then Isaiah must be regarded as having been agreeably disappointed by the outcome (Hackmann). If, on the other hand, it is denied that there was any remarkable deliverance in 701, the threats were fulfilled, and the promises were not. This is the view of Meinhold, who accepts both groups of prophecies, and thinks that Isa. 36-37 has been made to agree with Isaiah's prophecies of deliverance. If the signal deliverance is denied and the consolatory prophecies are rejected, then there is perfect agreement between the situation in 701 and Isaiah's attitude toward it. Finally, if there were two campaigns, a successful one in 701 and a disastrous one after 691, it is conceivable that Isaiah's prophecies of doom may date from 701 and his prophecies of promise from the later period. In view of these various possibilities the problem of the narrative section in Isaiah is, as Meinhold contends, fundamental to any sound criticism of Isaiah's prophecies in 701.

Wilke and Kùchler take up the other side of the problem, and discuss the attitude of Isaiah toward Assyria generally. Wilke denies the present sequences in the Book of Isaiah, but adopts a conservative position with respect to the anti-Assyrian prophecies. His discussion is very well arranged, and for that very reason the weaknesses in his position can be the more readily detected.

add my own essay, *The Invasion of Sennacherib*, *Bibliotheca Sacra* (1906); Wilke, *Jesaia und Assur* (1905); Kùchler, *Die Stellung des Propheten Jesaia zur Politik seiner Zeit* (1906); Staerk, *Das assyrische Weltreich im Urteil der Propheten* (1908), (not accessible to me).

Küchler accepts in general the critical position of Duhm, but denies totally the trustworthiness of chapters 36-37. In consequence he must hold that Isaiah's expectations as expressed, for example, in chapter 10 were grievously disappointed.<sup>24</sup> In addition to the above essays, attention should be called to four other monographs which treat of various phases of our problem.<sup>25</sup> Meinhold's monograph on the Remnant is reactionary as compared with recent critical theories. It is a strange mixture of acute incidental exegesis and impossible combinations. For example, to explain how the righteous can be saved in Jerusalem while the wicked are destroyed—the question in which his essay really culminates—he suggests that the ungodly went out of the city to the war against Sennacherib (pp. 156 ff.). In Guthe's most recent exposition of Isaiah's teachings his earlier untenable theories are abandoned. He strongly inclines to the results of Hackmann and Marti, but finds in 28 16 and 1 21-28 evidence that toward the end of his life Isaiah entertained the hope of a national restoration—something that Hackmann will not allow. The Messianic passages are relegated to an appendix. This disposition of them is intended to manifest Guthe's serious doubt of their genuineness, though he is not quite prepared to reject them. The reader cannot find a more admirably balanced résumé of the chief results of modern criticism than Guthe's little book. Kennett's theory is that the present Book of Isaiah was compiled in the Maccabaeian age, and that many of the prophecies in chapters 1-39 originated in that time—an extreme development of Duhm's opinion.

In the works just described no new principles of criticism or

<sup>24</sup> Küchler's monograph is also important for its polemic against another thesis of Winckler propounded in his *Geschichte Israels* (1895) and in his *Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, namely, that the eighth-century prophets were largely actuated in their attitude toward Assyria by political considerations. Küchler shows conclusively that Isaiah, at least, was governed exclusively by religious and idealistic motives.

<sup>25</sup> Meinhold, *Studien zur israelitischen Religionsgeschichte*, Bd. I, *Der heilige Rest* (1903); Guthe, *Jesaia (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, 1907)*; Kennett, *The Composition of the Book of Isaiah* (1910); Nowack, *Die Zukunftshoffnungen Israels in der assyrischen Zeit* (Festschrift Holtzmann, 1902, inaccessible to me).

interpretation are advanced, but only fresh exegetical or critical combinations, based on the general principles either of the earlier or the recent critical school. We have now to turn to a new formulation of the problem which definitely marks the third stage in the latest period of criticism. The parentage of the idea is to be imputed to Gunkel. In his *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit* (1895) he proved that in many passages in the Bible, and particularly in the first chapter of Genesis, there are borrowings, reminiscences, or allusions which can be traced to The Babylonian Cosmogonic Poems. The method he pursued was to take many phrases, words, and ideas in the Bible, and show that by themselves they are unintelligible; to be understood, they must be set in a larger context. The Babylonian Creation epic furnishes this context. In the application of this method it appeared that many ideas which now are found only in late portions of the Bible and which, for this reason, were supposed to be themselves late, had a long antecedent history in Hebrew literature or tradition. Gunkel himself suggested that the same method should be applied to the subject of Israelite eschatology generally, and in (Bousset und Gunkel) *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments*, Heft 1 (1903), he sketched out a history of the eschatological idea of the Day of the Lord on the basis of this new method of research. But it remained for Gressmann in his *Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie* (1906) to subject for the first time the whole problem of Old Testament eschatology to a re-examination in the light of Gunkel's new method. The result for the criticism and interpretation of Isaiah was extraordinary.

We have seen how Duhm considered Isaiah to be the real founder of the eschatology of hope; and how, on the other hand, Hackmann, Cheyne, Volz, and Marti sought to show that the eschatology of hope was irreconcilable with the eschatology of doom proclaimed by Isaiah; and, further, how from the contradiction between the two sets of ideas they drew the conclusion that the eschatology of hope could not have originated with Isaiah, but must have arisen later. Gressmann grants the premise of these critics, namely, that there is no organic connection between the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope,

but he denies their conclusion. He raises the question whether the eschatology of hope may not be earlier than Isaiah, earlier than the prophecy of the eighth century altogether. If it were so, these prophets might have accepted the eschatology of hope as a part of their traditional faith notwithstanding the fact that it could not be combined with the eschatology of doom in an organic unity (see above, p. 504). The way in which Gressmann works out this point is very interesting; but only the briefest outline of his argument is here possible.

There are, according to Gressmann, three ways in which the existence of a preprophetic eschatology may be established: *First*, It may be inferred from the prophetic polemic; the prophetic antithesis implies a preprophetic thesis. *Secondly*, it may be inferred from those eschatological views which are not organically related to the fundamental convictions of the prophets, but stand in a more or less manifest contradiction to them. *Thirdly*, it may be inferred from conceptions or phrases which are not of themselves intelligible, and hence imply an antecedent history. By evidence of this kind Gressmann first seeks to establish the existence of a preprophetic eschatology of doom. Here he has his strongest case. It must be admitted that the Day of the Lord in Amos (5 18) is already a standing phrase. He uses it without explaining it, assuming that his hearers would understand it. The idea of the Day of the Lord must therefore be older than Amos. What is its history? What was understood by the phrase? If we turn to Zephaniah, the Day of the Lord appears as a cosmical catastrophe (1 2 ff., 18). According to the modern critical school (cf. Stade) Zephaniah was the first prophet to conceive the Day of the Lord as a cosmical catastrophe. But this position is untenable, since the conception in Zephaniah is altogether vague, not concrete and definite as we should expect if it was original with him. How the catastrophe is to come about is not clearly explained; contrast Zeph. 1 18 with 1 16. Moreover, Zephaniah is not the first prophet to express the conception of a cosmical catastrophe: it is plainly implied in the earlier prophets (see Amos 8 9; Hos. 4 2; and above all Isa. 2). But it did not originate with any one of these prophets; their conception is no more coherent than Zephaniah's. Finally, the idea of a cosmical catastrophe is itself



a mythical idea, and as such prehistoric; it cannot, therefore, have originated with the prophets.<sup>26</sup>

Gressmann surmises that in the development of the idea of the Day of the Lord there were three stages. There was, first, the mythical stage, in which some physical disaster, such as a flood or a fire or an earthquake, must have been in mind. In support of this assumption the prophecies against the heathen nations are alleged. The doom denounced in these prophecies upon all nations presupposes the idea of a cosmical catastrophe. The second was the popular Israelite stage, in which the primitive notion became blurred and indefinite, as we now find it reflected in the prophets, and at the same time the catastrophe was limited to the nations, whereas Israel was to escape. This stage may be inferred from the polemic of Amos (see Amos 5 18 ff.). Finally, there is the prophetic stage, in which the idea of the Day of the Lord is historical and moral. The Day of the Lord is a day of destruction, not solely for the enemies of Israel, but for Israel itself, because of its sins. This destruction is to be accomplished by a foreign foe—the Assyrians or the Chaldaeans, the Persians, the Syrians, as the case may be. The natural convulsions, therefore, which are described in Isa. 2 or in Zephaniah, are not to be taken in the original mythological sense. The prophets are speaking of the destruction of Israel by the kingdoms which Jehovah commissioned to execute his judgment. Yet the convulsions of nature are not to be interpreted allegorically any more than literally. They are nothing more than poetic formulas which the prophets borrow from the past to heighten the mysterious and awful effect of their predictions of doom. They describe the historical ruin of the nation poetically in the terms of the old mythical catastrophe.

In the same way, Gressmann tries to reconstruct a preprophetic eschatology of hope. In the pictures of the Golden Age, for example, there are many traits which would not naturally be suggested to the prophet's mind by the historical situation and the needs of the people. The predictions of freedom from foreign

<sup>26</sup> Gressmann argues, further, that Palestine was physically not the kind of a land in which the idea of cosmical catastrophe would be likely to arise, and infers from this that the whole notion is foreign.

oppression, restoration from exile, and the like, may be so explained, but others cannot be. The covenant with the beasts of the field (Hos. 2 20), or the idyllic description of peace in nature (Isa. 11 6-8), can only be explained by mythology. This is corroborated by analogies in other literatures. Thus the notion of the harmlessness of the wild beasts is especially associated in classical mythology with the animals that dwell in sacred groves—a garden of the gods. It is easy to imagine that the same notion existed in Hebrew mythology in connection with Paradise, the Garden of the Lord (Ezek. 28 13), and to infer that the Golden Age to come, in such passages as Isa. 11 6-8, is painted in the colors of Paradise. Similarly, such imaginative pictures of a transformed nature as those in Isa. 41 18-20; 48 21; 55 12 ff. may best be explained as derived from a myth of a restored Eden. This conjecture is supported by Isa. 51 3, where the new Jerusalem is described as Eden. It is not said in this passage that Eden itself will return, but Jerusalem is described in the terms of a restored Eden. The descriptions in Deutero-Isaiah thus disclose an old mythological background; but the prophet uses mythical features in a purely poetical way, to paint the glory of the restored Jerusalem, just as the mythical features of the eschatology of doom were seen to have lost their original meaning and to have become traditional poetic imagery. This use of mythological description is characteristic of “the prophetic style.”

In the same way it is argued that the references to milk in Joel 3 18, where the figure is by no means self-explanatory, and to milk and honey in Isa. 7 15-21 are in origin mythical. In other religions milk and honey are the food of the gods; their natural place is in a description of the abundance of a garden of the gods. The phrase, “a land flowing with milk and honey,” does not occur in the Hebrew stories of Paradise, but is a standing hyperbole for the productiveness of Palestine. Originally, however, it must have had a mythological connotation.<sup>27</sup> Gressmann contends that these prophecies and phrases, and many others of similar character, can best be explained by the hypothesis that there was an old myth of an eschatological Eden, the counterpart of the primitive Eden. But if the prophecies of eschatological hope

<sup>27</sup> Gressmann, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

have a mythical background, the eschatology of hope, as well as the eschatology of doom, is prehistoric, and therefore preprophetic. By similar combinations he endeavors to establish the preprophetic origin of the idea of the Messianic King.

It must be admitted, I think, that Gressmann makes a very strong argument for the preprophetic origin both of the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope. Its real force can scarcely be estimated from the brief résumé given above. But granted that he establishes this part of his case, the genuineness of the hopeful prophecies in Isaiah is not thereby proved. It is quite conceivable that Isaiah may have adopted and modified the eschatology of doom without at the same time adopting the eschatology of hope, as indeed Gressmann himself admits that the pre-exilic prophets, as contrasted with the post-exilic prophets, were stormy petrels, whose main message was one of warning. In favor of such a supposition it may be urged that the eschatology of hope has not been made moral and historical in any such degree as the eschatology of doom. Yet why should not the prophets have been able to spiritualize the former as they transformed the latter? Gressmann's theory is that the eschatology of hope in the prophets is an unwilling concession to the popular preprophetic eschatology. But why was it necessary for them to make such concessions? Finally, the contradiction between the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope in the present form of the prophecies remains—a contradiction which Gressmann admits. All this would seem to make strongly against the genuineness of the eschatology of hope in Isaiah, even supposing it to be established that its ideas were current before his day. It is conceivable that the pre-exilic prophets resisted the popular eschatology of promise,<sup>28</sup> while the later prophets, under changed conditions, were more tolerant of it.

Gressmann has an extremely ingenious way of getting around these difficulties. He reminds us that the myth of a cosmic catastrophe which is supposed to lie behind the eschatology of doom and the myth of an eschatological Eden which is supposed to lie behind the eschatology of hope are both purely hypothetical. As

<sup>28</sup> Gressmann even conjectures that this optimistic outlook was cultivated in the schools of the "false prophets."

a matter of fact, no such myths have been discovered. They are matters of inference;<sup>29</sup> but Gressmann is sure of his inferences. He next assumes that these myths had been sundered in very early times, before they became known to the Israelites. They had once stood in an organic relation to each other; but this relation had been broken, and all memory of it had disappeared in remote times. The lack of connection between the eschatology of hope and the eschatology of doom which recent critics have made so much of, and which Gressmann admits, is to be explained by this early sunderance and disintegration of the great pair of eschatological myths. The unmediated juxtaposition of hope and doom in our prophetic books is but the inheritance from an already disjointed past. The juxtaposition of contradictory utterances thus becomes a feature of "prophetic style" once more, a convention of prophetic writing.

For this very subtle theory Gressmann thinks he can offer proof in one striking instance, namely, in the prophetic doctrine of the Remnant. Did the idea of the Remnant originally belong to the eschatology of doom or to the eschatology of hope? To the eschatology of doom, unquestionably, answers Gressmann. The Remnant implies a catastrophe, and was originally intended to emphasize the greatness of the catastrophe (see Amos 3 12; 5 2 f.; Isa. 6 11 ff.; 17 5 ff.). But in the prophets the Remnant is incorporated into the eschatology of hope. This reversal of significance was not made by the prophets themselves; for, when they speak of the Remnant, they assume that their hearers will apprehend the word as they do—the hope of the future is lodged in this Remnant. Thus Isaiah gives no explanation of the name of his son, Shear-jashub; he expects the people to understand the allusion.<sup>30</sup> Similarly Amos alludes to the Remnant of Joseph (Amos 5 14 ff.) without explaining it. If we may infer from the way in which Amos speaks of the Day of the Lord that his contemporaries were familiar with the idea and the phrase, it may on the same grounds be inferred that they were familiar with the idea of the Remnant.

<sup>29</sup> Gressmann is here at a decided disadvantage as compared with Gunkel. In *Schöpfung und Chaos* Gunkel had a real myth to start with, whose existence in the earliest times could be proved; Gressmann has none.

<sup>30</sup> Scholars have often conjectured that Isaiah explained the name in some prophecy now lost.



The transition from the eschatology of doom to the eschatology of hope through the change in the significance of the Remnant was not an original transition. An organic connection between the two eschatologies is not established in this way. The idea of the Remnant naturally belongs to the eschatology of doom. It can be transformed into hope only when the Remnant is identified with Israel. This is not explicitly done by the prophets, which shows that they did not originate this new conception of the Remnant, but adopted it from the popular eschatology. But if the Prophets could in this instance adopt the popular eschatology of hope, although it had no organic connection with the eschatology of doom, there is no objection in principle to supposing that they adopted other elements of the popular eschatology. "With the idea of the Remnant [interpreted as a hope], the rigid eschatology of doom is broken through. A breach is now made, through which the entire eschatology of hope, or at least a great part of it, can enter. . . . It must also be borne in mind that the material was traditional, and could therefore be handed on, without much concern about its consistency" (p. 248).

Gressmann consequently lays down the following canon for the criticism of the prophets: "The sole warrantable criterion upon which the genuineness of an eschatological passage may be denied is the contemporary historical situation presupposed in it. So long as this is not irreconcilable with the ascription of the passage to the author in whose book the prediction of future salvation (*die Heilsesthatologie*) has come down to us, so long its genuineness may be maintained" (p. 248). Thus the criterion of religious ideas, which recent critics made the chief ground for denying the genuineness of the eschatological passages in Isaiah, is formally rejected by Gressmann.

Gressmann did not propound his theories in an apologetic interest; in fact, in the form in which he presents them they are radical in the extreme. The genuineness of the Messianic passages is indeed rehabilitated, but at what a price! They are the outgrowth of an alien mythology. As it was to be expected, however, Gressmann's rejection of the principles which have guided critics for a generation and his novel solution of the problems of the book were turned to account by scholars of a more con-

servative temper. In *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (1912) Sellin attempted to re-establish, on the basis of Gressmann's work, something very much like the old orthodox doctrine of Messianic prophecy. He denied, of course, that the eschatological ideas were derived from a foreign mythology, and tried to show that they all had their source in the revelation of Jehovah at Sinai. Mythical traits, the presence of which he admits, are only embellishments, borrowed from kindred ideas in other nations, and do not affect the substance of Israelite eschatology. With the work of Sellin criticism would seem to have boxed the compass, and to incline once more to positions held before 1880.

I have contented myself with giving only a résumé of Gressmann's positions so far as they bear upon the genuineness of Isaiah's prophecies, without going into a criticism of these positions which would be likely to lead rather far afield. But the reader ought fully to realize what an enormous drain upon his speculative faculty is required by Gressmann. It must be *assumed* (1) that there were originally two clearly defined eschatological myths, one of a world catastrophe, one of a restored Eden, for which there is no historical evidence but which are admittedly only matters of inference; (2) that these two hypothetical myths were once organically connected; (3) that before they entered into Israel the connection between them was forgotten, and that each myth became so disintegrated that at present we have only fragments of them left; (4) that the prophets adopted these *dissecta membra* from the popular uncanonical eschatology, but that, while they were able to ethicize the myth of doom, they were not able to ethicize the myth of hope, at least to the same degree (why not?); (5) that the prophets made no attempt to join together again the two hypothetical myths once hypothetically connected, but left the fragments in the same disjointed state in which they found them, except for the artificial and inadequate connection supplied at times (not always) by the doctrine of the Remnant. In spite of Gressmann's genius for brilliant combination, in spite of the great suggestiveness of his work, in spite even of the probability that there *was* a preprophetic eschatology of some sort, for the establishment of which thesis the greatest credit is due to Gressmann, yet when his theory is allowed

to stand out stark and stripped of incidental protecting exegesis, its inner weakness is revealed. The defence of Isaiah's prophecies by such a purely conjectural construction is precarious. Yet Gressmann has struck out a new mode of attacking the problem which may lead to important results.

From this survey of the history of criticism we turn to the most recent contribution to the voluminous literature on Isaiah, the commentary of Professor Gray.

Commentaries may be of two kinds, creative, of which small class Duhm's is a conspicuous example, or reproductive, like Marti's. The commentary of Professor Gray belongs to the latter type. From what has been said above about Marti the reader will understand that this implies no disparagement of Professor Gray's work. There is ample room in a reproductive commentary for learning, acumen, and independent judgment, and the volume before us exhibits all these qualities.

In the Introduction Gray adopts the three fundamental principles of the modern critical school, namely, that the Book of Isaiah is a collection of oracles of widely diverse age and character; that the oracles are in poetical form, and that differences of form often enable us to determine the limits of a prophecy or to recognize interpolations; and that in the outlook upon the future, types characteristic of earlier and later periods respectively may be discriminated.

On the first point he remarks: "The fact that the Book of Isaiah is not the work of the prophet Isaiah<sup>31</sup> but a post-exilic compilation, ought to be the starting-point in all detailed criticism, or interpretation of the Book" (p. xxxii). In a continuous work, like the history of Thucydides, the presumption is always in favor of the genuineness of any section, but this presumption does not hold in a compilatory work; "each piece must be judged by itself." On p. xcvi Gray turns this principle against Gressmann's canon, that the historical background of a prophecy is the only legitimate criterion for the determination of its genuineness.

<sup>31</sup> "Prophet of Isaiah" is a misprint. Other misprints noticed are "Chs. 28-32" for 28-33 (p. xlvii); "unlike" for alike, p. 32; "Cheyne, p. 29" for p. 27 (p. 110); "vv. 18-23" for 19-23 (p. 157); "8a-10" for 8c-10 (p. 148); "prophetic" for *antiprophetic* (p. 377, line 11). The last mistake results in a serious misunderstanding of the view criticised.

This assumes that the presumption is always in favor of the genuineness of a prophecy which is contained in a book bearing a prophet's name; but in a compilation there is no such presumption. In general, Gray does not seem to have been much impressed by Gressmann's discoveries.

In regard to the age of the compilation, Gray does not follow Duhm and the more radical critics in putting it in the Maccabaeian period. Against so late a date he argues from the history of the canon, and especially from the age of the Greek translation. Here Gray puts the case admirably. The Maccabaeian theory is based on one of several possible interpretations of a number of prophecies; and "a possible, but not necessary, theory of the interpretation and origin of a section may rightly be judged unproven if it conflicts with the probable, even though not certain, history of the prophetic Canon" (p. xlv). Gray himself inclines to a date toward the close of the third century B.C.<sup>32</sup> His criticism of Kennett (p. lix) is just and trenchant.

The discussion of the poetic form of the prophecies (pp. lix-lxviii) is also excellent. In a former number of the *Harvard Theological Review*<sup>33</sup> the attempt was made to apprise the reader of the state of this question at the present time. It is a pleasure to be able to refer him now to Gray's elucidation of the subject. It would be hard to find anything in brief compass more informing and satisfactory. In general it may be said that the poetical analyses of the various prophecies are among the strongest features of the book, and in this respect Gray has made a distinct advance upon the commentaries of Duhm and Marti. In keeping with the general scheme of the *Hand-Commentar*, Marti did not give a continuous translation of the prophecies. His results are therefore not apparent to the eye, and not easily judged. Duhm translates in metrical form, but practically says to the reader, "Trust my ear." He seldom seeks to justify his views of the poetical structure of the prophecies. Gray, on the other hand, has adopted a system by which the phenomena are made clear even to a student unacquainted with Hebrew, and the impartial way in which this is done cannot be too highly commended.

<sup>32</sup> A concise and clear statement of the author's theory of the successive stages in the formation of the book will be found in § 40 (pp. lv-lvii).

<sup>33</sup> Vol. V (1912), pp. 86 ff.

Most writers are so in love with their metrical schemes that they find it hard to resist the temptation to gloss over difficulties in the application. Gray always apprises the reader at the outset of the actual facts of the case, so that an opportunity is given to judge of the aptness of the metrical emendations he proposes.

In another connection (pp. liii-lv), Gray discusses the important question of the relation of the present form of the prophecies to the spoken word. His opinion is that the bulk of the [genuine] prophecies in the Book of Isaiah "are condensations into artistic poetic form of what Isaiah had said in public at greater length, but without the same restraint of form." This would seem to imply after all that Isaiah was an author. Just what effect this theory would ultimately have on the theory of the composition of the book, Gray does not tell us. This particular subject has not yet been sufficiently investigated. Thus far the Introduction has given clear, balanced, and sufficiently complete statements of the problems of the book. When we come to the eschatological question, however, the treatment is less satisfactory.<sup>24</sup>

Gray recognizes that it should be one of the main aims of a commentary on Isaiah to "disengage the work of that prophet from the later accretions which it has received, and so to recover . . . the spirit and teaching of a single personality in place of the confused and composite form that must present itself, if we attempt to treat the entire book as the work of a single hand" (p. xi). But it is also an important part of his task "to do justice to the other contributors to the book, and, above all, to approach with sympathy the work of, perhaps, many nameless writers that now forms a large part of it" (p. xii). These represent the convictions and hopes of the post-exilic Jewish church, and as such are of the greatest significance.

Of the first part of this double task Gray acquits himself in §§ 74-89, "Isaiah as Prophet and Teacher" (pp. lxxxi-xcvi). The second part, an examination of the religious ideas and expectations of the other contributors to the book, is touched upon only

<sup>24</sup> In passing, one inexplicable omission should be noted. In §§ 58-73, "Isaiah in relation to the political and social conditions of his age," there is no reference to Hezekiah's reforms. Since the attempt has often been made to connect the prophecies of hope in one way or another with these reforms, a discussion of their date and character is of great importance.

incidentally in the volume before us; it is to be hoped that it is the author's intention to treat this subject connectedly, including the eschatology of these authors, in the Introduction to the second volume. Otherwise, a serious omission in the Commentary would have to be recorded.

The survey of Isaiah's work as prophet and teacher will be disappointing to a reader who looks for an exposition of the development of Isaiah's ideas and expectations. After saying that the supreme interest in the study of Isaiah is to discover what he had himself learned from God, what he taught his own age, and what through it he has contributed to man's increasing knowledge and consciousness of God, Gray continues (p. lxxxiii):

These questions can be answered up to a certain point; but, owing to the uncertainty that hangs over many questions of the literary origin of much of Isa. 1 1-39, . . . they cannot with advantage be pursued into the detail that has sometimes been attempted. Here, at all events, no fresh elaborate attempt will be made to trace development in Isaiah's conceptions and teaching, to bring to light conflicting conceptions in his view of the future, for example, or in his judgment of Assyria, and then to determine the chronological sequence of the changes. All the more elaborate structures of Isaiah's "theology" rest of necessity on shifting and insecure foundations; even if it were certain, and it is not, that passages such as 11 1-8; 9 1-6; 32 1-8 were the work of Isaiah at all, it is altogether uncertain at what period of his life he composed them, and how he came by, or how he modified, his conceptions of a Messiah.

I have given this quotation at length, because I believe it discloses the principal defect of the book. The author declines at the outset the attempt to solve the chief problem of Isaiah. He does not shun the task of improving on the metrical analyses of his predecessors, although the greatest uncertainty exists about the structure of Hebrew poetry; why should he refuse the obligation to formulate the eschatological problem more precisely, even if he feels that the critical foundations are "shifting and insecure"? If they are so, it is the first business of the critic to try to make them more stable and secure. As a matter of fact, Gray inclines, though it is an irresolute and swaying inclination, to that wing of the modern school of which Hackmann and Marti are the most conspicuous representatives (see especially his treatment of the

Messianic prophecies); but, in consequence of the over-cautious attitude avowed in the paragraph quoted above, the formulation of the eschatological problem, instead of being more precise and sharply defined than it was by Hackmann and Marti, is much vaguer and more blurred. My criticism is not directed against Gray's opinion that the eschatological problem is as yet not satisfactorily solved; it is that his commentary does not make as plain as those of his predecessors what, exactly, the elements of the problem are. I do not demand that he should decide among rival theories, but that a commentary at this date in the history of criticism should exhibit fully and clearly the different theories, with the critical and exegetical arguments by which they are supported or confuted, and the consequences that follow from them.

One example of the shortcomings of Gray's commentary in these respects must suffice. Isaiah 22 1-14 has been a cornerstone in many constructions of the eschatology of Isaiah. The first question is whether the passage is a description of what has occurred or a prediction of what will occur. Since the time of Soerensen a favorite theory has been that the passage is historical. This opinion is based mainly on verses 8-11 (and verses 6-7), which can hardly be construed otherwise than as historical, and on the prevalence of perfect tenses throughout the rest of the passage. But, if historical, the most natural place to put the prophecy is after the invasion of Sennacherib in 701. From this a very interesting inference is drawn: the last datable utterance of Isaiah is a prophecy of unmitigated doom, and the prophet's life closes as it began (see chapter 6) without hope for his nation. This is a fundamental point in Hackmann's construction, and when Isa. 22 is associated with chapters 28-31 (rejecting the consolatory pendants), which are prior to the arrival of the Assyrians before Jerusalem, we have a consistently gloomy series of prophecies from the time of Sennacherib.

There is a difficulty, however, in the way of this date for chapter 22. If we turn to verses 1-5 with the reference to the Day of the Lord (22 5), and to verses 12-14 which announce disaster for sin (see verse 14b), we are evidently in a time before disaster. This also best suits the careless attitude of the people. These verses are interpreted by Hackmann as expressing the frivolous joy of the

people after the final withdrawal of Sennacherib. In that case the destruction which is announced cannot refer to the invasion of Sennacherib, but must mean some other, undefined destruction in the future. But this does not seem to be the natural interpretation of the passage. Consequently, Duhm, on the ground of verses 1-5 and 12-14, puts the prophecy at the beginning of the revolt against Sennacherib, when the people were confident of the result of the new Egyptian alliance. The objection to this view is that verses 8-11 (6 f.), which are almost certainly historical, imply a time of the greatest distress and anxiety in the recent past, such as must have been caused by the appearance of Sennacherib under the walls of Jerusalem. Accordingly, we have a third theory, represented by Robertson Smith and Dillmann. This theory puts the prophecy in the midst of the campaign, after the humiliation of Hezekiah (2 Kings 18 13-16) and the supposed temporary withdrawal of Sennacherib, but before the final retirement of the Assyrians. This theory would account for verses 8-12 (6-7) as recalling the anxiety of the people at the approach of Sennacherib; for verses 1-5 and 12-14 as the result of the feeling of relief that ensued upon his temporary withdrawal; and for the stern warning of the prophet, who looked for a return of the foe. But the combination assumes the substantial truth of the narrative in Isa. 36 f. Another objection to it is the difficulty of finding a place for chapter 10, which is usually assigned to the same period. The only remaining possibility is to give up the unity of the section, and remove verses 8-11, and possibly verses 6-7. Then the passage can be placed most fittingly at the beginning of the Egyptian alliance, when perhaps, as Duhm suggests, Padi, the loyal king of Ekron, had been brought in irons to Hezekiah for safe-keeping.<sup>35</sup> Such is the problem of Isa. 22 1-14. It is seen to involve the credibility of chapters 36-37; and through its relation to chapters 28-31, on the one hand, and to chapter 10, on the other, the passage is of fundamental importance for the question what Isaiah, in the time of Sennacherib's invasion, expected the outcome to be.

Let us see how Gray treats this problem. The people of Jerusalem may have given themselves up to revelry, "either because they do not perceive the issue of things, and see in a tem-

<sup>35</sup> See Sennacherib's inscriptions.



porary alleviation a permanent relief, or because, feeling the insecurity of the present, they are determined to drown their cares in wine and feasting (verse 13 f.)" (p. 363). Between these alternatives Gray does not decide, yet an analysis of the manifestation of the people's feelings should shed some light on the question. But what is the danger, whether past or imminent, and what might be the "temporary alleviation"? On page 364 we appear to be informed: "The period to which we might most probably assign verses 1-5, 12-14 is that of Sennacherib; what is described is the revelry to which the city gave itself up when the Assyrian king in 701 B.C. raised the siege, or blockade, of Jerusalem." Here Gray appears to decide in favor of danger past and the joy of deliverance. But he does not tell us what he means by "a temporary alleviation." Does he hold to the historical character of Isa. 36-37, and put 22 1-14 in the midst of the campaign, as Robertson Smith does; or does he hold that the prophecy is to be placed after the final withdrawal of Sennacherib? In the latter case Isaiah must have expected some immediate disaster from another quarter. The reader is not informed on these points. On the next page (365) we read: (22 1-5) "A rhetorical question addressed by the prophet to the merry-making city which has swarmed up to the flat roofs to watch thence (Judg. 16 27) the spectacle of Sennacherib's retreat (cp. 37 22), or something similarly pleasing, such as the entrance into the city of the captive Assyrian vassal Padi, king of Ekron (Duhm)." Here again alternatives are presented and this time, since 37 22 (which must be the final retirement) is introduced into the argument, it would seem as if the choice lay between the final withdrawal of Sennacherib<sup>36</sup> and a date at the beginning of the campaign. This alternative is presented as if it made no difference which of the two possibilities is accepted. As a matter of fact, it makes the greatest difference. The significance of the prophecy for the eschatology of Isaiah is involved in this choice.

In the Introduction the author has something further to say on the questions raised by Isa. 22 1-14. At p. xciii we read: "So later,

<sup>36</sup> The allusion to 37 22 in this connection is unfortunate. The joy at Sennacherib's retreat is countenanced by Isaiah in chapter 37; in chapter 22 it is rebuked. The comparison suggests the great critical difficulties in which the prophecies supposed to be delivered in this period are involved.

while Isaiah insisted that no harm would befall the city from Sennacherib, he may have held, and apparently did hold (22 14), that harm would befall it from another quarter, unless they repented." Here Gray appears to have decided in favor of a date for 22 1-14 after the final withdrawal of Sennacherib. But in the comments on the passage itself this theory is presented as only one of several possibilities among which the reader is free to choose. Yet the view which Gray himself thus tentatively accepts in the Introduction is a very important element in his theory of the eschatology of Isaiah.

If we turn, finally, from the historical criticism of Isa. 22 1-14 to the literary criticism, the same vagueness and irresoluteness is observable. For example on pp. 363 ff. the question of the unity of the passage is raised. About the difficult verses 6-7 Gray says: "If vv. 6 f. are a real sequence, v. 6 describes some of the elements (Kir and Elam) in the army which on the day of Yahweh will attack Jerusalem" (p. 364). A little further down on the page he says: "It is doubtful whether v. 6 fits into the political situation"; and in fine print mentions the views of some of his predecessors about verse 6, among which Winckler's is pronounced "most improbable." The reasons for the views are not given. These remarks are made in the general introduction to the chapter. When we come to the exegesis of verses 6 and 7 we read: "On the question whether these verses form part of the vision of vv. 2b, 3, 5, see above pp. 363 ff." We are thus referred back to the Introduction, in which the question is raised, but not discussed exegetically. Neither is it discussed exegetically in what follows (pp. 367 ff.). That is, the relation of the verbs and suffixes in verses 6 and 7 to the preceding context, or of the subject (a siege) to the following context, is not commented upon, though these exegetical questions properly belong to the criticism of the verses. But on page 368 we finally discover something for which we have been looking, namely, a discussion of the question whether there can have been an Elamite contingent in the Assyrian army in 701. A good résumé of the historical facts bearing on the question is given, and then the conclusion: "In the light of these facts other alternatives are: (1) to understand Elam as equivalent to such few Elamite mercenaries as might serve in an Assyrian army though

Assyria and Elam were opposed to one another, or soldiers from those small portions of Elam which Sargon had temporarily annexed in 711; (2) to see in the verses the work of a later writer (cp. 11 11; 21 2); (3) with Winckler to treat the poem as a celebration of an Elamite attack, directed against the interests of Assyria, on a Babylonian town (Sippar)." With this the matter is dismissed. Gray thus concludes apparently with allowing the possibility of Winckler's view which he had just before pronounced "most improbable." No attempt is made to help the student to a decision between the various possibilities, and no explanation of the verses is given if the decision is in favor of their being late.

The examination we have made of Isa. 22 1-14 illustrates another of the defects of this commentary. Not only does the author frequently leave us in doubt about his own conception of a problem or his judgment on disputed points, but the matter is at times so ill-arranged that the reader, even when he knows just what he is looking for, often has hard work to find it. This fault belongs in some measure to all the International Critical Commentaries, and is to be ascribed to the plan of the series. It is fair to say also that the character of the Book of Isaiah and the enormous volume of literature upon it makes the problem of ordering the material an unusually difficult one. But the fact remains that in the volume before us the matter is not arranged and presented with that clearness which is one of the chief excellences of a commentary.

After so much in the way of criticism, let it be said in conclusion that Professor Gray's work has very great merits. Scholars will find in it the history of criticism and interpretation concisely but comprehensively presented, even down to last year's crop of articles and dissertations. It is solidly learned, too, and the student of the Hebrew text will find in the exegetical notes a very useful apparatus. The author is eminently fair-minded in his statement and estimate of other men's opinions. The indecisiveness which has been spoken of before is a result of the same temper; he does not want to make up his mind on insufficient evidence. It may be that judiciousness is sometimes in excess, but it is the defect of a good quality, even though on occasions an exasperating one.

*EDITORIAL NOTE*

The Editors of the *Harvard Theological Review* take pleasure in announcing that in the next volume, beginning January, 1914, a new department of current literature will be introduced, in which it will be their endeavor to bring to the attention of their readers, as promptly as possible, recent publications in the various fields of theological study and in related subjects such as the history of religions, social ethics, and religious education. The department will include signed reviews by competent hands with short descriptive and critical notices. As hitherto, important books or groups of books will be discussed at greater length in special articles, and from time to time surveys will be given of the progress of learning in particular fields. In these various ways the Editors hope to attain two ends: *first*, early and comprehensive notice of new books in their field, and, *second*, deliberate and authoritative criticism of such as are of greater interest or more permanent significance.

In connection with this enlargement of its scope, the body of the *Review* will be printed in a new and somewhat larger type, which, it is believed, will be acceptable to many of its readers.

The Reverend Frederic Palmer, D.D., Lecturer in the Harvard Divinity School, has been added to the Editorial Committee, and will serve as Managing Editor.

THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- SPIRITUAL CULTURE AND SOCIAL SERVICE.** *By Charles S. MacFarland.* pp. 222. New York: Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. cop. 1912. \$1.00 net.
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